

Races and Peoples
Contemporary
Ethnic and Racial
Problems



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Russian text edited by I. R. Grigulevich, D. Sc. (Hist.)
and S. Y. Kozlov, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)

РАСЫ И НАРОДЫ, СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ЭТНИЧЕСКИЕ
И РАСОВЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ

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INTRODUCTION

National and racial problems take up a large place in the life of mankind today. Pick up any newspaper or switch on the radio or television, and this fact will be made quite clear. Scholars in almost all countries are, naturally, giving these problems close attention. Soviet specialists are working on a very broad range of ethnic and racial problems, both theoretical and purely practical ones. The geographical setting for their work is the whole inhabited world; the historical period covered is from early man's first appearance right up to the present day. The results of these studies are published in monographs, anthologies and scientific journals. In 1971 the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Ethnography began publication of a yearbook called *Rasy i narody* (Races and Peoples), dealing specifically with ethnic and racial problems. Three issues have already appeared, arousing considerable interest both in the USSR and abroad. The present book offers the foreign reader some of the articles originally published in these yearbooks, as well as several which have appeared over the last few years in specialist journals. A number of articles were written specially for this collection.

Theoretical questions of the historical development and functioning of ethnic communities, ethnic processes in various parts of the world, relations between different nationalities, issues in race studies and the unmasking of racism and chauvinism—such is the range of problems discussed by leading Soviet scholars—ethnographers, anthropologists, historians, a philosopher, sociologist and legal expert—in the pages of this book.

In order to understand and deal with many ethnic and racial problems in a scientific way, one needs a deep theoretical comprehension of the main categories and concepts in ethnic and race studies, e.g., "race", "racial type", "ethnos", "ethnic community", "population", etc. Soviet scholars are devoting a great deal of time to the study of these categories and their historical embodiment. They are also examining the functioning of the latter in time and space. These questions are explored in this book in the contributions by the leading Soviet exponents of ethnographical and anthropological theory, Y. V. Bromley, N. N. Cheboksarov and V. P. Alexeyev. Their studies make up the first section, "Problems of Theory", of the book. Some of the conclusions and solutions proposed in these articles are open to discussion and are widely debated by Soviet ethnographers and anthropologists. Such, for example, are the highly interesting interpretation put forward by Y. V. Bromley of so fundamental a concept in ethnography as that of the "ethnos" and V. P. Alexeyev's "The Modes of Race Formation and Genetic Geography". Foreign specialists will find much to interest them in the new ideas current in Soviet ethnography and anthropology. At the same time the attentive reader cannot fail to notice the close adherence to the historical principle that underlies all the articles. The Soviet specialists show how both races (biological categories) and ethnic communities change in the course of historical development under the influence of numerous factors. This is particularly true of ethnic communities, which undergo substantial changes in close (though variously manifested) connection with the progressive changing of socio-economic formations.

Another large section of the book contains studies of ethnic processes and national problems in the world today. The foreign reader will, presumably, be especially interested

in the articles describing Soviet experience in handling national problems and ethnic processes in the USSR. In 1972 the peoples of the USSR celebrated the 50th anniversary of the founding of their state. The USSR is a multi-national state of a new kind, a living embodiment of the ideas of proletarian internationalism. Thanks to the consistent implementation of the Leninist national policy, the country has seen its national problems resolved and gigantic transformations brought about. This resulted in the all-round progress and flourishing prosperity of all the nations and nationalities living in the USSR.

"The half-century history of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Leonid Brezhnev stressed in the report on the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR, "is that of the emergence of the indissoluble unity and friendship of all the nations joined in the framework of the Soviet socialist state. It is the history of the unprecedented growth and all-round development of the state born of the socialist revolution, which is now one of the mightiest powers in the world. It is the history of the growth to manhood and attainment of true prosperity—economic, political and cultural—of all the Republics that have united under the banner of the Soviet state, of all the nations, big and small, which inhabit the country."¹

A qualitatively new historical community, the Soviet people, has formed in the country. The experience gained in resolving the national question in the USSR is of universal historic importance. It is particularly relevant to national and state construction in those developing countries which have a poly-ethnic population.

This group of articles examines the process whereby the Soviet Union was created and has since developed. Special prominence is given to ethnic aspects of the transformations and changes that have occurred, to questions of the drawing together of nations and to the general laws governing the national development of the peoples of the USSR. One special article is devoted to a sociological study of cultural interaction between the nations in the USSR today and

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1972, p. 5.

its effect on the development of each of the cultures in contact (aspects of their content and form, as well as their structure as a whole).

Taking a dialectical approach to these problems, the authors make the point that the implementation of the main principles of the Leninist national policy does not imply the total disappearance of the national question, meaning by this the question of the relations between the peoples of the multi-national USSR. National factors play a prominent part in various spheres of life in the Soviet Union, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The need for a study of ethnic processes in the USSR has recently become more pressing in view of the general acceleration of all aspects of social development in the direction of the ultimate aim of building a communist society in the USSR.

National problems in the capitalist countries and the developing countries of the Third World take on a different appearance. Today we are witnessing a worsening of the national problem in a number of Western states. There is the upsurge of the national movement in various parts of Great Britain—in Scotland, Wales and particularly in long-suffering Ulster, where for several years now England has been waging what is really a colonial war to suppress the poorest section of the population, the Irish Catholics. In Belgium there is the conflict between the Walloons and Flemings; in Spain—the national struggle of the Basques, Catalans and Galicians, a part of the general democratic anti-Francoist movement. Canada is faced by national demands from its French-speaking population, while the national struggle of various groups in the population of the USA has merged with the anti-racist struggle and is gaining momentum. Such is the reality of the national situation in the developed capitalist countries of the West, showing that, even in its political form—bourgeois democracy, capitalism is unable to solve national problems, and they flare up from time to time.

History bears out Lenin's view that a genuine solution of national problems requires far-reaching social transformations and the elimination of all forms of exploitation and inequality.

The processes of national consolidation are already more or less complete in most European countries and several other developed capitalist countries. In the developing countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania, however, nations and peoples are still being formed, and the conditions under which this is happening are very special. One of the most important factors in the development of the peoples of these areas today is the powerful national liberation struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism that has gathered momentum over the last 25 years. Its most important result has been the formation of more than 70 new independent states with a total population of more than 1,500 million people. These young states were immediately assailed by a host of ethnic problems. The countries had generally retained the political boundaries that had been established by colonial powers at the time of the imperialist carve-up of the world. When the lines were being drawn on the map, the ethnic factor had not usually been taken into account. Two features result from this: on the one hand, most of the new states are poly-ethnic, and, on the other, a single ethnos (or group of related peoples) is often spread across several neighbouring countries. This sort of situation (particularly common in Africa) impedes the development of young states and lies at the heart of various conflicts provoked and sustained by reactionary forces at home and, more often, abroad.

The setting up of independent states and the onward march of progress in various spheres of life (no matter how slow the pace of development may sometimes be) help to intensify the processes of ethnic consolidation (formation of new peoples and nations, growth of national consciousness) and national integration in the countries of the Third World. The nature, direction and pace of these processes are determined by a whole range of factors, the forms and combinations of which are highly specific to each country. They include the ethnic composition of the population, the religions practised, the presence or absence of traditional or newly established economic and cultural ties, the possession or absence of a language of inter-national intercourse, the policies and role of the state in the processes taking place, etc. Even the briefest and most summary description of ethnic problems

gives an idea of their complexity and the difficulties they present to the investigator. The standard approach or any kind of simplification have less scope here than in any other field. Any national problem needs to be analysed dialectically and objectively, with due regard for all its aspects. Ethnic separatism, for example, is a question that preoccupies many developing countries. In the conditions specific to Africa and, in particular, to a country like Nigeria, the separatist movement that led to the formation of the short-lived Republic of Biafra was undoubtedly a reactionary phenomenon. But in Asia, for example, the struggle put up by the people of East Bengal for the right to independent development and which culminated in the creation of the state of Bangladesh has been acclaimed as just by progressive world public opinion. When examining and describing ethnic questions, Soviet scholars always consider their role and place in the general process of social and economic transformation and in the struggle of the peoples for peace and progress and against all reactionary forces and tendencies.

One of the problems affecting vast numbers of people the world over is racism and racial discrimination, both closely linked with colonialism. Although exposed long ago by science and condemned by the peoples, racism is still very much alive in both the theory and the practice of many capitalist countries. At the present time racism has taken on its most savage and inhuman forms in the Republic of South Africa, where it is an official state doctrine. Millions of Africans in Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies are undergoing racist and colonialist oppression. The same applies to the indigenous population in other countries, e.g., the aborigines in Australia. Various forms of racial and national discrimination are practised on tens of millions of people in the USA—Negroes and immigrants from Mexico, Puerto Rico and countries in Asia and Africa. Racism and chauvinism permeate the theory and practice of the Israeli Zionists and the whole of their imperialist policy in the Middle East. West German neo-fascists and reactionary forces in Britain and a number of other countries are all, to varying degrees, preaching racism and attempting to put their ideas of man-hatred into effect.

That is why questions relating to the iniquities of racism always feature on the agenda at the United Nations. In a series of resolutions and decisions the UN has sharply condemned racial discrimination, declaring it to be illegal and contrary to the spirit and letter of the UN Charter. UNO proclaimed 1971 the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. The 28th session of the UN General Assembly declared 1973-1983 to be the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Under pressure from the forces of progress, racism either puts up a frantic open resistance, or it attempts more subtle ploys in pseudo-scientific, "cultural" and politically neutral guise (see the criticism of "psycho-racism", "cultural relativism" and other trends in bourgeois ethnology and sociology, which try to camouflage their racist essence, in the article by Y. P. Averkiyeva).

The struggle of the peoples and the world's broad progressive forces against all forms of racial discrimination continues to grow both in scale and intensity. It is the duty of all humanist scientists to do all they can to help in this struggle: they should constantly expose racism and prove that there are no grounds for the racialist prejudices that are often harboured, thanks to the efforts of the racists, by very large groups of people in a number of countries.

Soviet scholars have contributed significantly to the exposure of pseudo-scientific racist "theories". By revealing the close link between racism and imperialism, they have laid bare the class, social basis of racism. Soviet anthropologists took an active part in drafting the well-known UN resolutions of 1950 and 1951 on races and racial distinctions, which condemned all notions of the "superiority" of some races. They have also contributed towards UNESCO documents dealing with the biological and social aspects of racial problems.

The international scientific conference "Racism Is the Ideology of Imperialism and the Enemy of Social Progress" was held in Moscow in December 1971. The address given by the eminent Soviet scholar and public figure Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, in which he made a detailed analysis of racism as a reactionary social phenomenon, is reprinted in this book.

While condemning all types of racial and national discrimination and calling for the free development of all races and peoples, Soviet scholars also denounce all manifestations of bourgeois chauvinism and nationalism in both large and small nations and peoples, no matter what arguments are used to conceal or justify them.

The problems examined by the contributors to this book are also being tackled, to a greater or lesser extent, by scholars in other countries. Soviet specialists attentively follow the studies carried out by their foreign colleagues, and make particular use of the mass of factual material on the many peoples and countries that is to be found in their works. However, the interpretation of this material often elicits serious objections from Soviet scholars, whose methodological and theoretical positions differ from those adopted by many of their colleagues in the capitalist and developing countries. We hope, nevertheless, that the increased exchange of information will serve to foster mutual understanding and progress in science, from which all true scientists will benefit.

I. R. Grigulevich and S. Y. Kozlov

Problems of Theory

Y. V. Brombley

THE TERM "ETHNOS" AND ITS DEFINITION

The use of the Greek word "ἔθνος" in international scientific literature was for a long time limited largely to two derivative terms, namely "ethnography" and "ethnology"¹ which actually denoted the same field of knowledge.² To denote the object of ethnographic-ethnological study researchers usually employed either general "generic" terms, used in everyday speech, such as the Russian "narod", the German *das Volk*, the English "people", the French "peuple", etc., or specific terms, differentiated in meaning by reference to the stage of social development, such as the Russian *natsiya*, *narodnost* and *plemya*. However, in recent times

¹ These terms had already gained currency in the middle of the 19th century.

² Sometimes West European authors regard ethnography as a descriptive subject and ethnology as a theoretical subject. However, this distinction is of a somewhat relative character. In the USSR the term *ethnology* has failed to gain currency, while the term *ethnography* has united both descriptive and theoretical studies of the peoples of the world.

the word "ethnos", together with cognate "specific" terms, necessarily including the adjective "ethnic" (e. g. *etnicheskaya obshchnost*, *etnicheskiye protsessy*), has been increasingly used to denote the entire complex of such communities.

The works of P. I. Kushner, written at the turn of the 1950s,³ contributed substantially to the introduction of these terms into scientific literature written in Russian and first of all into ethnographic literature.⁴ Preparatory work for the multi-volume series *Peoples of the World* did much to promote the wide use of the terms "ethnos" and "ethnic community" (*etnicheskaya obshchnost*). Preparation of this series made imperative the use of terms which denoted in generalised form the variety of the world's ethnic structures.⁵ The growing interest of Soviet ethnographers in problems of ethnogenesis and ethnic history and in present-day ethnic processes in particular has also exercised its influence on elaborating the terminology. As a result, a series of special articles appeared, devoted to the terms "ethnic community" and "ethnos" and their typology.⁶

In our opinion, the introduction of the term "ethnos" and its derivatives into scientific usage to denote the category

³ P. I. Kushner, "National Self-Consciousness As an Ethnic Determinant", *Brief Reports of the Institute of Ethnography*, No. 8, 1949; P. I. Kushner, *Ethnic Territories and Ethnic Boundaries*, Moscow, 1951, p. 6 (both in Russian).

⁴ One of the first Russian works specially devoted to ethnos was written by S. M. Shirokogorov and published in Shanghai as far back as 1923 (S. M. Shirokogorov, *Ethnos*, Shanghai, 1923). However, the term ethnos had been introduced into ethnographic literature in the Russian language much earlier.

⁵ Between 1956 and 1966, 13 volumes (18 books) of this series appeared, covering all the peoples of the world.

⁶ S. A. Tokarev, "The Problem of Ethnic Community Types", *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 11, 1964; V. I. Kozlov, "On the Concept of Ethnic Community", *Sovetskaya etnografiya* (henceforth *SE*), No. 2, 1967. L. P. Lashchuk, "On the Forms of Pre-National Ethnic Ties", *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 4, 1967; N. N. Cheboksarov, "Problems of the Typology of Ethnic Communities in the Works of Soviet Specialists", *SE*, No. 4, 1967; L. N. Gumilev, "On the Term 'Ethnos'", *Reports from Departments and Commissions of the Geographical Society of the USSR*, Leningrad, 1967, issue 3; L. P. Lashchuk, "Attempts to Typologise Ethnic Communities among the Medieval Turks and Mongols", *SE*, No. 1, 1968; G. V. Shelepov, "Common Origin—A Sign of Ethnic Community", *SE*, No. 4, 1968; L. V. Khomich, "On the Meaning of the Concept of 'Ethnic Processes'", *SE*, No. 5, 1969, etc.

of human communities in question is fully justified, even if only because its conventional name is polysemantic in most European languages. It is true that our philosophical literature often uses the "generic" term "historical community". However, the latter conveys a much broader sense than the category we are concerned with. Therefore in practice the term does not help us to distinguish this community from numerous other varieties of historically-formed social communities, such as the state, the clan, the family, etc. At the same time the prospect of international unification of the main nomenclature used in ethnographic-ethnological research favours the use of specialised "ethnic" terminology. This in turn, it is hoped, will help bring the ideas about the subject of such researches closer together.

However, a number of new difficulties has arisen because of the introduction of specialised terms. This is primarily due to the fact that the terms themselves have not been used consistently. In most cases the terms "ethnic community" and "ethnos" have been used to simply mean "people". In such instances "all kinds of ethnic communities—nations, nationalities, tribes (or groups of related tribes)" are usually meant.⁷ The view is occasionally expressed that the term "ethnic community" should be used to denote pre-nation formations only. However, since in everyday Russian usage the word *narod* (people) also covers the concept of nation, the substitution of the term "ethnos" for the term *narod* inevitably means classifying the nation among the ethnic communities. It should be noted that the term "ethnic community" is interpreted as a broader concept than the term "ethnos" or "people".⁸ This interpretation proceeds from the idea of ethnic communities existing at different taxo-

⁷ S. I. Bruk and N. N. Cheboksarov, "The Modern Stage of the Development of Asian and African Peoples", *SE*, No. 4, 1961, p. 76. Also: *The Numbers and Distribution of the World's Peoples*, Moscow, 1962, p. 29 (in Russian); S. A. Tokarev, op. cit., p. 43; V. I. Kozlov, "On the Concept of Ethnic Community", *SE*, No. 2, 1967, pp. 117-18.

⁸ M. G. Levin and N. N. Cheboksarov, "General Information (Languages, Races and Peoples)", *Essays in General Ethnography. Australia and Oceania, America, Africa*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 10-11 (in Russian); N. N. Cheboksarov, *Problems of the Origin of Ancient and Modern Peoples*, Moscow, 1964, p. 5, and "Problems of the Typology...", *SE*, No. 4, 1967, p. 100.

nomic levels and orders. Ethnoi, or peoples, are "assumed to be the basic units in the ethnic classification of mankind, in addition to which it is possible to single out ethnic communities that are of a taxonomically higher or lower order".⁹ Ethnolinguistic communities belong to one level, ethnoi, or peoples, belong to another, and so-called ethnographic groups belong to still another level. One and the same community of people may be a component part of several ethnic communities of different taxonomical levels forming thereby a peculiar sort of hierarchy.

It is quite obvious, however, that the amplitude of semantic divergences in these cases is much smaller than in the case of the common usage of the word *narod*. This fact once again points to the advisability of having a specialised "ethnic" terminology. In our view, however, a necessary prior condition to its introduction is to establish the common characteristics that make it possible to unite in one category all the communities that existed and continue to exist, beginning with the early tribes and ending with the nations of today. In other words, the problem is to establish their most typical, intrinsic features, i.e., the essence of ethnos (people).

In solving this problem it would obviously be wrong to completely ignore the concepts of an earlier coinage, both in respect to the term "ethnos" and to other terms denoting various kinds of ethnic communities. But in that event the question will inevitably arise: how can one incorporate all the different ideas? Obviously, a simple mechanical enumeration of existing definitions would hardly be effective, because such enumeration by itself would not produce the criteria for giving preference to one definition or another. In our view, it would be far more practical and important to establish beforehand some of the common and most characteristic features of the existing ideas about ethnos and ethnic communities. Such an approach may provide some starting points in judging the specific character of the phenomenon in question.

A more general starting point would, perhaps, be the idea of the ethnos as a community of people, characterised

⁹ N. N. Cheboksarov, "Problems of the Typology...", p. 96.

by certain peculiar features. In this case a comparison of one community of people with other similar communities in the form of the "we-they" antithesis is inevitable. The notion itself (including the common usage) about the existence of a special category of human communities, to be called "ethnic" (irrespective of the words used to denote them—people, ethnos, nationality, nation, etc.), largely stems from the comparison of one community with another. It is true that the opinion has been expressed that the question of distinguishing one ethnos from another is of secondary importance in establishing the essence and specificity of ethnic communities. However, this view overlooks the fact that it is precisely this contrasting of one's own community with another that helps to determine and consolidate one's ethnic distinctions and thus to bind the community together. Unless an ethnic community is distinguished from other similar communities, it is a fiction.¹⁰ Of course, the very unity of the external distinctive features of an ethnos is an indication of its definite internal integrity. But the fundamental feature of ethnic communities which distinguishes them from other human communities, is exactly that they all possess a characteristic of considerable typological significance—namely mutual distinction.¹¹

This in turn determines the fact that a typical property of the differentiating features of an ethnos is their distinct external manifestation. These features are established from data obtained through direct observation, conducted through personal contact with people belonging to different ethnic communities.

However, by no means all communities characterised by the outwardly distinct "we-they" opposition can be regarded

¹⁰ B. F. Porshnev, *Social Psychology and History*, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

¹¹ Two qualitatively different types of historical typology are known to exist. One of these performs the function of generalisation by abstracting itself from the directly given space-time conditions for the existence of objects of historical research, whereas the other establishes the commonness and oneness of phenomena within a definite space-time continuum (E. S. Markaryan, *Outlines of the Theory of Culture*, Yerevan, 1969, p. 110). Quite obviously, it is the second type of historical typology that has a direct bearing on the case in point and specifically the variant for which the existence of definite distinctions between the objects of typology is the main criterion.

as ethnic communities. Cases of temporary, though obvious, opposition of groups of people have nothing to do with the above (e.g., sports teams wearing different colours). According to the current conception of an ethnos, considerable stability is regarded as one of its characteristic features.¹² And this conception refers not only to an ethnos as a whole, but also to its basic differential features.

Thus, among the numerous features characteristic of different communities of people, those that are distinct and endowed with stability should be included among primary ethnic features.

But this general definition does not dispense with the need to specify the spheres in which these features manifest themselves most clearly. Although the above general criteria are implied to one degree or another in all the existing definitions of an ethnos, this has not ruled out marked differences between them in the concrete formulation of ethnic features. Thus, some researchers regard language and culture as fundamental features of this kind;¹³ others add to these territory and ethnic self-consciousness;¹⁴ still others include in addition the peculiarities of psychological make-up;¹⁵ a fourth group—common origin and state affiliation;¹⁶ and a fifth group sees the essence of the ethnos only in specific psychological stereotypes.¹⁷

What is the origin of this difference of opinion? In our view, it is largely the fact that both the essential and secondary features of the ethnos are closely interconnected. Hence the difficulty in establishing its essence—the fundamental intrinsic features—and distinguishing them from the secondary features.

The primary object of a scientific analysis of ethnos is precisely to establish its essential features, for "all science

¹² It is significant that ethnoi (peoples), as a rule, survive several socio-economic formations.

¹³ P. I. Kushner, *Ethnic Territories and Ethnic Boundaries*, p. 6.

¹⁴ N. N. Cheboksarov, "Problems of the Typology...", *SE*, No. 4, 1967, p. 5.

¹⁵ V. I. Kozlov, "On the Concept of Ethnic Community", *SE*, No. 2, 1967, p. 26.

¹⁶ S. A. Tokarev, *op. cit.*, p. 44; G. V. Shelepov, "Common Origin—A Sign of Ethnic Community", pp. 65-73.

¹⁷ See L. N. Gumilev, *op. cit.*

would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided".¹⁸

To solve this kind of problem in natural science, the researcher usually conducts special experiments, in the course of which he places the system under investigation in unusual conditions, in order to get an insight into its essence. In the case of the social sciences the possibilities for conducting mass experiments are rather limited. Some of the social sciences, history for instance, are almost totally deprived of such possibilities. In their case experiment is replaced by the socio-historical experience of mankind. Therefore, to solve our problem, we must turn to socio-historical experience with the object of establishing those of its "experiments" in which ethnic systems happened to be placed in conditions that considerably deviated from the normal ones, and caused the separation of the main features from the secondary ones. In our opinion, mankind has conducted a large number of "experiments" of this kind in the course of its existence. The different forms of migration are a case in point.

It is generally known that when groups of people settle in a new place not only they, but also their descendants preserve to a greater or lesser degree their original distinctive, i.e., ethnic, features.¹⁹ In our view it is the sum of these features, characterised by particular stability, that forms the essence of an ethnic community—ethnos in the narrow sense of the word. The features and elements of an ethnic community which are lost through migration should, consequently, be regarded as features of secondary importance. These represent, as it were, the outer shell of the ethnic nucleus. Therefore, a necessary preliminary for isolating the nucleus of an ethnos is the removal of its shell.

When tackling this problem, however, account should be taken of the various "splitting" effects that different forms of migration may have on an ethnos.

In a generalised form the different kinds of migration may

¹⁸ See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Vol. 25, Part 2, p. 384 (in Russian).

¹⁹ This circumstance should not be absolutised. Moreover, to ignore the fact that changing historical conditions, though gradually, inevitably transform ethnic features may create the illusion that these features are immutable.

be reduced to two fundamental types. In some cases there are migrations of large groups of people or even of whole peoples. A typical case in point is the Great Migration of Peoples, including the incursion of nomads into the European plains, which resulted in the settlement of some of their groups there (such as the Proto-Bulgars and Hungarians). Usually the consequence of such migrations for ethnic communities was the loss of their traditional natural environment and much of their cultivated landscape, although this, as a rule, was as yet poorly developed.

Another form of migration can be described as micromigration, i.e., migration of relatively small groups—individual families in most cases. This form sometimes occurs within the framework of mass migration, which in this case is a gradual process, extending over a rather long period of time.²⁰ Today micromigration is the main form of resettlement. It should be pointed out that such migrations on one scale or another have occurred throughout the history of mankind from the time of the peopling of the Ecumene. This is of particular interest to us because it is precisely micromigration that produces the greatest "splitting" effect on an ethnic system. In addition to the biosphere and cultivated landscape, micromigration usually removes a large part of the elements of material culture and brings with it a complete change in economic ties and often major social changes too. In short, a study of ethnic systems through the prism of micromigrations shows that fundamental ethnic features are really the inherent characteristics of their individual bearers. That is why an ethnic community, or a part of it, will preserve its typical features for many generations, even though it may have been torn away from its traditional socio-historical and natural environment. However, it would be incorrect to conclude from this (as is sometimes done) that ethnic features are eternal, that they do not depend on the environment. In reality it is the other way round. But this is a different question, and we shall deal with it later. What is important here is the fact that people who have found themselves in new conditions of existence reproduce in themselves some of their traditional ethnic features. This

²⁰ The settlement of Russians in Siberia is a good example.

fact strikingly testifies to the relatively "persistent" character of such features in people.

What kind of features are these? We have established that they must be stable and externally explicit and that they must also play a differentiating role. It would appear that these requirements are fully met by the external physical features of people, i.e., racial characteristics, such as colour of the skin, hair and eyes, type of hair, facial features, height, shape of the skull, etc. It is significant that in everyday life these external, visual, stable and differentiating features often serve as a point of departure in deciding the question of the ethnic affiliation of an individual or a group of people.

Some Soviet ethnographers have recently advanced the opinion that most peoples of the world are characterised by a relatively homogeneous racial composition.²¹ Soviet physical anthropologists hold a contrary view, namely, that the physical type of separate ethnical communities is not, as a rule, of a homogeneous character; accordingly, it is essential to strictly distinguish between races and ethnic communities.²²

These diametrically opposite views stem from the fact that they proceed from anthropological units of different taxonomic levels. What is meant mainly in the former case is the major races (and only sometimes the so-called small races), and in the latter case—the so-called anthropological type—the smallest classification unit. The layman will hardly notice the distinctions between close anthropological types. He therefore generally regards ethnic communities as an integral physical-anthropological unit. But despite the fact that in everyday life it is the layman who determines the ethnic "we-they" opposition, racial distinctions in most cases are not essential ethnic features. And not so much because there are no "pure", racially unmixed ethnoi, but rather because there are no clear-cut physical-anthropological bound-

²¹ See V. I. Kozlov, *The Dynamics of Population Size*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 51-52, and "On the Concept of Ethnic Community", *SE*, No. 2, 1967, p. 110 (both in Russian).

²² In this case reference is made to the fact that northern Italians are taller, more brachycephalic than southern Italians; that their hair is lighter; that northern Frenchmen are taller, and their hair fairer, than that of the southern Frenchmen (Y. Y. Roginsky and M. G. Levin, *Anthropology*, Moscow, 1963, p. 321, in Russian).

aries between adjacent ethnic communities belonging to one of the major races. Such affiliation is quite typical of neighbouring ethnic communities, for each major race has vast areas in which it prevails. That is why the attempts to establish the ethnic origin of people on the basis of external anthropological distinctions alone, so often made in day-to-day life, are usually of a very approximate nature. This also explains why cases when racial distinctions are used as the basic ethnic determinant are so exceptional. Such cases refer only to ethnoi surrounded by neighbours belonging to other big or small races.²³ Such ethnoi are known as "isolates" who have been surrounded by peoples of a different racial type.²⁴ It would seem that physical-anthropological characteristics are used just as frequently as one of the main ethnic features alongside language, for instance.²⁵ Physical-anthropological characteristics play an important, though obviously secondary, role in distinguishing between ethnic communities that differ sharply from some (one, two or more), though not all, of the adjacent communities (this occurring mainly on the boundaries of the main areas of habitation of the major races).²⁶

²³ It is true that such a situation may arise as a result of the migration of a part of the ethnos in question, or its individual members, to a different racial surrounding. For instance, it is easy to distinguish a Russian from a Buryat beyond Lake Baikal, or an Englishman from a Kaffir in South Africa, on the basis of their racial distinctions (G. F. Debets, "Races, Languages and Cultures", *Science of Races and Racism*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1938, p. 147, in Russian). However, such distinctions are hardly characteristic of the aspect we are interested in, for they cannot be applied to an ethnos as a whole (to the Russians and the English in this particular case).

²⁴ Thus, all the Negritos of Southeast Asia (the Andamans, Semangs and Aetas) have, thanks to prolonged isolation that protected them against mixing with other peoples, developed into stable ethnic communities.

²⁵ P. I. Puchkov, "On an Analysis of the Ethnic Situation in the Oceania", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 10, 1968, p. 93.

²⁶ In considering the role of physical-anthropological distinctions in ethnic differentiation, we cannot ignore one rather widespread prejudice. According to this prejudice, recognition of the fact that these distinctions sometimes play a certain role in ethnic division opens the door to racism. However, what is clearly overlooked here is that racism arises from the idea of the inequality of races and not from recognition of racial distinctions (whose existence is beyond dispute).

In most cases when ethnic communities, though not identical (at the level of anthropological types), are nevertheless relatively homogeneous racially (at the level of major and minor races),²⁷ physical-anthropological distinctions play a differentiating role only if one or more such communities are compared with ethnic units belonging to other races which are territorially rather remote. In other words, we are here referring to situations that are by no means typical. That is why racial characteristics, though plainly apparent, cannot generally serve as a sufficient basis for distinguishing ethnic communities.

Among the traits characterising human beings the group features of their activity are of far greater importance than their physical traits in establishing ethnic identity or ethnic division. Activity is the fundamental characteristic of human beings. To live, man must first of all engage in practical work. Pointing out that the essential characteristic of people is that they are doers and subjects of the historical process, Lenin wrote: "...All history is made up of the actions of individuals, who are undoubtedly active figures."²⁸ Human activity is extremely multi-faceted. It is not limited merely to work for the production of material values, although the latter is the leading form of human activity. For instance, art and the other aesthetic activities of society are highly specific. Speech (both oral and written) undoubtedly represents a special form of activity. Besides external activities, human activity also include complex "internal" psychological processes.

The sum total of activities specific to human beings (i.e., non-biological activities) makes up culture in the broadest

²⁷ At the same time it would be incorrect to maintain that racial unity is the hallmark of any ethnic community, including the nation. For instance, Carlos A. Echanove Trujillo, a Mexican sociologist, writes that "a nation is a community of people united by common basic features, such as race, language, tradition, customs and trends" (Carlos A. Echanove Trujillo, *Sociología Mexicana*, Mexico, 1948). However, it is obvious that this formula, if adopted even for big races, inevitably excludes from the list of nations all the ethnic communities that are not homogeneous in this respect, for example, the North Americans, Cubans, Mexicans, etc.

²⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 159.

sense of the word,²⁹ i.e., everything that is created by mankind, as distinct from the things created by nature.³⁰ Culture includes the activity of people as expressed in their actions and deeds, and not only materialised labour.

The total culture in this sense is usually subdivided into material and spiritual culture.³¹ Material culture is, on the one hand, the objects that satisfy "material" needs (tools, household implements, accommodation, clothing, means of communication and transport, etc.) and, on the other hand, people's habits of work and social practices, the social organisation of labour and the forms that that organisation takes, and the organisation of life in general.

The concept of "spiritual culture" is extremely broad. It is generally defined as "the totality of a society's moral, artistic, scientific and philosophical attainments". It is also pointed out that a society's spiritual life includes such things as language, speech and thought (logic), rules of conduct and what might be termed "emotional culture".

It should be noted that special prominence is given to the "organisational" aspect of culture, i.e., its role as a comprehensive means of organising the most varied types of human

²⁹ The term "culture" is extremely polysemantic. It has many meanings not only in everyday usage, but also in different sciences, including philosophy, which use it with different implications.

³⁰ G. Frantsev, "Culture", *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1964, p. 118; Y. Shchepansky, *Elementary Concepts of Sociology*, Moscow, 1969, p. 39; E. S. Markaryan, op. cit., p. 61 and ff; A. A. Zvorykin, "The Definition of Culture and the Place of Material Culture Within General Culture", *Publications of the Seventh International Congress of Anthropology and Ethnography of Peoples*, Vol. 4, Moscow, 1967, p. 117 (all in Russian).

³¹ In fact this division is largely arbitrary, since every cultural element has its "material" and "spiritual", "objective" and "subjective" aspects. Thus, in order to become a cultural element, an idea must necessarily be given symbolic, i.e., materially objectivised, expression. On the other hand, a material object that is the product of a culture is "spiritual in the sense that its creation embodies an idea that expresses its functional purpose" (E. S. Markaryan, op. cit., p. 86, Note 38).

activity, co-ordinating them and giving them purpose.³² Whether a community performs its basic functions (especially production) efficiently or not depends entirely on the degree of cohesion and integration that it possesses. Consequently, men have always sought to maintain society as an integrated whole. But specific means of integration were required for this purpose, so that a human community might perform just as efficiently the functions which an insect community carries out through the instinct mechanism. These means are provided by the area of culture that incorporates the system of values, beliefs and ideals, i.e., the standards of accepted behaviour.³³ Of particular importance here is that part of culture which may be termed "symbolic" (the sign system), especially language. Acting as instruments of abstractive cognition, sign ("symbolic") systems at the same time make it possible to convert individual experience into social experience and make it available to individuals.³⁴

It is necessary to distinguish between the personal culture of an individual and the culture of the community. The former functions within the framework of the latter. However, every society grants the individual a certain degree of freedom to be original, or to deviate from the generally accepted patterns. The culture of a community is not merely the sum of the individual cultures of its members. "It is the sum of the creative work, values and patterns of behaviour, accepted and recognised by the community, which have acquired meaning for its members, determining those forms of behaviour regarded as 'obligatory', e.g., the rules of propriety, principles of social relations within a community, etc."³⁵

The phenomenon of a common culture is a vital condition for the performance of ethnic functions by culture, for if the culture of an individual bears no relation to that of the entire ethnos, it cannot be regarded as a distinctive feature of it. But a common culture is above all the "sum of living,

³² Ibid., pp. 76-77.

³³ Ibid., p. 80.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 87.

³⁵ Y. Shchepansky, op. cit., p. 45 (in Russian).

current and functioning works and models",³⁶ including those that have just emerged or have emerged in the not too distant past. However, as we have already noted, ethnic features must be characterised by stability. Therefore, they should be sought first of all in those spheres of culture which are characterised by continuity. These features are inherent in that part of a common culture which is passed on from one generation to another³⁷ and which is known as traditional culture. However, the stability of the traditional components of culture is not sufficient by itself to allow these components to perform ethnic functions, for the traditional culture may include not only ethnically relevant elements, but also national, international and universal elements.

In short, cultural components may only be called ethnic if they are not only traditional and meaningful to every member of a given ethnos, but are also specific to, and distinctive of, it. They must also be clearly visible. In most cases these features are seen in such spheres as language, material culture, folk art, folk-lore, customs and rites, etc. It is not surprising that ethnic features are generally found in these spheres. We shall examine some of them below. It is the reproduction of such components of culture that helps the migrants to preserve their traditional ethnic features in their new habitat. However, the process of reproduction itself calls for an explanation. Here we inevitably turn to human psychology and to social consciousness, for "everything that sets men acting must find its way through their brains."³⁸

Unless account is taken of some of the qualities of human psychology in the broad meaning of the word, it will not be possible to establish the mechanism that makes for stable

³⁶ Y. Schepansky, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

³⁷ See V. V. Pimenov, "Certain Regularities in the Development of Culture", *SE*, No. 2, 1967, pp. 3-14; T. A. Koleva, "About some Aspects of the Development of Customs (on Data from Bulgaria)", *SE*, No. 1, 1969, pp. 68-78; E. A. Baller, *Continuity in the Development of Culture*, Moscow, 1969 (in Russian).

³⁸ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1970, Vol. 3, p. 352. As Lenin puts it, "man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 212).

common features in the activity and behaviour of members of separate ethnic collectives and ensures their transmission from one generation to another.

The basis of this mechanism is formed by the relatively stable components of the human psyche—the psychic stereotypes. These are, on the one hand, the "dynamic" stereotypes, which are responsible for the automatic elements of human behaviour (habits), and, on the other hand, the "value" stereotypes, which in the form of "concepts", "knowledge", "skills" and "standards of behaviour" constitute social consciousness.³⁹ However, it is important to note that the formation of such psychic properties in man displays certain specific features. Man's cultural achievements and his social and historical experience are not, of course, passed on genetically. This experience is transmitted from one human generation to the next through learning and imitation, i.e., through the "socialisation of the individual". In man, as distinct from animals, the main instrument for transmitting experience is the social medium of language.

In short, the stable psychic stereotypes, far from being an immanent property of the human mind, are themselves the products of certain external conditions, mainly social and historical. The fact that traditional psychic stereotypes continue to function even when the conditions have changed through migration does not prove that they are completely independent of these conditions; it merely shows that they are subject to inertia.

But no matter how great the role of the dynamic stereotypes and "value" stereotypes in the reproduction of individual elements of ethnic features (e.g., customs, rites, practices, habits, etc.), nevertheless, the psychic reality of the ethnic specificity of culture is by no means limited to them. One must also take into account the effect of the special complex psychic formations into which the intellectual, volitional and emotional properties of the psyche are synthesised. In the final analysis it is the totality of such formations, which have been shaped by history and which are

³⁹ See A. N. Leont'ev, *Problems of Psychic Development*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 287-89 (in Russian).

usually referred to as the psychological make-up,⁴⁰ that determines several of the most general features of the behaviour and activities of the members of an ethnos and, consequently, of its culture too. Sometimes even the "simplest" psychic properties, e.g., perception, take on an ethnic colouring.⁴¹

Moreover, one often hears complaints about the elusiveness of the ethnic functions of both the psychological make-up as a whole and other components of the psyche of ethnic communities. However, this is to lose track of the fact that ethnic differences are usually clearly marked, while the underlying psychological distinctions are hidden from the view of the direct observer. Consequently, indirect evidence must be used in assessing these distinctions.

It must also be borne in mind that such evidence should not be confined to fixed material forms of culture. As mentioned earlier, they include actions and deeds.⁴² They may also express ethnic differences in cases where they form only an "intermediate" stage on the way to creating cultural values. In fact, there is a broad array of possibilities for stable ethnic peculiarities to manifest themselves indirectly.

If their existence is sometimes doubted, this results, among other things, from the curious reaction to the incli-

⁴⁰ Like other psychic stereotypes, the psychological make-up of a certain social group takes shape in the course of history and under the action of external conditions.

⁴¹ We would even say that there is reason to think that "every people, living as it does in more or less unique conditions, particularly natural conditions, evolves an individual dynamic stereotype of artistic vision and transmission of reality". This perception "expresses some individual natural features and also features of the economic, political and cultural (including atheist or religious) development of a given nation" (S. T. Kaltaklichan, *Leninism on the Essence of a Nation and the Formation of an International Community of Peoples*, Moscow, 1969, p. 161, in Russian).

⁴² A vivid illustration of ethnic distinctions here is provided by the differences in folk dances, so brilliantly described by Nikolai Gogol: "The Spaniard does not dance like the Swiss, the Scot or the German of Teigns, nor the Russian like the Frenchman or Asiatic. Dances differ even in the provinces of one and the same state. A Russian from the North will not dance like a Ukrainian, a South Slav, a Pole or a Frenchman; one has a dance that speaks, another's dance is devoid of feeling; one dances in a loud frenzy, another calmly; one is effortful and heavy, another light and smooth."

nation of the everyday consciousness to absolutise individual features of the psychological make-up of ethnic communities, especially its basic component—the personality.⁴³ There is usually no justification for trying to absolutise in this way. Most of the determining personality traits, e.g., industriousness, patriotism, courage and purposefulness, are, after all, common to all mankind. Consequently, it cannot be a question of one ethnic community's having the monopoly of a particular trait, but simply of distinctions between the various peoples in the degree to which it is possessed and the forms it takes. A quality like industriousness, for example, is far from being equally apparent in the various peoples owing to specific features of their socio-economic, geographical and other conditions of life.⁴⁴ But it is by no means easy to place a yardstick against all the nuances involved in such distinctions and give an accurate description of them. Moreover, it is very important to remember that such descriptions are invariably influenced by the fact that we perceive and evaluate the behaviour and way of life of another people through the prism of the cultural traditions and values of our own ethnic group.

In other words, identifying distinctive features in the characters of individual ethnic communities is fraught with difficulty. But this is no reason for denying that such features exist. Like the other distinctive features of the psychological make-up of every people, they are clearly displayed in the uniqueness of its traditional culture, which includes its pursuits and behaviour.⁴⁵ All that has to

⁴³ The tendency to absolutise in this way occasionally finds its way into scientific works when the attempt is made to detect in a people traits of character that are peculiar to it alone (see: T. Y. Burmistrova, "Some Aspects of the Theory of the Nation", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 12, 1966, pp. 106-07).

⁴⁴ See: V. N. Razov, "Concerning Certain Elements in National Psychology", *Proceedings of Moscow University. Philosophy*, No. 2, 1967, p. 72 (in Russian).

⁴⁵ It would obviously be inaccurate not only to substitute a people's culture for its psychological make-up, but also to consider that all its ethnic peculiarities are predetermined by its psyche. It should be borne in mind that not all psychological activity is objectivised in men's outwardly expressed acts. At the same time, objects of material culture often reflect to a greater or lesser extent the features of the materials used to produce them.

be done is to perfect the study of the interdependence between the cultural features and the characteristic features of the psychological make-up of the members of different ethnoi.

A peculiar but, at the same time, essential distinctive ethnic feature is ethnic consciousness, i.e., the awareness by members of a given ethnos of their affinity to it, this awareness being based on their opposition to other ethnoi and manifested first of all by a common ethnonym. A vital component of ethnic consciousness is the idea of a common origin. A common historical fate shared by the members of the ethnos and their ancestors throughout its existence forms the real basis of this common origin.⁴⁶ That consciousness is a fundamental feature characterising an ethnic community is particularly evident from the fact that re-settlers lose it only after a long period of time. In practice an ethnos exists as long as its members preserve the idea of their affiliation to it.

Finally, an essential feature of the ethnos, which, in effect, has until recently been left out of account by researchers, is endogamy⁴⁷ in the literal sense of the word. This means that couples mainly marry within their own community.⁴⁸ That endogamy was characteristic of the basic ethnic units of primitive communal society—the tribes—has long been generally recognised.⁴⁹ However, it appears that the overwhelming majority of modern ethnic communities—nations—observe endogamy to a similar extent: usually more than 90 per cent of their members enter into ethnically homogeneous marriages. The significance of endogamy as a sort of "stabiliser" of the ethnos lies in the special role

⁴⁶ But not a common origin itself. The mixed racial composition of most ethnoi contradicts this.

⁴⁷ See: Y. V. Bromley, "Ethnos and Endogamy", *SE*, No. 6, 1969, and also the discussion of this article in *SE*, No. 3, 1970.

⁴⁸ In its narrow specific interpretation endogamy is a custom which forbids marriage outside the given social group.

⁴⁹ A special survey has shown that among the Australian aborigines marriages concluded with other tribes averaged 15 per cent. In big modern ethnic communities, such as the Russians and Byelorussians, mixed marriages between different nationals did not account for more than 10 per cent of the total number of marriages in the area of main habitation (data of 1925).

played by the family in most societies in transmitting cultural information. Endogamy helps to preserve the ethnic homogeneity of most of the units making up the ethnos, thus ensuring the inheritance of traditional culture from one generation by another. At the same time marriage within an endogamous circle inevitably furthers cultural uniformity.

Various factors contribute to endogamous boundaries, including natural and socio-political barriers (language, state frontiers, etc.) and individual components of social consciousness (such as religion and ethnic consciousness). As scientific and technological progress makes headway, accompanied by improvements in the means of communications, natural factors recede more and more into the background.

The boundaries of endogamy form a sort of genetic barrier for the ethnos concerned. As a result, such a genetic unit as population⁵⁰ becomes linked with the ethnos. In drawing attention to this circumstance it should be stressed that it would be incorrect to regard population as the essence and primary basis of the ethnos.⁵¹ On the contrary, an ethnos performs the functions of population only thanks to endogamy which, as we have just seen, is itself derived from many factors, often mainly social and ideological.

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that none of the elements of the ethnoi (such as language, customs, religion, etc.) can be regarded as indispensable differentiating ethnic features. This is sometimes used as a reason for ignoring these elements as expressions of the essence of the ethnos.⁵² Moreover, supporters of this view overlook the fact that the ethnos is not a mere sum of "features" and "common characteristics", but an integral system which is conscious of its integrity. For instance, if language and ethnos, linguistic and ethnic division were always to coincide,

⁵⁰ The term "population" is used in a number of different ways. Here it refers to genetic units, i. e. relatively exclusive groups, within which the crossing of individuals occurs more frequently than outside.

⁵¹ See: L. N. Gumilev, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

distinguishing between these terms would seem to be pointless.

At the same time it should be stressed that ethnoi are dynamic systems which have taken shape in the course of history. No ethnos is either eternal or immutable. But this, of course, does not in the least contradict the fact that stability is a characteristic feature of an ethnos, as we have noted more than once. What is meant here is a relative stability, changes occurring in ethnic phenomena at a rate which is slower than that in other components of social life. Now if we compare ethnic changes with the biological changes taking place in populations linked with ethnoi, we see that the ethnic processes occur at a much higher rate.

Thus, an ethnos in the narrow sense of the word and in its most general form may be defined as a historically established community of people, characterised by common, relatively stable cultural features, certain distinctive psychological traits and also by an awareness of their identity and distinctness from other similar communities.

In Russian the term *natsionalnost* (nationality), as applied to class society, is somewhat similar in meaning to the term "ethnos" when it is used to denote a people as distinguished from other peoples.⁵³ In this case the meaning implied in *natsionalnost* is much narrower than that of *natsiya* (nation).⁵⁴ This terminological distinction⁵⁵ undoubtedly helps to differentiate between close, though not identical, phenomena. Similarly, it is advisable to make a terminological distinction between the narrow and broad meanings of the term "ethnos". The former will be expressed by the

⁵³ The term *natsionalnost* in modern Russian is used, in addition to the above meaning, to denote the fact that a person belongs to a definite people (nation); besides, the adjective formed from it is used in the sense of "state" since it was borrowed from the West European languages through direct translation, e.g., "national income", "national armed forces", etc.

⁵⁴ See S. I. Kaltakchan, op. cit., p. 89.

⁵⁵ It should be pointed out that in the context of stages in social development the term *natsionalnost* has a broader range of meanings covering not only capitalist and socialist nations, but also peoples of pre-capitalist class formations.

word "ethnikos" ("εθνικός"), a derivative of "εθνός". We should not forget, however, that an ethnikos is by no means an isolated phenomenon. It is closely connected with its environment, made up of both social and natural factors which manifest themselves as necessary conditions governing the origin and existence of that ethnikos.

Assessing the role played by these factors in the origin of the ethnos in general, and the ethnikos in particular, is a special, complicated problem. It has several separate facets, of which the most important are the geographical, economic and state-political aspects. Each of these may be the subject of specialised research. We shall, therefore, in this connection confine ourselves to warning against a typical mistake that often occurs under such circumstances: confusing the conditions of origin of ethnic systems with their main components. The point is that factors that have played an important part in giving rise to one or another phenomenon afterwards usually retain their significance only as auxiliary forms.⁵⁶

At the same time it is necessary to take account of the fact that an ethnos, in the narrow sense of the word, i.e., an ethnikos, does not have just a one-way relationship with its environment, but interacts with it. Owing to their close interconnection an ethnikos and its environment constitute a complex formation of a peculiar kind. In addition to the ethnikos, two main spheres manifest themselves distinctly. The first could be called the "internal" sphere. It consists of all the "non-ethnic" social phenomena that are linked with an ethnikos. The natural environment may in turn be regarded as an "external" sphere.

An ethnikos is in effect a social phenomenon. As such it is particularly closely connected, in a two-way relationship, with its "internal" sphere, by which it is, in the final analysis, conditioned.

Generally speaking, it should not be forgotten that although ethnic characteristics proper may be divorced from other social phenomena, both in the layman's mind and in some theoretical propositions, in objective reality ethnos

⁵⁶ A. V. Gulyga, "Concept and Image in Historical Science", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9, 1965, p. 7.

cannot exist outside social institutions of all levels, from the family to the state.

The way in which ethnic features proper are combined with social (in the narrow sense of the word) features depends to a certain degree on the space parameters of the ethnikos. What is meant is the homogeneous and heterogeneous (dispersed) distribution of the bearers of ethnic qualities within a given territory. For example, in the USSR practically all the nationalities within their own republics (with few exceptions) are modern homogeneous ethnic formations. The people who do not belong to the indigenous population of the given republic and do not form compact groups there can be regarded as heterogeneous formations. However, no phenomenon exists in a pure form. Every homogeneous ethnic formation (at least every modern one) has alien ethnic inclusions which may be big or small. More than that, there exist so-called homo-geo-heterogeneous ethnic formations. They occur when one territorial unit is inhabited simultaneously by members of different ethnoi. This occurs not only in small territorial units, such as rural communities, but also within the boundaries of large political and territorial units (e.g., Russians and Kazakhs in Soviet Kazakhstan).

Among homogeneous ethnic formations a special place is undoubtedly held by those which are bound up with "social organisms", i.e., individual societies and independent macro-units of social development (tribal units in the primitive society; socio-political units in the class society).⁵⁷

The special formations that originate as a result of the interpenetration of the ethnikos and the social organism often enjoy relative independence, which makes their self-reproduction possible. Such "synthetic" formations, which have been one of the most important and widespread forms of existence for the ethnikos, can, in our view, be defined as ethno-social organisms (or ESOs).

In addition to community of ethnic features, such organ-

⁵⁷ See: Y. I. Semyonov, "The Category 'Social Organism' and Its Significance for Historical Science", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 8, 1966.

isms are usually characterised by common economic, social, territorial and political features (this is, as it were, the maximum version). The ethnic and socio-economic factors are the most essential components of the ESO. Socio-economic factors which form the basis of all social phenomena, including ethnic phenomena, are more mobile than the latter. It is precisely this relative conservatism and independence of ethnic qualities that explain why the same ethnikos is able to remain virtually unchanged over a period of several socio-economic formations. For instance, the Ukrainian ethnikos existed under feudalism, capitalism and now it exists under socialism (that is why we use the same name, "Ukrainians", though we may be referring to either the feudal, capitalist or socialist epoch).

But an ethno-social organism is different. Its affiliation to a particular formation invariably gives it a special character in each case. This is why it has become normal in our recent literature to give prominence to ethnic communities such as the tribe and narodnost (nationality), the bourgeois and the socialist nation. Yet it is clear that this classification is not entirely consistent, since it groups together in a single type (the nationality) ESOs from two different formations—the slave-owning and the feudal. As has already been rightly pointed out in our literature, they are completely "different types of ethnic community".⁵⁸ They differ, for example, in the correlation of their socio-class and ethnic components. Thus, the ESO of every slave-owning society mainly involves its free population and excludes a considerable proportion of the direct producers in that society (the slaves), since many of them usually belong to other ethnoi. In a feudal society the ESO primarily involves the working population and does not always include the ruling feudal class.⁵⁹ The term "demos" has been suggested to designate the main type of ethnic community (or ethno-social organism in our terminology) in a slave-owning formation, since such communities were made up largely of a free population.⁶⁰ Needless to say, the name may or may not be accepted (one could,

⁵⁸ S. A. Tokarev, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

for example, call them a slave-owning nationality as distinct from a nationality of the feudal formation). What is beyond all doubt is the actual existence of a special type of ESO that is characteristic of the feudal system.

The affiliation of the social components in an ESO to a certain socio-economic formation usually exerts a definite influence on the structure of its ethnic qualities—homogeneity above all. Thus, the ESO of primitive communal society—the tribe—was at one and the same time characterised by social homogeneity and ethnic uniformity. Though class division in the ethno-social organisms of antagonistic formations does not completely destroy their ethnic integrity, it nevertheless leads to the emergence of group (class, estate, or caste) ethnic features in them. In this connection one immediately thinks of Lenin's comment that under capitalism "there are two nations in every modern nation".⁶¹ In a slave-owning society and even more so in the feudal system class division and, in the latter case, sometimes caste division too provide just as much justification for identifying two or even several ethniki variants in every ESO.

Soviet experience has shown that in a socialist society the abolition of antagonistic classes has sharply intensified the process of so-called ethnic consolidation, i.e., the ESO is rapidly becoming more ethnically homogeneous.

In studying the typology of ethno-social organisms in the process of their historical development, it is necessary to mention the occurrence of transitional stages. These may be caused by processes taking place both in the socio-economic and ethnic spheres. In the former, we are confronted with transitional periods in social development. For instance, in the USSR, during the period between the Great October Socialist Revolution and the thirties, the socialist nations gradually emerged. In speaking about the developing countries today (or "developing nations" as they are sometimes called), we could say that these ESOs are also in a transitional stage.

As to transitional stages of ethno-social organisms, arising from a change in their ethnic qualities, most illustrative

⁶¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 32.

are those cases where these changes end in an alteration of ethnic consciousness. A case in point is that of the French Canadians and Anglo-Australians, who, as ESOs, were until quite recently in a transitional stage of this kind. In the case of the Anglo-Australians alien inclusions—Germans, Italians and other immigrants—as often happens, played no small role in the qualitative change.

The interpenetration of ethniki and social organism has a spatial aspect, in addition to a historicoo-developmental aspect. In a class society it is often observed that the ethniki and the social organism, as represented by a state-political formation, fail to coincide territorially. Depending on the character of this relationship, it is possible to identify three types of ethno-social organisms.

Type One (ESO-I)—when outside the main common territory the given ethniki exists in heterogeneous form or in the form of small homogeneous groups that are not characterised by socio-economic independence. Among the ethnic communities known today the Turkish nation belongs to Type One, since outside Turkey the Turkish ethnos exists in a dispersed state. The Slovaks are another example. The overwhelming majority of the Slovaks form the Slovak nation inside the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (or the Slovak ethno-social organism—the Slovak Socialist Republic). Only a small minority of Slovaks live outside their country, either in a heterogeneous state, or in the form of small homogeneous groups (e.g., the Slovak settlements in the USSR, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania).

Type Two (ESO-II). The relationship of the principal components is such that socio-political formations mould several ethno-social organisms out of one ethniki. A striking example is the Arab ethniki. The modern socio-political communities (states) have moulded several ethno-social organisms out of it: Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, etc. Each of these is characterised by dialectal and cultural differences. In a sense, the Spanish American ethniki presents a similar picture, the only difference being that within separate socio-political units it is not quite homogeneous. A graphic example of dismemberment of a single ethniki into two separate ethno-social organisms is the case of the

two German states today—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. In this case we observe within one ethnukos at the same time two different historical types of ethno-social organism, belonging to different socio-economic formations.

Type Three (ESO-III). Within the framework of one socio-political community (state) there are several homogeneous ethnukoi with relative independence. The ethno-social organisms which are thus formed should, perhaps, be regarded as bodies with structures that are not quite complete, since they are deprived of their own statehood. Classical examples of this variety are some of the nations within the framework of pre-revolutionary Russia: the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Georgians, Armenians and a few other nations that re-acquired their statehood only after the Great October Socialist Revolution.

A study of the different varieties of ethno-social organisms on the historico-developmental and spatial (territorial) levels convincingly reveals a diversity of forms of the existence of ethnukos. This diversity is by no means exhausted by the above types and varieties of ESOs.

The ethnic picture of the world is considerably complicated by the hierarchical character of ethnic phenomena. This has a direct bearing on the structure of ethno-social organisms. In the ethnic hierarchy there are formations which not only rise above the ethnukoi and ethno-social organisms (the so-called ethno-linguistic communities, for instance), but also enter them as ethnographical groups. Thus, the Russian nation, which together with the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nations forms the East-Slav ethno-linguistic community, only a short while ago had as component parts distinct ethnographic groups (the Pomors of the White Sea coast, the Kerzhaks, the Don, Orenburg, Amur and Ussuri Cossacks, etc.).

It is also necessary to take account of the vast number of small and very small ethnic formations ("splinters" of an ethnukos), both of a homogeneous and a heterogeneous character. They exist as inclusions (chiefly in the form of national minorities) in separate ethno-social organisms. Not infrequently they are distinguished from one another by their basic structural components. It would be incorrect

to ignore this fact in a detailed typological study of ethnic communities. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the ethnukos forms certain systems not only with the social, but also the natural, environment. These systems are known as "ethnospheres".

In a word, the ethnukos is characterised by "polyvalence". This produces the abundance of forms that it takes and, correspondingly, a great number of types and varieties of ethnic communities. However, to denote this diverse typology a rather limited number of symbols-terms is used. Quite often different researchers use one and the same term to denote typologically different ethnic phenomena. This, in particular, explains to a large extent the discrepancies between individual Soviet researchers in the field of social sciences, as was clearly shown by the discussions devoted to the description of ethnic communities as a whole and to their separate types.⁶²

Misunderstandings frequently arise when one researcher uses the term "ethnos" in the narrow sense, i.e., in the sense of "ethnukos", and another—in the broad sense, i.e., in the sense of an ethno-social organism. The former will, quite rightly, say that community of economic ties is not characteristic of an ethnos, whereas the latter—who regards the ethnos as an ethno-social organism—will, for very good reasons of his own, claim the opposite.

It therefore follows that it is vital to clearly differentiate the terms that have been already formed. It might be better to use the term "ethnos", both in its narrow and broad sense, only to denote the basic ethnic formations (within the continuum tribe-nation); whereas the term "ethnic community" could be used to denote all members of an ethnic hierarchy. (Obviously, however, it will not be possible to wholly overcome the somewhat polysemantic nature of these terms, which are of a broad, general nature.) Undoubtedly, new terms are needed, but they should be introduced gradually. That is why the author of the present article has proposed

⁶² Particularly illustrative in this respect was the discussion on the term "nation" held in 1966-1968 in the journal *Voprosy istorii*.

to introduce only two new terms. One of these is "ethnikos", which has been used to denote the ethnos in the narrow sense of the word, i.e., as an ethnic phenomenon proper. The other term is "ethno-social organism" (ESO), which in a general way reflects the main type of symbiosis between ethnic and macro-social formations.

N. N. Cheboksarov

HUMAN RACES AND POPULATIONS

The scientific elaboration of the notion of race plays an important part in the noble and very relevant struggle with racism today. The basis of every racist theory is the pseudo-scientific and essentially reactionary concept that there are clear-cut physical and psychical distinctions between races, and that hereditary causes are responsible for these distinctions, which allegedly enable one to identify those groups of mankind which are full-fledged or inferior physically and psychically. The racists believe that if people differ in the colour of their skin, the type of hair they have, the width of their noses and other external racial features, they must inevitably differ in their psychic stereotypes too. The psychic stereotype of the so-called inferior races is ascribed several negative qualities and mental inferiority. This is the concept responsible for the policy of racial discrimination, apartheid and genocide that is pursued in various countries.¹

¹ On racism, racial discrimination, apartheid and genocide see the following publications of the USSR Academy of Sciences Miklukho-Maklai Institute of Ethnography: *Against Racism*, 1966; *Documents Expose Racism*, 1968; *No to Racism!* 1969; *The Peoples Against Racism*, 1970 (in Russian); and the yearbook *Rasy i narody*, No. 1, 1971 and No. 2, 1972.

It is, therefore, of great importance for the struggle with all varieties of racism and for the exposure of the factual inconsistency of various racist conceptions that a correct answer be found to the question of how racial features are really combined and how they relate to other morphological, physiological and psychological features. Advances in the natural and social sciences, especially cybernetics, information theory, genetics, molecular biology, ecology, ethology, neurophysiology, psychology, ethnic anthropology, ethnology and general and applied sociology have enabled scientists to broaden and refine their understanding of human races, their origin and development and their differences and interconnections with one another and with other biological and social groups of mankind.²

In their study of races anthropologists clearly distinguish between the conditions and factors behind their origin and evolution, on the one hand, and external manifestations of racial features in the physical appearance of individuals, on the other. These two aspects are bound together by yet another set of phenomena, immediately related to the mechanism that produces racial types. This is the biological, genetic information, which, like any other information, has a finite volume and may be broken down into basic primary units. The units in this case are genes, located in the molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). All attempts to define the areas in which the races were formed and to trace the history of their development and dispersal are reduced in the final analysis to defining the boundaries and distribution patterns of certain genes or sets of genes.³

Slightly generalising the concepts of race which exist in modern anthropology, we may reduce them to two main viewpoints, known as the "typological" and "populationist" approaches. The essence of the first approach is that a race is regarded as a totality of the individuals belonging to

² S. A. Arutyunov and N. N. Cheboksarov, "Race, Population and Ethnos" (paper given at the Seventh International Sociological Congress, Varna, 1970), pp. 4-14 (in Russian).

³ S. A. Arutyunov and N. N. Cheboksarov, "Information Transfer as a Mechanism for the Existence of Ethno-Social and Biological Groups", *Rasy i narody*, No. 2, 1972, p. 12.

a single morphological type, which is inherited from generation to generation. According to this view, which was best expressed in the works of Polish anthropologists (Y. Czekanowsky, I. Michalsky, A. Wanke, A. Vierciński, et al.), in every human group there can be distinguished either visually or mathematically a combination of certain racial characteristics. The genetic basis for this view is the hypothesis that pleiotropism is responsible for the main racial features, i.e., they depend on one gene or a group of linked genes located in one chromosome.⁴

The other concept, the populationist one, considers a race as a historically formed combination of morphological and physiological features among the population of a certain territory (area). Supporters of the populationist concept, among them many British and American anthropologists (T. Dohzhansky, L. Dunn, J. Neel, W. Schull, K. Stern, N. Barnicot, C. Coon, et al.), believe that racial features are mostly inherited independently of each other and are often polymeric, i.e., each feature is determined by a whole series of genes.⁵ A heated debate has been going on for some years now between the representatives of these two schools of thought. In 1962-1964, for example, the argument was ventilated in the *Current Anthropology*; it continued at the international congresses of anthropology and ethnology in Moscow (1964) and Tokyo (1968).

It is worth noting that extreme populationists completely deny the reality of the very concept of race and avoid

⁴ For a more detailed treatment see: V. P. Alexeyev, "The Factors in Race Formation, the Methods of Race Analysis and the Principles of Race Classification", *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 4, 1964; "The Theory of Race Studies at the Seventh International Congress of Anthropologists and Ethnographers", *SE*, No. 2, 1965; "The Geno-Geography of Man", *Science and Mankind*, 1968, pp. 51-65 (in Russian).

⁵ James V. Neel and William J. Schull, *Human Heredity*, Chicago, 1954; N. Barnicot, "Biological Variability in Modern Populations", *Human Biology*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 165-246 (in Russian); L. C. Dunn and T. Dobzhansky, *Heredity, Race and Society*, New York, 1946; C. Stern, *The Race Concept*, Paris, 1952; W. W. Howells, *Mankind in the Making*, New York, 1959; Carleton S. Coon, *The Origin of Races*, New York, 1963 and *The Living Races of Man*, New York, 1965.

this word in their publications, making reference only to differences between separate territorial groups of people (populations). At this point it is interesting to quote the remarks on the concept of race made in the book *Human Heredity* by James V. Neel and William J. Schull, eminent supporters of the populationist concept, who write that this term was used by various authors with such different implications that it lost its original meaning to a great extent. In particular, its reputation was abused greatly as a result of attempts to use it for proclaiming and disseminating the idea of the superiority of certain groups of people over other groups—attempts that have no place in scientific research.⁶

According to Neel and Schull, the number of subdivisions classed as races depends mainly on fractionality of those differences between groups of populations which we use as criteria.

The genetics of populations proved that these differences are seldom absolute, but sooner amount to a difference in the gene frequency, thus helping to solve this problem. In other words, the differences between races are mainly quantitative, and not qualitative.⁷

These authors, just as other populationists, consider the race to be a genetically more or less isolated group of people having a common genome distinguishing it from other similar isolates.⁸

Needless to say, there are no racist scholars among either the populationists or the typologists. A true scholar cannot be a racist, because the facts (anthropological and others) are against this misanthropic theory. But the adherents of racism make use in different ways of both definitions of race. If the racial type is inherited as a whole and depends on only one gene or a group of linked genes, then it may be supposed that these genes affect not only external racial features, but also morphological, physiological and, ultimately, psychological features. Distorting the facts, racists

⁶ James V. Neel and William J. Schull, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Op. cit.* *Genome* is the name given in modern genetics to the sum, or rather the system, of genes in an organism.

gladly exploit the idea that there is a connection between racial type and people's psychic, as well as physical, qualities.

The supporters of the populationist concept deny any heredity-based connection between morpho-physiological racial features and psychic traits both in groups and in individuals. It is obvious that such a viewpoint provides a more solid ground for exposing and criticising racist theory and practice. Quite naturally, then, most Soviet anthropologists, e.g., V. V. Bunak, Y. Y. Roginsky, G. F. Debets, V. P. Alexeyev, the author and many others, are more inclined to accept the populationist concept of race, but avoid the extremes of this concept, which involve a complete denial of the reality of racial differences.⁹ Recently V. P. Alexeyev put forward a kind of synthesis of both these concepts in his theory of modes of race formation. According to him the typological and population variations of racial features reflect two sides of the race-formation process, which may assume various specific forms in different areas and ethnic groups.¹⁰

Thus the concept of race and race formation in modern anthropology is closely connected with the theory which regards populations as basic units in the evolution of the whole organic world, man being one of the latter's components and the most active one. The term "population" was introduced into biology by W. Johanssen in 1903. He used it to designate groups of freely crossing (or potentially able to cross) organisms inhabiting a certain area and having certain time-space relations with each other.¹¹ Biological or Mendelian population is a reproductive community of individuals of different sexes and of one species, sharing in a common gene pool. The highest unit in the hierarchy of population is always the whole species, as one of the

⁹ "Factors in Race Formation, Methods of Race Analysis and the Principles of Race Classification" (symposium material), *Voprosy antropologii*, No. 20, 1965.

¹⁰ V. P. Alexeyev, "Race-Formation Modes and the Geographical Distribution of Race Feature Genes", *SE*, No. 1, 1967 (in Russian).

¹¹ W. Johanssen, *Über Erblichkeit in Populationen und reinen Linien*, Jena, 1903.

founders of population genetics, S. S. Chetverikov, noted.¹² It is important to note that among highly organised animals there is hardly ever a free crossing or panmixia of all individuals, because the pairing possibilities are always regulated by the age of males and females, their physical strength and other peculiarities, as well as by the internal organisation of the herd and subsequent ethology of individuals. The selectivity of crossing is especially clear among some mammals, e.g. wolves, lions or baboons. It is clear thus that panmixia is not a necessary feature of any population.

Today almost all Soviet and Western evolutionary biologists are making a close study of population, although they define differently. In the opinion of N. P. Naumov, "population is a self-contained group of individuals of one species, having its inner structure or organisation and occupying a certain territory. It preserves its existence through the crossing of its members and through ties (exchange of individuals) with other populations. Population is a form of existence of a species in a certain environment and their diversity is a means of adjustment to the variety of conditions in the area."¹³ In our view the most important thing in this definition is the acknowledgement of an independent existence and development of a population on the basis of its internal organisation.

Taking issue with Naumov, S. S. Shvarts and his colleagues from the Institute of Ecology in Sverdlovsk stress that "a population is not just any natural territorial grouping of individuals, but only a grouping that possesses all the necessary qualities for maintaining the species' existence in constantly changing and fluctuating environmental conditions. Therefore a population may be regarded as an elementary form of existence of a species, a unit in a spe-

¹² S. S. Chetverikov, "Some Features of the Evolutionary Process As Seen from the Standpoint of Modern Genetics", *Zhurnal eksperimentalnoi biologii*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1926.

¹³ N. P. Naumov, "Levels of Organisation in Living Matter and Population Biology", *Zhurnal obshchei biologii*, No. 6, 1971, p. 659; "The Problems and Tasks of Population Biology", *The Development of the Concept of Structural Levels in Biology*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 322-31 (in Russian).

cies' biochorological structure."¹⁴ All territorial subdivisions within a population may be called "micro-populations", and intra-species unions of several populations are, to use V. N. Beklemishev's term, "superpopulations".¹⁵

Every biological species is a complicated system of populations of various sizes. The development of these populations, often called in modern biology "micro-evolution", is affected by four main evolutionary factors: mutations, population waves or "life waves" (fluctuations in the number of individuals in the population), isolation and natural selection. The essence of the latter, in the opinion of many modern Darwinists, consists in a differentiated achievement of a reproductive age by individuals who leave their descendants in the population.¹⁶ The cumulative effect of all these factors leads finally to stable changes in the genotypic constitution of the population.

Every population contains a permanent flow of hereditary information, which is transmitted from generation to generation through the DNA of the reproductive cells. Each crossing, i.e., each fusion of male and female gametes into zygote, can be considered as an act of transfer of genetic information from two heterosexual individuals to their descendants. The result is the birth of a new individual, who, though genotypically different from both father and mother, at the same time combines not only their hereditary features but also bears the genetic information of many past generations. Most of this information is common to the whole species, but it also includes information factors from populations of various hierarchical stages up to the individual features acquired from the parents.

It is obvious that the more crossing within the population the larger part in its micro-evolution is played by the intra-group exchange of genetic information. If every cross-

¹⁴ S. S. Shvarts, E. Gurvich, V. G. Ishchenko and V. F. Sosin, "The Functional Unity of Populations", *Zhurnal obshchei biologii*, No. 1, 1972, p. 3.

¹⁵ V. N. Beklemishev, "The Spatial and Functional Structure of a Population", *Bulleten Moskovskogo obshchestva ispytatelei prirody. Otdel biologii*, Vol. 65, Issue 2, 1960.

¹⁶ A. V. Yablokov, "Morphology and Micro-Evolution", *Zhurnal obshchei biologii*, No. 1, 1970.

ing is represented on a graph as a line, then the cluster of lines would be most dense in the centre of the population's area, and more diffuse at the outskirts. It would be most diffuse along the frontiers with different populations. Such a map would reflect the population boundaries of the species, the degree of their isolation and the character of the genetic barriers between them. An exact history of populations is always connected with the emergence, disintegration and reconstruction of such barriers.

In the animal and even more so in the vegetable world genetic barriers between populations of the same species are always determined by the spatial distribution of these populations and by natural geographical boundaries of various types—such as mountain ranges like the Himalayas, Caucasus, Alps, etc., and the associated plateaux and highlands like Tibet or the Pamirs, ice-covered polar areas, deserts like the Sahara or Gobi, Takla Makan, Kalahari, etc., oceans, seas and the largest rivers and lakes. Beside these major boundaries, which delimit not only the population areas of the same species, but also the areas of various cognate vicaring species, lesser obstacles also act as barriers between neighbouring populations, usually demarcating different biological stations. Such stations are the various parts of forests, steppes, tundra, savannas, jungles and swamps, as well as valleys and canyons in mountainous areas, oases in deserts and small islands in seas, lakes or even large rivers.

Speaking of populations of animals and plants it is necessary to emphasise that for each species as an organised system they are the only real biological units. Evolutionary processes in the organic world occur within the framework of these units and, as Darwin showed, produce important changes in morphological and physiological group features, and in many cases cause local varieties to emerge within the species, which are regulated by natural selection and which tend under certain conditions to develop into new independent species.¹⁷ It is obvious that the more crossings take place in different populations, the more rapidly are

¹⁷ Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species*.

new varieties or geographical races formed, differing from each other both phenotypically and genotypically.

Can the micro-evolution laws of the organic world be applied to man? One can hardly doubt the fact that the species *Homo sapiens* consists of biologically reproductive communities or populations and the resulting races, which are stable local complexes of features reflecting group affinity in origin. But in human society all these groups are somehow inlaid into the system of social entities specific only to man. Biological micro-evolution takes place in the *Homo sapiens* species, too, but its direction, pace and forms are dependent on the new laws of socio-economic development, which deeply influence all micro-evolution factors.

One of the four above-mentioned main factors of micro-evolution, mutation, which performs, in the words of A. V. Yablokov, "the role of elementary evolutionary material",¹⁸ has been stimulated during man's entire history by physical and chemical mutagens, acting in the artificial anthroposphere created by man to suit his own needs. The frequency of mutations has risen in the age of technical progress and social conflicts due to an increase in ionising radiation, air and water pollution and drug-taking in the capitalist world.¹⁹ These mutations mostly being harmful, man may have to face the danger of future genetic load. One eminent Soviet expert on the biosphere, M. M. Kamshilov, rightly pointed out that "some qualitative indices give cause for concern. Many authors note a rising percentage of abnormalities and deformities in newborn babies."²⁰

Still more evident is the connection of "life waves" with socio-economic development, since they are dependent on birth rate, mortality, type of economy, cultural level, class exploitation, wars, epidemics, etc. Today the world's population is rising rapidly and by the end of the century

¹⁸ A. V. Yablokov, "The Development of Evolutionary Views and the Leninist Theory of Cognition", *Zhurnal obshchei biologii*, No. 2, 1970, p. 153.

¹⁹ M. M. Kamshilov, "Noogenesis", and "Organisation and Evolution", *Zhurnal obshchei biologii*, No. 1 and No. 2, 1970.

²⁰ M. M. Kamshilov, "Scientific and Technological Progress and the Evolution of the Biosphere", *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 4, 1972, p. 69.

will probably be in the region of 6,000,000,000.²¹ But while in some countries there is a real population explosion, in others the rise in population is slow or even non-existent. The "life waves" of the human species are influenced also by the increase in life expectancy, the earlier onset of puberty, the slowing down of the ageing process, acceleration, the change in the disease pattern, etc.²²

The third main factor in micro-evolution, isolation, which stimulates genetic drift, is also, in man, becoming more and more dependent on social structures, since geographical isolation, which played the main role in the early stages of human history, has now given way to social isolation (ethnic, linguistic, class, professional, religious, political, etc.).

In the early stages of social development the main limitation on panmixia was clan exogamy. With the emergence of classes and states, this role was taken over by social stratification, often reinforced by law. On the other hand, with the development of migration and colonisation and with progress in transport and communications the number of isolated human populations is constantly diminishing.

Much has been written about the decrease of the role of natural selection in the *Homo sapiens* species. The downgrading (but not total absence) of this factor explains why geographical human races never turn into new species, and their intermediary forms never disappear (as happens among animals and plants) but are formed again and again due to inter-race cross-breeding stimulated by endless migration and resettlement. From the most ancient times the population of many vast regions, such as Southeast Asia, Central and South Asia and North and East Africa, has been racially heterogeneous. In the period between the 16th and 19th centuries new zones of race mixing sprang up in Siberia and the Far East, North and South America, South Africa,

²¹ V. I. Kozlov, *The Dynamics of Population Size*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 233-49 (in Russian); V. V. Pokshishovsky, *The Population Geography of Foreign Countries*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 27-36 (in Russian); "World Population Data", *Natural History*, No. 1, 1970, pp. 60-62.

²² M. M. Kamshilov, "Scientific and Technological Progress...", p. 69.

Australia and Oceania. In the human species, contrary to all other animals, a mixture between intra-species taxa takes place not only along the borders of the areas of habitation, but in their centres too.

That the general trend in the history of human populations is socially and economically preconditioned is clearly reflected in the fact that their genetic boundaries, as a rule, coincide with the frontiers between social groups, and, first of all, between ethnic communities of different orders and the ethnoi and their local subdivisions—the ethnographic groups. A certain endogamy peculiar to an ethnos makes it at the same time, as Y. V. Bromley shows, a kind of a population. "Owing to endogamy, which creates a genetic barrier, the ethnos to a certain extent functions as a biological unit. But a population cannot be regarded as the essence and the base of an ethnos. The ethnos functions as a population only as a result of its endogamy, which by itself is a derivative of many factors, mostly social in their essence."²³

Both the population and ethnic structures of mankind are hierarchical. But the units of these two structures, being essentially different, do not necessarily coincide, though they are somehow related. The main unit in the study of populations is the dem, comprising 1.5 to 4 thousand persons; 80-90 per cent endogamy is characteristic of a dem. Dems may be small ethnoses, like the tribal communities of the Australian aborigines or the small tribes of India, ethnographic groups of larger peoples or their local territorial communities (like ancient pogosty in the North of Russia). Dems numbering less than 1,500 with an endogamy rate of more than 90 per cent, are termed "isolates"²⁴ by

²³ Y. V. Bromley, "Ethnos and Endogamy", *SE*, No. 6, 1969, p. 89; "On the Question of Essence of an Ethnos", *Priroda*, No. 2, 1970; "The Ethnos and the Ethno-Social Organism", *Vestnik AN SSSR*, No. 8, 1970; "Towards a Description of the Concept of Ethnos", *Rasy i narody*, No. 1, 1971, pp. 9-33; *Ethnos and Ethnography*, Moscow, 1973, pp. 114-24.

²⁴ V. V. Bunak, "The Study of Minor Populations in Anthropology", *Voprosy antropologii*, No. 21, 1965; "Commentary" (in the book *Human Biology*, translated from the English, Moscow, 1968, pp. 160-64; *The Evolution of the Elementary Unit of Population (Deme) and Its Anthropological Significance*, Moscow, 1968 (in Russian).

V. V. Bunak. Being related in their origin, neighbouring dems are united into groups of smaller populations (micro-populations) and the latter compose large populations (superpopulations). Average and large ethnoses usually correspond with such large superpopulations, which include a ramified system of dems and relict isolates.

Thus in *Homo sapiens*, unlike all other animal and plant species, the history of populations develops not so much in the natural geographical environment as in the artificial social environment created by people to suit their material and spiritual needs.²⁵ Accordingly the relations between the two types of intra-species local communities, reproductive (populations) and historico-genetical ones (races) are radically changed. While in the animal world the subspecies or geographical races are always groups of neighbouring populations and can in a sense be identified with "superpopulations" in V. N. Beklemishev's sense of the word,²⁶ in the human species this correspondence is being more and more eroded.

Of course, the races of archanthropus and palaeanthropus, and probably of the earliest neoanthropus, too, were formed from large populations or groups of them, connected by their common origin. But as the primitive Ecumene broadened and people settled new previously uninhabited regions of the world, new populations began to emerge, in which racial heterogeneity long remained discernible. For instance, palaeanthropological research provides good grounds for believing that the early neolithic and perhaps even mesolithic population of Northeastern Europe arose from a fusion of northeast-bound proto-Europeoids and proto-Mongoloids of Siberian origin.²⁷

Similarly on the Indian subcontinent from the most ancient times métisation took place between the indigenous

²⁵ N. N. Cheboksarov and I. A. Cheboksarova, *Peoples, Races and Cultures*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 164-69; E. S. Markaryan, *A Systems Analysis of Society*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 36-40 (both in Russian).

²⁶ V. N. Beklemishev, *op. cit.*

²⁷ M. V. Vitov, K. Y. Mark, N. N. Cheboksarov, *The Ethnic Anthropology of the Eastern Baltic Area*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 139-86 (in Russian); G. F. Debets, "How the Northern Zone of the Russian Plain and the Eastern Baltic Area Were Settled", *SE*, No. 6, 1961; V. P. Alexeyev, *In Search of Our Ancestors*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 224-30 (in Russian).

Australoids and southern Europeoids (Melanochroei), penetrating from the Northwest, and various groups of Mongoloids, originally from Southeast Asia. Even today racial heterogeneity can be seen in the large and small populations of southern, central and eastern India, Bangladesh and Nepal.²⁸ Métisation between Europeoids and Mongoloids started at least in neolithic times and also took place in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Southern Siberia. Today "typically" Europeoid and Mongoloid faces can be encountered even in one and the same Uzbek or Turkmen family.

No matter how we resolve the problem of the initial genetic relations between the various Australoid and Mongoloid races of the Pacific Basin, it is obvious that they have been mixing together over many millennia in Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, Micronesia and Polynesia. Nowadays in East Asia and in Oceania it is difficult to distinguish between intermediate racial types remaining here from the period of ancient racial homogeneity and métis forms which arose later as the result of interaction between Australoid and Mongoloid populations.²⁹ In the opinion of some scholars, both Mongoloid and Australoid populations took part in the settlement of America, which started in the late Palaeolithic age.³⁰

Consequently, the coincidence between varieties (races) and the largest populations (superpopulations), so typical

²⁸ G. F. Debets, "The Anthropological Composition of the Population of South Asia", *The Peoples of South Asia*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 45-50; N. N. Cheboksarov and I. A. Cheboksarova, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-59; N. N. Cheboksarov and A. A. Zubov, *The Main Problems in the Ethnic Anthropology in India*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 1-20; *Essential Problems in India's Ethnical Anthropology*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 1-18.

²⁹ N. N. Cheboksarov, "The Anthropological Composition of the Population", *The Peoples of East Asia*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1965, pp. 76-89; "The Main Problems in the Ethnic Anthropology of the Far East", *Questions in the History of the Soviet Far East*, Vladivostok, 1965, pp. 37-50; V. R. Kabo and N. N. Cheboksarov, "First Settlement and Early Ethnic History", *The Peoples of Southeast Asia*, Moscow, 1966, pp. 23-64; N. N. Cheboksarov and I. A. Cheboksarova, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-19 (all in Russian); N. N. Tchekhokarov, "Problèmes essentiels d'anthropologie ethnique de l'Asie du Sud-est", XXIX International Congress of Orientalists, Paris, July 16-22, 1973.

³⁰ A. A. Zubov, "On the Physical Type of America's Earliest Population", *SE*, No. 4, 1968.

of the animal world, had already in quite ancient times become complicated and partly destroyed among the Hominidae owing to radical changes in the character of the interactions with the natural environment and the new artificial environment. A fast rate of inter-racial métisation, impossible in any other animal species, not only at the edges but even in the centres of race area, resulted in a situation where more and more human populations formed, disintegrated or became transformed long before they could be consolidated into new races. The genetic independence from each other of most differentiating racial features and the clinal nature of their geographical changeability favoured a growing complication of correlations between the racial and population structure of mankind.

Nevertheless mixed populations, which had absorbed different racial components over a long period of complete or nearly complete isolation, always tended eventually to develop into separate races, no less consolidated than other races formed from genetically more homogeneous populations. Such was the case with Japan, which was settled in the late Palaeolithic and Neolithic by at least three groups of races: Australoids (Ainu), southern Mongoloids (Austro-nesians) and eastern Mongoloids (proto-Japanese, probably, Altaic-speaking). The subsequent long insular isolation and the almost total absence of immigration resulted in the present situation, where the Japanese can be regarded as a special group of racial types, deserving, in the opinion of M. G. Levin, G. F. Debets and the author, a separate place in the classification of races.³¹

Similar processes took place in Hindustan, where, owing to métisation between Australoids and southern Europeoids and possibly also Mongoloids, the southern-Indian (Deccanese) group of racial types has been formed, which is, according to all diagnostic criteria, of an intermediary or transitional nature. The degree of consolidation in the Deccanese group is less than that in Japan because Hindustan has never been so rigidly isolated from the rest of the world as

³¹ G. F. Debets, "The World's Racial Composition", *An Atlas of the World's Peoples*, Moscow, 1964, p. 120; M. G. Levin, *The Ethnic Anthropology of Japan*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 177-204; N. N. Cheboksarov and I. A. Cheboksarova, op. cit., p. 118 (all in Russian).

Japan.³² The population of Brazil is also about to turn into a separate group of racial types, because here for four centuries a "molecular" mixture has been going on in various local populations between American Mongoloids (Indians), southern Europeoids (Portuguese and other European settlers) and Negroids (descendants of African slaves).³³ All these examples, and it is easy to add to them, demonstrate the specific character of the racial and population structure of *Homo sapiens*.

In recent decades the study of genogeography of odontological, dermatoglyphic, serological and other features with clear regional variation (sensitivity to PTC test, types of ear-wax, colour blindness, etc.) permitted a new approach to the problems of racial classification, which should after all reflect the history of formation, development, distribution, resettlement and interaction of actual human groups.

In the light of this new data there is a much greater probability in the hypothesis that African Negroids are more closely connected in their origin with Europeoids than the morphologically similar Asian and Oceanian Australoids, and the latter are genetically closer to the Mongoloids than to the Negroids.³⁴

Recent genogeographical data indicate that the frequency of the shovel-shaped incisors, the distal crest of the trigonid, the Carabelli's cusp, certain forms of palm prints and

³² See the works listed in Note 28.

³³ G. F. Debets, op. cit., p. 121; N. N. Cheboksarov and I. A. Cheboksarova, op. cit., p. 109.

³⁴ A. A. Zubov, "Anthropological Odontology and the Historical Sciences", *SE*, No. 1, 1965; "Towards Founding a New Area in the System of Anthropology", *SE*, No. 1, 1966; "On the Race-Diagnostic Significance of Several Odontological Features", *SE*, No. 3, 1968; *Anthropological Odontology As a Source of Historical Information*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 4-41; Y. G. Rychkov, "Peculiarities in the Serological Differentiation of the Peoples of Siberia", *Voprosy antropologii*, No. 21, 1965; T. D. Gladkova, *Skin Patterns of the Hand and Foot in Apes and Men*, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian); Y. G. Rychkov and V. A. Sheremeteva, "Population Genetics of the Aleuts on the Komandorskiye Islands (Problems of National History and Adaptation in the Population of the Bering Straits in Ancient Times)", *Voprosy antropologii*, No. 40, 1972. A. Renane, Y. Schwidetzky, H. Walter and R. Knussman, *Die neue Rassenkunde*, Stuttgart, 1962, pp. 29-68, 135-232.

various genes of different blood and serum groups (Rhessns, Duffy, Lutheran, allotypes of haptoglobins and immunoglobins, etc.) allow us to divide mankind into two large groups of populations, the eastern and the western. The latter includes the Negroids of Africa and the Europeoids, the former includes all Mongoloids (together with the American Indians). The Australoids of Southeast Asia and Oceania occupy an intermediary position between these groups. In most of the adaptive racial features, such as pigmentation, type of hair, lip, nose, etc., they resemble the Negroids of Africa, and therefore some anthropologists include both of these groups into one Equatorial or Negro-Australoid race. But in many features of teeth, blood, palm prints and other neutral (non-adaptive) features the Australoids clearly differ from the Negroids and more closely resemble the Mongoloids.

As new data are accumulated about the geographical distribution of such features, the hypothesis of a primeval split of mankind into two branches becomes more and more convincing. These two branches, the western Negroid-Europeoid one and the eastern Australoid-Mongoloid one, are certainly bound together by the common origin of common ancestors, but they differentiated at a very remote time. The first group of populations can also be called Euro-African or Mediterranean-Atlantic, and the second—Asian-Oceanian or Pacific.

The question remains as to when the division of mankind into these two groups could have occurred. The fact that *Sinanthropus* (one of the earliest men who lived in East Asia during the early Palaeolithic Age some 500-300 thousand years ago) possessed such dental features as shovel-shaped incisors and the distal crest of the trigonid indicates that the western and eastern populations of our forebears began to diverge as long ago as the time of the original migration of mankind throughout the world.

Recent discoveries in palaeoanthropology and archaeology lead us to suppose that the early stages in the evolution of hominids took place not in Central Asia, as many authorities had previously thought, but in East Africa and adjoining Mediterranean areas. This region was the starting-point for the gradual dispersal of early man. In the course of the early Palaeolithic he spread through almost the whole of Africa, Europe and Asia apart from the then inaccessible

Far-Northern and mountainous regions. It is possible that even then the first, very sparse groups of early man which made their way from the west into the southern and eastern parts of Asia already had a high concentration of several neutral dental features, blood groups, palm prints, etc., which later became typical of the whole eastern branch of mankind. Originally, perhaps during the early Palaeolithic, two race-formation centres may have arisen.

The most ancient centre was located in the Mediterranean and a slightly later centre in Southeast Asia. This concept can be called "dicentrism". Later on people of the *Homo sapiens* species, settling throughout the globe, absorbed more ancient populations on the periphery of the primitive Ecumene, conserving their neutral features and adjusting to new environmental conditions, and diversified into the modern races.³⁵

In this article we have dealt with only a few questions connected with the interrelations of the races and populations of mankind. But it is obvious that an analysis of these relations among various peoples and at various times has a great and even decisive significance for resolving many complicated problems in ethnology, anthropology and related social and natural disciplines, such as history, archaeology, sociology, psychology, linguistics, geography, demography, human biology, anthropogenetics, etc. Scholars of various disciplines are focussing their attention on such problems as the origin of man and society, genogeography and the formation of races, the history of the family and marriage customs (especially exogamy and endogamy), ethnogenesis and national development. The connection between the history of the peoples and their populations is especially clear from the study of ethnic processes in the present and in the past.³⁶ It is evident that all these pro-

³⁵ See the works listed in Note 34 and: N. N. Cheboksarov and I. A. Cheboksarova, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-53; N. N. Cheboksarov and A. A. Zoubov, *op. cit.* (see Note 28).

³⁶ The study of ethnic processes is one of the most important, relevant and interesting topics in modern ethnography. The literature on the subject is already quite extensive. For the most recent bibliography on the USSR see: Y. V. Bromley and V. I. Kozlov, "Leninism, and the Main Tendencies in Ethnic Processes in the USSR", *SE*, No. 4, 1970.

ses and, first of all, the processes of ethnic differentiation, consolidation, assimilation and integration resulting in the emergence and destruction of genetic barriers, largely pre-determine the exact history of human populations, from the smallest isolates and dems to mankind as a whole. In the future universal communist society the elimination of ethnic barriers will no doubt result in a situation where local biological units of the *Homo sapiens* species, which started its development as a real population of a higher order, will again become no more than mere micro-populations of a unified global community of Earthmen.

V. P. Alexeyev

THE MODES OF RACE FORMATION AND THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE GENES RESPONSIBLE FOR RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS

THE CONCEPT OF POLYMORPHIOUS SPECIES AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR ANTHROPOLOGY

The term "species" was first used in its modern meaning by Kourad Gessner in 1559, when describing ten species within the Genus *Gentiana*. Later, in the middle and late 17th century, a species was defined as a systematic category within a genus by Gaspar Bauhin and John Ray. Of course, these early attempts are not a reason for acknowledging the priority of Gessner, Bauhin and Ray in creating the theory of species. That priority undoubtedly belongs to Carolus Linnacus. He introduced a binary nomenclature and elaborated a complete concept of species, which may be called morphological. This concept in various forms has survived to the present day.

According to Linnacus, a species is primarily a morphological unity, a morphological identity. No matter how numerous the individuals of one species are, they all belong to it. There are no intermediate forms. Varieties are created only by external causes. The moment such a cause is with-

drawn, the variety returns to its original form, i.e., its individuals regain features typical of the species. The species is invariable, and the number of species is constant.

Linnaeus' concept, very useful for practical work, very logical and coherent, was the guiding principle of nearly all systematists working in botany or zoology during the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. True, Lamarck believed that environment exerts much more intensive influence on the organism. He favoured the idea of change in and between the species. His opinions, however, were too daring and also often too conjectural to attract support at the time. Their weak point was that, in trying to replace Linnaeus' metaphysics and his idea of the constant species with a dialectical approach, Lamarck negated the reality of the species in a nature that was always developing. In his view, the species was a symbol of an artificial order imposed on nature by man.

The year 1859, when the great work of Darwin was published, saw the beginning of a revolution in the understanding of the species. Darwin's aphorism that a variety is a budding species, a species is a developed variety has become the basis for the subsequently elaborated evolutionary theory of the formation of species. Darwin was not a systematist (leaving aside his two-volume work on cirriped crustaceans written before his major works on the theory of evolution), but his theory led to changes in all research in the field of systematic zoology and to a slow but steady formulation of a new theory of species. Parallel to the development of the theory more and more facts were being collected which could not be explained by the old concept of the morphological or monotypic (monomorphous) species: the practical systematist of the mid-19th century worked with a large series of specimens from many species, and was well aware of geographical variability. Thus, the old theory of species was also hampering practical systematic studies.

It is difficult or altogether impossible to say who was the first to give a precise formulation of the new concept of the polytypic or polymorphous species—the dynamic species as opposed to Linnaeus' static species. Darwin provided the theoretical basis for such a concept but, not being a systematist himself, he did little systematic work and scarcely looked

at the structure of the species. However, in an article on biogeography A. Wallace was already distinguishing several taxonomic units within the species: races or subspecies, varieties for non-overlapping areas (local forms), co-existent varieties and simple (individual) variability.¹ By the turn of the century the idea of the complex structure of the species was being applied to botanical and zoological material by such scholars as the zoologists O. Kleinschmidt and P. P. Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky, and the botanist S. Korzhinsky. Studies of geographical variability were combined with a theoretical analysis of its significance for the formation of species. This helped to establish the concept of the complex structure of the species. In botany there were the works of V. Komarov, R. Wetstein and G. Turesson (especially his theory of ecotypes); in zoology, the numerous fundamental studies by B. Rensch.

The theory of ecotypes was developed in the 1920s and 1930s by Soviet botanists, notably N. I. Vavilov and Y. N. Sinskaya. The studies of B. Rensch were continued by numerous scientists in many countries. By 1930 the complex structure of species, resulting primarily from geographical variability, became universally recognised. This was reflected in a number of definitions. N. N. Vavilov proclaimed his understanding of Linnaeus' species as "a complex and dynamic morphophysiological system, related in its genesis to a certain environment and area". F. Oakland and J. Huxley suggested a distinction between monomorphous and polymorphous species (Oakland called them unimorphous and multimorphous, Huxley—monotypic and polytypic). As a result, the concept of the polymorphous species prevailed. The number of recognised monomorphous species decreased with further studies of geographical variability. Numerous facts to this effect were collected by E. Mayr. The analysis of the polymorphous species and all its components gradually became the key problem of both the theory of the formation of species and the practical work of systematisation.

In physical anthropology the complex nature of modern humanity as a species was demonstrated by the Soviet

¹ See: *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 1, 1967.

scientist V. V. Bunak. He wrote that "the only presently living species of the hominid family, the *Neoanthropus* genus, is a collection of several species, partially extinct, partially surviving, which form fertile hybrids, blurring the boundaries between species and blending into a single aggregate species".² V. V. Bunak equates constitutional differences with extra-areal physiological and zoological races. He also takes into consideration sharp individual deviations, occurring in all human races, which are usually called "aberrations" in biological literature. Unfortunately, Bunak was not at all justified in equating, in spite of unlimited fertility, large races with simple monomorphous or, as he calls them, "particular" or "fractional" species. The fact is that he regarded unlimited fertility as a secondary phenomenon. This may explain the unpopularity of Bunak's view in anthropological literature.

Human races, granted all their distinctions from animal races, can be compared with biological systematic categories only on the subspecies level. Bunak's concept of aggregate species was elaborated further by him. Thus, he defines late palaeolithic humanity as "a mixture of varieties of one polymorphous subspecies that had not yet been divided into races".³

An aggregate species is not the same as a complex polymorphous species, the concept of which originated in botany and zoology. A polymorphous species, as defined in biological theory, is not only a conglomerate of different races, but also a dynamic system, whose constituents may disappear or change, and become more differentiated if geographical variability prevails, or less differentiated where mixture takes place. Finally the hierarchy of constituent elements may change during the life of the species. As mankind is subdivided into many morphological variants, often differing physiologically, the only concept of zoological systematics applicable to modern mankind is that of the polymorphous species. This concept presupposes the different na-

² V. V. Bunak, "The Term 'Race' in Zoology and Anthropology", *Russky gennyichesky zhurnal*, Vol. 7, No. 6, 1930, p. 126.
³ V. V. Bunak, "Human Races and Their Formation", *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 1, 1956, p. 88.

ture of each category within the species. As applied to man, this suggests the genetic and morphological heterogeneity of the racial groupings. However, in most accepted classifications these are differentiated only by their size, and not by the nature of the processes of change. This is also true of the classifications suggested by Soviet scholars, who have realised the importance of a dialectical approach to race formation.

I think that an underestimation of the qualitative peculiarity of racial complexes on different levels of classification and different territories, an underestimation of the multiple ways in which races are formed and the diversity of their results, as expressed in different types of variability, runs counter to the concept of the polymorphous species that is gaining ever wider recognition in zoology and is indispensable to a modern theory of species formation.

THE INTERACTION OF FORM-BUILDING FACTORS AND THE NATURE OF THE RACE-FORMATION PROCESS

There is another approach to the genetic and morphological peculiarity of racial complexes on different levels and in different territories. Obviously, race-forming factors do not influence the process of race formation all at the same time. One race-forming factor may become prevalent over all others for reasons largely unknown. It would determine the exact process which would finally lead to the resulting combination of features: adaptation, isolation, selection, etc. All these processes affect the genetic structure of the population and, consequently, its morphology in different ways. The results of their influence should therefore be distinguished. A few examples are in order here.

In mountainous regions with no roads between the separate ravines the isolation factor is the most important in race formation. One such territory where isolation is extremely manifest and well studied is the West Pamirs. The first student of isolation in mountainous parts of Tajikistan was V. V. Ginzburg, who gathered data about variations for

A, B, O blood groups in different Tajik mountain villages. He showed that such variations are very considerable between even neighbouring villages, nearly approaching those for the whole Ecumene.

In recent years Y. G. Rychkov and G. L. Khit have collected copious data on the somatology, craniology, blood groups and dermatoglyphic patterns of West Pamirs ethnic groups. Y. G. Rychkov made a special analysis of isolation in the Pamirs based on somatological and craniological data.

The variability of morphological characters in Pamirs groups proved to be at any rate not greater than in populations unaffected by isolation. Khit confirmed Ginzburg's observations about the high variability of blood group factors for both A, B, O and M, N systems. She also obtained the corresponding data for dermatoglyphic patterns. For blood group factors monofactorial inheritance was proved. Sharp variations for these factors between the inhabitants of separate villages may be accounted for by genetic drift. This explanation is less satisfactory in the case of the dermatoglyphic patterns, since monofactorial inheritance is out of the question here. That does not necessarily mean polyfactorial inheritance with an unlimited number of factors—there may be two, three or four of them.

The drift hypothesis is hardly applicable here anyway. But we do not necessarily need to find a cause for the considerable variability of dermatoglyphic data. It is more important to realise that isolation in the Pamirs either does not affect at all or reduces the variability of morphological polyfactorial characters, while it influences monofactorial characters in the opposite way, increasing their variability range.

A different kind of variability is attested in mixed groups in territories where the mixing of morphologically heterogeneous populations is the main form-building factor. An example of this is the area of the Ural race (the Ural type), viz. Western Siberia, the territory along the Urals and between the Volga and the Kama. The range of morphological variability here is very wide: in a comparatively small territory forms are found varying widely as far as Mongoloid and Europeoid characteristics are concerned. Variations in

single characteristics are assembled into local combinations. This is reflected in high inter-group correlation coefficients.

Each group is differentiated from the others by the degree of its proximity to the Europeoid or Mongoloid poles of the imaginary axis, rather than by a complex of "neutral" characteristics. Our information about variations in isoserological systems over that territory is not complete. Judging by dermatoglyphic characteristics, peoples of the Ural type occupy an intermediate position between the Europeoids and the Mongoloids. The features themselves are patterned by strong inter-group correlation. Consequently, mixing does not lead to different variability of morphological and other characteristics. On the contrary, it regulates the race formation process so that complexes of characteristics are formed in micro-areas within a large mixture area. These complexes are connected through chains of intermediate forms and according to all the characteristics—morphological, serological, dermatoglyphic—seem to take an intermediate position between the original characteristics, which participated in mixing. Each complex of characteristics, specific for a given micro-area, differs from the others in that it tends to approach one rather than the other original prototype.

It would seem that the difference between the two types of race formation is self-evident. Not only is the nature of the process different, but also its results—the complexes of historically associated characteristics, with each complex revealing a specific variability type. However, the overwhelming majority of anthropological classifications include the Pamirs peoples in the Central Asian interfluvial or Pamirs-Ferghana race, and the West Siberian and Ural peoples in the Ural race. These two races are placed in almost the same taxonomical rank. All classifications point out that Mongoloid components played some part in the formation of both races. That part was less important in the former and considerable in the latter race. However, the nature of the variability within each of these categories is ignored. Therefore, if the present status of the two races in the system is taken as the starting point, they can be equated as taxonomic units. This, however, ought not to be done, for important

variability factors of the entire complex of characteristics and their interconnection are thereby ignored.

Adaptation, direct, indirect (correlative) or mediated by natural selection, may also result largely in a specific type of race formation. All features that are used in textbooks (without being finally proved, it is true) as the most typical examples of adaptation—the flat face, the epicanthic eye-fold and the straight thick hair of the Mongoloids, the Negroid curly hair, thick lips and wide nose—are spread over large areas, as adaptation naturally manifests itself primarily in relation to basic environmental components, which are distributed over large territories. These features are common to all the groups that have been undergoing adaptation. However, they conceal a more or less significant polymorphism for other characteristics, whose variations often depend on chance and cannot be assembled into definite complexes. This is, perhaps, the source of the difficulties occurring in any attempt at a classification of separate local varieties in the Negroid or Mongoloid races. These difficulties prevented some important scholars from recognising these major races as real taxonomic units. They prefer to speak of them as conventional concepts uniting groups of heterogeneous objects. More such examples could be given, but this does not seem necessary, for the author's task is to modify the commonly accepted idea that form-building factors play a different role in different territories or groups. Thus, the concept of the polymorphous species should be replaced by a realisation that the units of anthropological systematics are themselves heterogeneous as a result of the various ways in which race formation takes place. Such units should be differentiated according to the type of their variability as well as to their taxonomic value.

MODES OF RACE FORMATION

The specific process of race formation in different territories is dependent on the intensity of isolation, the power of adaptive variability, the absence or presence of ethnic and social barriers (ethnic affiliation, creed, endo- or exogamy,

etc.), as well as on the demographic structure of the population. This process leads, as we have been trying to demonstrate, to different types of inter-group variability, and, consequently, to differences in the quality of the basic systematic units within the species *Homo sapiens*, to their polymorphism and different behaviour in inter-group variability patterns. This diversity is reflected in the differing variability of different characteristics, and also in the degree of their manifestation, interconnection and territorial co-occurrence. In other words, all these factors reflect the intensity of the process of race formation and its patterns.

One can sum up all these characteristics in the concept of different modes of race formation, i.e., forms of race formation that reflect specific inter-group variability in each case, i.e., specifically characterise the actual race-formation process in a given territory.

The idea of race-formation modes makes it possible to differentiate race formation, understood as a dynamic process, into constituent elements and study every such constituent separately. That would give fuller and better results than a summary review of race variability in general. The concept of modes also enables one to synthesise disparate data on morphological features (conventional types of all racial classifications), on serological characteristics (cf. W. Boyd's serological races), as well as on many other independently varying morphological and physiological systems. This can be done by tracing common regularities underlying these data. Finally, the concept of modes transforms the existing dry and symmetrical scheme of race formation in modern man into a live and many-faceted reflection of the complexity and variety of racial differentiation in mankind.

So far three race-formation modes can tentatively be proposed. They are by no means exhaustive, nor does the author aim at a comprehensive classification. These three race-formation modes are an initial and a rather imperfect outline of such a classification. The first and, judging by the available anthropological evidence, the most widespread type of race formation may be called the mode of typological variability. This is the type of change characterised by sharp territorial differentiation in separate complexes of features, a high degree of historical correlation be-

tween these features, and pronounced morphological distinctions between the separate populations. The whole group of populations where this variability type occurs display a more or less strict geographical variability within a common area. The example of the Ural race, given earlier, serves well to illustrate the mode of typological variability. For several decades the anthropological study of races has centred on typological variability. At present supporters of the widespread typological concept of race (Soviet scholars, many anthropologists from Poland and other socialist countries, and some German and American specialists) regard the typological race formation as the only form of race-formation process. They tend to apply the typological concept particularly often in palaeoanthropological studies. This concept in its extreme form leads to a typological diagnosis of the individual in racial analysis, which is reflected in practical work.

The second type of race formation may be called the mode of local variability. One can speak here of more or less geomorphologically homogeneous territories, free from serious aquatic barriers. If such a territory is populated by ethnically homogeneous people and there is no or little adaptation, the only factor to restrict mixing is the range of marriage connections. The variability due to local random causes is of primary importance under such conditions. It is practically the only, or at least the dominant, form of race formation. The population concept of race now gaining more and more recognition (represented by the overwhelming majority of American and British anthropologists as well as by many Soviet and some West European specialists) in its extreme approach rejects the typological concept of race formation and ascribes the decisive importance to micro-variability and discovery of specifically local shifts in variations of characteristics. Studies in racial genetics begin and end with the homogeneous population instead of the typological complex. Individual supporters of the population concept go so far as to reject the reality of races, i. e., the existence of any typological complexes at all, thus denying any regularities in inter-group variability. True, such scholars are a minority among the adherents of this theory.

It can easily be noticed that the idea of race-formation modes goes some way towards reconciling the two concepts of race, demonstrating that the precise type of variability emphasised by supporters of one concept or the other is really not universal, but prevalent only in a particular area. The idea of the race-formation process as a complex synthesis of micro-processes that may take the path of type formation or turn towards local variability, often over large territories, restricts the sphere of application of both population and typological concepts of race and creates a basis not for continuing the discussion, but for practical studies that would reveal within the Ecumene centres of typological, or, as it were, wave-like race formation.

The third type of race formation may be called the mode of conditioned variability. It is based on genetic drift for monofactorial characteristics and conditioned changes in time for polysfactorial ones. These processes are not parallel and their results do not coincide.

Conditioned changes of morphological characteristics often unify the anthropological composition of the population over large areas, cf. the spread of brachycephaly in the modern epoch. Genetic drift, conversely, differentiates populations, introducing an ever greater number of distinctions between them. These two processes should probably be considered as separate modes of race formation. However, in both cases conditioned changes may proceed along the same lines for some time. Besides, genetic drift by its very nature does not embrace changes of polygenetic characteristics. Needless to say, race is not merely the sum total of monogenetic characteristics. Therefore, in considering modes of race formation, i.e., the ways in which race complexes are formed, it is advisable to continue to consider these two phenomena together under one concept, the mode of conditioned change.

These modes of race formation are not mutually exclusive. Often different modes may act together, which results in specific territorial development. This is clearly shown by an example from the last type of race formation referred to. Brachycephalisation, dolichocephalisation, gracilisation, and, as has been found of late, also maturation, as well as genetic drift, tend to complicate the pattern of race for-

mation following on the whole a typological or wave-like mode. Practical study of that variation in the Ecumene is an exciting task for future work.

THE MODE OF TYPOLOGICAL VARIABILITY

Typological variability has been a subject of study since the first detailed anthropological classifications appeared, i.e., at least for a hundred years. During that time a number of highly elaborate schemes of genealogical interrelations and the hierarchy into which they should fit have been suggested for the basic types. A major drawback of these classifications has always been the lack of agreement between the various schemes on fundamental points, not to mention numerous odd details. There is not even agreement on the number of basic races, and any lesser issue inevitably leads to controversy too. However, we are interested in taxonomic discussions far less than in the race-formation type itself, which results in morphologically pronounced, easily distinguishable geographical complexes of characteristics. Let us consider the race-formation process in the Caucasus. This can easily be done, since we have almost exhaustive somatological data for all major ethnic groups in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, gathered by Soviet anthropologists in recent years.

All these studies have led to the distinction of four anthropological types in the Caucasus area: Pontian, in the western regions of the North Caucasus and near the Black Sea; Caucasian, in the central foothills of the Caucasus; Armenoid, or Near-Asiatic, in Georgia and Armenia; and Caspian, in Azerbaijan and South Daghestan. Each of these types is characterised primarily by a specific morphology, so distinct that in most cases a representative of any of these types can be identified at once by the complex of characteristics he possesses. Naturally, there are morphologically transitional forms, especially in intermediate areas. Thus, the Caucasian type gradually changes into Pontian through varieties found among East Circassians and Kabardians. Forms intermediate between the Caucasian and the Near-Asiatic types

occur in Central Georgia. South Daghestan is a transitional zone between the Caucasian and the Caspian types. Materials on the anthropology of Azerbaijan have not yet been published in full, but they will no doubt help to identify transitional forms between the Near-Asiatic and the Caspian types. However, in the centres of the areas each of the four types possesses a specific complex of characteristics, distinguishing it sharply from the other Caucasian types.

Apart from specific morphology, the four types are characterised by a definite geographical location. The Pontian type occupies the western part of the Caucasus, the Caucasian type the northern part of the central regions, the Near-Asiatic, the southern part of the central regions, and the Caspian the eastern part of the Caucasus. Their areas border on each other, but do not overlap, or, if they do, as in Daghestan, that can always be ascribed to comparatively late migrations of various ethnic groups. Even in the periphery of the areas the borders between the types are distinct enough and, with rare exceptions, it is always possible to decide whether we have a periphery population of some type or other, or a transitional group.

True, there is certain geographical variability even within the areas of the basic populations. Thus, the western varieties of the Caucasian type are, as a whole, somewhat lighter in colour than the eastern ones, though the Svans, the darkest people of this type, live in the west. Caspian types among Daghestan peoples are a little lighter than the Azerbaijanians. The Near-Asiatic type in the Caucasus also shows considerable variations, as M. G. Abdushelishvili demonstrated with the help of copious material. But in most cases these distinctions concern one separate characteristic. They do not form complexes of characteristics and do not distort the overall picture of close genetic ties between all groups within a type. The irregular nature of variability within the type, its tendency to appear only in odd characteristics and the absence of distinctive complexes keep variability within the type separate from differences between types. An important fact here is that in the latter case distinctive features are associated by high inter-group correlation.

Thus, the mode of typological variability is clearly manifest in the Caucasus. The same type of race formation, but

on a lower level, that of subtypes, has been considered above in connection with the genesis of the Ural type. One can consequently make a general statement that mixture leads to intense typological variability and the appearance of groups that form a chain of gradual intermediate stages between the original types. A second case is when an intensive race-formation process is accompanied by isolating factors, such as geographical barriers or social ones, like ethnus, language, religion or endogamy. This may lead to a disappearance of the original integrity in the case of monogenetic characteristics, but with polygenetic characteristics this may result in the formation of typological differences, the original integrity still being preserved. This is evidently the picture in the Caucasus.

As far as non-mountainous regions are concerned, Siberia provides a similar pattern of race formation. The isolating geographical factor here is the vast taiga-covered expanse; the isolating social factor is language differences.

THE MODE OF LOCAL VARIABILITY

Studies of the mode of local variability do not have such a long tradition as the study of typological variability. Such studies have begun only recently. Apart from collecting primary data following traditional procedures, methods for the study of micro-variability and its causes (above all the range of marriage ties) are being elaborated and improved.

The field work of the anthropologist blends here with that of the genealogist, which creates considerable, sometimes insurmountable difficulties. Such work can only be successful when, together with somatological data, information on other systems with monomeric heredity is being collected. Such systems are much more important for the mode of local variability than for the mode of typological variability.

Studies carried out in Central Europe (by I. Schwidetzky, M. Wolf) are of great interest for the understanding of local or, more precisely, micro-variability. They have shown that

the width of the marriage circle, determining in the long run local variations of characteristics, itself depends on numerous factors. In particular, these studies have elucidated the role of physical geography in anthropological differentiation. It turns out that groups of populations which are absolutely identical in historical and ethnographical respects and are spaced at regular intervals along the Middle Rhine fall into two subgroups sited on opposite sides of the Rhine.

Similarly, forest areas act as geographical barriers in the formation of micro-isolates. Such concrete studies of micro-variability are an important step towards developing a theory of this phenomenon and its role in race formation. Among the more recent forward-looking studies special mention should be made of V. V. Bunak's report at the Seventh International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences.

A good example of local variability prevailing over typological variability is the territory of the Great Russian Plain, populated by Russians. Its vast extent, the comparative homogeneity of its physical geography, the absence of ethnic barriers—all this produces a wave-like type of race formation, when the degree of difference between groups depends on random factors that create the background for local variability, rather than on combinations of characteristics associated by inter-group correlations. Soviet scholars, who have gathered in recent years copious somatological material on all the main territorial groups of Russians, distinguish several territorial complexes within the Russian people. But distinctions between these complexes are less sharp than in the Caucasus; in other words, the degree of morphological differentiation is incomparably lower on the Great Russian Plain than among the Caucasian peoples. Besides pigmentation, only cranial index and face width display any territorial correlation. Most other characteristics vary randomly with territory. Thus, the criterion of a definite area is not in favour of typological variability.

A similar mode of race formation was discovered by J. Hiernaux in Central Africa. Notwithstanding the elaborate technique of data gathering, a wide coverage of both morphological characteristics and various monomeric sys-

tems and a sophisticated mathematical analysis of the data, he was unable to distinguish in the Bantu-speaking peoples he studied any morphologically different territorial complexes that could be regarded as types. In spite of the isolation of these Bantu-speaking groups, anthropological distinctions between them are not associated with any noticeable inter-group correlation. Linguistic homogeneity may counterbalance isolation, though individual languages and even groups of languages within the Bantu family differ considerably.

On the strength of these examples one may conclude that micro-variability plays an important role in race formation, and is the prevalent form of variability in many territories. The study of the mode of local variability is only just beginning, but it promises to advance our views on the process of race formation as a whole.

THE MODE OF CONDITIONED VARIABILITY

Both genetic drift and the conditioned shifts in time of morphological characteristics have been studied for a long time, and many aspects of these phenomena are sufficiently clear. However, there has been no contrastive evaluation of the rate of conditioned change in monogenetic and polygenic characteristics, although the relevant data are available. But this refers only to a general description of these phenomena.

A casual analysis is sufficient only for genetic drift. However, even numerous studies of this kind have not led to any satisfactory results as far as the conditioned change in morphological characteristics is concerned.

It is not yet clear whether these phenomena have resulted from some paratypic effect or from internal shifts (e.g. in the rate of growth) that outwardly express changes in genetic structure.

The mode of conditioned change rarely occurs in its pure form. Its effects could be surmised where in regular geographical variability a break in regularity occurs for characteristics typical of one or several populations. Palaeoanthro-

logical material helps to establish whether one is dealing with a case of conditioned variability or with a complex of characteristics preserved from a previous stage of race formation. But this material is not always available, so the choice between these two possibilities is difficult, though not impossible. It seems likely that the pure form of the mode of conditioned variability is represented in the Nganasan and, in part, the Dolghans anthropological types. They are characterised by a huge face and head, far larger than in other groups even of the Central Asian type, the most mature of all Siberian Mongoloids. As regards their other characteristics, which have not undergone conditioned change at all, these peoples hardly differ from the Katanga type. The break in the normal progress of geographical variability for precisely those characteristics that are usually liable to conditional change is in this case a most convincing proof of the effect of the mode of conditioned variability. The Nganasans' and the Dolghans' special place in the blood group factor matrix, would have provided an ample proof of the case but there is not enough material on Siberia as a whole to be able to judge.

Such relatively clear-cut cases as the anthropological peculiarities of the population of the Taimyr are comparatively rare.

Thus, one could presume the action of the mode of conditioned variability in the formation of the Caucasian type in the central foothills of the Caucasus, because its main distinctions concern those characteristics where variability occurs most frequently—the size of head and face and the general build. There are, however, reasons to believe that we have a survival of a past epoch in race formation, i.e., the preservation in isolation with very few changes of a most ancient protomorphic type, probably from the time when the alpine regions of the Caucasus were first settled by man of the modern variety. Conditioned variability played some part in the formation of the Caucasian type, but this is only reflected in the increase of the cranial index. Thus, conditioned change has manifested itself only in one characteristic, and not in a complex of characteristics, so this region cannot be considered typical as regards the mode of conditioned variability.

Conditioned variability is usually a concomitant feature which complicates the already tangled picture of race formation along typological or local variability lines. The effects of brachycephalisation or gracilisation have been studied on palaeoanthropological data in the Soviet Union. Their significance for the formation of physical peculiarities in some populations has also been explored. The role of dolichocephalisation has been studied on craniological material for the pre-modern and on somatological material for the modern population of Switzerland. Similar phenomena in other regions of Western Europe and North Africa are common knowledge. They also occur in the areas populated by Mongoloid peoples, for example, in Japan. But the general trend of the race-formation process in all these regions follows either the typological or local mode. Thus, the complex intertwining of different modes of race formation is the norm rather than the exception. It is probably due to the fact that the types of race formation may replace each other in the same territory with time, and later stages may preserve the vestiges of processes that took place in earlier times.

A GENERAL SCHEME OF RACE ANALYSIS
IN CONNECTION WITH THE NATURE OF THE
RACE-FORMATION PROCESS

The concept of various modes of race formation reconciles not only the two opposed concepts of race, the typological and populationist concepts, but also different, often mutually exclusive, tendencies in race analysis. Indeed, the geographical criterion is of crucial importance where regular geographical variability and high inter-group correlation between characteristics are observed (i.e., local complexes are distinguishable within a territory, with characteristic morphology and restricted areas of their own). For such cases the taxonomic evaluation of characteristics with emphasis on the geographical criterion appears to be effective. This principle was elaborated in the brilliant article by A. Yarkho.⁴ The entire racial analysis is accomplished for major

⁴ A. I. Yarkho, "On Certain Questions of Race Analysis", *Antropologichesky zhurnal*, No. 3, 1934.

characteristics with the subsequent identification of smaller categories, which are then organised according to the genealogical scheme. This taxonomic operation is inevitably part of the study of the mode of typological variability, and is, in fact, indispensable for the latter.

This is not the case for the mode of local variability. Territorial diversity rules out the use of the geography of race characteristics for the reconstruction of their history and, consequently, for the evaluation of their age and taxonomic importance.

Naturally, when individual characteristics are strictly localised, while most others display considerable variation (cf. pigmentation on the Great Russian Plain), they should be given priority, and territorial complexes should be differentiated according to such characteristics. But it is impossible to distinguish smaller categories within such complexes because geographical variability blurs the picture, varieties of individual characteristics intertwine and the criteria for morphological affinity are not clear enough when different groups share common features mosaically rather than in complex: i. e., affinity for one characteristic is accompanied by divergence for another. The technique of summary comparison retains its value for such cases, notwithstanding the critical attacks it has been exposed to for the past thirty years. In practice, it is the only possible way to establish the degree of similarity between different populations and quantify it. Theoretically, its application is quite sound, for, as long as different characteristics have dispersed areas, the equating of each of them to the others is justifiable because of its short history and the resulting low taxonomic value. It is impossible and unnecessary to discuss here the existing methods of summary comparison. It should, however, be kept in mind that its success depends on two factors, no matter which particular method is applied: the maximum number of characteristics and the minimum number of morphophysiological connections between them should be included in the calculations. This is a precaution against making erroneous comparisons between forms resulting from parallel development.

No strict or comprehensive technique has so far been suggested for the study of conditioned variability. There are

no constants for genetic drift or for the rate of conditioned changes in morphological characteristics. The theory of genetic drift is mainly used to explain sharp differences of monomeric characteristics in adjacent populations. In the study of morphological characteristics and their changes from one epoch to another the direction of the latter is emphasised rather than their rate. The rate of genetic drift in different populations and in different territories is indeed hard to determine, as the relevant data should cover at least two generations and preferably three. As for the rate of change in morphological characteristics, one may follow here the approach currently applied to the rate of evolution and make use of the experience already gained in that field. The change rate units employed there (Darwin, etc.) are very rough and thus ill-suited to our purposes, but the principle of rate evaluation may be the same. There are enough factual data to permit the evaluation of the change rate in many regions of the Ecumene.

Thus, considering the complexity of the race-formation process and the variety of race-formation modes, it is difficult to suggest even theoretically a universal scheme of racial analysis. The first stage in a study of racial genetics should be the determination of the mode of race formation. The regular nature of geographical variability and the high inter-group correlation between characteristics allow of an analysis for leading characteristics with eventual grouping of the complexes according to the genealogical hierarchy. In the case of irregular geographical variability and low inter-group correlation between characteristics or its absence, summary comparison technique is preferable. In the study of conditioned change one should aim at an evaluation of the change rate as compared with other territories, because this is where conditioned variability primarily manifests itself.

THE MODES OF RACE FORMATION AND THE NATURE OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF GENES

All these race-formation modes express various combinations of phenotypical variability. However, we should be primarily interested in genotypical variability, in the genet-

ic fund of populations and, consequently, in the genesis of combinations of characteristics rather than in mere morphological similarity. The transition from phenotypical variability to genotype is actually the key task in race genetics studies.

This transition is simpler in the case of monomeric characteristics. For example, there exist formulae for the correspondence between phenotypical frequencies and the frequencies of respective genes for blood groups of the A, B, O system and certain others. At present maps of the paucimanic and regional distribution of serological factors can be drawn for gene frequencies but not for phenotypical variations. There are no such formulae for morphological characteristics with polygenic structure, so maps of these characteristics could be drawn only for phenotypical variations. However, in this case too there is a certain basis for the transition from phenotype to genotype and for understanding the genetic significance of a characteristic or a combination of characteristics. The more widespread a homogeneous variation or group of variations, the lesser the probability that we are dealing with a chance event, and the greater the probability that this variation or group of variations is of an ancient origin reflecting certain genetic interrelations between the ethnic groups in which it occurs. Thus, the geography of a polygenic characteristic is so far the only basis for any judgement about its genesis.

What causes the differences in phenotypical variability in different territories, which are reflected in different modes of race formation? Bearing in mind the importance of the geographical distribution of characteristics for establishing their genesis, we assume that the cause of different modes of race formation lies in the nature of the geographical distribution of genes for racial features. We have already mentioned that typological race formation occurs most often in areas where, owing to geomorphological peculiarities and water barriers, the integral race-formation process is subdivided into several micro-processes, each in its own large region but somewhat separated from the others. Such is the case in the Caucasus and also in Central Asia, where an additional cause of typological variability has been intensive mixture between Europeoids and Mongoloids in the recent

past. The geography of genes is affected in this case by physical geography, which causes more or less abrupt breaks in their geographical distribution. The genetic geography of local variability is different. Here the distribution of genes is only restricted by the extent of the marriage circle. Water and other geographical barriers influence the race-formation process (cf. the above-mentioned studies of the Middle Rhine), but this influence is too weak to disturb the even distribution of genes. The whole territory is, as it were, subdivided into a multitude of tiny race-formation centres, whose diameter depends on the extent of the marriage circles. On the other hand, these circles tend to merge, so transitional areas are formed between separate micro-centres. A more uniform gene distribution than in typological variability results in a wave-like nature of race formation.

Thus, genetic geography is the key to the geography of the race-formation process and to understanding the origin of different variability modes. These, as well as other considerations (see below), should be regarded as a tentative hypothesis.

THE MODE OF LOCAL VARIABILITY AS THE TERRITORIAL LIMITATION OF PANMIXTION

If no geographical barriers existed within the Ecumene and, consequently, there were no isolation or adaptation, the anthropological composition of mankind today would be much more homogeneous. A complete restriction of mixing (e.g., a situation where no movement of population had ever occurred) would have had a further stabilising effect on the morphology of modern man. But even in the latter case the anthropological composition of mankind would not be fully homogeneous. The distribution of genes over the Ecumene would be influenced by the long distances that act as barriers. There would be concentrations of genes and variability clusters over certain territories, while the areas between them would form transitional zones with intermediate morphological characteristics.

This is approximately the picture we observe when micro-variability prevails over typological race formation. Morphological features change very little from group to group, and the genetic structure of populations changes as little. Genes in the genetic fund are, as it were, replaced gradually, for each characteristic at a time. This replacement is reflected in the variations of characteristics, but causes no noticeable shifts in variability. The extent of replacement is determined by its marriage circle and the intensity of marriages. Thus, the genes for racial characteristics are more or less evenly distributed over the whole territory where the mode of local variability is observed, but within this territory a great number of alternating micro-areas are distinguishable, with higher and lower concentrations of genes. If it were possible to draw genetic maps for such cases, they would look like a complex mosaic of large and small genetic concentrations for each characteristic.

The marriage circle is a variable. In the countryside, other conditions being equal, it is affected by closeness to a city, the road density and the trade connections between regions and separate villages. Thus, even in an area with an ethnically homogeneous population the extent of the marriage circle may vary from region to region for economic reasons. In this sphere physical anthropology borders upon economics and economic geography. To assess the concrete influence of the marriage circle on territorial variability, it is necessary to carry out comprehensive genealogical studies linked with economic data (the economic level of a region), demographic information (the migration of population) and data on economic geography (e.g., the highway and railway network). Without this information it is very difficult, and even impossible, to operate with such concepts as the marriage circle or degree of affinity, as does, for example, V. V. Bunak. Generally speaking, no matter how variable the marriage circle is, it is primarily a territorial concept and depends on how far marriage connections reach. These are restricted mainly by distance, by the practical isolation of populations separated by a given number of kilometres constant for that district. It is our view, then, that in the local variability mode one is dealing primarily with the territorial restrictions on panmixtion. In other words, the local variability mode

results from a geographical distribution of genes in which gene concentrations vary only little and irregularly from region to region, and the possibilities of gene migration are only restricted by distance.

THE MODE OF TYPOLOGICAL VARIABILITY AS
THE MECHANICAL AND SOCIAL RESTRICTION OF
PANMIXTION

The geographical distribution of genes bears a different character in the case of typological variability. Populations in which various complexes of characteristics occur often differ from each other in that they possess not only different variations of the same characteristics, but also new features, i.e., morphological peculiarities that characterise only these or related populations, and are absent in other populations or groups of populations. This fact in itself reveals a different geography of genes as compared with the mode of local variability: different genes are concentrated in different regions; they are no longer uniformly distributed over the territory. This may be caused by two factors. The first factor is an original chance difference in genetic concentration, which may have increased after the formerly uniform territory was segmented by isolating barriers or when race-formation processes in this area took completely opposite courses (this is normal in the typological variability mode: in adjacent areas race-formation processes often display opposite features). The second factor is a slow change in genetic structure after isolation has taken place and under the influence of adaptation or other race-forming factors.

How does typological variability manifest itself when its area is not a mixture zone? If the area is either very large or very small, it is hard to believe that race-forming factors are acting on a group of populations with an absolutely identical genetic structure. This is logically improbable. All detailed genetic studies show that even genetically similar *individuals* are hard to find, to say nothing of *populations*. Genetic heterogeneity at the very beginning of race

formation is a hard fact (the Wright Effect). True, at first the significance of this phenomenon for race formation was overestimated, and this gave rise to well-grounded criticism. But that criticism was aimed only at the exaggerated evaluation of the Wright Effect in the theoretical interpretation of evolution. The phenomenon itself is an undisputed reality. Thus, a group of populations, small or large, in which the mode of typological variation begins to act is genetically heterogeneous from the very start. That heterogeneity may be expressed to a varying degree: from a difference in the concentration of the same genes to different inventories of genes in the populations' genetic fund. Heterogeneity is accentuated by the fact that no race-formation mode exists in isolation, but has to deal with the results of the preceding race-forming processes.

What happens to this heterogeneity thereafter? What factors enhance it? Is typological variability merely a result of heterogeneity in the group of original populations? The answer to all these questions lies in the correct evaluation of the importance of geographical barriers and social isolation. If mixture occurs in a group of heterogeneous populations, it, naturally, eliminates heterogeneity, provided the original complexes differed only slightly. But if they differed considerably (if regular typological combinations were preserved from an earlier stage of race formation), mixture creates a system of inter-group correlations and leads to regularity in the geographical distribution of characteristics. Morphologically different and territorially localised complexes appear.

If geographical barriers are present (geomorphological—mountains, hydrological—rivers, or botanical—forests or bogs, deserts and semi-deserts), they, naturally, increase the original heterogeneity. The former integrity, especially in morphological characteristics, is preserved and therefore it is possible to establish mutual affinity between types, but the differences that existed in the group of original populations are enhanced partly due to isolation itself, partly to stochastic processes, adaptation, indirect adaptation, selection, i. e., the race-forming factors determining the specific character of race formation in a given territory and in a given group of population. Social isolation acts in a sim-

ilar way, fixing and enhancing the original heterogeneity. Thus, the mode of typological variability appears either in unlimited, intensive panmixtion (when new types based on the already existing ones are formed), or when panmixtion is restricted by geographical factors and social isolation. In that case, new types are formed that are new taxonomic categories.

Geographical barriers act as mechanical causes preventing the spread of genes and combination of genes. This makes it possible to relate, as is done in the title of this chapter, typological variability to mechanical and social restrictions on panmixtion.

Thus, the mode of typological variability is based on a geographical distribution of genes in which their panecumenic or distant migration is hampered by mechanical (geographical barriers) and social (social isolation) factors.

THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF GENES IN CONDITIONED VARIABILITY

The question of whether the conditioned dynamic change of morphological characteristics in time (cranial index, facial width, cranium shape, height) is paratypical or genetically determined is not yet solved. There are many hypotheses in favour of one solution or the other. Brachycephalisation has been related to habitats with large basalt outcrops or to alpine regions. On the other hand, gracilisation has been related to the introduction of agriculture and a change of diet. An attempt has been made recently to use data on the relation between constitutional habits and psycho-physiological peculiarities in order to connect the problem of gracilisation with the selection hypothesis. The problem is whether the psycho-physiological structure of a more gracile type is better suited to the new requirements of the social environment in an agricultural society than that of the more mature type. The data on the correspondence between morphological and psycho-physiological peculiarities and the correctness of this approach seem to be confirmed by Y. Rogninsky's most interesting observations. Nevertheless the

most general hypothesis explaining the effect of conditioned processes on morphological characteristics is the one suggested by V. Bunak in order to explain brachycephalisation, the hypothesis of shifts in the rate of growth. Although in this case external causes are likewise not unimportant, the main emphasis is placed on the internal morphological regularities of growth.

This field, as seen from the genetic point of view, belongs to phenogenetics, the most difficult and slowly developing area of genetics. In all probability, the crucial factors in the genetics of development and growth are phenomena in plasmic heredity. We are less concerned with stating this fact, however, than with pointing out that these phenomena are outside genetic geography and the regularities in the territorial distribution of genes. Conditioned changes in monofactorial characteristics, reflected in genetic drift, are also governed by probability rules which are outside genetic geography. Unlike other modes, the mode of local variability is, thus, not a result of the geographical distribution of genes. It results from stochastic processes in the case of monofactorial characteristics and from phenogenetic variability in the case of polyfactorial ones.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The progressive concept of the polymorphous species now dominant in biology should be expanded to cover the systematic divisions of mankind. Man is not an aggregate species, as some classifications assert, but a polymorphous species.
2. The different role that form-building factors play in different conditions leads to specific nature of variability in different zones of the Ecumene and in different modern human groups.
3. All this makes it possible to distinguish different modes of race formation, displaying their special types of variability: the mode of typological variability, the mode of local variability and the mode of conditioned variability.

4. The cause of different modes of race formation lies in the varying character of the geographical distribution of genes.

5. The mode of typological variability appears when panmixtion is restricted mechanically or socially, when the migration of genes is hampered by geographical barriers or social isolation. In unrestricted panmixtion the effect of this mode is limited by the formation of complexes of characteristics based on already existing complexes, i. e., by recombination, rather than by the formation of fundamentally new complexes.

6. The mode of local variability appears when panmixtion is territorially restricted. This is determined by the extent of the marriage circle when only inertia in overcoming distance hampers the migration of genes.

7. The mode of conditioned variability is not a result of any regularity in the geographical distribution of genes. It seems to result from stochastic processes in the case of monomeric characteristics and from phenogenetic variability in the case of polymeric characteristics.

8. The existing methods of racial analysis should be differentiated according to the mode of race formation they are applied to. The initial step for every study in racial genetics should be to establish the mode of race formation.

The viewpoint expressed here has been formed under the influence of the outstanding studies by N. L. Vavilov which, in the author's opinion, are an unparalleled example of determined scientific inquiry.

National Problems and Ethnic Processes in the Modern World

The Soviet Union

V. A. Kumanev
EXPERIENCE OF THE USSR IN IMPLEMENTING
A NATIONALITIES POLICY

The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the world's first multi-national state of workers and peasants, was a continuation of the great cause of the October Revolution and it was a mighty gain for socialism. It resulted from the selfless creative efforts of all the Soviet peoples under the leadership of the working class and the guidance of its vanguard—the Communist Party. Lenin wrote: "...We have a right to be and are proud that to us has fallen the good fortune to *begin* the building of a Soviet state, and thereby to *usher in* a new era in world history, the era of the rule of a new class, a class which is oppressed in every capitalist country, but which everywhere is marching forward towards a new life, towards victory over the bourgeoisie, towards the dictatorship of the proletariat, towards the emancipation of mankind from the yoke of capital and from imperialist wars."¹

In its political significance and social and political consequences the creation of the USSR is one of the major events of the 20th century. The resolution of the CC CPSU "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 55.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" states: "This historic event is a convincing victory for the ideas of proletarian internationalism and is the fruitful result of implementing the Leninist nationalities policy of the Communist Party."² Only the uniting of all the fraternal peoples freed by the revolution into a single Union could guarantee favourable conditions for the restructuring of society along socialist lines and for the unprecedented, all-embracing upsurge in the economy and culture of all the Soviet republics.

The formation of the USSR was a powerful factor in the growth of the country's international authority. It initiated the far-ranging development of diplomatic, economic, trade, cultural and other links with foreign states. The USSR emerged as the champion of the cause of friendship between peoples and provided an example of strict adherence to the principles of proletarian internationalism.

When surveying the course of the USSR's development over 50 years, one must always bear in mind the legacy in national relations that the Bolsheviks inherited from the old Russia—a country whose population was extremely varied ethnically and was dispersed over a vast area.³ The Empire's working masses lived in widely differing social, economic and cultural conditions. Many of them, e.g., the nomadic peoples, had scarcely reached the feudal stage in their social development. In a large number of regions there was no industry and practically no working class, and, as Engels observed, "only proletarians are capable of eliminating isolation, only an awakening proletariat can establish brotherhood among different nations."⁴ A high proportion of the "national borderlands" of the Russian state were simply appendages, supplying the industrial centre with raw materials.

A striking reflection of the downtrodden status of the nationalities in the Empire was the almost universal illiteracy of the non-Russian peoples: just before the Revolution

² *On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Resolution of the CC CPSU of February 21, 1972, Moscow, 1972, p. 4 (in Russian).

³ Non-Russians accounted for up to 57 per cent of the population of tsarist Russia.

⁴ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 2, S. 614.

only 0.5 per cent of adult Tajiks could read and write; for the Kirghiz the figure was 0.6 per cent, for the Yakuts and Turkmen 0.7 per cent, and so on.⁵ There is no record of anyone's being able to read or write in the Far North. The autocracy's attitude towards the possibility of educating the national minorities is summed up in the cynical declaration made by the Minister of Education, Count D. A. Tolstoi: "The purpose of educating all nationalities living in our country is unquestionably to Russify them."⁶

Teaching took place in the most unsanitary conditions. As Kosta Khetagurov wrote, school buildings in Upper Ossetia were "more like cattle-sheds than places of education".⁷ A direct result of the autocracy's policy of colonisation was the absence of writing among almost 50 peoples. Tsarist satraps did not allow instruction in schools to be given in the vernacular, and they banned the publication of newspapers and books in the national areas. The diffusion of elementary knowledge was proceeding so slowly in these areas that the statisticians of the time could only make the gloomiest of forecasts. Lenin wrote in 1913: "There is no other country so barbarous and in which the masses of the people are robbed to such an extent of education, and knowledge—no other such country has remained in Europe; Russia is the exception."⁸

Even tsarist officials were forced to admit the incredible backwardness of the small nationalities. For instance, in 1902 the head of the gendarmerie in the Ufa Gubernia wrote in a report: "Almost the whole of the non-Russian population is still at the lowest level of cultural development.... As for the indigenous Bashkirs, they are on the way to complete degeneration...."⁹

However, despite sharp contrasts in the level of cultural and economic development in the different areas, Russia was an economic entity, and links existed or were emerging

⁵ See: *Bolshevik*, No. 20, 1932, pp. 80-83.

⁶ Quoted in: R. B. Suleimenov, K. N. Bisenov, *The Socialist Path to Cultural Progress of the Backward Peoples*, Alma-Ata, 1967, p. 63.

⁷ K. Khetagurov, *Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1951, p. 187 (in Russian).

⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 139.

⁹ *Kommunist*, No. 14, 1967, p. 43.

between the regions within a single state framework. Throughout their entire history the peoples of the country had shared a common destiny, and had made common cause against foreign invaders. They were further united by the revolutionary struggle against exploiters within their own ranks. The popular uprisings led by Stepan Razin and Yemelyan Pugachev and the Patriotic War of 1812 against Napoleon provide sufficient illustration of this. The working masses of other nationalities were actively involved, alongside the Russian people.

There is no doubt about the spiritual closeness between the foremost representatives of many peoples of the Empire—Pushkin and Chavchavadze, Shevchenko and Valikhanov, Abai and Khetagurov, Chernyshevsky and Akhundov, and many others who strengthened and developed the tradition of friendship among the democratic intelligentsia of different nationalities. This tradition won through despite the nature of capitalism and the chauvinistic policies of the exploiting classes. The revolutionary poet of Latvia, Janis Rainis, wrote: "We Latvians are not demanding freedom from Russia.... We Latvians join with all democratic elements in the common fraternal struggle for a future free Russia."¹⁰

As for the broad masses of the people, manifestations of friendship in those conditions were, naturally, limited and were, to a considerable extent, spontaneous and incoherent. Lenin wrote in 1903: "The accursed history of autocracy has left us a legacy of tremendous *estrangement* between the working classes of the various nationalities oppressed by that autocracy. This estrangement is a very great evil, a very great obstacle in the struggle against the autocracy...."¹¹ Only in the uncompromising battle with the forces of oppression and reaction could that alienation be overcome.

The decisive stage in unifying the emancipation movement of the peoples of Russia began with the emergence of the proletariat into the historical arena of the class struggle. Its ranks comprised workers from the most varied nationalities. The Marxist party created by Lenin played an outstand-

¹⁰ *History of the Latvian SSR*, Vol. 2, Riga, 1954, p. 491.

¹¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, p. 462.

ing role in welding the whole working population together. The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party was the first mass form to be seen in Russia of the international ideological and political community of working people. Lenin pointed out in May 1905: "To dispel any idea of its being national in character, the party called itself '*Rossiiskaya*' and not '*Russkaya*'.¹² Having united within itself the most conscious section of the proletariat and other strata in the working population, the Party was fully in a position to express the vital interests and revolutionary will of the country's working people as a whole, no matter what their nationality.

National relations in pre-revolutionary Russia thus contain a great paradox: on the one hand, Russia was "the prison of the peoples", yet, on the other, there existed here factors that were conducive to a future alliance of nations, and the tradition of friendship between working people of different nationalities was steadily developing. A great social revolution was required to rid the masses of the impurities of mutual distrust and national selfishness and isolation. As Marx put it, "For the peoples to actually unite, they should have common interests; for their interests to be common, the corresponding property relations should be destroyed."¹³

After Marx and Engels, and in new historical conditions, Lenin scientifically worked out the ways in which the national question could be resolved. Long before the victory of the socialist revolution in 1917 Lenin had revealed its class content, showing clearly that the solution of the fundamental national problems was inseparably linked with the main general tasks of a proletarian social revolution, the emancipation of the working people from all forms of exploitation, and the building of socialism.

Lenin armed the working class with a coherent, balanced doctrine on the national question. He gave them a clear concrete programme for attaining equality, mutual understanding and friendship between peoples. He wrote: "We must link the revolutionary struggle for socialism with a revolu-

¹² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 496. The adjective *Russkaya* (Russian) pertains to nationality, *Rossiiskaya* (also Russian) pertains to Russia as a country.—*Ed.*

¹³ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 4, S. 416.

tionary programme on the national question."¹⁴ As Lenin saw it, international unity was impossible without the elimination of all forms of oppression and a real guarantee of the complete political, economic and cultural equality of the nations. That was only possible under socialism. The propertied classes of subjugated nations, he warned, often made use of nationalistic slogans to conceal their attempts to divide the workers and fool them, while behind their backs they would strike a bargain with the exploiting classes of the dominant nation. Lenin wrote: "Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism—these are the two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the *two* policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question."¹⁵

The October Revolution swept away the landowners and the bourgeoisie with their system of national and colonial oppression of the peoples of Russia. It brought political equality and freedom to all working people and created the right conditions for the establishment and development of a union of nations, large and small. Lenin prepared the vital historic revolutionary proclamations which abolished all types of national and national-religious privileges and restrictions, and instituted the equality and sovereignty of all peoples, irrespective of size. Among these documents are the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, the Notice to All Working Moslems of Russia and the East, the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, the first Constitution of the RSFSR (1918) and many others. The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia stated that the oppressive policies of tsarism and Russian capitalism "should be replaced by a policy of voluntary and honourable alliance between the peoples of Russia".¹⁶

After the downfall of the Provisional Government the Bolsheviks' national policy gave priority to overcoming the economic, political and cultural backwardness of the formerly downtrodden peoples. Without this it would have been impossible to put national relations on a sound footing and

¹⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 408.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 20, p. 26.

¹⁶ *Decrees of Soviet Power*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, p. 40 (in Russian).

to ensure that the masses worked together to build a new way of life. "Such is the dialectics of the Marxist-Leninist approach to the national question: the way to cohesion, unity and the all-round integration of nations lies through their complete liberation from social and national oppression, through the creation of the most favourable conditions for the development of each nation."¹⁷ At the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Lenin spelled out the programme for dealing with the national question after the victory of the socialist revolution, saying that, unless that task were correctly handled and due consideration given to national interests and peculiarities, "we cannot build socialist society...".¹⁸

The building of a single multi-national Soviet state as the political form of fraternal co-operation and mutual help among the working people of different nationalities actually began during the first few months after the October Revolution. It is symbolic that the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, at which the Soviet Republic was first proclaimed, was attended by representatives from the most diverse regions and national areas throughout the country. There were delegates from Baku and Moscow, Saransk and Petrograd, Kharkov and Kazan, Revel and Tiflis, Tashkent and Izhevsk, as well as from many towns and villages in the Ukraine, the Baltic area, Siberia, Transcaucasia, Byelorussia and the Urals.

One of the vital factors making for political, economic and cultural progress in the former "national borderlands" of Russia, the attainment of real equality and the strengthening of friendship between them was the setting up of a Soviet state system in forms corresponding to national features. The Ukraine, Byelorussia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were proclaimed sovereign Soviet republics alongside the Russian Soviet Republic.

In January 1918 the Russian Soviet Republic, which was multi-national in composition, was declared by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets to be a federation. Lenin's

¹⁷ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 10-11.

¹⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 196.

Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, accepted by the Congress, stipulated that the Soviet Russian Republic was based on a free union of free nations and was a federation of Soviet national republics. The Soviet type of federation ruled out the coercion of one nation by another, creating the conditions for fraternal co-operation between peoples. It also ensured the harmonious blending of the centralised power and the genuine democracy of the working masses. In a speech made at the Congress Lenin confidently predicted that "more and more diverse federations of free nations will group themselves around revolutionary Russia. This federation is invincible and will grow quite freely, without the help of lies or bayonets. The laws and the state system which we are creating over here are the best earnest of its invincibility".¹⁹

It should be noted that essentially the legislation of the Government of the RSFSR covered the whole country and was implemented in its various regions. Despite the immense difficulties caused by the Civil War and the intervention, a serious start was made on the process of creating the socialist statehood of the large and small peoples of Russia. As more areas were cleared of the enemy, new national Soviet republics were formed, all of which strove for close unity and amalgamation. As early as April 1918, at the Fifth Congress of the Soviets of Turkestan, the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkestan was proclaimed, the first autonomous Soviet republic within the RSFSR. In a letter to the Communists of Turkestan (November 1919) Lenin stressed the extreme international importance of a correct national policy: "The attitude of the Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Republic to the weak and hitherto oppressed nations is of very practical significance for the whole of Asia and for all the colonies of the world, for thousands and millions of people".²⁰

In the course of 1919-1920 the Bashkirian, Karelian, Tatar, Mari, Udmurt and other autonomous republics and regions were born. The urge towards unity that developed during those years was expressed tangibly by the military and

¹⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 481.
²⁰ Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 138.

political alliance between the Soviet republics. The wartime situation made this imperative, for, as Lenin pointed out, it was impossible to defend the existence of the Soviet republics, surrounded as they were by the world's imperialist powers, whose military might was far superior, unless the Soviet republics formed a very close alliance.

Mutual aid between the peoples of the Russian Federation took the most varied forms. There was the joint struggle of the working people of all nationalities against the white-guard counter-revolution and the intervention. There were also the food supplies sent voluntarily to the central areas from the eastern regions of the country, and there are other examples. Fraternal co-operation between the peoples of the Soviet Republic was at the same time accompanied by generous disinterested assistance offered by the Russians and other developed nations to the economically and culturally more backward peoples. This was given to help them build a new way of life. In the historical conditions that had arisen, Lenin considered amalgamation into a state union on federal principles to be the most acceptable form of state entity. He said: "In recognising that federation is a transitional form to complete unity, it is necessary to strive for ever closer federal unity...."²¹ Lenin spoke in detail on this theme in his report at the Second Congress of the Communist International.

By the end of 1922 the RSFSR already included ten autonomous republics. All the Soviet republics were linked by a system of allied treaty relations. The People's Soviet Republic of Khorezin and the Soviet Republic of Bukhara established a firm alliance with Soviet Russia. These republics generally had unified control of finance, military affairs, communications, etc., and yet they did not constitute a single state. "Thus, the vital interests of all the Soviet peoples," Leonid Brezhnev stated, "the very logic of the struggle for socialism in this country demanded the formation of a united multi-national socialist state."²² Leonid Brezhnev also stressed the fact that "the experience of the three revolutions in Russia, the Bolshevik Party's inter-

²¹ Ibid., Vol. 34, p. 147.

²² L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 9.

nationalist slogans, the Decrees on Peace and on Land, the policy of the Communists and Lenin's very name became a symbol of joint struggle for a new life. The working class and the working people of all nationalities wished to strengthen their unity, which had already borne such important fruit in the earlier period.”²³

The establishment of social ownership of the means of production served as the economic basis for the uniting of all the Soviet republics, while the decisive political prerequisite for the process was the assertion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The first five years of Soviet power alone provided the world revolutionary movement with valuable experience, some of which concerned the development of new socialist relations and co-operation between nations and national groups. On Lenin's advice, the Transcaucasian Federation was set up in 1922. It brought Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia together, and entered into close military and economic alliance with the RSFSR. This was a significant step along the road to the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Life itself insistently demanded the complete amalgamation of all the Soviet republics.

The experience that had been gained enabled the truly historic task of creating the USSR to be undertaken in earnest. During these years Lenin brilliantly proved the historical necessity of uniting the Soviet republics, and further developed the internationalist principles of building a multi-national state.

Needless to say, it is not easy to arrive immediately at the most rational ways of combining national and international interests. Focussing attention on the complexity of attaining full unity among nations, Lenin pointed out: “Such a union cannot be effected at one stroke; we have to work towards it with the greatest patience and circumspection, so as not to spoil matters and not to arouse distrust and so that the distrust inherited from centuries of land-owner and capitalist oppression, centuries of private property and the enmity caused by its divisions and redivisions may have a chance to wear off.”²⁴

²³ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 8.

²⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 293.

History has preserved the names of a number of multi-national states, both ancient ones (the Roman Empire, the empire of Alexander the Great) and others from more recent times (Napoleon's empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire—aptly called “the motley monarchy”). Only force and oppression kept the peoples of these states within the same frontiers for a while. Such states were torn by class and national contradictions, and were extremely unstable as unions. As soon as history put them to the test, these motley national conglomerations fell apart in next to no time, since they were built on violence and on an extremely undemocratic base. Lenin made the point: “We do not rule by dividing, as ancient Rome's harsh maxim required, but by uniting all the working people with the unbreakable bonds of living interests and a sense of class. This our union, our new state is sounder than power based on violence which keeps artificial state entities hammered together with lies and bayonets in the way the imperialists want them.”²⁵

Furthering the complete national development of the former semi-colonial and dependent peoples of Russia became the corner-stone of Soviet policy since the first steps in the building of socialism. In a resolution of the Tenth Congress of the RCP (Bolsheviks) one of the high-priority tasks was declared to be “to help the working masses of the non-Russian peoples to catch up with Central Russia, which is surging ahead...”²⁶ In following this policy, the Bolshevik Party staunchly upheld Leninist theses relating to the nationalities question. It had to win a hard fight against various anti-Leninist tendencies in its own ranks, revisionists and nationalists of all shades, and instil the spirit of internationalism into the country's tens of millions of working people of all nationalities.

In order to satisfy the peoples' national interests, a special People's Commissariat was set up a few days after the victory of the socialist system to deal with the affairs of the nationalities. By assuming control over every aspect of the

²⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 480.

²⁶ *The CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses and Conferences and of Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee*, Vol. I, 7th ed., p. 559 (in Russian).

work of creating a multi-national state, Soviet power foreshadowed all attempts to infringe the equality of the nations.

Even during the first months after the victorious socialist revolution the Soviet republics constantly expressed their readiness to enter into a closer union. For example, the Ukrainian Provisional Government of Workers and Peasants declared in January 1919 that it was in favour of unifying with Soviet Russia.²⁷ A similar resolution emerged from the Fourth Conference of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine in 1920: "The Russian and Ukrainian working and peasant masses have been united by the struggle against tsarist oppression and the Great Russian bourgeoisie. There are strong ties between them: they speak similar languages, live on one another's territory and share a common economic life. Complete separation of the two Soviet states would simply be an artificial procedure in conflict with the joint struggle waged in the past and in the future by the Ukrainian and Russian workers and peasants."²⁸

In mid-1922 the Communist Parties in the national republics raised the question of establishing closer links with the RSFSR. After that, a vast move towards unification got under way among the peoples of the republics in support of this proposal. All the republics—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia (Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), the Ukraine and Byelorussia—were in favour. Consequently, it was just a question of finding the most effective form of amalgamation.

The CC RCP (Bolsheviks) set up a special commission to draw up a draft treaty that would unite the Soviet republics. Its members included J. V. Stalin, G. K. Orjonikidze, G. I. Petrovsky and A. F. Myasnikov. Although seriously ill, Lenin kept an eye on the commission's preparatory work. He reacted sharply against a plan, supported by Stalin, to "autonomise" the republics, since this would have meant the inclusion of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan,

²⁷ See: *Fraternal Solidarity of the Peoples of the USSR*, Collection of Documents, Central State Archives of the October Revolution, Moscow, 1964, p. 125 (in Russian).

²⁸ *The Communist Party—the Inspirer and Organiser of the Ukrainian People's Movement for the Unification and Formation of the USSR*, Collection of Documents, Kiev, 1962, p. XII (in Russian).

Armenia and Georgia as autonomous republics. The proposal infringed the rights of the Soviet republics and did nothing to consolidate the friendship of the peoples. Another proposal would also have created disunity rather than unity. It put forward the idea that the republics should unite as a confederation. This, however, would have meant that there would be no single budget, citizenship, foreign policy, etc.

The correct course, which embodied the interests both of the country as a whole and of each individual republic, was identified by Lenin, who suggested a new state formation—the USSR. This Union brought together the independent Soviet republics on a voluntary and equal basis. As Lenin observed in his letter of September 26, 1922 to the members of the Political Bureau, "...we consider ourselves, the Ukrainian SSR and others, equal, and enter with them, on an equal basis, into a new union, a new federation...."²⁹ Lenin's view was supported unanimously by the commission formed by the Central Committee, and on October 6, 1922 a Plenary Meeting of the CC RCP (Bolsheviks) approved the proposal and passed the following resolution: "The Meeting considers it essential to conclude a treaty between the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republics and the RSFSR regarding their amalgamation to form a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each one, however, retaining the right of free withdrawal from that Union."³⁰

During the period from October to December 1922 mass meetings took place throughout the country to discuss the question of forming a Union out of the republics. The resolution adopted at a meeting of industrial, office and professional workers in Minsk included the words: "Soviet Byelorussia has been very successful so far, largely owing to its close links with the other Soviet republics."³¹ In Azerbaijan workers from the Kedabek copper works and peasants from neighbouring villages passed the following resolution: "We demand as soon as possible a closer economic and mili-

²⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, pp. 421-22.

³⁰ *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1971, p. 325 (in Russian).

³¹ *A Short History of the USSR*, Part II, Moscow, 1964, p. 147 (in Russian).

tary alliance within a single Soviet Federation."³² Hundreds of similar resolutions poured from meetings held by the working people in Armenia, Georgia and the RSFSR.

On December 10 of the same year the Seventh All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets also decided to support the proposal to form a Union.³³ Such resolutions were adopted by the First Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets, the Fourth Congress of Soviets of Byelorussia and the Tenth All-Russia Congress of Soviets. The republics elected delegates to the inaugural session of the All-Union Congress of Soviets.

In the context of a broad mass drive for amalgamation into a Union, December 30, 1922 saw the opening of the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR in the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. V. I. Lenin, M. I. Kalinin, A. S. Bubnov, S. M. Budyonny, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, J. V. Stalin, P. G. Smidovich and K. Y. Voroshilov were among those elected to form the Russian delegation. The Ukrainian delegation consisted of G. I. Petrovsky, M. V. Frunze, V. Y. Chubar, E. I. Kvirin, D. Z. Manuilsky, N. A. Skrypnik, V. M. Primakov, R. P. Eideman and others. The Transcaucasian Federation was represented by G. K. Orjonikidze, S. M. Kirov, N. N. Narimanov, F. I. Makharadze, A. F. Myasnikov, G. M. Musabekov and other distinguished Party workers. The Byelorussian delegation was headed by A. G. Chervyakov. Lenin was unanimously elected honorary chairman of the Congress. He was unable to attend, owing to his serious illness. With a feeling of deep love for the leader of the world's proletariat the participants in this historic forum sent greetings to Lenin.

Speaking on behalf of the Comintern, the well-known Bulgarian revolutionary Vasil Kolarov declared to the Congress that the peoples of Russia were the first in recorded history to exercise their right to freely choose their own destiny. The formation of the USSR was an event of international significance, an important landmark in mankind's social progress. He appealed to the proletariat to do all

³² *40 Years of the USSR and the Transcaucasian Federation, Collection of Articles*, Baku, 1962, p. 83 (in Russian).

³³ See: *The Communist Party—the Inspirer and Organiser of the Ukrainian People's Movement for the Unification and Formation of the USSR, Collection of Documents*, Kiev, 1962, p. 270 (in Russian).

they can to strengthen the power of the Land of the Soviets—the bulwark and hope of working people the world over.

The Congress unanimously ratified the Declaration and Treaty forming the USSR. These historic documents gave legislative backing to the Leninist principles for constituting a state union: equality, voluntary membership and fraternal co-operation on the basis of proletarian internationalism. Entry to the USSR remained open to all Soviet republics which were then in existence and which might be formed in the future. They retained the right of free secession from this voluntary union. In the period between the congresses the supreme organ of power in the USSR was elected—the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Its presidium was headed by four chairmen: M. I. Kalinin, G. I. Petrovsky, A. G. Chervyakov and N. N. Narimanov.

Summing up the work of the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR, Kalinin observed: "Whole millennia have passed since the finest brains of mankind began to tackle the theoretical problem of what forms would enable people, without great agony and strife, to live together in friendship and brotherhood. Only now, today, is the first stone in this edifice being laid in practice."³⁴

While the congress was in session, Lenin, seriously ill at the time, dictated his article "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'". In this he drew attention to the need for extreme tact which the representatives of a large nation would have to display when dealing with the interests of smaller peoples. No injustice was to be allowed, nor the slightest affront to their national dignity. He wrote: "The fundamental interest of proletarian solidarity, and consequently of the proletarian class struggle, requires that we never adopt a formal attitude to the national question...."³⁵ Lenin's article suggested practical measures designed to consolidate the newly formed Union and eliminate any Great-Power perversions that might appear in the Soviet state apparatus.

³⁴ M. I. Kalinin, *Articles and Speeches 1919-1935*, Moscow, 1936, p. 95 (in Russian).

³⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 609.

Following Lenin's directions, the Twelfth Party Congress, held in April 1923, worked out a detailed programme for setting up the USSR, based on equality of rights and obligations for all the Union republics. In the summer of that year a meeting of the Central Executive Committee approved the Constitution of the USSR and appointed the union government headed by Lenin. It was left to the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets (January 1924) to complete the formation of the single unified state and pass its Basic Law (Constitution). The Constitution of the USSR was a genuinely democratic code of laws produced by the world's most progressive state. It affirmed the complete equality of the peoples, their sovereignty and obligations to the proletarian state, and the principles of democratic centralism. The structure of the supreme state organs ensured the active participation of all the nations and nationalities in the construction of the world's first socialist society.

By its example the Soviet Union showed mankind how backward peoples in an international community could by-pass the agony of capitalist development and leap from pre-capitalist relationships to the socialist mode of production. Moreover, it should be noted that the rate of economic growth in the backward regions always exceeded that of the central area. Large subsidies were generously allocated from the Union budget to help the peoples of underdeveloped areas.

The task had to be accomplished in the context of hostile capitalist encirclement, which excluded any possibility of receiving material assistance from outside. In addition, the country's economy lagged far behind that of the developed countries of the West, and the lack of qualified specialists was a further disadvantage.

In the foreword to *Capital* Marx wrote that "one nation can and should learn from others".³⁶ This proposition by the founder of scientific communism was fully borne out in the USSR. During the pre-war five-year plans socialist reconstruction and the cultural revolution, with the fraternal assistance of the Russian people, brought about a rapid transition among many formerly backward peoples from

a pre-capitalist economy to a developed socialist one. In the course of state construction due heed was paid to national peculiarities, differences in the level of social development and the class features of particular areas. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, the gross output from large-scale industry throughout the country was on an average 8.5 times greater than it was in 1913. The rate of industrial development in the Union republics was even higher than in the central areas or the Soviet Union as a whole. The accelerated growth of the national republics was maintained in later years. Thanks to the peasants' conversion to socialism, the nature and appearance of the national village underwent a drastic change. The collective farm system made for an all-round rise in agricultural production.

A culture that was national in form and socialist in content grew out of the cultural revolution. Schools, hospitals and cultural centres sprang up throughout the republics. Profound changes took place in the outlook of the masses, the ranks of the national intelligentsia and the working class were swelled and the painful legacy from tsarist days—mass illiteracy—was eliminated. Universal seven-year schooling for all nationalities was introduced, the medium of instruction being the native language. Improvement of the system of writing and the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet during the thirties were important steps for many of the non-Russian peoples. They greatly facilitated reading and writing in the native language and helped the broad masses of the population to master Russian. For any Soviet nation the Russian language became one of the means of acquiring a sound knowledge of modern science and technology, art and literature. It assumed its rightful place as one of the leading international languages. Russian, the language of Lenin, is studied today in many countries the world over. It is the medium through which the socialist nations and nationalities normally communicate with one another. A constant exchange of linguistic and cultural values takes place, together with fruitful contact between cultural workers belonging to different nationalities.

In 1940 the family of Soviet republics was increased by the admission of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian SSRs. Shortly afterwards the Moldavian SSR was formed.

³⁶ K. Marx, *Capital*, Moscow, 1958, Vol. 1, pp. 9-10.

The Great Patriotic War was a stern test of the unity of the multi-national Soviet state, but the working people of all the nationalities rose up in defence of their country and showed the world prodigies of valour.

As the Soviet Union entered the period of communist construction, a new stage began in the development of the socialist nations and national relations. The nationalities policy of the CPSU encourages the peoples to develop their talents and gifts. The multi-national culture has advanced on a broad front. The works of our writers are now translated into 89 languages of the USSR and are also published abroad. Today the drawing together of the socialist nations is proceeding apace. They are developing international features and uphold common, Soviet traditions. As Leonid Brezhnev put it, "The unity of the multi-national Soviet people is as solid as a diamond. In the same way as a diamond sparkles with multi-coloured facets so does the unity of our people scintillate with the diversity of nations, each of which lives a rich, full-blooded, free and happy life."³⁷

Fresh prospects for further progress with the economy and culture and strengthening the friendship of the peoples were opened up by the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU. In its Resolution on the Report of the CC CPSU, the Congress stressed that the Party "attaches great importance to educating all working people in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, pride for the socialist Motherland, for the great achievements of the Soviet people, in the spirit of internationalism and intolerance of all manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism and national exclusiveness, in the spirit of respect for all nations and nationalities".³⁸ An important theoretical thesis was advanced at the Congress: that there is now a new historical community—the Soviet people. This historical community differs qualitatively from the community of people who at a certain stage of historical development formed the category of nation. The new historical community of Soviet people is broader than the national community, since, without casting aside specific national

³⁷ L. I. Brezhnev, *Fifty Years of Great Achievements of Socialism*, Moscow, 1967, p. 35.

³⁸ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 226.

features and with careful regard for national feelings, it brings peoples together in supreme international unity. This thesis was further elaborated in Leonid Brezhnev's report *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*.³⁹

Anti-communist ideologists have been vainly trying for many years to discredit the national policy of the CPSU and Soviet power, employing the most shameless fact-juggling, falsification and more subtle devices based on lies. The reactionary French economist Charles Montirian frankly revealed the aims of bourgeois propaganda when he declared that, if Communists stress class contradictions, then the theoreticians of the "free world" should stress the contradictions between nations, making a special point of seeking out and inflating contradictions between the socialist countries.⁴⁰

The constantly and rapidly growing economic and intellectual capacity of each Soviet republic and each people provides an effective answer to the various fabrications produced by "Sovietologists".

The Ninth Five-Year Plan is an important stage in the further progress of Soviet society towards communism. The Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress on the latest Plan clearly lay down the main economic tasks that have to be fulfilled during 1971-1975 and delineate new targets for every Union republic. The attainment of these goals will indicate the high degree of economic co-operation between the socialist nations in the geographical distribution of productive forces and the perfecting of production relations.

* * *

Fifty years is long enough to enable one to look back and see what social, economic and cultural progress has resulted from the CPSU's nationalities policy. The writer Maxim Gorky, the founder of Soviet literature, once said that revolution rejuvenates a world that has become jaded and

³⁹ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 23 et al.

⁴⁰ Quoted in: M. P. Rogachev, M. A. Sverdlin, *Nations, the People and Humanity*, Moscow, 1967, p. 83 (in Russian).

poisoned by triviality and narrow-mindedness. Revolution creates new people. The October Revolution and the development of the Soviet republics within a single fraternal union have created a new man: he is an internationalist, a patriot and an energetic and conscious builder of communism. It has been a complex process, and the socialist environment itself was the school in which the new personality was moulded.

The USSR's achievements in the economic field are today an example to the peoples struggling against imperialism. Soviet power has done its utmost to accelerate economic and cultural progress on the former "national borderlands". Concentration of effort and resources and unselfish mutual help between the Soviet peoples has enabled them to create in every republic a highly developed industry, large-scale mechanised agriculture and an advanced culture. Nowadays no one is surprised to hear that, for example, Udmurtia is noted for its heavy engineering, that Byelorussia produces computers and powerful tip-up lorries, and that today Bashkiria alone produces four times more electric power than the whole of tsarist Russia did in 1913. During the last five-year plan alone the country's industrial production rose by 50 per cent.

The rate of development of the formerly backward outlying districts of the country is particularly impressive. Thus, during the half century of the existence of the USSR "Kazakhstan's industrial output has increased 600-fold, Tajikistan's over 500-fold, Kirghizia's over 400-fold, Uzbekistan's about 240-fold and Turkmenia's over 130-fold. The gross cotton crop in Uzbekistan has gone up 120-fold and in Turkmenia 90-fold. Kazakhstan now produces almost 30 times more grain than it did in 1922."⁴¹

Further expansion in all republics of the Union will take place during the Ninth Five-Year Plan. This will be an important step in consolidating the international position of the multi-national Soviet state. Z. Samhu, the late Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme National Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, wrote: "The experience of

⁴¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 22.

dealing successfully with the national question in the USSR and the achievement of genuine friendship between the nations and nationalities and their drawing together was, and is, of enormous international significance. It exerts a powerful influence on the development of the world revolutionary process."⁴²

The 50-year course of development in the USSR reveals the essence and significance of socialism for resolving the age-old national question. It marks the triumph of the ideas of socialist internationalism in practice. The CC CPSU's resolution "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" notes: "The formation of the Soviet Union was one of the decisive factors ensuring favourable conditions for restructuring society according to socialist principles, boosting the economy and culture of all the Soviet republics and consolidating the defensive capacity and international standing of the multi-national state of the working people."⁴³

⁴² *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1972, p. 10.

⁴³ *On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Resolution of the CC CPSU of February 21, 1972, p. 4.

advanced socialist nations; the more complete the democracy the stronger the aspiration towards a close union of peoples. History has confirmed Lenin's prediction.

As was pointed out in the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR", "the formation of a multi-national socialist state was a notable result of revolutionary creative activity on the part of all the Soviet peoples, headed by the working class and under the guidance of the Communist Party.... The military and political alliance that had arisen during the Civil War, the closest possible co-ordination in foreign policy, joint efforts in restoring the national economy, in economic development and in raising the defence potential were naturally conducive to taking the next step and merging the equal peoples into a single socialist family."¹

Many years' experience has made the country's peoples aware of the great benefits that accrue to them through their amalgamation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Only the full use of the country's total energies and resources has allowed the Soviet people to overcome, in an amazingly short period, the economic and cultural backwardness inherited from tsarism and capitalism; to carry through the industrialisation of the country, the socialist transformation of its agriculture and a genuine cultural revolution; to build socialism and transform the USSR into a highly developed world power.

The success of the Leninist nationalities policy, the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, the assistance rendered those peoples who had lagged behind in their development by the more highly developed peoples and especially by the Russian people—all this secured the upsurge and progress of the socialist nations. The cultural level of the peoples of the USSR has risen, cadres from the various nationalities have come into being, a unified social structure has been formed comprising the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the working intelligentsia.

¹ *On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 21, 1972, pp. 9-10.

On December 30, 1972, all the peoples of the Soviet country celebrated the 50th anniversary of the new-type multi-national state, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The birth of this fraternal union of national republics showed the triumph of the ideas of proletarian internationalism and the Leninist national policy; it was an event of world-wide historic significance. It occupies a place of outstanding political significance and social and economic consequence in the history of the USSR and its peoples.

Having overthrown the rule of landlords and capitalists, the October Revolution of 1917 opened up a new era in the history of the country's peoples. It broke down the tsarist landlord-capitalist "prison of the peoples" and liberated all Russia's nationalities. In the revolutionary class battles waged under the direction of the Leninist Bolshevik Party the unity of working people of all nationalities became firmly established.

While paving the way for the socialist revolution, V. I. Lenin pointed out that the toiling masses of formerly oppressed peoples once liberated from the bourgeois yoke would aspire whole-heartedly to union and amalgamation with large and

The realisation of the basic principles of the Leninist nationalities policy does not, of course, mean that the national problem, i.e., the problem of interrelations between the peoples of the multi-national Soviet country, has lost its relevance. National factors play, and will in the foreseeable future continue to play, a prominent role in the life of the country. Consequently, there is complete justification for the close attention paid by philosophers, historians, ethnographers and research workers in other disciplines to the study of processes leading to change in the role and form of national factors and of the national communities themselves. The topicality of the study of these processes, commonly called national or ethnic processes (we shall touch upon a certain difference between these two terms later), has recently increased with the accelerated rate of social, economic and cultural progress under the impact of the revolution in science and technology, and with the profound changes that are taking place in all spheres of the country's life on the path to a communist society.

However, despite the great progress achieved in recent years in the study of national processes in the USSR,² there remain many blank spaces and unsolved problems in this field. Naturally, it is impossible to examine all these problems or even most of them in one short article; in a number of cases we shall merely attempt to pose the problems which ought, in our opinion, to attract the attention of researchers.

Methodologically, research into national processes is based on the works of Lenin, particularly on his concept of the two tendencies in the national problem and the laws governing the evolution of nations and inter-national relations. "Developing capitalism," wrote Lenin, "knows two

² This is reflected, for example, in a number of the theoretical conferences and sessions that have taken place in recent years; their materials have been published in the following collections of papers: *The Triumph of the Leninist Nationalities Policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Makhach-Kala, 1968; *The Triumph of the Leninist Nationalities Policy*, Ulan-Ude, 1968; *The Triumph of the Leninist Nationalities Policy in Tataria*, Kazan, 1968; *The Triumph of Lenin's Ideas on Proletarian Internationalism and Friendship Between Peoples*, Alma-Ata, 1969; *The Building of Communism and Problems of International Education*, Kiev, 1969; *The Building of Communism and Problems of the Drawing Together of Nations*, Kiev, 1969 (all in Russian).

historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of inter-national intercourse in every form, the break-down of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc.

"Both tendencies are a universal law of capitalism. The former predominates in the beginning of its development, the latter characterises a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society."³

Lenin focussed serious attention upon the second tendency and pointed out that processes of mutual drawing together are primarily characteristic of multi-national states within which nations are "bound to one another by millions and thousands of millions of economic, legal and social bonds".⁴ The strengthening of inter-national contacts in such countries is due to economic development which, according to Lenin, brings nations living within a single state closer together, breaks down national barriers and leads to territorial mixing of different nationalities in urban centres and industrial areas. "Towns," he notes, "play an extremely important economic role under capitalism, and everywhere, in Poland, Lithuania, in the Ukraine, in Great Russia, and elsewhere, the towns are marked by mixed populations."⁵ "On the boards of joint-stock companies we find capitalists of different nations sitting together in complete harmony. At the factories workers of different nations work side by side."⁶

An important form of the process of national drawing together that expanded vigorously since the era of "mature capitalism" was, in Lenin's view, natural assimilation; by this he meant the shedding of national features and the transition to a different nation;⁷ he stressed that "capitalism's world-historical tendency to break down national barriers, obliterate national distinctions, and to assimilate

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27.

⁴ Ibid., Vol. 19, p. 503.

⁵ Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 50.

⁶ Ibid., p. 36.

⁷ Ibid., p. 27.

late nations ... manifests itself more and more powerfully with every passing decade ... is one of the greatest driving forces transforming capitalism into socialism."⁸

It should be particularly noted that, in Lenin's view, the victory of a socialist revolution is to result in a further strengthening of the tendency towards inter-national drawing together. He stressed that "already under capitalism, all economic, political and spiritual life is becoming more and more international. Socialism will make it completely international."⁹ "The masses of working people," he wrote, "as they liberate themselves from the bourgeois yoke, will gravitate irresistibly towards union and integration with the great, advanced socialist nations...."¹⁰ "The aim of socialism is not only to end the division of mankind into tiny states and the isolation of nations in any form, it is not only to bring the nations closer together but to integrate them."¹¹

Summing up, as it were, his conclusions on all these problems, Lenin pointed out that "it is impossible to abolish national (or any other political) oppression under capitalism, since this requires the abolition of classes, i.e., the introduction of socialism. But while being based on economics, socialism cannot be reduced to economics alone. A foundation—socialist production—is essential for the abolition of national oppression, but this foundation must also carry a democratically organised state, a democratic army, etc. ... And this, in turn, will serve as a basis for developing the practical elimination of even the slightest national friction and the least national mistrust, for an accelerated drawing together and fusion of nations that will be completed when the state withers away. This is the Marxist theory...."¹²

In recent years the problem of the historical framework within which the two tendencies in national development discovered by Lenin are acting has been repeatedly raised in Soviet publications. It has been pointed out that it would be a mistake simply to transfer the tendencies in

⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 28.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 19, p. 246.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 339.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 325.

question, characteristic as they are of capitalism, into socialist society, since "the nation is a socio-historical category; its economic base ... its class structure and socio-political aspirations, its spiritual aspect, i.e., everything that characterises the particular historical type of nation, becomes radically transformed as a result of the transition from capitalism to socialism".¹³ As for ethnic characteristics, which will be treated in more detail below, it was pointed out that they "survive and continue to evolve in a transformed shape under socialism".¹⁴ And those authors are, in our view, right, who stress in this connection that "while purely class characteristics of the nation change radically with the change in the society's social structure, its inherent ethnic features largely survive".¹⁵

The inadmissibility of a mechanical transfer of the tendencies noted by Lenin into socialism applies especially to the first of these tendencies. When describing it, Lenin was referring not only to national development and self-determination but also to the "struggle against all national oppression"¹⁶; this was done away with as a result of the victory of the October Revolution. As for the second tendency, its applicability to socialist society is in accordance with Lenin's directly expressed views, and calls for no objections, although the forms in which this tendency has been displayed under new conditions were, of course, bound to undergo changes.

The programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while noting that "under socialism the nations flourish and their sovereignty grows stronger", stresses at the same time that "the development of nations does not proceed along lines of strengthening national strife, national narrow-

¹³ "The Triumph of the Leninist National Policy", *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1969, p. 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ P. M. Rogachev, M. A. Sverdlin, *Nations—Peoples—Mankind*, Moscow, 1967, p. 72; see also: A. M. Yegiazaryan, *On the Main Tendencies in the Development of the Socialist Nations of the USSR*, Yerevan, 1965; A. G. Agayev, "Towards the Study of the Historical Tendencies of Socialism in the National Problem", in *The Building of Communism and Problems of the Drawing Together of Nations*, Kiev, 1969 (all in Russian).

¹⁶ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27.

mindedness and egoism, as it does under capitalism, but along lines of their association, fraternal mutual assistance and friendship.... Full-scale communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved."¹⁷

Two tendencies, both of a progressive character, are noted in the Programme of the CPSU with regard to the national question. They are, on the one hand, the multi-lateral development and flourishing of nations and, on the other, the drawing together of socialist nations, their growing mutual influence and mutual enrichment.

These two aspects of national development have been very unequally studied; the processes of each nation's advancement have usually been at the centre of attention. As for problems of inter-national contacts and the drawing together and merging of nations, the attention afforded them has been patently insufficient. At present the elucidation of precisely this aspect of national development appears particularly urgent. At the same time, we consider it necessary to dwell also on the specific phenomena that promote the survival and sometimes even the strengthening of national feeling and the survival of national factors in the life of Soviet society; thus, an extremely variegated pattern arises from the interaction of the two tendencies.

In examining the interrelation of the tendencies in national development in the USSR, the extreme complexity of national phenomena should be taken into account: they are linked with very different spheres of social life, from the economic to the psychological. And like any complex system, they may be considered in various aspects, in various interrelations with other factors and elements of the social environment. The methodology of such multi-lateral research as well as the corresponding terminology have not yet, unfortunately, become firmly established. When discussing national problems in print and at conferences, different authors not infrequently designate different concepts by the same term; this causes serious difficulties in academic discussion. On account of this, since our attention will

¹⁷ *The Road to Communism*, 1962, p. 559.

henceforward be fixed mainly on the ethnic aspects of national processes or ethnic processes as such, we shall begin by making clear our understanding of these terms.

The concept of "ethnic processes" as applied to modern times has only fairly recently become current in research literature; this is mainly due to the fact that many Soviet authors have more or less agreed on the expediency of substituting the more exact concept "ethnic communities" (or "ethnoses") for the former broad term "historical human communities", i.e., tribe, nationality, nation.

In our opinion, by *ethnic processes* in the broad sense of the term should be understood processes of change in all the main elements of the ethnic community, i.e., in language, culture, etc., and first and foremost in those of them which are specific to the particular ethnic community in question or which serve its members as distinctive symbols and indices of ethnic identity.

In accordance with this view, it would appear useful to distinguish two main interrelated aspects in national phenomena and processes: the socio-economic and the ethnic aspect as such.¹⁸ While recognising a certain arbitrariness in this distinction (since the "ethnic" is also social in the broad sense) we shall, however, make use of it in the following pages in order to concentrate attention precisely on the ethnic aspect which, though very important, has been heretofore insufficiently studied. This aspect determines to a great extent the peculiar character of national problems; for this reason, if for no other, it is of great interest not only to ethnographers but to researchers in other disciplines as well.

The principal types of ethnic processes are those of ethnic division and of ethnic amalgamation; historically, their relative roles varied, but at present the predominant type of ethnic process all over the USSR is that of ethnic amalgamation.¹⁹

¹⁸ See: M. S. Dzhunusov, "Theory of the Practice of the Development of Socialist National Relations", *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 9, 1967, p. 32; L. V. Khomich, "Ethnic Processes (To the Problem of the Subject Matter and the Methodology of Its Study)", *Summaries of Papers at the Annual Session of the Institute of Ethnography, USSR Academy of Science*, Leningrad, 1968, pp. 37-39 (all in Russian).

¹⁹ V. I. Kozlov, *The Dynamics of Population Size*, p. 260 et seq. (in Russian).

These historically natural and, on the whole, progressive amalgamation processes, which express trends towards larger-sized peoples, may be subdivided into three classes: *consolidation*, *assimilation* and *inter-national integration*. Ethnic consolidation comprises such processes as the merging of several linguistically and culturally inter-related ethnic units into a single people, e.g., the tribal groups of the Turkmens merged into a Turkmen nation, mainly in the Soviet period. Processes of ethnic assimilation are usually taken to consist in the melting of small groups (or individuals) of one people into another people. By inter-national integration we mean interaction between different ethnic units (nationalities and nations) within a single state, leading to the birth of a common cultural unity; such processes, which are taking place in certain multi-national states, including the USSR, are today of the greatest interest to researchers.

The two principal tendencies noted above, which characterise the evolution of national phenomena in various spheres of social life in the USSR are very unequal in their manifestation. But their interaction may be observed everywhere, both in socio-economic and in "purely" ethnic phenomena; the former strongly influence the latter (especially ethnic consciousness); the latter may, in their turn, exert a considerable converse influence over the basis phenomena.

A major role in the course of these tendencies and in their changing proportions in the USSR has doubtlessly been played by the progress in the sphere of productive forces. In inducing closer economic links both within regions and on a country-wide scale, this progress has, in the final analysis, served as a material pre-condition for ethnic consolidation within nations²⁰ and for inter-national integration within the state.

In analysing the actual historical course of the changing interrelation between the tendency towards the internal

²⁰ For a more detailed examination of ethnic consolidation in the USSR see: V. K. Gardanov, B. O. Dolgikh, T. A. Zhdanko, "The Main Trends in Ethnic Processes among the Peoples of the USSR", *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 4, 1961; T. F. Aristova, G. P. Vassilyeva, "On Ethnic Processes in South Turkmenia", *SE*, No. 5, 1964; L. F. Monogarova, "Modern Ethnic Processes in the Western Pamirs", *SE*, No. 6, 1965.

development of nations and that towards inter-national drawing together, an important fact should, in our opinion, be taken into account: on the eve of the October Revolution industrial capitalism in backward Russia had not achieved any considerable development among many of its peoples, and they still remained at a stage where the first tendency predominated. Under the new social and political conditions, marked by the elimination of national oppression and inequality, this tendency, which had been artificially held back by tsarism, inevitably underwent at first a particularly intensive (though greatly transformed) development. Owing to its unfavourable legacy in national relations, the country was faced immediately after the victory of the socialist revolution with the task of doing everything necessary for carrying out Lenin's instructions. Lenin pointed out that "only exclusive attention to the interests of the various nations can remove grounds for conflicts, can remove mutual distrust".²¹ In order to achieve this goal, different forms of national statehood were devised, education and writing in the mother tongue became widespread, the processes of *national consolidation* were accelerated, etc.

In outlying regions, formerly backward in socio-economic and cultural development, such processes found expression in the amalgamation of linguistically and culturally kindred tribal and territorial groups into large nationalities and nations. It was in this way, for instance, that many Central Asian nations were formed, such as the Turkmen nation, which came into being through the consolidation of the tribal groups of the Jonud, Teke, Gokleu, etc.; the Kirgbiz nation—from the tribal groups of the Ong, Sol, Ichkilik, etc. Many Siberian peoples also came into being through consolidation processes: among them the Altayans who absorbed the Altai-Kizhi, Telengit, Teleut and other small tribes and nationalities; also the Khakass, who were formed by the amalgamation of the Kachin, Sagai, Beltir, etc.

In the more highly developed regions of the country national consolidation took another form: large peoples already in existence became more closely knit; they also absorbed related small territorial groups. In this way the Cossacks,

²¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 386.

Pomors, Kerzhaks and other ethnographic groups became merged in the main body of the Russians; the Mishars, Kryashens and Nagaibaks—with the Tatars; the Teptars—with the Bashkirs; the Mengrels, Khevsurs, Svans and others—with the Georgians. As a result of all this, while a certain number of new peoples came into existence in the USSR, the total number of peoples decreased. Thus, while the 1926 census distinguishes 194 nationalities, the 1959 census showed only 109, the 1970 census only 104 ethnonyms.

The rise of national state forms (republics, regions, districts) not only fixed the results of such amalgamation but created favourable conditions for the development of the peoples that had come into being, of their culture, language, etc.

Prior to the Revolution, about 50 peoples, among them such large ones as the Kazakhs, Turkmens and the Kirghiz had no written literature in their own language. Dozens of peoples (the Adygheis, Kabardinians, Ingushes, Lesghins, Khants, Nenets, etc.) had no written languages at all; these were only devised in Soviet times. Only in the USSR has it been possible to pass in a historically short period from the depths of ignorance to the heights of advanced culture and science. Impressive evidence of this is yielded by the productive activities of the Republican Academies of Science, including those in the outlying regions of former tsarist Russia where half a century ago even simple literacy was an exception among the indigenous population.

The second form of amalgamation processes, *ethnic assimilation*, evolved naturally during the Soviet period owing to the territorial mixing of the various national groups and the increase in economic, cultural and other links. Assimilation processes, however, mainly involve territorially dispersed groups (Jews, Mordovians, Karels, etc.) and groups of individuals settled in territories occupied by a different nationality. A factor of assimilation is the sharp diminution in national prejudice and the breakdown of religious barriers; this has led to an increase in nationally mixed marriages. The 1959 census showed 102 mixed families for every 1,000 families in the USSR (in Latvia 158, in the Ukraine 150). Mixed marriages are especially frequent among the urban population

of Moldavia (269 families per thousand), the Ukraine (263) and Byelorussia (237), etc. The numerical strength of some peoples is subject to considerable changes owing to assimilation. Thus the number of Mordovians decreased from 1,456,000 in 1939 to 1,285,000 in 1959 and to 1,263,000 in 1970, while their neighbours, the Chuvashes (formerly their approximate equals in numbers) who inhabit a more compact territory, have grown in the 1926-1970 period by more than 320 thousand. On the whole, peoples living within their own Union or Autonomous Republics as a rule steadfastly preserve their mother tongue and their sense of national identity.

To the third class of amalgamating processes belong those of so-called *inter-national integration*, described by Lenin as processes of the drawing together and amalgamation of nations. As noted above, Lenin dates the beginning of these processes from the period of mature capitalism "that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society".²² The intensified action of this tendency in the socialist era, predicted by Lenin, is based primarily on the objective laws of economic development, which breaks down ethnic boundaries. The social and economic development of all Soviet peoples, the growth of industry and agriculture and the accompanying changes in social and class structure were subordinated mainly to targets of state-wide importance and took place in the closest inter-national concord. As a result of the Leninist national policy and the elimination of former national inequality, the division of labour has everywhere come to be based on professional, and not on national, identity of population groups, on regional economic, and not on ethnic, features. Closer inter-regional economic links have resulted in migrations and increased mixing of nationalities. Everyone knows the great construction projects that have become symbols of fraternal friendship of the peoples of the USSR: the Dnieper power station and the iron-and-steel project in Zaporozhye, in the Ukraine, the Bratsk, Volga and Krasnoyarsk power stations in the RSFSR, the Nurek power station in Tajikistan, the Riga power station in Latvia, the development of the virgin lands

²² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27.

in Kazakhstan and in the Hungry Steppe (Uzbekistan), the Kara-Kum Canal in Turkmenia and the Kama car factory in Tataria. Volgograd, Minsk, Sevastopol and other cities destroyed by Hitler's armies were raised from the ruins by the whole country. All the Union Republics came to the aid of Tashkent when it fell victim to a great earthquake, and the city was rebuilt within a brief space of time. And when heavy rains descended upon the capital of Georgia, causing considerable damage, Tashkent was among those cities which stretched a fraternal helping hand to Tbilisi and sent detachments of builders and various materials.

It has become a usual occurrence to hear such reports as, for instance, that Azerbaijan oil workers are setting out to help organise the oil industry in Tataria, Bashkiria, Tyumen and other regions of the country. Such examples of fraternal labour solidarity between the country's peoples are innumerable.

The growing economic ties between the Union Republics and the mixing of nationalities promote their economic drawing together and integration within the boundaries of the socialist state as a whole. "The economy of the Soviet Union," Leonid Brezhnev said, "is not a sum total of the economies of the individual republics and regions. It has long since become one economic organism, formed on the basis of the common economic aims and interests of all our nations and nationalities."²³

This natural economic integration of the peoples of the USSR is very closely linked with their political integration within the boundaries of a single union state. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not a mere conglomeration of national and administrative units, but an organic community. In the course of building socialism and communism, as the CPSU Programme points out, "the boundaries between the Union republics of the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance".²⁴

Over the years of Soviet power a homogeneous social structure has been achieved among the peoples of the USSR.

²³ L. I. Brezhnev, *The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 28.

²⁴ *The Road to Communism*, 1962, p. 559.

A decisive part in this was played by doing away with the exploiting classes as well as by the rise of a working class and an intelligentsia of their own among the formerly backward peoples.

The most important factor in the integration of Soviet citizens belonging to different national groups was their common Marxist-Leninist ideology, the international rallying of the workers around the Communist Party of the USSR and their common goal in building communist society.

As is generally known, one of the principal results of the processes of drawing together of nations in the USSR has been the rise of a new historical community, the Soviet people. The main pre-conditions leading to its formation were the October Revolution and the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The rise of this community should, in our view, be regarded as a process that has gathered momentum with the complete victory of socialist production relations in the USSR. This process has found its outward expression not merely in the new term "Soviet man" but also in such concepts as "Soviet culture", "Soviet patriotism", "Soviet character", etc. The term "Soviet people" came into official use in the late 1930s; this is evidenced by its mention in the text of a resolution of the Eighteenth Party Congress and in the Party Rules adopted by that Congress.

The Soviet people as a specific historical community is an exceedingly complex many-sided social phenomenon, a kind of multiform body of people belonging simultaneously to various national, class and other social groups.

The drawing together of nations in the economic, social, political and ideological fields was accompanied by their drawing together in the ethnic sphere. The latter process, however, went on much more slowly and had its own peculiar features. This was due, among other causes, to the fact that the linguistic and cultural development of Soviet nations, unlike their social and economic development, was originally determined primarily by their internal requirements. By its very nature it was bounded by the limits of the ethnic (national) communities and not all its elements permitted wide inter-national co-operation: Russians, for

instance, helped Kazakhs to build schools but were generally unable to teach in them. This task could only be performed by the efforts of the Kazakh intelligentsia. This also applies to the professional level of national culture. In brief, the development of these elements was of an ethnically differentiating, rather than integrating type.

In analysing the ethnic side of national development, it is necessary to dwell more particularly on its linguistic aspect, which is directly linked with the general requirements of social and economic development. For economic and industrial progress and mechanisation, backwardness and illiteracy had to be eliminated; this target could only be reached in a short period of time through education in the mother tongue, use of these tongues in the mass media (press, radio, cinema), etc. The policy of equal rights for languages, the introduction of all the peoples' languages into administration, into legal proceedings, etc., the devising of written languages for many peoples that had none before, publication of literature in the vernacular—all this widened the sphere of the Soviet peoples' languages ever since the first years of Soviet power. This process is well illustrated by Ukrainian, which in pre-revolutionary Russia was scarcely used even in elementary schools. In the Soviet era all conditions were achieved for expanding the social functions of Ukrainian, i.e., as the language of education (including university education), science, social and political life, etc.²⁵ A rapid expansion in the functions of the national languages took place in the very first years of Soviet power. Further development in the functions of the principal languages of all the Union Republics may be observed at present.²⁶

Interaction between languages of Soviet peoples took the form, in the main, of vocabulary changes resulting from mutual word borrowing; this could not, of course, lead to any "drawing together and merging" of languages. Hence the second, integrating tendency in national development was

²⁵ Y. D. Desheriyev, *Regularities in the Development and Mutual Influence of Languages in Soviet Society*, Moscow, 1966, p. 366 (in Russian).

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 369-70.

displayed in the linguistic sphere mainly by the diffusion of bilingualism and by linguistic assimilation. This was effected primarily through the adoption by non-Russian peoples of the Russian language as the principal medium of inter-national communication in the USSR and as one of the major world languages with rich cultural traditions, a vast literature, etc.

In his works on the national problem, as is generally known, Lenin paid considerable attention to the adoption of Russian. He pointed out that "the requirements of economic exchange will always compel the nationalities living in one state (as long as they wish to live together) to study the language of the majority",²⁷ i.e., Russian. At the same time Lenin emphatically spoke out against any coercion in the diffusion of Russian, and specifically against granting it any privileges as a "state language". In a letter to Stepan Shaumyan he wrote: "Why will you not understand the psychology that is so important in the national question and which, if the slightest coercion is applied, besmirches, soils, nullifies the undoubtedly progressive importance of centralisation, large states and a uniform language? But the economy is still more important than psychology: in Russia we already have a capitalist economy, which makes the Russian language essential."²⁸ Lenin noted that "representatives of non-Russian nationalities in the Caucasus are themselves striving to teach their children Russian"²⁹ and emphasised that he wishes every inhabitant of Russia to have the opportunity to learn the great Russian language.³⁰

In the almost 60 years that have passed since the October Revolution, Russian has become much more widespread as a result of the increased mingling of Russians with other nationalities, more extensive inter-ethnic contacts in the economy, science and culture, higher frequency of nationally mixed marriages, etc. According to the 1959 census, over 10 million non-Russians declared Russian as their mother tongue. The 1970 census showed an increase in the number of

²⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 20.

²⁸ Ibid., Vol. 19, p. 499.

²⁹ Ibid., Vol. 20, p. 20.

³⁰ See: V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 72.

such persons to 13 million; besides these, 42 million had adopted Russian as their second mother tongue.³¹

In its resolution of February 21, 1972, "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" the Central Committee of the CPSU notes that "all nations and nationalities in the USSR have voluntarily chosen Russian as their common language for inter-national communication and co-operation. It has become a powerful tool for communication and unity among the Soviet peoples, a means for bringing into their reach the finest achievements of Soviet and world culture."³²

The cultural development of the peoples of the USSR in the Soviet period has been characterised, as is generally known, by an organic combination of diversity and unity.

The blossoming of national cultures that has taken place in the Soviet years, reflecting on the whole the first tendency of national development, has been adequately dealt with in Soviet research literature. The action of the second, integrating tendency in the cultural sphere is much less fully elucidated.

The diversity of the cultures of the Soviet peoples was historically formed under the influence of many factors; not the least important of them is the diversity of the natural environment in which these peoples dwelt, specific features of social and economic development, of inter-ethnic links, etc. In examining the changes that the cultural heritage of the peoples of the USSR has undergone in the Soviet years, it must be taken into account that these changes took a somewhat different course in the sphere of material culture from that of intellectual culture.

The fact is that processes in the sphere of material culture are conditioned first and foremost by progress in science and technology and the accompanying diffusion of standardised factory-made products. It should be emphasised that this is not something peculiar to the USSR; the same phenomenon is observed in many countries of the world and has been

³¹ *Number, Location, Age, Education Level, National Composition, Languages and Subsistence Sources of the Population of the USSR (Based on the 1970 Census)*, Moscow, 1971, p. 28 (in Russian).

³² *On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Moscow, 1972, p. 15.

intensified by the revolution in science and technology. Traditional national dress, for instance, gives way to the general European (or "city") clothes; the cart or the arba—to the car; the yurta and mud-huts—to standardised blocks of flats.

At the same time, in the sphere of material culture a process of interpenetration of various national elements is also taking place. For instance, certain national dishes have become widespread: the menu in almost any restaurant includes Siberian meat dumplings and Georgian grilled mutton, Uzbek pilaff and Ukrainian cabbage soup. It is evident that this interpenetration of national cultures, as well as the process of their levelling, tends, in the final analysis, to their unification for all parts of the Soviet people.

It should, however, be stressed that the levelling processes in material culture are most intensive in the sphere of production; as for consumption and everyday life, their intensity varies among different peoples, and traditional everyday use of even standardised products is distinguished by particular stability.

In the sphere of intellectual culture, inter-national integration is primarily expressed in the formation of a single socialist content for the spiritual culture of all Soviet people. The most important component of this process is the international Marxist-Leninist ideology that has everywhere ousted the elements of ethno-religious and nationalist ideology.

Unlike material culture, where unifying tendencies predominate, the spiritual culture of each Soviet people retains to a considerable extent its own unique colouring, and this is due not only to its connection with language specifics. The disappearance of certain outmoded elements of culture (primarily those connected with religion) is sometimes combined with the renascence and development of a number of cultural elements that had formerly been dying away or had only been prevalent among a part of one ethnos or another. Such trends have in particular found expression in the new blossoming of certain artistic handicrafts.

Special importance for present-day national processes in the sphere of spiritual culture attaches to the interaction

and mutual enrichment of the cultures of the Soviet peoples, an exchange, as it were, of cultural treasures. Thus, drama, ballet and many genres of the fine arts, have taken root among the Central Asian nations and certain peoples of Daghestan and the Far North through fraternal aid from other socialist nations, particularly from the Russian people. Soviet culture includes Pushkin and Shevchenko, Yakub Kolas and Mussah Djalil, Shostakovich and Khachaturyan. In this connection, we would note the important role of inter-republican festivals of literature and art, translations of literary works from one national language into another, etc. Great and increasing importance in this respect attaches to the mass media (the press, radio and television) that are progressing rapidly in the era of the revolution in science and technology. True, mass information media also promote internal national consolidation, but their decisive effect upon spiritual culture is towards integration and internationalisation.

This internationalisation includes, of course, assimilating the finest achievements of world culture; however, there can be no question of any "westernisation". The so-called Western culture is absorbed by Soviet people through the prism of their own traditions, ideological orientation and system of values and is apprehended in a somewhat different manner from the way it is in other countries, including socialist ones. At the same time it should be pointed out that the processes of drawing together, interpenetration, the levelling of former differences in material and intellectual culture and the language processes, have nothing in common with the fabrications disseminated by certain bourgeois "Sovietologists" about a supposed drive to "Russify" the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. The material and intellectual culture of the Russians has undergone no less change in the past decades than that of, say, the Byelorussians or the Kazakhs. The Russian language has also changed considerably owing to loan-words from languages of the country's other peoples and to the rise of new international terminology. In catering for that new community, the Soviet people, it appears now as an inter-national language, i.e., as a means for communication between all peoples of the USSR: Georgians and Estonians, Armenians and Kazakhs, etc.

As the spiritual cultures of the Soviet peoples influence and enrich one another and the achievements of world culture are assimilated, a culture is formed that is not merely an inter-national but an all-Soviet one. It manifests itself not only in the realm of professional art but, and this is particularly significant, in the everyday sphere, beginning with the all-Soviet revolutionary traditions, festivals and ceremonies, and ending with the rules of etiquette, common personal names, etc. The fund of general knowledge shared by the Soviet people that is derived from the common school programme, from Soviet films, TV and radio broadcasts, magazines, newspapers, etc., must also be taken into account. This all-Soviet culture is an important component forming the new structure, the Soviet people, which consequently appears not only as a political-state community but as a cultural one.

Analysis of the main tendencies in the development of national as well as of strictly ethnic processes shows that the interaction of these tendencies still bears a dialectically contradictory, though not an antagonistic, character. These contradictions are especially noticeable in the sphere of linguistic and cultural changes. Thus, the diffusion of Russian is accompanied not by a weakening but rather by a strengthening of the national languages; e.g., their social functions are in a number of cases widened, the circulation of books in these languages is increased, etc. The rapid levelling of many elements of material culture (tools, housing, dress) is proceeding literally before our eyes and their regional differentiation is more and more apt to follow practical expediency instead of ethnic tradition; this process is, however, accompanied by further development of such elements of traditional culture and professional national art as are primarily linked with satisfying the spiritual needs of the members of the respective ethnic communities. The diffusion of the generally held internationalist ideology, of the feeling of belonging to a single "Soviet people" is accompanied in a number of cases by a growth of national feeling, by a strengthening of national self-awareness.

The complex problem of the causes underlying the survival of a prominent role for national factors in the USSR

and the contradictory forms in which these factors manifest themselves, have been as yet insufficiently studied in Soviet research literature; this problem is an exceedingly important one and deserves special examination.³³ To pass on from general discussion to detailed analysis of the real causes of these phenomena is a very urgent task both in the theoretical and practical respects.³⁴

In recent years some progress can be observed in this field. In particular, a number of ethno-sociological studies have been carried out covering a complex interlacing of international and national components in the sphere of personal and group ideals, interests, orientations, morality norms, systems of values, etc. The results of these studies show the close relation of the ethno-psychological orientation to education level, social and professional status, bilingualism and other factors.³⁵ They make available valuable data for practical purposes, i.e., for guiding ethnic processes. However, a number of important problems still await a theoretical analysis. One of the central problems is that of the increasing vigour of inter-national contacts with the growth of the population's mobility. The dialectical contradiction here consists in the fact that such contacts, which take place not only in the zone of ethnic boundaries but also within the interior of ethnic territories, and which build up a basis for the exchange of cultural elements and, in the final analysis, for promoting the process of drawing together, are at times accompanied by an increasing attention to national self-determination, by an intensifying national consciousness, and, at times, a recurrence of nationalism.

"It should be remembered," Leonid Brezhnev says, "that nationalistic prejudices, exaggerated or distorted national feelings, are extremely tenacious and deeply

³³ See, for instance: V. P. Shkorinov, "The Internationalist Education of the Personality As a Problem in Ethics", in *The Building of Communism and Problems in Internationalist Education*, Kiev, 1969 (in Russian).

³⁴ See: E. A. Bagramov, "The Dialectics of the National and the International under Socialism", *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 4, 1970, pp. 121-26.

³⁵ See: Y. V. Arutunyan, "Concrete Sociological Research into National Relations", *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 12, 1969, pp. 129-40.

embedded in the psychology of politically immature people. These prejudices survive even when the objective premises for any antagonisms in relations between nations have long since ceased to exist. It should also be borne in mind that nationalistic tendencies are often intertwined with parochial attitudes, which are akin to nationalism."³⁶

As shown above, the course of the two tendencies acting in the ethnic sphere is exceedingly complex. Ethnic processes sometimes take place, as it were, on two levels, and if on one of them the urge towards national consolidation and preservation of ethnically specific features is predominant, on the other there is the tendency towards international integration and the drawing together and merging of nations.

Of course, the path leading to the merging of nations predicted by Lenin is long and involved and not all the sections of this path are at present plainly visible. Lenin said that national differences "will continue to exist for a very long time to come, even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world-wide scale".³⁷ The CPSU Programme notes that "with the victory of communism in the USSR, the nations will draw still closer together, their economic and ideological unity will increase and the communist traits common to their spiritual make-up will develop. However, the obliteration of national distinctions, and especially of language distinctions, is a considerably longer process than the obliteration of class distinctions".³⁸ And it is perfectly clear that on the way ahead a struggle is still in prospect both against national nihilism, against attempts to hasten artificially the process of the drawing together and merging of nations and against manifestations of nationalism that impede this process, which is on the whole a historically natural and progressive one.

"The further drawing together of the nations and nationalities of our country is an objective process," L. I. Brezhnev stressed. "The Party is against pushing the process; there is no need for that, for it is determined by the entire course

³⁶ L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 36.

³⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 92.

³⁸ *The Road to Communism*, p. 560.

of our Soviet life. At the same time, the Party considers as impermissible any attempt to hold it up, to impede it on some pretext, or to give undue emphasis to national distinctiveness, because this would go against the general line of development of our society, the internationalist ideals and the ideology of Communists, the interests of communist construction."³⁹

Y. V. Arutunyan

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN THE
USSR: SOME TENDENCIES AND OBSERVATIONS

In our age of radical social change and the scientific and technological revolution, when the material basis of human society is fundamentally changing, contacts between peoples are strengthened and at the same time transformed: culture becomes ever more international, new forms, ideas and patterns of behaviour appear. The future of the national culture becomes a subject of the utmost importance. How does the culture adapt to the new situation? What are its prospects? How does it combine its original and universal aspects? How does the system of national culture change, what are the dynamics of its elements and forms?

The problem is especially important for the multi-national Soviet state. At the same time it possesses many specific features. In the Soviet Union the world is witnessing, as it were, a gigantic experiment, in which national cultures are combined and brought closer together by the common state, economy and ideology.

A summary of the experience of cultural development in the USSR is of great value to an understanding of both the Soviet way of life and the processes of world history.

One can distinguish three approaches to the study of national cultures. One is the study of the cultural "fund" of the nation, i.e., of changes in the inventory of material and spiritual culture, the study of the interplay between

³⁹ L. I. Brezhnev, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

"vertical" and "horizontal" information in the nation's cultural fund (the information inherited from previous generations and that acquired through inter-national contacts). These questions have been rather widely discussed in Soviet research literature. The need is, however, felt for more systematisation and a wider use of sociological methods, so that the nations' cultural fund can be presented as a system.

The second approach elucidates the mechanism of the spread of cultural values and examines the nature of contacts and cultural relations between nations.

There exists a third and, possibly, crucial aspect of study that has so far remained beyond the scope of social science. It is concerned with the workings of the mechanism of cultural interaction, with the growth of the national cultural fund and its distribution among the masses of the people. These problems are especially acute now that the cultural fund is being expanded first and foremost by means of professional forms. The question of "culture consumption" might possibly seem idle in earlier stages in human history. When folk-lore forms were predominant, culture production practically coincided with culture consumption. Professional culture, on the other hand, reflects not only the attitudes of the society as a whole, but also the specific views and tastes of that section of the intelligentsia which is professionally engaged in culture "production". Obviously, these specific views, tastes and demands do not automatically coincide with those of the whole nation.

We are thus concerned with the reception of culture by the people, by its various strata and groups. It is the problem of the culture in the masses, of the transformation of the cultural make-up of the nation in all its social diversity.

The present article is a tentative summary of the studies conducted by the Department of Social Research of the Institute of Ethnography, USSR Academy of Sciences, during 1971 in Georgia. Although the research was based on a small sample, its results may be useful for a better understanding of the development of national culture.

The aim of this study, far from being purely procedural, was to obtain meaningful data bearing on different patterns of culture consumption in various population groups;

on the relationship between the traditional and the modern, and between the national and the international in their respective cultural make-up.

To accomplish these tasks, it was necessary to choose diametrically opposite subjects for our study. Only in this way would it be possible to reveal the peculiarities of these processes in different population groups, notwithstanding the small sample sizes. With this aim in view, we chose as the subject of our first statistical sample two research institutes of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, viz., the Institute of Mechanics and the Institute of Language. Our choice provided us with two highly qualified sections of the intelligentsia, working in one of the "sciences" and "arts" respectively. At each institute we interviewed half of the entire research staff, whom we selected by a random mechanical choice. Another sample was provided by industrial employees: we interviewed all engineers and technicians and half of all the skilled workers in an equipment shop of the Tbilisi Electric Locomotive Factory. The third sample included the inhabitants of the village of Ikhalto in the Tolavi District, the centre of the Shota Rustaveli Collective Farm.

The groups chosen were presumed to be at different distances from the core complex of "traditional culture". We assumed that in the village the traditional cultural complex would demonstrate the highest degree of integrity. In town traditional culture was presumed to be retreating as the education level was rising and as professional roles of the people were becoming more elaborate, i.e., the traditional cultural complex was presumed to survive best among the workers, then came the technicians and engineers and after them, the research workers with the least attachment to tradition. Our study was to find out what was the share of the traditional and the modern elements not only in material and spiritual life, but in people's value orientations and concepts as well.

The last point seemed of special importance to us, because to be able to predict social behaviour it is necessary not only to know the actual distribution of the national cultural forms, but also to be aware of the population's cultural orientations that reflect their inner needs.

Our questionnaire consisted of two sets of questions, both dealing with cultural orientations. The first set was concerned with the presumable change of tastes, interests and concepts from the "traditional" to the "modern". It was necessary to find out what groups (professional, age, etc.) still clung to the traditional rites, customs, folk art, folk music and dance, and to what degree; and what groups preferred modern behaviour patterns, modern professional literature and art. The second set of questions dealt with types of orientation in the opposition "strictly national—international". By "strictly national" we meant orientation *only* towards one's own national culture (music, dancing, literature, etc.); "international" orientations were understood as wide interest in, and knowledge of, other cultures besides one's own.

The study revealed heterogeneity and variety in orientations. This variety can be accounted for by the wide range of the social and professional positions of the informants, and also by the spheres of culture: material, spiritual, linguistic, etc., in which these orientations manifested themselves.

Notwithstanding the somewhat arbitrary subdivision of culture into spiritual and material, that approach was expedient, since these two spheres reflect to a certain extent two opposite tendencies or, one might say, cultural orientations of the population.

The material sphere traditionally includes the dwelling, the interior, clothes, food, the peasant yard with its sheds and barns, utensils and instruments, etc. We did not think it necessary to scan all of this list in order to find the national or the international elements. Our aim was to learn about national orientations and national preferences and tastes and to correlate these with other elements of culture. Can one expect national preferences to be revealed in one's relation to material objects? Hardly, for in an industrially developed republic like Georgia, with its urbanised town and village population, people's demands are determined by industry. It has been proved by ethnographic observations that material elements of folk culture are preserved only in remote corners, most often in the republic's alpine regions. But even there the elements of material life are not chosen

freely by the individual, nor can they indicate any national preferences. One generally cannot judge about national preferences in material life by its outward forms, because these forms may, in fact, be imposed. A dwelling or an interior may be inherited and preserved unchanged merely for lack of funds for innovations. One can best judge about national preferences in everyday things by more dynamic elements, those which can be chosen easily and can thus reflect the individual's demands and opportunities.

Using earlier experience from our own work and that of other ethnographers, we selected interior and food as such dynamic elements. However, we did not study the actual interior and food, but would rather suggest an imaginary situation during the interview. We asked informants to imagine that he or she had no financial limitations or any other and so could furnish the house the way they wanted and choose whatever food they liked. The choices were later evaluated by the researchers and graded with respect to the strength of national preferences.

We did not find any differences in national preferences between different socio-professional groups either in food or in interior. Contrary to our expectations, workers and peasants showed no interest in traditional forms. There was no traditional bias in the choice of the interior; instead practical considerations were dominant: appointments, furniture, etc., should be comfortable, modern and attractive. A slight preference for traditional forms of interior was shown by more educated groups. (However, in each of the socio-professional groups examined the percentage of such answers did not exceed 20 per cent.)

Choices of food were also largely determined by the concrete situation. In all groups national food dominated to the same extent, and no tendency could be traced for elimination of national preferences with the growth of the education level. Here too practical considerations were more important than national tastes: Russians who live in Georgia also favour the rich and spicy Caucasian cuisine.

In general, national attitudes can hardly be preserved in the sphere of material life in a developed urban society, because mass production is far from the realm of national preferences. Industrial mass production of consumer goods

presents the people with a wide choice, and local industries are bound to lose out in the competition. Mass production creates mass consumption. This is especially true of the Soviet Union, with its integrated economic system and labour division on the scale of the whole country. Mass production may sometimes reflect national tastes and traditions, particularly in architecture. But such fields are not numerous. Besides, individual choice is not involved here.

That does not mean that it is impossible for any elements of material culture to be used as national symbols, like the Russian "matryoshka" doll or samovar. But most often these objects have nothing to do with actual material life. They are merely to satisfy the tourists' passion for the exotic. It is common knowledge, of course, that under certain conditions national self-consciousness may be hidden even in the folds of the dress or in specific forms of headgear. In these cases one can speak of the material expression of national self-consciousness, which is the primary factor, rather than of any rigid historically determined national preferences in material life.

As the role of industrial forms in material life is increasing under the conditions of an integrated economy material culture tends to leave the domain of national culture on an ever larger scale.

Quite opposite tendencies are to be observed in spiritual culture, in the development of the spiritual make-up of the nation.

In the Soviet state close integrity exists not only in material life, but also in the spiritual sphere. It is rooted in the common political system, outlook and ideology. But the common conceptual and ideological basis for the culture cannot account for the entire substance of the culture, let alone its specific national forms. In spiritual culture significant changes are in progress, linked with a gradual decline and ultimate disappearance of the traditional, i.e., ethnographic forms that determine certain customary patterns of cultural behaviour, mainly rites or ceremonies.

The development logic here is as follows: the advance of education gives rise to new needs which, in turn, make

obsolete and gradually push into the background those cultural forms and traditions that put more restrictions on the freedom of choice and behaviour. However, many specialists remain strangely unaware of this trend. Actively promoting new ceremonial forms, they do not seem to realise that ceremonies in general have hardly any future in this country, with its present high urbanisation rate. Only certain non-compulsory and flexible forms may prove relatively vital. They should be capable of keeping pace with the changes in the social experience and demands of the people. It is not mere chance that the more rigid ritual and ceremonial practices are the first to go with the advance in education.

We chose the marriage ceremony to serve as an indicator of the general state of the ceremonial system which includes many rituals and customs (birth rites, marriage ceremony, funeral rites, etc.). We believed it to be more tenacious than the other forms and at the same time a ceremonial act which presupposes a person's independent judgement. The study revealed a strong regular interdependence between a person's qualification and education, on the one hand, and his national preferences in ceremonial forms, on the other: the higher the education level, the less national preferences the person shows. At the same time we discovered that some discrepancy is possible between national preferences and the circumstances of the actual wedding. That finding was important for the purposes of prediction. If an informant had a traditional wedding, but no longer favours that type of wedding now, then the value of the national ceremonies is decreasing even among the generation who used to adhere to them. Conversely, if a person had a modern wedding, but now he prefers the national forms, that would mean their value was increasing. However, the study found no significant gap between the actual and the preferred forms, proving that this particular aspect of ritual life is not falling out of use so rapidly.

Archaic forms of traditional culture based on religion become extinct very intensively with the growth of education. With the spread of education, the number of believers is falling sharply. Baptisms or Easter and other religious rites are becoming very rare among intellectuals. Among

industrial workers and particularly among rural inhabitants these ceremonies were still celebrated by no less than half of all the informants.

While archaic and largely vestigial traditional forms tend to decline, live modern forms of folk culture still preserve their importance among all population groups including intellectuals.

The Georgian scientific intelligentsia likes modern musical forms, such as symphony music, and to a lesser degree, popular music. Industrial workers, engineers and villagers prefer Georgian folk music and folk dance (however, the technological intelligentsia also enjoy modern popular music just as much). Though there exist some differences between the scientific intelligentsia and other social strata, they share with the others almost as great a love for folk forms. A very important conclusion follows: the cultural and aesthetic tastes of the scientific intelligentsia are growing wider and richer but at the same time they do not lose their orientation towards folk art, thus preserving the cultural folk heritage (see Table 1). The scientific intelligentsia may be said to exhibit the tendency of general development because of their level of education and qualification.

It should be mentioned, however, that the wider cultural orientation induced by the spread of education is not always taken into account in the cultural policy of various institutions. Does it not reflect a poor knowledge of the people's modern culture when during mass and representative cultural festivals the emphasis was on ancient folk art forms?

In fact, folk art forms preserve their significance while intertwining with professional forms. Professional forms themselves are a logical development of folk art and have a definite national colouring. Thus national Georgian composers and artists help to satisfy the public's demand for popular music and partly its demand for symphony music from the Georgian national musical tradition. This situation evidently reflects an absolute level of development of professional art: Georgian popular music proves to be sufficiently advanced to satisfy public demand. As for symphony music, Beethoven and Mozart take first place, followed by Georgian and Russian classical composers.

Table 1

Aesthetic Tastes

(percentage of the total number of informants in each collective)*

Question: What kind of music do you like?	Folk		Popular, light	Symphony
	Georgian	Russian		
Collectives of informants:				
Institute of Mechanics	56	15	56	63
Institute of Language	45	7	32	62
Factory	55	14	50	6
Collective farm	68	4	24	4
Collectives of informants:				
Question: What kind of dancing do you prefer?	Folk		Modern	Classical, ballet
	Georgian	Russian		
Institute of Mechanics	52	7	26	37
Institute of Language	55	10	7	48
Factory	82	9	28	6
Collective farm	76	8	10	14

* The sum of the answers exceeds 100 per cent because many named more than one kind of art.

Specific changes are under way in those spheres of cultural consumption which are based on language. Whereas the development of the non-linguistic spheres of culture follows the inherent logic of the symbolic system itself, it becomes possible to transcend the purely national framework in the linguistic spheres only with mastery of the symbolic system which is used for international communication. In the Soviet Union this is accomplished by the Russian language

which makes the entire stock of Russian and world culture accessible to the broad masses of the people.

The more qualified a professional group is and the more highly educated its members are, the deeper and better knowledge of Russian they have, since Russian is indispensable for qualified workers in their daily activities.

At the Institute of Mechanics 85 per cent of all workers are estimated to speak fluent Russian; at the Institute of Language, 76 per cent; at the factory and at the collective farm the figures are 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. It is noteworthy that Russian is not in any way replacing Georgian. Even those who have a perfect command of Russian know their mother tongue very well. So bilingualism is the most likely prospect for linguistic development.

Here too an analysis of the live forms of national culture confirms the same general rule: the growth and internationalisation of cultural demands and needs enriches the scope of cultural forms and creates new demands, while traditional demands connected with national cultural forms are preserved.

The materials of our study give a certain idea of the forms of interaction between national cultures. The more developed a cultural form is, the more international it is and the greater the capacity it shows for diffusion. It is not by chance that Russian traditional cultural forms, being more specific and related to earlier cultural and economic stages, are less popular with the Georgian people than more modern professional forms, especially in the field of science and technology. The following data speak eloquently of the great respect of the Georgian people for professional culture workers, Russian, Western or national (see Table 2).

What changes arise in the psychological make-up of people, in their notions, value orientations and behaviour patterns with the increase of the information influx, activisation of national contacts and the advance of their own national contacts and the advance of their own national culture? In other words, to what extent is the "consumed" culture assimilated? To what extent has it become part of the inner consciousness, a true activator of motives and behaviour?

Table 2

Cultural Orientations
(percentage of the total number of informants
in each collective)

Question: Who do you think are the greatest cultural personalities?	Cultural personalities named		
	Georgian	Russian	Western
Institute of Mechanics	56	89	85
Institute of Language	66	79	79
Factory	63	29	21
Collective farm	70	30	22

It should be pointed out that the intensity of cultural internationalisation decreases with the transition from material culture to spiritual. In spiritual culture the "psychological aspect" reveals the deepest layers of national feeling and attitudes which are manifested in everyday life, in notions of family life and behaviour, and in value orientations.

Nevertheless, to judge from the material available, this psychological aspect is also undergoing radical changes following the general trend of development. Free choice is becoming ever more important in private and public life. People are rejecting all the coercion that went with the strict behaviour patterns dictated by the former patriarchal life style. This is reflected in family life and in the choice of moral and ethical values, as well as in socio-political orientation. In family life, for example, the more educated or qualified a person becomes, the more independent he is of his parents. This statement may be tested by means of the question: "Is it necessary to obtain the parents' consent before marriage?" The percentage of people who answered in the affirmative was greater among the workers than among the scientific intelligentsia, and among the peasants than among the workers. In the Institute of Mechanics 49 per cent of the staff think it is absolutely necessary to have the parents' consent; in the Institute of Language

31 per cent think so; in the factory the figure is 37 per cent; in the collective farm, 54 per cent. Better qualified and educated people more often express the opinion that women should play active roles in public life. Such people attribute a lesser value to such traditional requirements for women as housekeeping efficiency. They are more concerned with the public role a woman plays, her devotion to a cause, her activities.¹ In educated families important questions are now more often decided by man and wife jointly. The research workers, though no less busy, help their wives at home more than the others. At the Institute of Mechanics husbands gave their wives no help at all only in seven per cent of all families. At the Institute of Language that figure was 10 per cent; at the factory, 17 per cent; at the collective farm 37 per cent.

Among social and professional values the worker's initiative seems to be the most important in more educated groups, especially among the scientific intelligentsia. The prestige of traditional values like "material prosperity" and "quiet life" is higher among the less educated groups and lower with the more educated ones. Among the latter new values are gaining ground, such as "interesting work", "conditions for creative work", "success". One absolute value, recognised in all groups, is "the family" whose function in society is as important as ever.

As for socio-political values, higher qualifications are associated with new values, which refer to greater freedom of choice, e.g., democracy, which is most highly valued in the more educated groups. Though different socio-professional groups display a great variety of choices, there exists a basic uniformity in their value orientation systems. For example, "interesting work" is valued higher than "material prosperity" not only at the research institutions, but also at the factory. "Wealth" has not been mentioned among value orientations, and orientation towards "material prosperity" tends to be uniformly distributed between

¹ Both at the Institute of Mechanics and at the Institute of Language "devotion to a cause" and "activities" were listed among a woman's desirable qualities as often as "efficiency in housekeeping". At the factory and at the collective farm "efficiency in housekeeping" was chosen from two to three times as often as "activities".

the groups. This is caused not only by ideological influence, but by the influence of everyday life itself, by the new system of social relations that no longer include wealth and property as significant sources of social influence and prestige. There are many other values that all the groups have in common and that unite them; for example, the many common answers given by the informants when they were asked to identify problems they thought were vital for Soviet society. Though many problems were cited in these answers, researchers, workers and peasants were unanimous in emphasising "the struggle for peace", "the upbringing of the young people" and "the growth of the system of public education". The choices clearly show that all these people are united by their concern for the future of their country.

The basic similarity of value orientations reflects the ideological unity of Soviet society. The nations are brought closer together by the common Marxist-Leninist outlook and common moral norms. This unity, in addition to the common economy and culture, forms the moral and cultural basis for a new historic community—the Soviet people.

The peoples of the USSR have developed some common features. With the passage of time these similarities become deeper and more pronounced. "Now the working people of each republic form a multi-national collective, in which national peculiarities are organically combined with international, socialist, common Soviet features and traditions," says the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, "On the Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."²

The available data make it possible to conclude that national culture as a system is visibly changing. Some forms are replacing others in the process of adaptation to the new conditions in production and consumption. On the whole, national culture not only exhibits stability, but is actively developing in its more progressive spheres, which, as a rule, find international expression and, hence, a "common language" with other nations.

"The flourishing, drawing together and mutual enrichment of the cultures of the socialist nations and nationalities

have truly become a rulo in the spiritual life of the peoples of the USSR," it says in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics".

Another crucial question is how these changes in culture influence the system of national-psychological orientations, national attitudes and relations between nationalities. We have in mind here not institutionalised relations, but personal intercommunication between individuals.

There exists a somewhat simplified notion of the way cultural transformations and relations between nationalities influence each other. It is sometimes taken for granted that the internationalisation of culture and the exchange of cultural values between nations should automatically improve relations between the nations and lead to their mutual understanding. We have more than once disproved this simplified concept with the help of sociological data (cf. the articles by the author in: *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 4, 1968, and in *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 12, 1969). The present study has again proved that the relationship between cultural orientations and national-psychological orientations is in no way direct or simple.³ Those who displayed the strongest international orientations in culture, particularly among the scientific intelligentsia, do not always show positive attitudes in actual relations with people of other nationalities. To explain this fact, we supposed that there existed two independent systems of relations. This hypothesis was tested by means of a latent-structure analysis. Cultural and psychological orientations, evaluated from sets of relevant answers to questions, were represented

³ National-cultural orientations were evaluated from the answers to the questions about the knowledge of the language, literature, cultural personalities and national preferences in art. People orientated *only* towards national culture were defined as narrowly orientated. Those who combined national orientations with extra-national ones were defined as internationally orientated. We obtained information about national-psychological orientations from the attitudes to extra-national contacts, i.e., to the work in a mixed collective, to mixed marriages, etc. We evaluated actual "ethnic behaviour" from the data about the intensity of actual contacts with people of other nationalities in business, friendship and family circles.

on a special graded scale. The rank correlation between the two sets of answers—cultural and psychological—appeared to be insignificant. That may be considered as another proof of a hypothesis we suggested in our earlier studies.

At the initial stage of our work we started from a presumption that the system of relations between nationalities has little to do with cultural orientations, or the degree of internationalisation of cultural make-up, but is determined by a complex combination of social and professional interests. National relations are part of the system of social relations, and likewise depend on social interests and demands in general. National relations are a mere projection or a specific form of expression of social relations. The knowledge of other national cultures undoubtedly makes mutual understanding easier. People, as it were, acquire a common language, which in itself influences social relations favourably. It follows already from classical ethnographic accounts that the farther apart primitive tribes lived and the less they knew each other, the more mutually hostile they tended to be. On the other hand, strife would occur even between close neighbours when it came to demarcating hunting grounds or fishing places.⁴

It is not by chance that the system of national-psychological attitudes is closely correlated with the situation at work, with the ratio of labour demand and supply in a given field. To test this hypothesis, we introduced into the questionnaire the question: "Is it easy to get the kind of job you have?". It turned out that the answers to this question correlated with national-psychological orientations. The harder it was to get the work, the less favourable was the attitude to contacts with people of another nationality.

All this, however, does not mean that the actual behaviour of a person always coincides with the attitudes he expresses. A person may speak unfavourably of extra-national contacts but actually behave in an internationalist spirit. Contacts with other nationalities are especially

⁴ See: M. Arfanovsky, *Historic Unity of Mankind and Mutual Influence of Cultures*, Leningrad, 1967, pp. 10-11 (in Russian).

intense among the intelligentsia. They more often have friends from other nationalities, participate in mixed marriages, read in other languages and otherwise communicate actively with people of other nationalities (see Table 3). National behaviour is a resultant of many factors. Two equally important factors are cultural orientations and national-psychological attitudes. However, there appears to be no correlation between these two series, which is corroborated once again by mathematical correlation.

Table 3

Individual inter-national contacts
(percentage of the total number of informants
in each collective)

Collectives	Husband or wife is Russian	Close friends are of other nationalities	Relatives are of other nationalities
Institute of Mechanics	11	33	63
Institute of Language	7	45	72
Factory	1	21	48
Collective farm	1	18	44

These relations could be demonstrated in the form of an angle the apex of which corresponds to national behaviour, while the two diverging sides symbolise national attitudes and national-cultural orientations with their low correlation factor (see Fig. 1 on page 155).


A neutralisation of the variable "national behaviour" turns the dependence between national attitudes and cultural orientation even into a negative one.

This analysis may be of importance for the control of processes in national culture.

It is now obvious that, to influence cultural changes and national attitudes, one needs a whole system of measures. However, it is often supposed that national relations can be improved automatically by certain measures aimed at widen-

ing cultural-national orientations of the people, e. g., "month festivals" devoted to the culture of other republics, translations of books from the languages of other peoples, exchanges of radio and TV programmes between republics, etc.

Fig. 1*



* The figures show the relationship between the factors (national-psychological attitudes, national behaviour, national-cultural orientation) expressed as Kendall's rank correlation factor.

Our results manifestly show that one can hardly expect an automatic transformation of national attitudes through purely cultural measures.

There is no doubt that a wider range of cultural orientations, knowledge of other peoples' lives, languages and cultures can help in doing away with the vestiges of national prejudices among the groups which remain conservative because of lack of education and low mobility. Such people avoid contacts with those whose way of life contradicts their rigid traditional notions.

As for the educated part of the population—people engaged in qualified work—their national-psychological orientations can be influenced only by ideologically-orientated cultural information.

Hypothetically, one can assume, however, that the main role in the determination of the national-psychological attitudes of this population category is played by a system of socio-economic measures dealing precisely with the sphere

of socio-professional interests. Thus, national-cultural policies call for a differentiated approach to various population groups and different aspects of social life.

These conclusions are in no way final, but it seems that the material available is sufficient ground for the theoretical assumptions.

Foreign Countries

A. Kolpakov, O. Soroko-Tsyupa

THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE DEVELOPED
CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

During the past decade class conflict and social tension in the capitalist world have reached such a pitch that they have produced a widespread social and political crisis; the deep-seated contradictions within contemporary state-monopoly capitalism are intensifying. Apart from vigorous action on the part of the working class, the sixties are marked by a rise in the number of mass democratic movements. As the Resolution of the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU puts it, "state-monopoly development results in an aggravation of all the contradictions of capitalism, and in a rise of the anti-monopoly struggle".¹

One of the features of the struggle against imperialism today is that it is affecting national relations in the developed capitalist countries. National movements have reached a stage where they are becoming focal points in the general-democratic struggle. In a number of developed capitalist countries the movements have already attained this posi-

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 214.

tion. The struggle involves the broad masses of the workers and many representatives of the middle strata, the intelligentsia, young workers and students. This has a considerable effect on the political situation in whole countries and deepens the basic social conflict there.

A state of siege exists in Northern Ireland. In Belgium the clash between Walloons and Flemings is becoming worse. The national movement in Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia is gaining strength and has joined in the battle against the Franco regime. The Welsh and Scottish parties that are upholding national demands have made headway in recent elections. Negroes are fighting for their freedom in the USA. All these events and many other, similar ones betray the dismal failure that capitalist states suffer in their national relations. This simultaneous and for many unexpected deterioration in the national situation of the developed capitalist countries deserves a special analysis.

I

The rise of national movements in the developed capitalist countries bears out the historical law established by Lenin whereby two tendencies operate in the development of national relations under capitalism. The first tendency is towards the awakening of national life and of national movements and the formation of national states. The second consists of the development of international ties, the breaking down of national barriers, the creation of international integrity of capital (and economic life in general), and so on. While working on this "world law of capitalism", as he called it, Lenin noted that "mankind ... can arrive at the inevitable integration of nations only through a transition period of the complete emancipation of all oppressed nations..."²

At all stages in modern history national movements have usually formed an integral part of the general revolutionary process of the time to the extent that their aims were in

accordance with the main tasks of social progress in that historical period. In 1916, while assessing the state of the national question, Lenin said that in this respect there were three main types of country: "First type: the advanced countries of Western Europe (and America), where the national movement is a thing of the *past*. Second type: Eastern Europe, where it is a thing of the *present*. Third type: semi-colonies and colonies, where it is largely a thing of the *future*."³ The countries of the first type are the result of what happens when the struggle to create national statehood is linked with the establishment of a bourgeois-democratic order and the elimination of the vestiges of feudalism. Such countries passed through the period during which the bourgeois state was formed more than a century ago. That is what Lenin meant when he wrote that in the advanced countries (Britain, France, Germany, etc.) the national question had been resolved long ago and that *objectively* there were no "general national tasks". Consequently, *only now* is it possible in these countries to "blow up" national unity and establish class unity.⁴ Countries of the second and third types were undergoing the process of national self-determination in a different historical epoch—the period of imperialism and the development of its general crisis. Eastern Europe achieved national self-determination through socialist revolutions. As for the colonies and semi-colonies, they had to resolve their national problems during the liberation struggle against imperialism—a process that is still continuing.

Needless to say, it would be blatant dogmatism to consider that once Western Europe had passed through the period of bourgeois-democratic national movements, the possibility of a revival of the national question in some particular capitalist country and in certain historical conditions was ruled out. Denouncing an error of this sort, Lenin stressed that "...Class antagonism has now undoubtedly relegated national questions far into the background, but, without the risk of lapsing into doctrinairism, it cannot be categorically asserted that some particular national question cannot

² Ibid., Vol. 23, p. 38.

³ Ibid., p. 59.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 147.

appear temporarily in the foreground of the political drama."⁵

Not for a moment did Lenin lose sight of the peculiar vitality and sensitivity of national feelings and the full complexity of the national question. He specifically made the point that under capitalism, even in the most advanced countries, there is always fuel for national strife. As he put it: "Every one of these 'great' nations oppresses other nations both in the colonies and at home."⁶

Thus, under capitalism the national question, just like any other sphere of social relations, is seen by Lenin to be a constant source of social conflict.

Does this mean that relative national peace is impossible in bourgeois society? No, it does not. Historical experience, that of Switzerland in particular, led Lenin to conclude that this kind of peace was possible, since it was historically transient. However, the vital condition for this relative national peace was maximal democracy (or as much as capitalism can offer) in the whole state and administrative system. Lenin wrote: "...I asserted that, insofar as that is at all possible under capitalism, there was only one solution of the national question, viz., through consistent democracy."⁷ He emphasised that "only radical-democratic reforms can establish national peace in capitalist states and only socialism is able to terminate national bickering".⁸

The 50-year experience of the USSR shows convincingly that "only a socialist revolution can bring about the close unity of all the forces of the people, headed by the working class, in order to overthrow the system of capitalist exploitation and, together with it, the system of national oppression" (from the CPSU Central Committee's resolution "On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"). The experience of capitalism during the same half-century adds up to a web of acute social and national contradictions.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, pp. 459-60.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, pp. 450-51.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. 20, p. 40.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. 19, p. 251.

The flare-up of the national question which can be seen at the moment in the capitalist world is a natural result of the development of the essence of imperialism. Lenin said: "Imperialism means the progressively mounting oppression of the nations of the world by a handful of Great Powers...."⁹ Over the last 15 years the capitalist world has displayed more widely than ever before a tendency to internationalise economic life and break down national barriers. This is most vividly reflected in imperialist integration, the activities of international alliances of monopolies which exploit the working people of all capitalist countries, the developed ones included. "...Imperialism means that capital has outgrown the framework of national states; it means that national oppression has been extended and heightened on a new historical foundation."¹⁰ Modern state-monopoly capitalism is trying to adapt to the conditions of struggle between the two systems in the world arena: it has to adjust to the collapse of its colonial empires. As a result, the national situation has deteriorated throughout the capitalist system and in two aspects. There is the intra-state aspect, when we are dealing with states of a varied national composition, and there is the inter-state aspect, when it is a question of the relations between imperialist powers and countries, at various levels of development, that are politically and economically dependent.

Our revolutionary epoch is having a deep effect both on the pace of development of national movements and on their role in historical progress. In our epoch—the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism—the struggle for the social emancipation of peoples and against imperialism is being objectively converted into an integral part of the struggle carried on by revolutionary forces for democracy and socialism. Lenin made this link clear when he said that "...the several demands of democracy, including self-determination, are not an absolute, but only a *small part* of the general-democratic (now: general-socialist) world movement".¹¹

⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 21, p. 409.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 408.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 341.

It is only under socialism that national relations as a particular sphere of social existence turn into the natural historical process whereby nations draw together on the basis of equality. As Lenin pointed out: "It is *impossible* to abolish national (or any other political) oppression under capitalism.... By transforming capitalism into socialism the proletariat creates the *possibility* of abolishing national oppression...."¹²

The statements by Lenin quoted above provide the key to understanding the flare-up of the national question in the whole world system of capitalism. Not even the most developed countries have been spared.

The rise of national movements in today's developed capitalist countries exposes once again the anti-democratic nature of state-monopoly capitalism and its inability to resolve the national question along democratic lines. Being a negation of democracy as such, imperialism excludes democracy from the national question too. But the infringement of democracy everywhere, including the field of national relations, inevitably meets with its just deserts. In this connection, Lenin stressed that "...national struggle, national insurrection, national secession are fully 'achievable' and are met with in practice *under* imperialism. They are even more pronounced, for imperialism does not halt the development of capitalism and the growth of democratic tendencies among the mass of the population. On the contrary, it *accentuates* the antagonism between their democratic aspirations and the anti-democratic tendency of the trusts."¹³

The "explosion" of national feelings is thus triggered off by the general intensification of the contradictions within modern capitalism. However, in the national regions controlled by the imperialist powers its social antagonisms are especially acute.

We are talking about a particular group of states with a nationally mixed population. The overwhelming majority of the modern European capitalist states are quite "pure" nationally (over 90 per cent are homogeneous population).

¹² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 325.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 23, pp. 50-51.

Only Great Britain, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland and France can be considered multi-national. In *Great Britain*, apart from the 43,300 thousand Englishmen (81.5 per cent of the population), there are 5,100 thousand Scots, 1,250 thousand Irish, 1,000 thousand Welsh and 950,000 Ulstermen. Belgium has two nationalities: there are 4,850 thousand Flemings (52.7 per cent) and 3,800 thousand Walloons (41.3 per cent). In *Spain*, in addition to the 22,300 thousand Spaniards (72.8 per cent), there are 5,000 thousand Catalans (16.6 per cent), 2,500 thousand Galicians and 700,000 Basques. *France* is peopled by about 40 million Frenchmen (85.8 per cent); among the national minorities distinctive ethnic features can be seen in the 1,400 thousand Bretons and the people of Alsace and Lorraine (1,300 thousand). Of the non-European developed capitalist states *Canada* is multi-national: there are 7,000 thousand Canadians of British origin (about 40 per cent) and 5,500 thousand French Canadians (30 per cent). Thus, the rise of national movements, so typical today of nearly all the multi-national advanced capitalist states, involves a total of over 30 million people (1961 census figures).

II

The reasons for the present-day flare-up of the national question in the developed capitalist countries are deep and various. They are directly linked with the more or less pronounced backwardness that is a feature of all or nearly all the national areas of these states. The bulk of the population live in economic hardship and suffer from political and cultural inequality. In most of the countries in question these phenomena have their roots in the distant past and are considered "traditional". The industrial revolution arrived late on the scene here, and its effects were felt less than in the main part of the country. The bourgeoisie of the dominant nation saw the chance of quick profits and rushed in to acquire a geographically favourable site and to exploit the natural resources and the vast army of cheap labour. Thus it came about that these areas were developed by highly

specialised industries which catered mainly for the foreign market and so were extremely prone to fluctuations in the trade cycle, economic depressions and any substantial changes made in the international division of labour. The tradition of a national movement in these regions has kept alive (with large or small breaks) throughout the capitalist epoch. However, the movements have recently become so wide and active that they are making a considerable impact on the internal situation and are attracting serious public attention.

Structural changes in the economy resulting from the development of state-monopoly capitalism and the scientific and technological revolution have produced a breakdown in traditional economic specialisation and, consequently, changes in the social structure and professional orientation of large sections of the population.

The most typical example is that of Great Britain. During the modern period, and especially after the Second World War, the traditional industries in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (shipbuilding, textiles, iron and steel and mining) have been declining. In Scotland and Wales mines have been closed as industry has moved over to oil. The gradual running down of the old industries is not compensated by an adequate expansion in new ones that might absorb the unemployed masses laid off by the traditional industry. Reluctance on the part of the monopolies to risk building factories in remote areas and undertake the troublesome job of industrial retraining means that no schemes for rationally distributing the country's productive forces have a chance of success.

There is a similar crisis arising from the decline of traditional industries in Wallonia and Brittany and on a larger scale in Quebec. Montreal and its environs contain more than half the population of the province and two-thirds of its industry; the rest of the province has become, in effect, a huge depressed area.

Generally speaking, the national areas of a country tend to have a considerably higher level of unemployment and a lower standard of living than the other areas. Thus in Quebec ever since the war the average level of unemployment has been almost double that of the neighbouring English-

speaking province of Ontario, and the average per capita income has been accordingly 25 per cent lower. During the fifties and up to the mid-sixties the average level of unemployment in Northern Ireland was 330 per cent higher than that in Great Britain as a whole. Scotland and Wales present a similar picture: Scotland had 70 per cent more unemployment than the national average, and Wales 65 per cent. In addition it should be noted that medical services are worse in the national areas, infant mortality is higher, educational provision is inferior and, of course, the housing situation is more acute.

Economic difficulties are prompting more and more people in a number of areas to emigrate. In the mid-sixties an annual total of some 45,000 Scots left their homeland (as opposed to about 25,000 during the fifties). In the inter-war period the small country of Wales lost more than 400,000 people through emigration. Over 100,000 people under the age of 35 left Brittany during the late fifties and early sixties.

All these facts indicate that monopoly capital, occupying as it does the key positions in the economies of the national areas (and it is mainly the dominant bourgeoisie from the "equal nations"), is acting true to form and distributing the country's productive forces in accordance with its own selfish interests.

National oppression in these areas is thus indissolubly linked with social oppression. They are the two sides of the same coin. The burden falls particularly hard on the broad working masses in these areas. They are the worst off. It follows from this situation that the struggle for national liberation is intertwined with the social struggle.

The dominance of the monopolies in the economic life of the national "periphery" also retards and damages local business, both small- and medium-scale. This explains why members of the petty-bourgeois strata play an active part in the national movements, as is happening, for example, in Quebec and Scotland. In Quebec only about 20 per cent of total capital investment comes from "national" capital. The main enterprises and in particular the largest enterprises in the new industries all belong to a handful of American

and British-Canadian monopoly groups. The occupational structure inside the American- and British-Canadian-owned enterprises epitomises to some extent the social structure of French-Canadian society: the bulk of the workers are French-Canadians, while the foremen, engineers, technicians and managerial staff are mainly British-Canadians and Americans.

Since national discrimination takes such blatant and ruthless forms, it inevitably gives rise to increasingly bitter protest. It is encouraged by the successes of world socialism, the collapse of the colonial empires and the emergence of new national states, and the ever more visible contrast between the possibilities offered by the scientific and technological revolution and what it actually does give the ordinary working man in a capitalist society. All this leads the working masses to realise that modern productive forces are creating a real basis for a rise in living standards, but they must "become masters in their own home" first. The way ahead is blocked by state-monopoly capitalism, and the struggle for economic necessities comes inevitably to have a political content and a political nature.

III

The political inequality that is a feature of these areas is itself one of the most weighty factors in the growth of national protest. This inequality is mainly expressed by the almost universal absence of even limited forms of national statehood. This is the case in Scotland, Wales, the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia. The flagrant discrimination is also displayed by the constant infringement of the constitutional rights of the local representative bodies (in places where they exist).

In contrast to the native areas, where the declaration of a state of emergency, closure of newspapers, dissolution of political organisations and widespread police repression are not everyday occurrences, the political violence perpetrated by the ruling bourgeoisie against protesting national minorities has become part of the way of life. The denial of

civil rights to Ulster's Irish Catholics, the direct military occupation of Northern Ireland by British troops, and persecution by Franco's police in Catalonia and the Basque country are not just random events.

Political inequality for the bulk of the "peripheral" population goes hand in hand with economic stagnation, material deprivation and gloomy prospects.

Lenin said that under capitalism a large centralised state represented an enormous historical step forward. However, he made a special point of the importance of local autonomy, stating that "...the principle of centralism, which is essential for the development of capitalism, is not violated by this (local and regional) autonomy, but on the contrary is applied by it *democratically*, not bureaucratically... for bureaucratic interference in purely local (regional, national, and other) questions is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and political development in general, and an obstacle to *centralism* in serious, important and fundamental matters in particular."¹⁴

The flouting or ignoring of national rights and national political inequality have helped to bring about constitutional crises in a number of countries and party political crises in most. National minorities have set up "their own", national parties. These new political parties enjoy relatively wide support among the urban middle strata and some of the workers. They protest openly against the existing constitutional set-up and the traditional political parties, accusing them of being incapable of representing the interests of the national minorities and their regions. The national movement, led mainly by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, is an objective reflection of the fact that under modern capitalism the bourgeois state has become the instrument of a small group of monopolist oligarchies, which make unscrupulous use of it to serve their own ends. This basic idea, however, has not been fully grasped by the membership of the national movement, as their policy statements and actions make clear.

In the early sixties the leaders of the newly-formed national movement in Quebec tried to secure a number of reforms

¹⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 47.

through the agency of the province's traditional bourgeois parties (the Liberal Party and the *Unité Nationale*). Disillusioned by them, however, the national movement set up a new, petty-bourgeois opposition party, calling itself the Quebec Party. In the provincial elections of April 1970 a quarter of the electorate gave its support to this party. The Scottish National Party was very successful in the municipal elections of 1968, and its membership rose in a short time to 120,000. In Wales the *Plaid Cymru* numbered some 40,000 members in 1967 and it too made a good showing at elections.

Numerous parties, much concerned with national problems, are active in both the national areas of Belgium. The People's Union (*Volksunie*) is influential in Flanders, while in Wallonia there is the democratic French-speaking front, which includes the Walloon people's movement, Christian Walloon renewal and several other organisations. They reflect the specific features of the national conflict in Belgium and uphold the social, economic and cultural rights of their national communities. However, it must also be said that they often lapse into chauvinism and preach national exclusiveness (especially the Flemish *Volksunie*, in which some blatantly reactionary elements have taken refuge).

Alongside other opposition forces, local parties in the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia have joined in the struggle against the Franco regime. They demand an end to the anti-popular regime, democratisation of the country and the restoration of national autonomy.

A particular form of mass political movement against imperialism and reaction is the Northern Ireland Association of Struggle for Civil Rights. Set up with the help of the Communist Party of Ireland and trade unionists, it unites the main politically active section of the oppressed Catholic population.

No matter how different the new parties may be, their very appearance indicates the masses' dissatisfaction with the traditional bourgeois parties and heralds a crisis in the prevailing party political system.

Seeing this mass trend away from the bourgeois party political machine, Communists raise the question of

the possibility of creating a mass working-class party and of forming under its leadership a broad anti-monopolist coalition to press home democratic national demands as part of the social and anti-monopolist struggle as a whole.

A particularly bitter situation is reached in those national "outskirts" where certain ethnic groups are subjected to a twofold, and hence completely intolerable, oppression. Typical in this respect is the picture presented by Northern Ireland, where there are almost one million so-called Scots-Irish and Anglo-Irish (descended from the Protestant conquerors of Ulster) and half a million real Irishmen, who are Catholics. The whole area's population put up with a great deal of hardship resulting from the semi-colonial status of this chronically poverty-stricken region of Great Britain. Nevertheless, the Catholic minority bears the brunt of the harsh economic, political and spiritual oppression. The autonomous state of Ulster, which has been in existence since 1921, was set up by the British and local ruling circles with one aim in view: to restrain the spread of the Irish national liberation movement in the north and to create a "legal and state basis" for the oppression of the "inner colony"—the Irish national minority. The regional institutions set up on this basis in full accord with the needs of British imperialism are of a markedly reactionary type and are yet another obstacle on the path to national freedom. A powerful upswing in the region's national movement over the past 2 or 3 years has been caused by the constitutional crisis of the reactionary Unionist regime, the disintegration of the ruling Unionist Party into a number of rival groupings and the appearance of new political organisations calling for democracy and socialism.

The British Government's decision to dissolve the Northern Ireland Parliament, dismiss the Unionist cabinet and institute direct rule from London is convincing evidence of the debacle of Tory policy and the beginning of a new phase in the Irish crisis. British imperialism's policy of oppressing the Catholic minority through the Unionists has gone bankrupt after more than half a century.

It goes without saying that the Conservative Government's measures were unable to check the growth of

the national-democratic movement in Ulster. The movement calls for the debris of the collapsed Unionist regime to be cleared away and replaced by new, genuinely democratic institutions capable of guaranteeing the working people of Northern Ireland their fundamental social and civil rights.

A constitutional crisis has flared up in a number of multinational states where the national movements are directly raising the question of legislative recognition of national rights. It is important to remember that outbursts of national protest are provoked not only by economic hardship and economic backwardness, but also by purely political factors. The national movement in Spain, for example, thrives in precisely the most economically developed areas (Catalonia and the Basque country).

What is more, political factors can again be seen at work if one considers that the national movements in the developed capitalist countries are clearly feeling the effects of international political life. The collapse of imperialism's colonial system has had a marked effect: the opportunities for social manipulation by the ruling circles of the metropolitan countries have sharply diminished. The debacle of the colonial system has done much to undermine the "foundation" of the relative "national peace" that existed previously. It has also seriously weakened the age-old fetters of jingoism and destroyed the mutual guarantee of "joint" plundering of the colonies. The very fact of the appearance of independent states among the former colonial peoples registers in the minds of the oppressed nationalities of the "great powers", adding greater determination to their protests against all forms of national discrimination.¹⁵

¹⁵ This article is not concerned with other aspects of the national question in the developed capitalist countries that are connected with the international situation or with the direct or indirect influence of international factors. On this level the most serious influence is that of the development of economic integration, one of the consequences of which—directly affecting the working people—is the migration of manpower. Questions such as these have not as yet been fully elucidated, unfortunately; however, they are to a large extent separate issues, and require special study. It is self-evident that an investigation of them is extremely relevant to the tasks of the anti-imperialist struggle on the international scale.

In this connection one must not pass over in silence one other specific question, which plays an extremely important role in making national antagonism deeper and more acute, that of an infringement of cultural democracy, and language discrimination in particular. Disregard for national peculiarities and forced assimilation—forced, because that is the only way open to capitalism—give rise to determined protest. The progressive process of internationalising social life quite often under capitalism turns into violence against national minorities.

In such circumstances a revival of national culture takes on a clear political significance.

IV

The ideology of national movements in the developed capitalist countries is very complex and contradictory owing to their social heterogeneity. Workers and farmers, students and the urban middle strata take part in the national movement, but the leading role quite often belongs to the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. Young workers and students are enthusiastic supporters too. As is characteristic of petty-bourgeois national awareness in general, both the healthy and the chaff of petty-bourgeois illusions and prejudices are revealed: ideas of the state as being above-class, an abstract national community, sometimes even national exclusiveness and idealisation of the past. One must also bear in mind that extremely reactionary forces (neo-fascist groups, Right-wing clergy, etc.) try to make use of any flare-up of the national question. Nationalist ideas are sometimes close to anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism.

However, seen as a whole, the national movement bears the stamp of mass democracy. It reflects the demands of the masses for an end to unemployment, the adoption of a rational distribution of productive forces, firm measures to overcome the housing shortage and a democratic restructuring of education. Education must be made to conform to the demands of modern technological progress, and oppor-

tunities must be made available to the working people so that they can raise their educational level.

The national movement in the various capitalist countries raises the question of national sovereignty. Historically, the principle of national sovereignty has found expression in three forms: the independent state, the federation of states and national autonomy. Different social forces offer different solutions. But at the present stage in the social and political struggle there is often a clash of two viewpoints: the idea of separatism and creating a national state is more or less the predominant one among the petty-bourgeois forces; while the ruling bourgeois circles and monopoly capital are even opposed to developed national autonomy (as in Spain). At this point the national programmes of Communist Parties become important. The Communist Parties of Canada, Belgium and Spain promote the principle of democratic federalism and condemn separatism, thus upholding the principle of unity in the class struggle in those countries. The new programme of the Communist Party of Canada makes out a detailed case: The principle of secession, preferred by the French-Canadian petty bourgeoisie, would condemn the working people of both nations to additional economic hardship, and would weaken their political unity in the fight against their common enemies—monopoly capital and Canadian and American imperialism—and the struggle for fundamental social reform. The partitioning of Canada would not be in the interests of either nation. The Communist Party stands for the unity of the working class of both nations in the face of the common enemy—the Canadian monopolies and United States imperialism—both in order to restore Canada's independence and to further the struggle for a socialist system in Canada. The Communist Party puts forward a freely negotiated new agreement about a confederation between the two nations and the drawing up of a new Canadian constitution on the basis of voluntary and equal partnership between the two nations in a bi-national sovereign and democratic state. The Party sees in this the best sovereign solution for the working people of both nations.

Naturally, the programmes of the nationalist organisations are far removed from the aims dictated by the ideology

of the progressive, conscious section of the proletariat. The broad masses of the organised workers are coming to realise more and more clearly the connection between national liberation tasks and social ones in the struggle against imperialism. Wherever workers' organisations play an active part in the national movement, they help to broaden the spectrum of the democratic demands made by organisations in the national movement. It was at the instigation of the trade unions of Wallonia that priority was given to a number of measures directed against the monopolies, as well as to the demand for a federal system.

Very important for the growth of the role of the working class in solving Scotland's democratic and social problems was the recent fight put up by the Scottish shipbuilding workers, which lasted for months. They were resisting the attempts of the Tory Cabinet to "solve" the problem of the area's declining industries by closing the Clydeside shipyards. The successful struggle put up by the working class is ample proof of the fact that social and regional problems in national areas can only be settled by the class approach of a real workers' movement. The link between social and national struggle is becoming more apparent everywhere.

In Spain the national movement in Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia has recently been drawing steadily closer to the working-class struggle. In Catalonia the National Assembly of Catalonia met in secret at the beginning of November 1971. More than 300 representatives from all the region's political and national forces opposed to the regime took part. The fact that the Assembly set up a permanent co-ordinating committee is further evidence that organisations struggling for national rights and the restoration of national sovereignty are in close touch with organisations that are leading the working-class struggle. In Galicia this unity was demonstrated in March 1972 during the shipworkers' strike and a number of general strikes in the area. In the Basque country after the Burgos trial the nationalist movement ETA recognised the need to fight for national liberation together with the Spanish working class. Such a unification of national movements with the social anti-monopoly struggle led by the working class is a guarantee

that national aspirations will be realised. It is perfectly obvious that they would stand no chance of being attained outside the framework of the working-class movement and the common struggle against imperialism, and for democracy.

The events taking place in the developed capitalist countries add further weight to Lenin's well-known image of a broad spectrum of class forces participating in the social revolution.

The Communist Parties in the developed capitalist countries draw up their policies in accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory on the national question. They lend their support to progressive forces in these movements, defend the right to self-determination and uphold democratic principles for resolving the national question.

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of 1969 clearly expressed the Communist attitude to the national question in its concluding document: "We Communists oppose all forms of oppression of nations and national minorities. We want to see every nation or national group develop its own culture and language, and we firmly defend the right of all nations to self-determination."¹⁶ Proceeding from these general principles, Communist Parties work out their attitude to the national question, taking into account the specific features of the individual countries.

Belgium has a unitary state system which in the administrative division of the country ignores the existence of the two large national communities—the Walloons and Flemings. Attempts by the authorities to impose "demarcation lines" in areas which had seen particularly bitter national clashes only made national antagonism worse: local views were not sought. This forced the ruling circles to beat a retreat. At the suggestion of a constitutional commission, the parliament passed legislation in 1970 giving recognition to both language communities (Flemish and French) as well as to the German and bilingual Brussels communities. On this basis it was envisaged to set up administrative districts

with the official state languages. Flemish must be known in Flanders, and French in Wallonia. Administrators in Greater Brussels must be bilingual. But no matter how important such concessions are in a bi-national state, marking as they do a departure from the earlier unitary structure, they do not, in the final analysis, solve the problem. The Communist Party of Belgium defends the principle of democratic federalism, and links its realisation with a system of structural reforms designed to curb the vast power of the monopolies. A solution of the national question along these lines aims not only to create a healthy relationship between the two Belgian nations, but also to extend the democratic bridge-head, from which to continue the Belgian proletariat's struggle against state-monopoly capitalism.

The national question in Spain forms a direct part of the anti-fascist, democratic and revolutionary struggle against the Franco regime. The Communist Party of Spain supports demands for the restoration of the national autonomy of Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia, swept away by the Franquists.

In Canada the national question is complicated by a number of factors, which the Communists have taken into account in their national programme. While advancing a programme that supports the right to self-determination and recognition of the equal rights of the French-Canadian nation under a new constitution and a new federal structure, the Canadian Communists point out that, without the support of the working class of the English-speaking provinces, the British-Canadian ruling bourgeoisie will make no concessions to the French-Canadian nation in any democratic solution of the national question. For this reason the Canadian Communists combine support for the national aspirations of the French-Canadians with an active campaign to educate the working people along internationalist lines. Particularly important too in the Canadian situation is the fact that the flare-up of the country's national question is due in no small measure to the growing expansion of US monopoly capital. In aiming for a democratic solution of the national question, the Canadian Communists rightly consider that such a solution will both preserve the unity of

¹⁶ *The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 35.*

Canada and further the common struggle of the Canadian working class against the domination of monopoly capital.

In Great Britain the national question, which has flared up owing to the rise of national movements in Scotland, Wales and Ulster, has a number of specific features, which are particularly apparent in Ulster. In Scotland and Wales the main problems that are absorbing the energies of the Communist Party of Great Britain are the granting of autonomy and self-government to the Scots and the Welsh and the implementation of anti-monopoly democratic measures in the economy and social relations. But in Ulster the problem is far more complicated. Here the question is not only how to end the regime of national oppression directed against the Catholic minority, but also how to democratise the whole state-political structure as well as carry out a wide programme of social and economic reforms. As the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of Ireland held in Belfast in October 1971 stressed, a united anti-imperialist front must be created in Ulster to implement this programme.

The Communist Parties of these countries are actively supporting the national movements, since they recognise that a democratic resolution of the national question creates favourable preconditions for strengthening the international unity of the working people and for furthering the liberating mission of the working class.

V

The rise of national movements in the imperialist countries is a result of the aggravation of the main contradictions within state-monopoly capitalism. They reflect social protest against the anti-democratic nature of the modern bourgeois state, which is unable to further social and national equality and advance the struggle to remove the obstacles that state-monopoly capitalism has placed on the path towards the social, economic and cultural progress of society.

In present-day conditions, where the top bourgeoisie of the oppressed nationalities is intertwined with the monopolist cliques of the ruling nations, and where the working class forms the bulk of the population in the national areas, an alliance of the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the working class is taking shape in these movements. It is true that in many cases they have not as yet progressed beyond petty-bourgeois nationalism, and they are directed by members of the middle strata. Even so, the national movement is being influenced ever more strongly by the working class: consistent democratic and anti-monopolist demands are coming to feature more and more in the programmes of national movement organisations. Of course, these programmes still contain a sizeable sprinkling of petty-bourgeois utopias, but the important point is that objectively the national movements oppose the domination of state-monopoly capitalism.

In the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism, with state-monopoly capitalism now in its mature form, the national question in these countries plays a different historical role, and its solution is bound up with different historical prospects, from what they were during the rise of capitalism and its struggle with feudalism. At that time, as a part of the bourgeois revolutions, national movements helped capitalist relations to triumph. Today these movements are becoming more and more anti-monopolist and anti-imperialist.

Naturally, being opposed to all forms of social and national oppression, Marxists-Leninists cannot ignore the fact that various social forces take part in the national movements of the developed capitalist countries. To a greater or lesser extent the following tendencies are at work.

In the first place, the national movement enjoys considerable support among the working people, students and middle strata. They spontaneously call for a democratic approach to the national question, and also demand social and national equality. Their radical leaders often have an insufficient grasp of the extremely complex social and political situation in which a national struggle develops. They do not always clearly appreciate the need for the national movement to join the struggle put up by the vanguard sections of the

working class against the domination of the monopolies. Petty-bourgeois impatience and the despair it creates often push groups towards anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism or the tactics of individual acts of terrorism.

In the second place, petty-bourgeois democrats occupy a considerable place in the national movement. They reflect the interests of the masses and their anti-monopolist sentiments, and call for radical social reforms. However, their ideas for using national statehood in order to defend the interests of the masses, and their demands for nationalisation and democratic reforms in education and culture often rest on the utopian idea that the state is above-class.

In the third place, there are groups of bourgeois nationalists representing small- and medium-scale national capital. They are really struggling for their "own" interests and only seek concessions from the prevalent monopolist oligarchy and the state that expresses its will. Their position consists largely of national selfishness. They introduce the idea of national exclusiveness into the movement, and conceal their real, selfish aims by claiming to be defending "national interests" and the "national community". However, at one stage or another and, more important, where the alignment of forces is favourable, they may have a positive role to play in the national movement by opposing the predominant monopolist oligarchy.

Since the national movements of the developed capitalist states are developing in conditions where the fundamental class conflict is clearly expressed, and the working class is in the van of the struggle of the whole working people against the monopolist oligarchy, it is exceptionally important for the proletarian vanguard to correctly assess the national movement itself and to relate it to the main antagonism in contemporary bourgeois society. We are dealing with an exceptionally complex task, both theoretically and politically. It requires us to understand varied and at times contradictory tendencies. Nor can we shut our eyes to the potential danger of the use of national movements by reactionary forces. The main point is that the national movement has a considerable part to play in the anti-imperialist struggle led by the working class. As a part of the struggle for democracy, the movement today is historically involved in the

struggle for socialism. Only socialism puts an end to the exploitation of man by man and to all forms of national oppression. It guarantees the genuine equality of peoples and creates real conditions for fraternal co-operation between nations.

NATIONAL PROCESSES IN ASIAN COUNTRIES
OUTSIDE THE USSR

the Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Karapapakhs, Kashkais, Lurs, Bakhtiari, Baluchis, certain groups of Afghans (Pushtus), Mongols and others. As for a number of peoples inhabiting inland (especially highland) regions and small islands in Southeast and East Asia, many of them had not yet passed the stage of pre-class relations. Such were the Andamanese, Nicobarese and also some of the so-called "scheduled" tribes of India, the Ceylon Veddas, many small Mon-Khmer and Indonesian peoples in the interior of Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam and the highland peoples of the Philippines and some islands in Indonesia. It is interesting to note that peoples with strong survivals of the primitive-communal system were more often found in the peripheral southeastern regions of Asia than in the continental countries lying further to the north and west. This geographical pattern in the distribution of peoples in whose society pre-class relations predominated was, no doubt, a result of uneven rates of social and economic development: development was farther advanced in the countries of Southwest and partly in those of Southeast Asia, the centres of civilisation in the ancient world.

To ascertain the period when capitalist relations arose in the East and the direction of their further development is a complex problem, the investigation of which is far from complete. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the process of primary accumulation, which had been taking place in certain regions of Asia, was greatly slowed down or even halted by the European colonial conquests that began in the 16th century: these resulted in almost all Asiatic countries becoming colonies of European capitalist states or lapsing into economic and, in many cases, political dependence upon them. In the middle of the 19th century no mature capitalist relations existed in Asia; even the elements of capitalist economy occurring in the midst of feudal society were faint and very unevenly developed as between different peoples. At the same time, small enterprises of the manufactory type employing hired labour had already appeared in some countries, e.g., Turkey, Iran, India, China, Japan, Indonesia (mainly in Java) and the Philippines, and local commodity markets were growing up around the larger urban centres. The merchant bourgeoisie was fairly numerous; in

The trends in the development of the peoples of Asia, as well as of all peoples which have gained their independence in recent decades, are a subject of the utmost interest in modern public life. National processes in these countries are extremely complex. This is due to the specific character of their social and economic development as well as to the fact that the population of almost every developing country is composed of numerous peoples at different levels of ethnic evolution.

The complexity of the social and economic structure of Asia's population and the differences in the speed of its economic, social, cultural and ethnic development were brought into high relief in the period of colonial expansion, and especially during the era of imperialism.

In the middle of the last century, when feudalism generally prevailed, most of these countries retained to a greater or lesser extent vestiges of the primitive-communal system. Such an interlacing of different social forms was most strongly pronounced among certain nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples in Southwest Asian countries and in Mongolia which had in part preserved a tribal structure. This was true of

its ethnic composition it frequently differed from the country's main population. In Turkey, for instance, this bourgeoisie was to a significant extent Armenian, Greek and Jewish. In the middle of the last century such large trading cities and ports as Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Singapore, Canton and Shanghai were already in existence and growing rapidly. It should not be overlooked that by that time many countries in the East had already become, or were on their way to becoming, appendages of European countries, supplying them with raw materials. Much of the national income in such countries was appropriated, in one form or another, by the bourgeoisie of European countries; the local population was becoming impoverished and the peasantry was on the way to destitution. All this goes to show that most of the region's peoples had already been drawn into the world capitalist system, although to widely differing degrees.

For many Asian countries, however, their colonial subjection only further intensified the specificity of their social and economic base; this was bound to affect the whole course of national development processes. The subjugation of Asian countries did not result in mature capitalist relations being directly transplanted there from Europe. For a long time the imperialists aimed simply to seize material produce manufactured within the colonies' traditional economic systems. Consequently, social and economic development in these countries amounted to the retention of backward types of economic and social relations. On the other hand, monopoly capital could not help implanting capitalist relations into the enterprises it established. Thus, in Asia the coexistence of capitalism with pre-capitalist social forms differed from its European version. Besides this the role of pre-capitalist social forms and the degree to which large sections of the population were involved in them were much more significant in Asia than in Europe. This was what underlay the principal social specificity in the conditions governing ethnic interaction and consolidation processes in Asian countries. The attitude of the peasantry, the working class and the bourgeoisie towards the struggle for national liberation was influenced by the diversity of social forms in these countries, a feature they shared with the Third World countries as a whole. This situation accentuated the particular

importance of the toiling classes in the struggle, determined the role of revolutionary democracy and opened up the opportunity for the choice between capitalist and non-capitalist development.

The diversity of social and economic forms is also a determining factor in the socio-economic, political and, in the final analysis, cultural and ethnic development of the young states that have gained their freedom in the post-war period. When studying contemporary national processes, we must not forget the history of Asian countries, the fact that they were exploited by monopoly capital and that they were drawn into the world capitalist system. A scientific approach to the study of present-day ethnic processes, and particularly of national development, requires due consideration of the historical environment. The requirement is further confirmed by analysis of Lenin's ideas on the nation and the nationalities problem. This approach is most vividly seen in Lenin's comments on the national-colonial problems of the peoples of the East.

Early in the 20th century the sense of national identity among colonial peoples, many of which had attained a fairly high level of ethnic consolidation, was greatly stimulated by the national liberation movement that arose under the impact of the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and especially the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917. The movement was described by Lenin as "the awakening of Asia". He wrote: "Europeans often forget that colonial peoples *too* are nations, but to tolerate this 'forgetfulness' is to tolerate chanvinism."¹ At the same time, when examining problems of national development, Lenin always associated the origins of these phenomena with the early beginnings of bourgeois relations under feudalism.² "Nations," he wrote, "are an inevitable product, an inevitable form, in the bourgeois epoch of social development."³

The specific features of the historical background against which national processes in Asia took place have already been described above. Asian countries were drawn into the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 63.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 154-55.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 21, p. 72.

world capitalist system very early on; hence Lenin's following remarks are fully applicable to them: "Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. The first is the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. The second is the development and growing frequency of international intercourse in every form, the break-down of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc."⁴ Lenin stressed the conflict between these two tendencies under capitalism. In colonial countries this antagonism is displayed in a different way from Europe. In Europe there was a period when the first tendency predominated. Hence the struggle for national liberation that led to the nations gaining their statehood, their political independence. In fact only two multi-national states were established: Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire, and of these bourgeois Austria-Hungary finally broke up. Tsarist Russia also fell apart, but a new state arose from the wreckage, the USSR. This new state was based upon proletarian unity and the Marxist-Leninist solution of the national problem. In Asia national consolidation processes operated mainly within the framework of historically formed states. They were, however, states that had been forcibly included in the world colonial system as colonies. Thus, the action of the above two tendencies here is peculiar in many respects, but primarily in the fact of their acting simultaneously. That is why Lenin rightly described those colonial peoples which had embarked upon a struggle for national liberation as being already nations (*natsii*).

The actual course of national consolidation processes in Asian countries in the period of the powerful upsurge of the national liberation movement that followed the October Revolution is marked by a number of specific features. The inclusion of these countries into the world capitalist system has led to fundamental changes in the social composition of their population. An indigenous working class and intelligentsia have come into being. The formation of a national

bourgeoisie capable of leadership in processes of national consolidation was hampered in many countries, since imperialist capital permitted none but the pro-imperialist trading bourgeoisie (the *compradores*) to exist there; this group played an anti-national part. Hence it was the working class that came to be the main supporter of national revolution, together with kindred groups of working people (craftsmen, day labourers, etc.), as well as peasants and the local intelligentsia. The role of the latter was especially important in giving the movement its organisational and ideological shape.

The struggle for cultural development based upon the indigenous languages had already begun in colonial times. This process is accompanied by the rise of a national literature, political writing, a press and national social and political organisations, and by a struggle for school instruction to be carried out in the indigenous languages. These developments are different expressions of the rise of a national self-consciousness, a phenomenon that is more vividly manifested in nations than in other ethnic communities.

The example of national processes in Asia shows that a nation in the course of consolidation is not merely seeking linguistic and cultural self-determination; it aspires to become organised into an independent national state or to attain autonomous government within a multi-national state. The political factor, which has played a not inconsiderable ethno-formative role in the ethnic evolution of class society, acquires a particular, sometimes decisive, importance with the rise of capitalism.

Despite the enormous role played by the working class and by workers' organisations in the struggle for independence and in the fight against imperialism in Asiatic countries that have won independence since the Second World War, the leadership in most of these countries has fallen into the hands of various nationalistic forces.

Nationalism is an extremely heterogeneous phenomenon. Lenin always stressed that nationalism should be assessed in its concrete historical perspective: it should not be treated "as such", but a distinction should be made between the nationalism of a dominant nation manifested in oppressing other peoples, and that of an oppressed nation. In the

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27.

latter kind, according to Lenin, two aspects should be distinguished: the broadly democratic anti-imperialist aspect aiming at liberation from foreign oppression, and the conservative aspect manifested in setting one's nation against others, attempting to satisfy its interests at the expense of other peoples.

Bearing Lenin's distinction in mind, we must also note that the concept of "nationalism" is often identified in newly-liberated countries with the national liberation movement, i.e., the term is used in a broader sense.

In Asia during the period of struggle for political independence and in the subsequent period, when these countries were fortifying themselves against imperialist scheming, it was the progressive aspect of nationalism that came to the fore. Nationalism was supported by the broad masses of the people, especially by the peasants, whose sense of national identity evolved more rapidly than their class consciousness. But it was the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal essence of the national liberation movements that found expression in the nationalism of the working masses.

At present the leaders of many former colonies are putting forward programmes of national kinds of socialism. This is due to the immature stage reached by internal class relations on the one hand, and to the existence of the world socialist system and the growth of an international revolutionary movement on the other. The ideology of such a nationally oriented socialism is furthered by the survival of pre-capitalist social forms, by the continued existence, in many cases, of the *obshchina* (village commune), by tradition, etc.⁵

An exaggerated idea of its national exclusiveness is thus easily adopted by an ethnos, but, even more important, the search for national self-sufficiency is substituted for the aims of social progress, institutions from the past are maintained and attempts are made to smooth over class contradictions. The inability of petty-bourgeois socialism to solve the basic problems facing a developing country may be illustrated by pre-1962 Burma, where a government under U-Ni was in power. Burma's further advance along the path of social

⁵ N. A. Simonya, "On the Role of 'National Socialisms' in the Revolutions of Eastern Countries", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4, 1967, p. 53.

progress only became possible when the patriotic forces parted ways with the national bourgeoisie.

An important role in choosing the direction to be taken by national progress in developing countries is played by the intermediate social strata who have come to power: the intelligentsia and those of the army officers who have remained in touch with the people. Some leaders, having allied themselves with reactionary forces, put forward chauvinistic ideas and attempt to associate national interests and national pride with religious, caste, local and national prejudices. In a number of cases such tendencies are concealed behind socialist slogans of a national kind. Other leaders, who have come under the ideological influence of socialist countries and the world revolutionary movement as a whole, seek non-capitalist types of development. It is these latter leaders who form the body of national revolutionary democrats. Under the influence of the working class, which is constantly gaining in strength, the revolutionary democrats are gradually coming to realise that, in their struggle for social progress, the developing countries ought to make common cause with the socialist camp and the world working-class movement. In this way, the nationalism of formerly enslaved peoples, being, according to Lenin, an essentially progressive, broadly democratic movement, opens up before revolutionary democrats the opportunity of drawing closer to scientific socialism. This opportunity can be realised thanks to the increased influence of the international working-class movement over the economic, social and cultural life of the peoples of the world.

Ever since the 1970s a new aspect has been increasingly displayed in the national liberation movement: the particular urgency attached to problems of social economic development. An enormous role in this change is played by the state: "the increase in the share of the state sector in the economy of so-called 'Third World' countries".⁶ With the advance in social progress, primarily in socialist and socialistically-oriented countries, many traditional social institutions originating in the feudal and colonial past are being eliminat-

⁶ R. Ulyanovsky, "The Social-Economic Problems of Newly Liberated Countries", *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1972, pp. 87-99.

ed, and a struggle is being mounted against every kind of prejudice, e.g., against ideas of national exclusiveness and traditions of national self-isolation.

Such are the main social and political conditions under which processes of national consolidation are taking place in Asia.

One of the principal problems facing the developing countries today is that of devising ways in which the national consolidation of their peoples can be most rapidly completed. The great changes that have taken place in the political, social, economic and cultural life of developing countries since the Second World War have accelerated the processes of ethnic consolidation, the processes of transition from the lower to the higher types of ethnic community. A major role has, in the authors' view, been played by the sharp rise in internal population mobility (conducive to rapid ethnic mixing) and the increasing rate of urbanisation.

Migration processes in Asia had already assumed great dimensions in the middle of the 19th century. At that time large numbers of Chinese migrated in search of work to the countries of Southeast Asia (where the colonisers were starting a rapidly developing plantation economy). There they mingled with the indigenous population. The same motive induced Indians to move to Ceylon, Burma and Malaya, as well as to non-Asian countries (Central and South America, South Africa and Oceania). At present over 20 million Chinese are living outside China and over 5 million Indians outside India. Migrations connected with the Second World War and post-war events involved large numbers of people. There was, for example, the return of the Japanese to Japan from China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, the repatriation of the Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians from Turkey and the return to Turkey of Turks from the Balkan countries. Large-scale population movements were also caused by conflicts between different national and religious groups, e.g., the migration of Moslems to Pakistan and of Hindus and Sikhs to India.⁷ There were also transfers of population from

⁷ Migrations in the Hindustan Peninsula involved over 18 million people.

densely to sparsely inhabited regions (e.g., from Java to other Indonesian islands, from southern China to Sinkiang and northern China). In addition, ever-increasing numbers of nomads and semi-nomads began to adopt a settled way of life.

All these migrations, however, can bear no comparison to the movement of villagers into urban settlements. In the last quarter of a century the number of urban inhabitants in Asia increased almost 2.5 times, while the population as a whole only grew by a half. Over 150 million people moved from villages to cities. Given the extremely complex ethnic composition of the urban population⁸ and the favourable conditions for the development of ethnic processes prevailing in cities, it may be confidently said that urban growth promotes national consolidation of the peoples in every Asian country without exception.

The complicated course of Asia's social and ethnic history has made for a great diversity in its ethnic and linguistic composition. At present Asia is inhabited by peoples belonging to over ten different linguistic families. Some of these families are purely Asiatic, others are also represented in other parts of the world. Thus peoples speaking Sino-Tibetan, Thai, Miao-Yao, Vietnamese, Mon-Khmer, Munda and Dravidian languages are wholly confined to Asia, while there are peoples speaking Indo-European, Semitic, Altaic and Austronesian languages as mother-tongues both within and outside Asia. Most Asian countries are multi-national. The populations of India, Indonesia, China, the Philippines and Vietnam, each consists of over 50-100 peoples; that of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand and some others—over 20 each. The ethnic diversity of the population is increased by some of the peoples' being divided into several groups by state boundaries (the Kurds, Baluchis, Afghans, Punjabis, Bengalis, etc.). Only a few Arab coun-

⁸ Lenin had already remarked upon this feature of urban populations in 1913. He wrote: "The extremely mixed national composition of the population of the large city of St. Petersburg is at once evident. This is no accident.... Large cities, factory, metallurgical, railway and commercial and industrial centres generally, are certain, more than any other, to have very mixed populations..." (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 532).

tries, as well as Bangladesh, Korea and Japan, are more or less homogeneous in ethnic composition.

All the major human races are represented in Asia: the Mongoloid, the Europeoid, the Negroid and the Australoid. The Mongoloids include the overwhelming majority of the population of Eastern, Central and Southeast Asia, as well as small groups in South and Western Asia. The Mongoloids are subdivided into three groups: the Northern, Eastern and Southern Mongoloids. The first of these groups includes the Mongols and certain peoples of Northeast China; the second—the northern Chinese and the Koreans; the third embraces various mixed and intermediate forms linking the Mongoloids and the Australoids: the southern Chinese, Indonesians, Filipinos, peoples of Indochina, and the Japanese belong to this group (the Japanese type, which includes also Ainu elements, is characterised by a somewhat differing combination of traits). The Europeoid race is represented in Asia by various types of its southern branch (the Armenoid, Indo-Afghan and other types); these types are prevalent among the peoples of Southwest Asia and northern India. Comparatively small groups of Australoids are scattered over many regions of Asia. The Veddoid type is to be observed among the Veddas of Ceylon, the Bhils and various Dravidian and Munda-speaking groups in India and among some small peoples of Southeast Asia (the Senois, Toalas, etc.); the Melanesian and Papua types—among the East Indonesia peoples; the Negrito type—among the Filipino Actas, the Semangs of Malaya and the Andamanese; the Ainu type—among the Japan Ainus. A South-Indian type originated in the zone of early contacts between the southern branch of the Europeoids and the Veddoids. This is mainly represented among India's Dravidian peoples. In the southern coastal regions of the Arabian Peninsula there are representatives of the Negroid race.

Race may, under specific conditions, exert a certain influence over ethnic processes. Thus, owing to their age-old isolation, Negrito groups in Southeast Asia (the Andamanese, Semangs, Actas) have come to possess the character of ethnic communities. However, this is the exception rather than the rule in Asia, where race as such forms no handicap to close contact.

Relations in the religious sphere are also exceedingly intricate in Asia, where all the major religions of the globe had their birth. Some of them have spread all over the world (Christianity, Islam), others have remained mainly within Asia (Buddhism, Hinduism, Shintoism, etc.). A few large areas may be distinguished where one religion predominates: Islam in its two principal forms, the Sunni and the Shiite, is widespread in Western Asia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia. In Indochina and Ceylon Buddhism is predominant in its Theravada form (southern branch); in Southern Asia—Hinduism. In the countries of Eastern and Central Asia several religions are professed by believers: Mahayana Buddhism or Lamaism, Confucianism, Taoism, Shintoism, as well as Islam. Christians are in the majority only in the Philippines and Cyprus; they also form about half the population in the Lebanon. In Israel the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants are Judaists. The most backward peoples (mainly in Southern and Southeast Asia) have retained local primitive cults. In Asian countries religion frequently becomes an ethno-formative factor. Some religions forbid marriages with representatives of a different form of belief; this raises obstacles to the mixing of ethnic groups. Thus in most Moslem countries groups of a different religion, and sometimes even of a differing Islamic doctrine, are regarded as national minorities. In Syria, for instance, where Sunnis form 70 per cent of the population, all other inhabitants belonging to various Moslem doctrines and sects, as well as Christians and Judaists, are embraced by the concept "minority"; and this is no mere formality, for these groups do indeed retain considerable ethnic peculiarities.

A survey of the ethno-formative role of religion based on the abundant material furnished by Asia enables us to pose some interesting questions in comparative history, for instance, the problem of the contrasting role of Islam in the West and in the East of the region. In countries of the Near East and the Middle East Islam had, especially in its early stage, a strong tendency towards smoothing out ethnic differences because it encompassed peoples who, although differing in their level of social and economic development, all belonged to the same broad historical and ethnographic

region, or to closely related ones. The substitution of a sense of religious identity for ethnic self-consciousness still occurs in this part of Asia. A very different situation is observed in East and Southeast Asia, where Islam has become prevalent among certain peoples, but its area does not coincide with any particular historical and ethnographic region. Here Islam performs a fairly strong ethno-formative function, e.g., among the Huis of China. This numerous people scarcely differs from the Chinese in language, and has only unimportant distinctions in economy and way of life. The main factor separating the Huis from the Chinese is their religion. The Moros of the Philippines are in a similar situation: they are distinguished from the other peoples of the country, who are Christians or animists, by their religion, Islam; this is expressed in their name (Moro-Moor). In Indonesia, where Islam is professed by most of the population, it is Christianity that performs an ethno-formative function, e.g., Protestantism among the Minahasa and the Amboinese.

One of the principal problems requiring scientific study is the effect of religion not only on the formation of ethnoi, but on the specific cultural and behavioral traits of their followers. In India, for instance, it may be observed that the Sikh religion, having arisen as a reaction against Hinduism with its severe restrictions against the individual, favoured the development of a certain type of personality characteristic of the Sikhs: energetic, receptive to innovation, actively participating in the country's economic life. Sikhs are heavily represented in India's working class and bourgeoisie.

The diversity of the ethnic, racial and religious patterns in Asia is supplemented by the great variety of economico-cultural types. These represent complexes of interconnected characteristics of economy and culture. Such complexes arise among different peoples that have reached an approximately similar level of social and economic development and live in a similar geographical environment.⁹ These

⁹ See: M. G. Levin, N. N. Cheboksarov, "Economico-Cultural Types and Historic-Ethnographic Regions", *SE*, No. 4, 1955; Y. V. Chesnov, "On Social-Economic and Natural Conditions of the Emergence of Economico-Cultural Types (re M. G. Levin's works)", *SE*, No. 6, 1970; B. A. Andrianov, N. N. Cheboksarov, "Economico-Cultural Types and Problems of Their Cartography", *SE*, No. 2, 1972.

types are closely bound to the social and economic system, and their influence over the general direction and the distinguishing peculiarities of ethnic development is very great. Three major groups of economico-cultural types have been present in Asia since earliest times: that of hunters, food-gatherers and fishermen; that of cultivators by hand and hoe and cattle breeders; and that of plough agriculture.

The role played by economic and cultural factors in ethnic development is a very considerable one. It is of interest, first of all, to note that a people's numerical strength and demographic composition are directly influenced by their economico-cultural type. Hunting, food-gathering and fishing peoples number no more than a few tens of thousands, frequently only a few thousand or even a few hundred members. Peoples belonging to the second group of economico-cultural types may, of course, be much more numerous, however they too have, as a rule, a demographic ceiling: they very rarely number over one million. Nearly all the large peoples of Asia belong to the third group of economico-cultural types, i.e., to that of plough agriculturists. Naturally it is these peoples that have the widest scope for progressive social-economic development, and consequently also for ethnic development up to its highest level: the formation of nations. Thus a necessary precondition for cultural and ethnic development is, as a rule, the transition to more intensive forms of economy, i.e., to higher economico-cultural types. In many cases it is economic and cultural distinctions that serve to separate one ethnos from another by creating social barriers that lead to the isolation of backward peoples. Thus, such differences serve as the principal criteria for distinguishing two population groups inhabiting Kalimantan: the semi-nomadic hunting Punan tribes and the settled agricultural Dayak peoples. The importance of the nature of economic activity in originating ethnic distinctions was noted by Engels with regard to the ancient Hebrews, who had become differentiated from other pastoral Semitic peoples by shifting to agriculture.¹⁰

¹⁰ See: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, 1965, pp. 78-80.

The concept of historicoo-ethnographic regions that has been explored by Soviet researchers helps to describe the ethnic situation. These regions are extensive areas of the Ecumene that encompass groups of peoples inhabiting adjacent territories. Such peoples have real links binding them together, although they not infrequently differ in the level and peculiar characteristics of their social and economic development. At least four large areas of this kind may be distinguished in Asia (outside the USSR); they may be looked upon as "historicoo-ethnographic provinces of the first order": Western, Southern, Southeast and East Asia.¹¹ Within each of the four major historicoo-ethnographic provinces regions of a secondary order may be distinguished. These also possess certain geographical, economico-cultural and ethno-linguistic distinctions. In many cases these secondary regions coincide completely or in part with political entities, i.e., with states that existed in a certain historical period (up to the present). Western Asia, for instance, comprises such regions as Asia Minor, Arabia, Iran and, possibly, also Afghanistan, which is closely linked with Central Asia on the one hand, and with Northwest Hindustan on the other. The Southern province comprises Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Ceylon. Each of these countries may be regarded as a separate historicoo-ethnographic region.

Eastern Asia is also subdivided into historicoo-ethnographic regions coinciding with individual countries: Mongolia, Korea and Japan. The case of China is not so simple. From the historicoo-ethnographic viewpoint, it may be divided into two regions: a northern and a southern one, separated approximately by the Hwang Ho-Yangtze divide. In their ethnographic, linguistic and anthropological characteristics the peoples of South China have throughout the ages been closer to Southeast Asia, and have formed, as it were, a transitional zone between this province and East Asia. In the southeastern region the coincidence between state boundaries and the limits of historicoo-ethnographic regions is not so distinct. The main historicoo-ethnographic differences

¹¹ Some authors distinguish Central Asia as an independent region differing sharply from other regions in its historicoo-geographical characteristics.

within this region are those between its continental and island parts.

The historicoo-ethnographic provinces and regions evidently do not, as a rule, correspond to individual peoples, even to the largest of them, or even to whole groups of peoples speaking cognate languages, e.g., Turkic, Iranic, Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, Munda, Mon-Khmer, Tibeto-Burman, Indonesian, etc. Nevertheless, prolonged economic and cultural contact and frequently also mixed marriages between peoples inhabiting a single historicoo-ethnographic region of a higher or lower order lead to their developing common or similar ethnographic traits, to the diffusion of inter-group languages of communication and even to the rise of a common "regional" sense of identity and affection for their native land. In other words, within the framework of historicoo-ethnographic regions there usually arise objective conditions for the cohesion of the various peoples into what may be called "poly-ethnic communities".

This process is accelerated and intensified where such communities historically coincide with stable political units. In such cases there arose, within more or less stabilised boundaries, a type of amalgamation of peoples that may be called an ethno-political community. Communities of this type existed within state boundaries in pre-capitalist societies. Such communities were typical of almost all modern Asian countries in their feudal stage. With the rise of nations such ethno-political communities tend to develop into national-political communities. These will be examined in more detail below.

All historicoo-ethnographic regions encompass ethnic communities differing from each other not only in language and in their specific cultural traits but also in the level of development they have attained. The most backward of them which have survived in the internal highland regions of Asia, are usually designated in foreign and sometimes also in Soviet literature by the term "tribe", though the use of this term is not always well-founded. Tribes were, as we know, typical of the era in which the primitive community system predominated. Unlike societies of later historical periods, they were based on an actual or imaginary blood kinship, i.e., they comprised people of common descent, or at least those

who thought themselves linked by such descent. Another feature of tribal communities was the absence among them of any appreciable social stratification, still less of antagonistic classes. Owing to this, the culture of those peoples was more or less one for the whole group: the ethnic and the social aspects of culture were one and the same. The tribe, which consisted of several (originally, in all probability, of two or three) exogamous clans, appears to have been the earliest territorial-social community in which men of the modern type lived. However, a separate tribe with its institutions represented an early form of social organisation, but not an independent ethnos. The main type of ethnic community in the age of the primitive-communal system was, presumably, a group of related tribes living in adjacent territories, speaking dialects of a single language and possessing many cultural traits in common. It is such tribal agglomerations ("soplemennosti") that formed, presumably, the main ethnoi or peoples of the pre-class period of history. The individual tribes formed, as it were, ethnographic groups within such tribal communities of the first order.¹²

The meaning which different researchers attach to the term "tribe" or "tribal community" is very vague. Several groups of ethnic communities in Asia outside the USSR are all usually designated by the term "tribe", but in reality differ greatly from one another in the level of their social and economic development. Some of them number millions, some hundreds or tens of thousands, while others only thousands or hundreds of members. In Western Asia the term is used to denote large peoples mostly belonging to the economo-cultural type of nomadic or semi-nomadic cattle-breeders (e.g., Kurds, Kashkais, Baluchis, etc.). Such

¹² In Soviet literature the opinion is predominant that the earliest type of ethnic community was the tribe. The hypothesis that it was the group of related tribes and not the tribe that was the first type of ethnic community was promulgated by N. N. Cheboksarov (*Problems of the Origin of Ancient and Contemporary Peoples*, *Seventh International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnographical Sciences*, Moscow, August 1964, Moscow, 1964, p. 6). For a more detailed analysis of the concept of *soplemennost* see: S. A. Artyukov, N. N. Cheboksarov, "Information Transfer As a Mechanism of the Existence of the Ethno-Social and Biological Groups of Mankind", *Rasy i narody*, No. 2, Moscow, 1972 (in Russian).

communities, though preserving certain vestigial traits of the tribal structure, have usually already been drawn, in one way or another, into the system of feudal relations. They are divided into social groups with quite sharp differences in their property status.¹³ The tribal communities of Southeast Asia are very different: these ethnoi are, as a rule, composed of food-gatherers, hunters and fishermen, or cultivators by hoe, with little social stratification. They preserve many features of the primitive community structure, and their culture is comparatively homogeneous. Many small Dravidian, Munda, and some Tibeto-Burman-speaking peoples of Hindustan, the Highland Mons, the Khmers and Indonesians of Indochina, a few ethnoi in Indonesia and the Philippines (mostly inhabiting small isolated islands or the interior of larger islands) belong to this type. Forms peculiar to the tribe as a social organisation (tribal councils, chiefs, etc.) may feature in these ethnoi in very different degrees; they may even be totally absent. Frequently such tribal communities were not separated from other tribes by clearly defined boundaries: there was something like an "ethnic continuity" from tribe to tribe and from group to group. Such continuity appears to have been particularly characteristic of the New Guinea Papuans. Some investigators speak of them as "contact ethno-linguistic communities".¹⁴ Obviously, all these diverse ethnic communities may only artificially be designated by one and the same term.

The usual term for ethnic communities in pre-capitalist class societies, "narodnost" (nationality) is even more uncertain in its meaning than the term "tribe"; it embraces ethnoi of widely diverging characteristics. First to be borne in mind are the great differences between nationalities (*narodnosti*) of different historical periods, although they were always composed of people linked by economic and cultural

¹³ L. P. Lashchuk has proposed the term "Ulus community" for ethnic communities of nomadic cattle-breeders holding an intermediate place between tribes and nationalities (L. P. Lashchuk, "An Attempt at the Typisation of Ethnic Communities of Mediaeval Turks and Mongols", *SE*, No. 1, 1968); see also: *National Processes in the Middle East*. Moscow, 1970 (in Russian).

¹⁴ See: N. A. Butinov, "Ethno-Linguistic groups in New Guinea", *SE*, No. 3, 1962, pp. 81-89; *New Guinean Papuans*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 24-27 (in Russian).

ties stemming from their proximity and by a common language. At the dawn of class society the core of each people was generally composed of free commoners (cultivators or cattle-breeders) who were exploited in various ways by the tribal upper stratum. The latter frequently belonged to a different ethnos. Especially wide was the ethnic divergence between the ruling class and the exploited population in those countries where, in the antiquity, slavery-based production was prevalent. In such societies the slaves remained for a long time outside the country's major ethnoi and only came to be included in them by a slow and often very painful process. In feudal society the exploited population group, i.e., the peasants and the urban working people, always formed the core of the ethnos. It was the culture and everyday life of this stratum that formed the significant characteristics of the people as a whole. As for the upper classes of feudal society, there was often a wide gulf between them and the bulk of the population.¹⁵

The contrasts in everyday life and culture between the different classes and strata within each country sharpen with the evolution of society. Owing to this, the differences between classes, strata, castes and professional and religious groups come to be more sharply defined than those between ethnoi. This was true of the upper castes in India descended from the Kshatriyas and especially those descended from the Brahmins: their sense of identity was much stronger with regard to caste than to their ethnic group. Their social and cultural isolation was the greater for their use of Sanskrit,¹⁶ the dead language of ancient Indian culture. With the rise of Islam and the establishment of Moslem states in Western and later in South and Southeast Asia, headed often by Arab, Persian or Turkic feudal lords, a Moslem elite sprang up in these regions as well; among them the Arabic and Persian languages were in common use. In the

¹⁵ For a more detailed examination see: Y. V. Bromley, "Ethnos and Ethno-Social Organism", *Vestnik AN SSSR*, No. 8, 1970, pp. 48-54; "The Term 'Ethnos' and Its Characterisation", *Rasy i narody*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 9-33; V. I. Kozlov, *The Dynamics of Population Size*, pp. 32-38 (all in Russian).

¹⁶ M. K. Kudryavtsev, *Community and Caste in Hindustan (Indian Village)*, Moscow, 1971 (in Russian).

Middle Ages these languages exerted a strong influence over the tongues of all peoples inhabiting Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, and, to a certain extent, also over those of northern India and even of Indonesia.

Without relinquishing the term "narodnost'" (nationality), or starting here a discussion over its meaning, we must, nevertheless, keep in mind, when analysing the ethnic situation, the specificity of the larger Asiatic nationalities which has been described above. It was these nationalities that later became the initial environment within which the processes of national development took place. At the same time, it should be clearly understood that tribal communities and nationalities (*narodnosti*), even if these categories are interpreted in their widest sense, by no means exhaust the types of ethnic communities existing in Asian countries. This applied in the past, and it does at present. It must first of all be noted that all ethnoi of any considerable size are, as a rule, subdivided into local groups distinguished by certain differences in culture and customs, and frequently also in dialect. In professional scientific literature such subdivisions within large ethnoi are usually called "ethnographic groups". It is often difficult to distinguish between an ethnographic group and an independent people. An example of this is the population of the region in northern India where the various Hindi dialects are prevalent. Quite frequently individual small tribes and nationalities, especially backward ones, switch over to the language spoken by their larger and more highly developed neighbours, adopt many of their cultural traits and customs and become gradually transformed into an ethnographic group of this larger people.

Apart from tribal communities, nationalities, and the subdivisions of the latter (ethnographic groups), Asian countries experienced (as did other parts of the world) the rise at different periods of their history of specific territory-based communities of an intermediate character between ethnic communities proper and other historical population groups: economic, cultural, lingnistic or religious communities. These may be designated, respectively, as ethno-economic, ethno-cultural, ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious communities. An example of such an ethno-economic or ethno-cultu-

ral group is the multi-lingual nomadic pastoral Hamse group (comprising Turkic, Iranic and Arabic-speaking tribes) in southern Iraq. Such ethno-economic and ethno-cultural groups are especially plentiful in Southeast Asia. Among these we may reckon the Dayaks and the Punans of Kalimantan, and the valley peoples and the highland peoples of the Philippines. Such communities are distinguished not so much by language as by various economic and cultural differences. A peculiar group is formed in Southeast Asia by the so-called sea nomads (Selungs, Maukens, Orang-Lauts, the Bajao) scattered over the small islands and coastal regions of the continent at enormous distances from each other and plying various trades connected with the sea. Peculiar ethno-economic or ethno-cultural zonal communities have come into being in Laos, where three population groups may be clearly distinguished: the Lao-Lum, settled irrigated rice-cultivating valley-dwellers, ethnically identified with the Lao; the Lao-Thenh inhabiting the mountain slopes, engaged in slash-and-burn dry agriculture, comprising various small peoples of the Highland Thai and Mon-Khmer groups; and the Lao-Sung living in the high mountainous regions, engaged in dry agriculture by hoe, comprising mainly Tibeto-Burman and Miao-Yao groups, comparatively late migrants to Laos from the north. Each of these three zonal groups is characterised by certain economic and cultural peculiarities of its own. Each stands out clearly from its neighbours and is, to a certain extent, aware of its own identity as an actually existing community.

Ethno-linguistic communities are still more clearly distinguished. Practically speaking, every numerous people, as it comes to be dispersed over an extensive area, breaks up into ethnographic groups and assimilates smaller ethnic communities. It may, in the course of time, display a tendency towards still further ethnic differentiation during which separate though genetically related ethnoi may be severed from the main body. Besides the "Hindustanis" already mentioned, other groups in Hindustan may be reckoned among such broad ethno-linguistic communities: the Biharis, the Rajasthanis, the Lahnda-speakers and the groups speaking various Pahari dialects in sub-Himalayan regions. In Western Asia ethno-linguistic communities comprising the

Iranic-speaking Lur and Bakhtiari tribes belong to this category. In the island region of Southeast Asia one of the largest ethno-linguistic communities is that of the Malays. Separate ethnoi have long since arisen within this group, each of them possessing its own specific cultural traits, its own customs and its particular dialect (the Malacca Malays, the Riau, the Palembangs, the Djambis, the Kalimantan Malays, the people of Jakarta, etc.). The largest people of the Molucca Islands, the Amboinese, are also linguistically very close to the Malays. The Sulawesi Torajas, often erroneously regarded as a single people, are in reality a group of separate ethnic communities speaking related but independent dialects or even languages (the Palu, the Koro, the Poso, the Sadangs, etc.). More and more such examples might be provided, but the above is sufficient to support the conclusion that Asia abounds in ethno-linguistic communities. Such communities should not, of course, be confused either with separate peoples or with economic-cultural and historical-ethnographic groups. At the same time, ethno-linguistic communities should be distinguished from purely linguistic groups comprising peoples speaking genetically related but widely separated languages, where not only mutual comprehension, but all consciousness of affinity is ruled out. Linguistic families, such as the Indo-European, the Altai, the Sino-Tibetan, the Austronesian, etc., belong to such purely linguistic groups.

Examples of ethno-religious communities have already been given in connection with the role of religion in the formation of ethnoi. In India the Sikhs may be reckoned among communities of this type, and in some regions also the Jains, who differ from the surrounding population not by their language but by their religion, with which a number of specific cultural traits and customs is linked. It is important to point out that both these religious groups are endogamous. Another striking example of a small ethno-religious community is afforded by the Bombay Parsees, who have preserved their ancient Zoroastrian religion with its fire cult; they are ethnographically isolated from the neighbouring peoples. The ethnic consolidation of the major peoples of the Philippines (the Bisayans, Tagalog, Ilocos and Bikol) was, to a certain extent, bound up with their conversion

to Christianity that began with the Spanish colonisation in the 16th century. On the other hand, conversion to Islam brought about the birth of an independent ethno-religious group in the south of the Philippines—the so-called Moro. In Western Asia, the Kurds-Yezidians of Iran and Iraq, the Zoroastrians of Iran, the Druzes of Syria and Lebanon, the Nusairis (Alawites) of Syria and the Maronites of Lebanon may be regarded as ethno-religious communities.

It should be noted that ethno-religious communities are based upon proselytical religions, while tribal cults of local spirits, deities and deified ancestors are closely bound up with the ethnic community (the nationality or the tribal group) where they were conceived.

Of course, ethno-religious communities, like ethno-economic and ethno-linguistic ones, cannot be regarded as peoples or ethnoi in the strict meaning of the term. In order that an ethnic community proper should be formed at any level, it must necessarily possess characteristic cultural traits expressed in a commonly understood language. Lastly, an extremely important element of any community, a certain resultant of all ethno-genetic factors, is ethnic self-consciousness, awareness of ethnic identity.

On the theoretical level, it is highly important to pose the problem of yet another type of social-ethnic community, that which comes into being when ethnoi are involved in active political life.

In the last hundred years the consolidation of peoples in Asian countries was powerfully influenced by the rise of national liberation movements. Ethnic communities of all kinds were drawn into these movements, however much they differed in numerical strength, level of social development, language, economic life, culture and customs. The economic and cultural ties linking these peoples together, the growth of patriotism and a clear realisation of their belonging to a single whole, to their Mother Country, all this was greatly stimulated by participation in the common struggle. Heroes of the national liberation movement became heroes of the whole country, regardless of their ethnic affiliation. After independence had been won, the tendency towards economic consolidation within the boundaries of existing states grew even stronger. The population of these states came to realise

their affiliation to a new kind of community, that which is sometimes designated in non-professional literature and in the press—"people" (*narod*) or "nation" (*natsiya*), using these terms in their broadest sense. Such concepts as "the people of Iran", "the people of Afghanistan", "the people of India", "the people of Burma", "the people of Indonesia", "the people of Vietnam", etc. became realities in spite of the fact that each of these "peoples" comprises several different ethnic communities. Thus political boundaries in Asia (as well as in Africa and Latin America) have at present come to serve, in most cases, as boundaries delimiting the large rising communities of a new type, irrespective of their homogeneous or heterogeneous ethnic composition. These new communities are more stable and more clearly acknowledged by their members than the ethno-political communities of the feudal period. In Soviet historical and ethnographic literature it has been proposed to call them national-political communities.¹⁷ It is perfectly obvious that such communities cannot by any means be identified with nations (*natsiya*) or with any other ethnic communities.

The rise of the nation as an ethnic category is associated with a definite historical era, that of developing capitalism. As has been shown above, capitalist relations in Asia were still very feeble by the beginning of the imperialist era, although their roots go back to very early times, to the pre-colonial period. Lenin repeatedly pointed out that the growth of economic links between formerly separate territorial population groups of a country, the merging of local trading markets into a single nation-wide market, was a necessary pre-condition of national development.¹⁸ This process should not be understood in an oversimplified way, namely that each rising nation must have its own separate economic market. As has been justly pointed out by V. I. Kozlov, economic barriers follow, as a rule, not ethnic,

¹⁷ See: S. I. Bruk, N. N. Cheboksarov, "Modern Stage of National Development of Asian and African Peoples", *SE*, No. 4, 1961; N. N. Cheboksarov, "The Problem of Typisation of Ethnic Communities in the Works by Soviet Scientists", *SE*, No. 4, 1967.

¹⁸ See: V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 155.

but political boundaries,¹⁹ therefore nation-wide markets are formed not within ethnic, but within political units, i.e., within states. Still, in the course of capitalist development all of a country's peoples are gradually drawn into this nation-wide market, though to a varying degree. Economic links between the various peoples and between the ethnographic groups within each people, expand and gain strength. Thus there arise practical historical pre-conditions for the national consolidation of the different groups within each ethnos, and for the drawing together of different ethnoi living in the same state. Economic consolidation is naturally followed by cultural and linguistic consolidation. The awareness of a single identity rises at an accelerating rate among the people as a whole, until, at a higher level, it becomes national self-consciousness, the self-consciousness of a nation (*natsiya*).

Of course, national development in Asian countries took place under different conditions from those which prevailed when nations arose in highly developed capitalist countries. Among Asia's larger peoples national consolidation actually began only in the imperialist era. Since Eastern countries were, in one way or another, subjugated to imperialists, social-economic and cultural development in these countries was hampered, and social relations of the feudal and, in part, even of the primitive community period were largely preserved. These specific circumstances naturally exerted a strong influence over the ethnic history of all Asiatic peoples; their economic-cultural and ethnic development was extremely uneven, and the different types of ethnic communities survived up to our own times. However, the most numerous Eastern peoples, and those that had attained the highest level of social, economic and cultural development, embarked upon the course of national consolidation even under these difficult conditions. Capitalist social relations arose and gradually expanded first in urban, then in rural settlements. These peoples acquired a bourgeoisie of their own and an intelligentsia closely linked with the bourgeoisie. The number of hired workers increased very slowly, though

¹⁹ V. I. Kozlov, "Problems of the Theory of Nation", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1967, pp. 94-95.

incessantly, first mainly in agriculture, subsequently also in industry. Social stratification among the peasantry and in the masses of urban working people (mainly craftsmen) was also on the increase. Many of the landowners were gradually switching over to bourgeois economy and culture.

National development accelerated sharply at the turn of the 20th century. It is this period that saw such important events as the bourgeois revolutions in Turkey and Iran, the achievement of independence by Afghanistan and the rise of the national liberation struggle among the peoples of Hindustan, China, Indochina, Indonesia and the Philippines. An enormous influence over the national development of Eastern peoples was exerted by the birth of the first socialist country in the world and the solution of the nationalities problem there on the basis of a legislatively instituted and real equality of rights for all peoples, large and small. The national development of Asiatic peoples entered a new stage after the Second World War, when the world socialist system was formed, the whole colonial system broke down rapidly and new politically independent states superseded the former colonies. Today there are no colonial possessions left in Asia, with the exception of Portuguese Timor, Brunei (in the north of Kalimantan Island), Hsiangan (Hong Kong) and Aomyn (Macao) on the Chinese coast and a few small islands in the Indian Ocean.

The variety of types of ethnic and intermediate, near-ethnic (ethno-linguistic, ethno-religious and other) communities in Asia makes it hard to delimit them. It is particularly difficult to draw a clear line between nations (*natsiya*) and those ethnic communities which represent an earlier stage of development, but have endured up to our time. As we have seen, nations, as distinct from other types of ethnic communities, are characterised by stronger internal economic ties. In spite of the existence within every non-socialist nation of antagonistic classes with wide differences between them in culture and everyday life, all social population groups constituting a nation are bound closely together in their economic, social and cultural life. Hence, national consolidation processes always find expression in the development of a nation-wide culture and a national literary language. It may be said that the development of nations in any

country and at any historical period is accompanied by a struggle for the development of their own culture in their own language. This process is inevitably accompanied by the rise of a national literature, political writing and a press, by the establishment of social and political organisations and by a struggle for the use of their own language in schools. Essentially, all these phenomena express, in their various ways, the rise of national self-consciousness. This is much stronger in nations than in all other kinds of ethnic community. In many cases it becomes the main, often the only criterion for ascertaining ethnic affiliation. There can exist no nation lacking a national culture, literature, press, still less—one lacking a national literary language.

It is typical of the nation stage of ethnic development that ethnic self-consciousness no longer bears the multi-stage hierarchical character proper to peoples of the feudal ages. It may be confidently asserted that the highest degree of unity and the most homogeneous ethnic self-consciousness are characteristic of nations, and nations only, and may serve as criteria for distinguishing them from ethnic communities of other types. This is due to the particularly intensive consolidation processes within nations. In most present-day Asian countries, however, with their heavy feudal survivals, a very striking feature is the hierarchical character of ethnic self-consciousness. The influence of intermediate types of community (ethno-linguistic, ethno-religious, etc.) tends to weaken ethnic self-consciousness as such. Islam, for instance, largely smoothes away ethnic differences and furthers the simultaneous presence of ethnic and religious self-consciousness. At the same time, the protracted processes of consolidation and assimilation in feudal and semi-feudal societies favour the conservation of an ethnic self-consciousness in individual local groups.

It is scarcely realistic to regard statehood as an indispensable criterion of a nation, as some researchers do, since the nation is, after all, an ethnic, not a political category. It should, however, be remembered that every nation, in the course of its consolidation, aspires not only to cultural self-determination, but to the establishment of an independent national state or to winning national autonomy within a multi-national state. The political factor, which has played

a not unimportant ethno-formative role in ethnic development processes in all class societies, gains a particular, sometimes paramount importance in a capitalist society. It is this enormous role of the political factor that underlies, in our view, the prevalence in many countries (including the developing countries of Asia) of the terms "nation" and "national" employed in the meaning of "state".

The pace and nature of modern ethnic processes in Asian countries are largely determined by the social structure of these countries. The most favourable conditions for the processes of ethnic and national development are afforded by socialist countries. In Korea and Vietnam, where a single ethnos is, in each case, clearly predominant, these processes are, however, complicated by the partition of these countries. Such partition does not, of course, mean that independent national communities are being formed in the north and the south of Korea, or in the north and the south of Vietnam. After these countries are united on a truly democratic basis, conditions will, of course, be set up there for speedy national consolidation. With the development of socialism in the Mongolian People's Republic, the processes of national consolidation are gathering ever greater momentum. The formation of the Mongolian nation is successfully drawing to its completion around the Khalkhas (one of the Mongols' ethnographic groups) as its core. In China, as a result of the faulty policy of the Mao Tse-tung leadership, the nationalities problem has, like others, remained unsolved, although all the pre-conditions necessary for its solution were present. The national development of many numerous peoples, creators of high-level cultures (Uighurs, Tibetans, Chinangs, Mongols, etc.) is hindered by the forcible assimilation that has been raised to the level of state policy. The complete consolidation of the Chinese (Han) themselves is greatly impeded by the wide economic, cultural and linguistic (dialectal) differences between their ethnographic groups.²⁰

In those Asian countries where capitalist relations have reached a comparatively high level (such as Japan, and, in

²⁰ M. V. Sofronov, "Linguistic Problems in Chinese Society", *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka*, No. 1, 1972, pp. 153-64.

part, Turkey, India, Iran and the Lebanon), current national development processes are strongly influenced by the class struggle waged by the working class and the proletarian strata in the villages against the large-scale national bourgeoisie that occupies a position of leadership in the economy and the state structure. The almost uni-national Japan, with its higher level of economic development, differs from multi-ethnic India by its stronger national consolidation. Apart from the above factor, the integration process is complicated in India by the fact that not one but several nations are being formed there. Another characteristic of India is the age-old existence of endogamous castes that has found its ideological justification in Hinduism. A result of this is the predominance of caste self-consciousness over ethnic and even over national consciousness. In Indian social, political and scientific literature the term "nation" is almost exclusively used to denote the people of India as a whole, while the individual ethnics, even those that have reached a high level of national consolidation (the Bengalis and the Tamils), are regarded merely as linguistic groups.

National processes in Indonesia and the Philippines are of a specific character: here different peoples speaking related languages are gradually drawing closer to one another. This is favoured by the similarity in the social and economic structure of the various peoples of these two countries. In some countries there is one predominant nation but, in addition, other peoples with high prospects of independent ethnic development, e.g., the Azerbaijanians in Iran, the Lao in Thailand and many peoples in Burma. As for the social structure of many Asian countries, the peasants and semi-proletarian sections of the population (craftsmen, coolies, day labourers) are bound up with small-scale production. The numerical strength of the working class is not great here, and its organisational level is often low.²¹ The bourgeoisie in some Asian countries is largely composed of members of national minorities. This is particularly characteristic of Southeast Asia (Indians in Burma, Chinese in Thailand,

Indonesia and the Philippines, Chinese and Indians in Malaysia). In some Asian countries it was not the bourgeoisie, but certain intermediate strata, primarily the intelligentsia with the support of the broad masses of the people, that proved to be the active political force after independence. The intelligentsia was the bearer of its peoples' cultural and linguistic tradition. It is of interest in this context that in the course of anti-imperialist revolutions the struggle of the local intelligentsia was actively supported by the peasantry, whose national self-consciousness grew more rapidly than their class-consciousness. At present Asia's developing countries are facing the problem of choosing the most promising course for their further national progress. An important part in this choice belongs to the national intelligentsia. Some of them ally themselves with reactionary forces, put forward chauvinistic ideas and attempt to associate national interests and national pride with religious, casto, local and national prejudices. Others, having come under the influence of socialist countries, wish for non-capitalist development. It is these who form the national revolutionary democrats. Under the influence of the constantly expanding working class, this section of the intelligentsia is gradually coming to realise that in their struggle for social progress developing countries ought to make common cause with the socialist camp and the world labour movement.

²¹ See: V. Lukin, "Some Distinctive Features of the Class Structure in Countries of South and East Asia", *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, No. 11, 1966, pp. 55-56.

only aggravate the economic, social, ethnic and political contradictions.

Unresolved social and economic problems are the root-cause of inter-ethnic friction. Social conflicts are made worse by contradictions arising from the ethnic situation. The sharpness of social contradictions, in its turn, often aggravates the ethnic problems. The clash of interests between exploiting elements belonging to different ethnic groups sometimes causes the ethnic element to come to the fore, while protest that is essentially social takes the form of ethnic contradictions and conflicts. The policies of chauvinistically inclined reactionary forces may cause relations to deteriorate and bring about a crisis situation.

Attainment of political independence has created favourable conditions for resolving ethnic problems. However, the polarisation of forces within African states, resulting mainly from the struggle to select a course of development, has a considerable effect on the implementation of the principles for dealing with ethnic problems proclaimed by the policy statements of African governments and ruling parties. The situation is further complicated by interference from the imperialist powers, by their policy of causing inter-ethnic friction and making use of conflict situations, and by their overt or concealed support for separatist tendencies. In addition, the role and significance of ethnic problems in the reconstruction of society are underestimated in some African states.

The author's talks with statesmen and political leaders in some African countries show that some of them categorically deny the existence of ethnic problems in their countries, others underestimate their importance, while still others who admit the role of the ethnic factor, reduce the whole complex of these complicated problems to mere tribalism, by which they understand inter-tribal enmity.

In most cases ethnic problems are given a very narrow treatment, and their connection with social and economic processes is not brought out. Moreover, in many countries the nature and essence of ethnic conflict are often concealed.

The experience accumulated by most African countries since independence provides a mine of information for the

Many features of African life can only be understood if the ethnic factor is taken into account. The complex ethno-linguistic structure of most African states besets them with all the problems of a poly-ethnic state and compels them to tackle various aspects linked with the national problem. Owing to a number of characteristics peculiar to Africa and the preservation of many archaic institutions of the tribal system, the ethnic factor exerts an enormous influence on the pace and nature of social and economic processes and the political life of African states, and will apparently continue to do so for a long time to come.

The difficulties of social and economic development, the continuing dominance of foreign monopolies in the economies of most African countries, the absence of political stability, a sharp increase in property differentiation and the dissatisfaction of the bulk of the population with the corrupt and mercenary class of exploiters, whose numbers are growing with the development of capitalist relations, could

solution of many problems, including those connected with the processes of ethnic development.

It seemed, for instance, that the cause of many phenomena, and tribal discord in particular, lay mainly in colonialism, and that once independence was achieved, tribalism¹ would be eliminated. The depth of the processes of detribalisation—i.e., the intermixture of tribes and the formation of larger ethnic communities, including nations, had been somewhat exaggerated. African reality amended the situation, sometimes very considerably. Not only did ethnic conflicts in African countries fail to disappear, but in recent years they have even markedly increased. The loosening of tribal ties and the processes of assimilation and national consolidation are very complicated and contradictory; and alongside these processes we can see the phenomenon that has been called supertribalisation: in a number of instances the awareness of belonging to a certain ethnic group has been heightened, and separatist tendencies and nationalism have increased.

THE ETHNIC FACTOR IN POLITICAL LIFE

The study of African reality, as well as the author's own observations in thirteen African countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, etc.), show that ethnic problems are of considerable importance in African political life.

The ethnic factor has played, and in a number of cases continues to play, an important part in the activities of certain parties and organisations. In most countries of Tropical Africa, first organisations and, later, political parties were formed on an ethnic basis.

All this has undoubtedly contributed to the strengthening of ethnic particularism and has in some cases led to the aggravation of tribalist sentiments, and hindered the processes of ethnic consolidation.

The ethnic factor plays the greatest part in such countries as Nigeria, Zaire, the Congo, Kenya, the Sudan and some others.

¹ From Latin *tribus*—tribe.

Nigeria is the most densely populated country on the African continent. According to 1973 data, its population amounts to 65 million. It is also one of the most complicated countries in its ethnic structure.² Apart from such peoples as the Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba, each of which comprises approximately 10 million, Nigeria is populated by the Fulbe, Kanuri, Tiv, Ibibio and others, numbering from one to five million.³ In addition, there is a large number of other ethnic groups: according to official data, there are more than 200;⁴ according to other information, 230 different peoples live in the region of Adamawa alone;⁵ a third source identifies almost 317 peoples in the small Ogoja region to the east of the river Cross.⁶

These numbers are probably rather exaggerated, but there is no doubt about the extreme complexity of the country's ethnic structure.

In the period of British rule some peoples in Nigeria complained of the dictatorship of the Ibo.⁷ They were dissatisfied with the fact that the Government of Eastern Nigeria consisted entirely of the Ibo and that the Ibo were generally appointed to the highest positions.

Some frictions existing in relations between the Ibo, Efik and Ibibio, for example, are rooted in the remote past, in the slave-trading period. The territory of the

² For more detailed information see: R. Ismagilova, *The Peoples of Nigeria. Ethnic Structure and Brief Ethnographic Description*, Moscow, 1963 (in Russian).

³ The exact numbers of the different peoples of Nigeria are unknown, since the results of the last census (1962) were found to be incorrect. O. Awolowo, a notable political leader in Nigeria, gives the following figures (in millions): the Hausa and Fulbe 13.6; the Yoruba 13; the Ibo 7.8; the Efik and Ibibio 3.2; the Kanuri 2.9; the Tiv 1.5; the Ijaw 0.9; the Edo 0.9, etc. (See: O. Awolowo, *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution*, Ibadan, 1966, p. 24).

⁴ *Federal Republic of Nigeria. An Introduction to the Situation in Nigeria*, p. 16.

⁵ A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Adamawa Past and Present*, London-New York-Toronto, 1958, p. 2.

⁶ Colonial Office, *Nigeria. Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and Means of Allaying Them*, London, 1959, p. 34.

⁷ Colonial Office, *Nigeria*, pp. 47-48.

Ibo, Ekoi and Ukelle was a source of slaves for the Ibibio, Efik and other coastal tribes, who traded with European merchants. At that time the level of development of many of the peoples living in southern regions of Nigeria was much higher than that of the Ibo. They had their city-states that were governed by kings, they traded extensively with European merchants, their handicrafts were highly developed, etc. Consequently, these peoples looked on the Ibo with some contempt. Now the situation has changed: the Ibo are a long way ahead of all the other peoples of Eastern Nigeria in their development. The Ibo have a working class, a national bourgeoisie and an intelligentsia. The Ibo took an active part in the political life of their country. They created a powerful political organisation, the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons, to fight for Nigerian independence. Literacy is higher among the Ibo, they have more specialists and before the coup d'état of January 1966 many Ibo worked in Government offices, on the railways and in various companies in Northern Nigeria. Almost the whole officer corps of the Nigerian army consisted of Ibo.

During the latter years of British rule a strong movement grew up in Eastern Nigeria, calling for the formation of separate states: the Efik and Ibibio, for example, wanted to create a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers state. But there was no unanimity on this question: some favoured separation from the Ibo, others were against it.

In Western Nigeria, where two-thirds of the population are the Yoruba, the people of the Delta and Benin provinces, where the Edo live, complained to the Minorities Commission (1957-1958) that the Government of Western Nigeria was chiefly concerned with developing those provinces inhabited by the Yoruba, without a thought for the economic development of the Edo regions, or for the other needs of the local population, e.g., the construction of roads, schools, hospitals, etc. The Edo complained that the Government of Western Nigeria consisted of the Yoruba and that it was impossible for other ethnic groups to fill high administrative positions.

For a number of years the Edo had called for separation from Western Nigeria. The dissatisfaction was so great that,

after achieving independence, the Government of Nigeria agreed to create in 1963 a special state out of this region—the Mid-West State.

An enormous variety of peoples live along the middle reaches of the Niger and Benue rivers; they differ in numbers, language and level of development.

In the remote past many Central Nigerian tribes had to flee from slave traders and sought refuge in almost inaccessible mountainous areas. Long isolation naturally led to a preservation of tribal structure and hindered the economic development of these peoples. All the peoples of the Middle Belt were subject to rule from the North administration with its numerous emirs. These peoples expressed grave dissatisfaction with the existing order and resisted Islamisation. The Birom and Tiv were especially active in the drive to break away from Northern Nigeria.

Finally, the tragic events of 1966-1970, culminating in an attempt to separate Eastern Nigeria in May 1967 and the appalling loss of life, are well known. The war against Biafra that had seceded seriously complicated inter-ethnic relations and considerably aggravated the country's economic difficulties and political situation.

In the *Democratic Republic of the Sudan* more than 10 million of the total population of 14,730,000 (1968) are Arabs or Arabised peoples. The Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk (all Negroid peoples and numbering about four million) live in three southern provinces: Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria. They speak Nilotc languages. They differ completely from the Arab North in language, level of development (the lowest in the Sudan) and way of life. In language and culture they resemble the Nilotc peoples, who live in the northern parts of Kenya and Uganda and in the extreme northeast of Zaire. The situation is aggravated by religious differences as well: the Arabs in the north of the country belong to the Islamic faith, the peoples of the Southern Sudan are Christians. They also have their traditional religious beliefs. The Sudan's bitter ethnic contradictions are a legacy from the past.

During British rule in the Sudan the colonial administration followed a deliberate policy of keeping North and South apart,

The law of 1922 decreed that the Darfur, Equatorial and Upper Nile provinces, as well as a part of Northern Kordofan, Gezira and Kassala, were closed areas. The trade law of 1925 allowed trade to be carried on in the south of the Sudan only by members of the native population. This law was directed against Arab merchants from the northern parts of the country. The policy of segregation led to the Government-sponsored resettlement of whole tribes, such as the Banda, Dongo, Niangulgnle, Tohoyo and others, who had had close contact with the Muslim Arabic-speaking population of Darfur and Kordofan, to other regions, farther away from Arab influence.⁸

After the conference on linguistic problems in Rejaf in 1928, measures were taken to limit the spread of Arabic in the southern provinces.

The main principles of the segregation policy were laid down in the Memorandum of 1930.⁹

Under this policy, a system of passes for movement from the southern part of the Sudan to the northern part and vice versa was introduced. Tribal chiefs and their retainers were recommended to make no further use of Arab names and Arab clothing. Marriages between Northerners and Southerners were prohibited. Northern officials were recalled from the southern region.

Tribal customs and traditions were strongly encouraged. All this not only helped to preserve the tribal system in the southern region and deepened ethnic isolation but, as time went on, engendered bitter anti-Arab sentiment.

The policy of Arabification, carried through with particular vigour by the military regime that came to power in the Sudan in 1958, aroused deep resentment in the three southern provinces. Some demanded complete secession from the Sudan and the formation of the independent state of Azania. Others wanted autonomy within the Sudan. A movement for a reform in the southern provinces began before independence and greatly influenced the political life of the country. For many years a state of emergency

⁸ O. M. Beshir, *The Southern Sudan. Background to Conflict*, London, 1968, p. 50.

⁹ "1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy", see: M. O. Beshir, op. cit., pp. 115-18.

existed in these regions, troops were stationed in the south, and soldiers and local people were involved in incidents from time to time. The constitution of 1968 (the first constitution produced during the whole period of independent Sudan's existence) proclaimed the Republic of the Sudan to be a unitary state, having Arabic as its official language and Islam as its official religion. This naturally made relations between the North and South even more complicated and strongly influenced the political situation in the Sudan. The problem of the Southern Sudan called for an immediate solution. The new Government that came to power in May 1969 began to devote serious attention to the problem of the South. The Southern provinces were granted local autonomy, plans were worked out for the democratisation and social and economic development of these areas, the most backward in the whole country. However, the internal political crisis of summer 1971 again caused tension in the South, and prodded the Government into taking more decisive political measures to cope with the situation. The agreement giving regional autonomy to the Southern provinces of the Sudan was signed in Addis Ababa in March 1972. It may be assumed that the conclusion of this agreement will create favourable conditions for resolving the acute problem in the Southern Sudan.

The ethnic factor plays a great part in the political life of Kenya too. That this is so is particularly apparent from the actions of the various parties. A case in point is the struggle for power that took place just before independence between the Kenya African National Union (KANU), most of whose members were ethnically Gikuyu and Luo, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which united the national minorities—the Nandi, Kipsigis, Masai, Teita, etc. Some years ago the Masai, numbering 155,000 according to the census of 1969,¹⁰ formed the party known as the Masai United Front and demanded the formation of an independent state.

From time to time rumours are circulated about the secession plans of the Luo who live in Nyanza Province in Western Kenya. These rumours have been used in the inter-

¹⁰ *Kenya Population Census, 1969*, Vol. 1, Nairobi, 1970, p. 69.

party struggle. But the crux of the dispute lies not so much in the orienting on various ethnic groups as in the differing approaches to the problem of Kenya's future social and economic development.

For many years the country has been much disturbed by the Somali problem. One part of the Somali people, living in Northern Kenya, has been seeking to join the Somali Republic. But, besides the Somali people, other peoples live in this region: the Turkana, Galla, some of the Meru, etc.—and they do not wish to break away from Kenya. There was no unanimity on the question even among the Somali people themselves. The situation has now been normalised, and the leaders of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia are finding ways to deal with the Somali problem.

British colonialists played a considerable part in aggravating ethnic relations in Kenya. During the period of the national liberation movement from 1952 to 1955 they used the neighbouring people against the Gikuyu and tried to isolate them from one another. The story was constantly spread, and still is, that the Gikuyu think themselves higher than all the others and try to occupy a dominant position in the country. Every possible encouragement has been given to the formation of narrow tribal parties and organisations: the Political Union of the Kalengin, uniting the peoples of the Nandi group, the Masai United Front, the Kenya African Democratic Union, etc.

There is no doubt that all this does a great deal to aggravate and hinder the solution of ethnic problems in modern Kenya. What is more, these problems are even further complicated by the fact that they include not only relations between different African peoples, but also relations between Africans and Europeans, Africans and Asians, Africans and Arabs, Europeans and Asians, Asians and Arabs.

The ethnic factor plays a considerable role in other countries too. Everybody remembers the events in Congo (Kinshasa), now Zaire. In Togo, Dahomey and Ghana there is conflict between the North, settled by Mossi-Grusi peoples, and the South, inhabited by peoples of the Guinean linguistic group, more developed socially and economically. In recent years reactionary forces in the *People's Republic of Congo* have repeatedly used tribalism as a weapon in the

struggle for power. Events became especially critical in 1958 and 1966. Inter-tribal clashes took place between Bahutu (Hutu) and Watutsi (Tutsi) in *Rwanda* in 1963 and in early 1973.

In *Chad* unrest has continued for several years among the Tedda, and French armed forces have been used to suppress it. The Government published the "White Book" about the events in *Chad*: serious shortcomings in the tax-collecting system were listed among the reasons for the riots among the nomadic tribes.¹¹ The "White Book" attributed most of the blame for the existing difficulties to the French colonialists, since they had completely ignored such traditional *Chad* institutions as the sultanates and the power of tribal chiefs when creating the system of administration.

There was a rising among the Tuaregs in *Mali* in 1963-1964; considerable military and financial resources were used to suppress it.

The Tuaregs in *Mali*, estimated by different sources to number from 170 thousand to 250 thousand, roam with their herds in the regions bordering on *Algeria* and *Niger*, and preserve their traditional way of life and customs. Such features as slavery, for example, continue to exist in Tuareg society and it has a very powerful tribal aristocracy.

As long ago as 1959 the ruling group of the Tuaregs asked France to support their plan for creating an independent Tuareg state. This state would include those areas of *Mali*, *Algeria* and *Niger* that had been settled by the Tuaregs. In subsequent years some political circles have continued to support these separatistic aspirations.

During the Tuareg rebellion in the second half of 1963 leaflets were distributed, calling again for the creation of an autonomous state. For a whole year military action was taken against the Tuaregs. Troops equipped with modern weapons eventually put down the revolt.

When analysing the reasons for this rebellion, we apparently ought to consider not only the separatistic tendencies

¹¹ *West Africa*, 22.XI. 1969, p. 1424.

cies of a few Tuareg chiefs and the use made of them by certain neo-colonialist circles.

In this case, mention must be made of the difficulties that have been caused by an interlacing of social, economic and ethnic factors. The efforts of the Mali Government to change the traditional, historically established way of life of such proud nomadic people as the Tuaregs, with their highly developed sense of independence and dignity, common to both chieftains and commoner in this tribe, have met with determined opposition. The tribal leaders of the Tuaregs are just as fully in command as before and keep their fellow-tribesmen in submission. Any attempt to infringe on the rights of the chieftains attracts a sharp negative reaction.

The events in Mali following the Tuareg rebellion can be seen as a vivid illustration of the necessity to take into consideration the ethnic factor and a knowledge of traditional institutions when drawing up concrete social and economic plans.

The tragic events which led to a rapid deterioration in relations between the Tutsi and the Hutu took place in *Burundi* in the spring and summer of 1972. The bourgeois press attributes the cause simply to the traditional enmity between the farming Hutu and the cattle-breeding Tutsi, and abounds in reports of Tutsi ethno-chauvinism.

It would, however, be inaccurate to see tribalism as the sole cause of the events in Burundi, although the ethnic element undoubtedly played a part. The trouble seems to have been sparked off by conservative feudal circles loyal to King Ntare V, reacting against the policies of the Micrombero Government. But as always happens when internal political relations deteriorate in a situation in which conflict is already latent, certain political forces played on ethnic contradictions.

Tribalist sentiments and the stirring up of differences between the populations of North and South have always accompanied the *coups d'état* that have taken place in *Dahomey* and *Togo*.

Inter-ethnic contradictions are also complicating the internal political situation in *Zambia*.

ROOTS OF ETHNIC CONTRADICTIONS

What is the nature of ethnic tensions and what are the reasons for the often complicated relations between different African peoples?

This question cannot be answered without knowing the history of the African peoples, the peculiarities of their culture and the role of surviving traditional institutions which appear not only in the position of authorities, legalised by custom, but also in habits and archaic norms of tribal morality. In order to understand the nature of ethnic prejudice, it is very important to analyse social and economic changes, as well as the many transitional forms in both economic and social structures and ethnic processes. Only the careful study of material about each country and a thorough examination of ethnic situation, ethnic history, the peculiarities of historical development and the forms and methods of colonial rule may help in analysing the essence and social significance of ethnic contradictions and tensions.

Contradictions between peoples belonging to different ethnic groups can be reduced in the final analysis to social and economic causes, but in some countries, usually when there is an internal political crisis and an intensification of the struggle for power between politicians who express the interests of different social strata of the population, subjective factors often come to the fore. Ethnic prejudice, known to be of great vitality, is not the least of them.

The danger of ethnic prejudice is not only that it separates peoples and causes friction between ethnic groups, but also that it actively helps to perpetuate the isolation of national minorities and produces nationalist sentiments and an exaggerated emotional attachment to one's language and culture.

Whenever ethnic prejudice becomes the norm in social conduct, it not only divides people but also distracts them from urgent social problems, thereby helping reactionary politicians to keep the masses in servitude.

History has known examples of the elevation of ethnic prejudice into an officially accepted norm, e.g., anti-

Semitism in Nazi Germany, and racism in the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia at the present time.

In some cases hostile relations among people of different ethnic origins are to a certain extent the result of the remote period of the slave trade. For instance, the northern regions of Ghana, Dahomey, Nigeria and the southern regions of Sudan were sources of the delivery of slaves for a long time. In other cases peoples who created highly developed state structures in the past look down on their much more backward neighbours. Such relations can be observed, for example, between the Ashanti and the northern peoples of Ghana, between the Baganda and the NilotiC peoples in Uganda, between the Hausa and the peoples of the Middle Belt of Nigeria, etc.

Considerable influence on ethnic problems in African states was exerted by the policies of colonialists before the achievement of independence by the African countries. The policy of indirect rule in the British possessions helped to preserve the tribal system, strengthen traditional authority and foster the tribal separatism that eventually led to nationalism. Examples of this are the nationalistic sentiments of the Ashanti in Ghana, the Baganda in Uganda, etc.

The assimilation policy that was pursued in the French-speaking countries produced a tense situation over the question of native languages and of culture. This has undoubtedly had a bearing on the policies of these now independent countries.

Uneven social and economic development has adversely affected the relations between the peoples. It is known, for instance, that during their colonial rule the French used the more literate Fulbe as colonial administration officers, sending them to backward regions, inhabited by the Gerze, Toma, Coniagi and Bassari peoples. The British colonial administration made the Baganda their district representatives in Uganda, and the Iho were used for administration service in Northern Nigeria among the Hausa, Fulbe and the peoples of the Middle Belt. That is why the Gerze, Toma and other peoples considered the Fulbe to be colonial lackeys, and the Lango, Acholi and others thought the same about the Baganda people. The unevenness of economic development has led to a situation in which the

rising bourgeoisie of the Ewe or Fanti in Ghana, for instance, wants to seize power. At the same time, the feudal chiefs among the Ashanti in Ghana or the tribal chieftains of the Tuaregs in Mali and the feudal circles of the former kingdoms Buganda, Ankole and Toro in Uganda are trying to preserve their ancient privileges. In all these cases the methods used include the stirring up of tribalist feelings and inter-tribal and religious strife. The colonialist and neo-colonialist policy of setting peoples against each other and encouraging the formation of parties and groups on an ethnic basis played a considerable part in complicating relations among African peoples.

It is necessary to take account of various phenomena that are connected with traditional tribal institutions. The role of traditional morality and various rites and customs is very strong today. There are, for example, tribal unions in towns which control the lives of their tribesmen, and a moral code exists, compelling a man to give every possible help to another from the same ethnic group (e.g., finding jobs for fellow-tribesmen, irrespective of their abilities).

The connection with the past can also be traced in people's psychology. Like many other nomadic peoples, the Masai of Kenya, for instance, pass on from generation to generation their legends about the creation of the world. According to these legends, God once endowed one of his sons with cattle. He was a remote ancestor of the Masai, and from him they trace their origin. That is why the Masai consider themselves to be the owners of all cattle, and if the neighbouring peoples, the Bantu farmers, have cattle too, then, in the eyes of the Masai, they possess them illegally. This explains the frequent raids made by Masai warriors on the Gikuyu and Kamba to drive off their cattle. Clashes over cattle often occur between the Turkana of Kenya and the Karamojo, who live in Uganda. A certain length of time and, above all, a great deal of educational work will be needed in order to change the persistent customs of the remote past.

The custom of taking an oath before joining one of the secret societies existing among many African peoples dates back to the old tribal structure. During the period of the national liberation movement in Kenya (1952-1955), known

to history as the Mau-Mau movement, the oaths played a definite role and were used in the struggle against the colonialists. In 1969 the Kenya press published articles about a wave of ceremonies at which people swore oaths to the gods of the Gikuyu. The newspapers reported that the campaign had a mass character and had spread over the Central, Western and Eastern provinces of the country and a part of the Rift Valley. Members of various ethnic groups, including the Kamba, Balmhyia and Emhu, sometimes were forced to swear loyalty to the Gikuyu, and this led to a worsening of relations among them and to incidents. The Government of Kenya condemned these actions. The police were ordered to put a stop to such ceremonies.

The role of traditional authorities has often been underestimated. In fact, though, the chiefs continue to play a major role and influence the political life of today. They urge their subjects to vote for one candidate or another or to blackball him, to pay taxes or to refuse to do so, etc. A sufficient indication of the true state of affairs is given by the fact that, according to some data, 300 high chiefs and about 3,000 chiefs of lower rank live in Ghana. It is well known what a great role the numerous obas, emirs and other traditional rulers play in Nigeria. That is why making use of traditional authorities will probably help the official authorities to realise many plans for national and cultural construction.

Usually, however, almost every African country suffers from a complex of factors which leave their mark on relations between various ethnic groups.

The crisis in the Congo or in Nigeria, for example, cannot be explained away by the ethnic factor alone, although the national question became crucial at various stages. Both social and economic factors and the whole complex of the historical legacy, ethnic processes and religious differences form the basis of the Nigerian crisis. Its main elements are the struggle for democratisation of the country, the fight of the national bourgeoisie against the domination of the feudal rulers of the North, and the prolonged political crisis that began soon after the achievement of independence and extremely intensified the intra-party struggle. In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the

political situation in Nigeria, it is necessary to take into consideration the ambitions of individual politicians, their exploiting of nationalistic slogans and the contradictory and ambiguous nature of ethnic processes, when uniting tendencies and a wish for unity are combined with an opposing separatist tendency. The use of tribalist ideology and tribal separatism by neo-colonialist circles, who are interested in strengthening their position, is of considerable importance. It is necessary to take into account the struggle of the imperialist monopolies for Nigeria's oil deposits, as well as the contradictions among the various Western countries.

These are some of the most important reasons for the complex ethnic relations in a number of African countries.

ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN AFRICAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME DOCUMENTS

It is quite clear that a concrete solution of the various ethnic problems depends on the way in which the particular African country develops, on which classes and political parties direct the process of national construction.

It is evident that the objective conditions for nation-building will be probably more favourable in those countries where the task is set of fundamentally reconstructing African society by democratic methods, supported by the broad masses of the people, and where the struggle for economic independence and social progress is being led by national-democratic parties and movements. In these countries the ruling party is regarded as the leading and organising force for economic and social progress.

The Soviet scholar G. B. Starushenko rightly notes that in some cases, peoples who have been living for a long time in an atmosphere of enmity and mutual distrust need much more solid guarantees of their interests than a formal declaration of their equality.¹²

¹² G. B. Starushenko, *Nation and State in the Countries on the Way to Freedom*, Moscow, 1967, p. 260 (in Russian).

The main guidelines for solving ethnic problems in African states are primarily reflected in their constitutions. Comparative analysis shows that they proclaim the principle of the equality of all the peoples within their political boundaries. Thus, all racial and ethnic discrimination, as well as separatist propaganda, is prohibited by law.

African governments see it as their task to weld the various ethnic groups together and to forge real national unity.

The *Ordonnance N. 1* of the Republic of Mali declares: "Any action of racial or ethnic discrimination, as well as any regionalist propaganda that might undermine the security of the State and the integrity of the Republic's territory are punishable by law."¹³

Article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana declared that "no person should suffer discrimination on grounds of sex, race, tribe, religion or political belief".¹⁴

"Algeria considers it to be its duty to maintain that the Arab language is the national and official language.... The Republic guarantees respect for everyone's convictions, beliefs and freedom to worship as he pleases."¹⁵

Article 10 of the Constitution of Algeria includes the following: "The fundamental objectives of the democratic and popular Algerian Republic are:—safeguarding the national independence, territorial integrity and national unity.... The struggle against all discrimination, in particular, discrimination based on race and religion."¹⁶

The Constitution declared the necessity for struggle against any discrimination, "in particular [my italics—*R.I.*] discrimination based on race and religion".¹⁷ This important paragraph of the Constitution refers directly to the country's Berber population.

Every person in Kenya enjoys all rights and freedoms irrespective of race, tribe or origin, place of habitation,

¹³ "Ordonnance N. 1 portant organisation provisoire des pouvoirs publics en République du Mali", *L'Essor*, December 24, 1968.

¹⁴ *Constitutions of Nations*, 1965, Vol. 1, The Hague, Netherlands, p. 216.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

political belief, colour, outlook or sex, the Kenyan Constitution declares.¹⁸

Referring to the draft of the constitution of Cameroon which brought in a unitary form of state system, President Ahijo stressed in his speech broadcast on May 9, 1972, that the preservation of cultural and linguistic diversity was a fundamental principle of the new constitution.

The constitution of the Guinean Republic proclaims the equality of all citizens: "Racial discrimination or regional propaganda is punishable by law" (Article 45).¹⁹

Prominent African statesmen and politicians condemn tribalism and show conclusively that national unity is essential.

As long ago as December 1958 the first Conference of African peoples in Accra adopted a special resolution on tribalism. The conference called upon African governments to enact the necessary laws and to fight resolutely against tribal enmity and separatism.

A Nigerian Association of Struggle Against Tribalism has been created in Nigeria. At the end of September 1968 it appealed to public opinion in the country to put an end to this dangerous phenomenon.

"If the Congo doesn't kill tribalism, tribalism will kill the Congo", proclaimed placards issued by the Information Ministry in Brazzaville. These placards showed the bodies of Congolese who had perished during the tribal conflicts that took place between November 1958 and February 1959 in Pointe Noire and Brazzaville.

The programme documents and declarations of leading state and party figures in Africa all voice the idea of the struggle against tribalism and the necessity of strengthening national unity.

The programme documents of most political parties in African states do not include special paragraphs dedicated to the nationalities question, where, for instance, the means of eliminating tribal enmity and establishing co-operation among various peoples within the country might be specified

¹⁸ See *Government and Politics in Kenya. A Nation Building*, Nairobi, 1969, p. 138.

¹⁹ *Guinea, The Constitution 1958*, 1963.

and statements made about the policy towards national minorities and the attitudes of the parties towards the problem of self-determination, etc. The only exceptions were the programme of the Sudanese Communist Party, which states the main principles on which a solution to the Southern problem could be based, and the "Maximum Programme" of the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

The main demands made by the Sudanese Communist Party were as follows: the necessity of national democratic revolution; the alliance between the revolutionary forces in the North and the peoples of the South on a democratic and anti-imperialist basis; and the granting of autonomy to the Southern provinces, with power in the hands of the Southerners which had linked their destiny to the revolutionary forces of Northern Sudan.

A special section is dedicated to ethnic problems in the programme of the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The equality of all ethnic groups in Angola is guaranteed by the MPLA programme; the task is set of strengthening their union and fraternal mutual assistance; mention is made of the possibility of giving autonomy to ethnic groups living in a compact and well-defined area; every people is accorded the right to use its own tongue, to devise its own written language and to develop its culture. The programme places special emphasis on the need for solidarity with all the peoples of Africa who are fighting for independence.²⁰

As a rule, all the programme documents proceed from one premise: there is a single Guinean, Algerian, etc., nation. Taking into account the danger of the ethnic factor's influence on party activities and the danger to economic and social progress of tribalism and separatistic ideology, many parties have rejected the possibility of forming party organs on an ethnic basis.

Ideological work among the population is considered to be of vital importance, and the recruitment policy should be mainly concerned not with ethnic origin but with practical qualifications, etc.

²⁰ MPLA. *Angola, exploitation esclavagiste, résistance nationale*, p. 61.

Thus, already in 1962 Amadou Ahidjo called on the party congress of the Cameroon Federal Union "to put an end to the system of creating tribal units in the party". When the inter-party conflicts, where the ethnic factor played a considerable role, had been overcome with great effort and the National Union of Cameroon (UNC) had been created, Amadou Ahidjo saw the main task of his party as being to strengthen and consolidate national unity.²¹

The party Rules of the Progressive Union of Senegal say that membership of the UPS is incompatible with belonging to an ethnic or regional alliance of a political nature.

The Progressive Party of Chad aims to unite all the ethnic groups into one nation and to win recognition for the principles of universal equality.

While promoting anti-imperialist and anti-feudal campaigns, the Unity and National Progress Party of Burundi (UPRONA) considers tribalism to be one of its principal enemies.²²

The article "Ethnic Groups, the Party and the National Question"²³ by President Sékou Touré of the Guinean Republic is an important document, expressing, as it does, the policy of the Democratic Party of Guinea (DPG) regarding the essence of the national question and the principles to be applied.

Sékou Touré stresses that "the creation of a nation and its future depend fundamentally on the unity of the ethnic groups that comprise it".²⁴

"Tribalism, regionalism—in a word, ethnic isolation—is a factor that helped the colonial regime to preserve its domination. Even today it still helps imperialism to divide the African states."²⁵

"The future of each of the ethnic communities," the President points out, "is bound up with their participation in the

²¹ A. Ahidjo par lui-même, p. 44.

²² *Info-Burundi*, No. 201, 28.XI-4.XII, 1966, p. 1.

²³ A. S. Touré, "Les groupements ethniques, le parti et la question nationale", t. XVI, Conakry, 1969, pp. 5-10.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

founding and development of a community that is broader, in the economical and political sense, more viable—a national community. That is why ever since the attainment of independence the Party has emphasised the need to uphold the complete equality of all the ethnic communities, and has constantly maintained that each of them would disappear as an ethnic group if it were to exclude itself from the national community. The development of a national culture through the revival of our own languages and the devising of writing systems for them testifies to the Party's concern that ethnic communities should prosper, rather than die out. All this can only be achieved within a national framework. To foster a single nation, harmonious and powerful, to create a responsible, free and worthy People—such is the lofty mission that the Guinean revolution must fully accomplish!"²⁶

Speaking about ways of overcoming tribal particularism and isolationism, Sékou Touré states that the best means for dealing with ethnic isolation is neither outright denial of the existence of ethnic communities (since they do, in fact, exist) nor (even more emphatically) any form of suppression. In his view, each people must be made to understand that its survival and prosperity depend on the development, consolidation and even greater prosperity of the national community as a whole. "No ethnic group can survive if the nation perishes from the havoc wrought by ethnic particularism."²⁷

The Constitution of the DPG passed in 1969 called for a determined struggle against all forms of exploitation of man by man, the creation of "a single nation, strong and flourishing, democratic and socialist" and the building of a socialist society in which social justice, democracy and peace would reign.²⁸

Article 4 of the Charter, which defined the obligations of a party member, required him *inter alia* to fight against racism, chauvinism and parochialism; to follow the party line unequivocally in the selection of personnel according

²⁶ A. S. Touré, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁸ *Les Statuts du Parti Démocratique du Guinée*, Conakry, 1969, pp. 5-6.

to their political and practical qualities; to do everything possible to strengthen the power of the Guinean Republic, and to wage a tireless struggle for peace and friendship between peoples.²⁹

The programme of the Mouvement National de la Révolution (MNR) in the People's Republic of Congo attached great importance to the struggle against tribal separatism and to the strengthening of national unity (this line was continued in 1969 by the Congolese Party of Labour). The MNR Charter (programme) adopted in March 1966 emphatically decreed that the "party has to fight against tribalism, which divides party members into groups, often into antagonistic groups".³⁰ This policy was to be pursued in all fields, including the selection of personnel, the reorganisation of the army, etc.

"The Congolese nation comprises all Congolese citizens, whether they reside on the territory of the Republic or not. The Congolese nation is one and indivisible."³¹

The MNR Charter especially emphasised the necessity of serious educative work among the population, extensive propagation of revolutionary ideas and education of personnel in the spirit of socialist ideology.

These positions in the MNR Charter were developed and given practical form in subsequent MNR documents, notably in the resolutions of the MNR Central Committee plenary meetings. Thus, in the resolution "About Methods of Control", adopted in 1966, the Central Committee of the MNR condemned the use of "tribalism and regionalism as the means for appointment to responsible positions or for remaining in responsible positions". The resolution also condemned "any narrow-minded nationalism, the purpose of which is to destroy the foundations of proletarian internationalism and which leads to political adventurism and demagogery".

In the Charter of the Congolese Party of Labour (Parti congolais du travail—PCT), adopted at the end of 1969,

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

³⁰ *Charte MNR*, Séssions Février-Mars (16.II. 1966-III.1966), Brazzaville, 1966, Thèse 3.

³¹ Ibid., Annex, "Quelques règles et méthodes de travail", art. 3.

Marxism-Leninism was proclaimed to be the theoretical basis for the ideology and actions of the PCT. Article 6 of the Rules, which defined the obligations of a party member, emphasised that he must "resolutely combat against regionalism, tribalism, liberalism and fractional work in all their forms".³²

Considerable prominence is given to ethnic problems in policy statements from the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the ruling party. The KANU Constitution, passed in 1966, declared: "KANU shall strive for unity and understanding among all the peoples of Kenya—breaking down tribal, linguistic and racial and cultural barriers. It will be the responsibility of leaders of KANU to educate all the people of Kenya to appreciate the need to build a Nation."³³

In the preface to the party programme-manifesto (1963) containing the main principles of the party, President Jomo Kenyatta, characterising KANU policies, stressed that "there will be no place in the Kenya we shall create for discrimination by race, tribe, belief or any other manner".³⁴ Kenyatta said that all the best and valuable elements of traditional society would be used in creating the new Kenya.

The experience of Tanzania is highly relevant to the solution of ethnic problems in the developing countries. The policy of TANU, the Tanganyika African National Union, deserves close study.

The first Constitution of TANU, adopted on July 7, 1954, stated that one of the aims of the party was "the struggle against tribalism and against all isolationist tendencies among Africans".³⁵ The 1965 Constitution omits this paragraph.³⁶ The new Constitution reflected the changes that had taken place over eleven years. If the main task of the political organisation of Tanganyika in 1954 was the fight

³² "Statuts du Parti Congolais du Travail", *Etumba*, 3-10, 1, 1970, p. 3.

³³ *The Constitution of Kenya African National Union*, Nairobi, 1966.

³⁴ *What a KANU Government Offers You*, Nairobi, 1963, p. 1.

³⁵ *Constitution of the Tanganyika African National Union*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1955.

³⁶ *Tanganyika African National Union. TANU. Sheria na madhuhumi ya Chama*.

for independence and the consequent need to consolidate all the peoples, in 1965, with independence achieved, the Party had to face up to the concrete problems of transforming society socially and economically. The struggle against tribalism had ceased to be one of TANU's principal tasks.

The new Constitution, "The Interim Constitution of Tanzania", was adopted on July 5, 1965.³⁷ It reflects the principles formulated by the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, for the Constitutional Commission. The document which Nyerere called "The National Ethic" lists the main rights and duties of citizens and the main principles of his policy:³⁸

The fundamental equality of all human beings;

Every Tanganyika citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an equal part in government at local, regional and national level;

The nation of Tanganyika is unalterably opposed to the exploitation of one man by another, of one nation by another or one group by another;

The aim of the government must be to provide equal opportunities for all citizens;

There must be no discrimination against any Tanganyika citizen, motivated by racial or tribal feeling, colour, sex, convictions or religion;

There must be no rousing of group hatred or any policy that leads to loss of respect through racial, tribal or religious feelings.

In his other speeches, addresses and writings Nyerere often returns to the principles that would help to form new relations between people belonging to different ethnic groups.

"Brotherhood and mutual understanding are the only foundation, on which society can hope to function smoothly and in accordance with its aims," Nyerere says. "If they are not accepted, there will always remain the inherent danger—not always apparent—of division in the society,

³⁷ *The Interim Constitution of Tanzania. The Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1965; Bill Supplement No. 5, Vol. 46. Also see: *Constitutions of Nations*.

³⁸ J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Umoja*, A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-1965, London, 1967, pp. 262-64.

i.e., a split in the unity of the family, civil war within the nation or wars between nations."³⁹

That is why everyone who joins TANU swears an oath that is written into the Constitution and which begins with the words: "I believe in the universal brotherhood of men and the unity of Africa."

Nyerere sees a direct link between the resolving of ethnic problems and the socialist transformation of society. He has repeatedly made the point that only socialism eliminates inequality and the exploitation of man by man, and creates favourable conditions for the flourishing of the individual and society as a whole. In a socialist society the main thing is man, irrespective of sex, colour, education, etc.⁴⁰ "The ultimate success," the President points out, "in the work of building socialism in Tanzania—as elsewhere—depends upon the people of this nation ... upon their contribution to it—their work, their co-operation for the common good and their acceptance of each other as equals and brothers."⁴¹

In the introduction to *Freedom and Socialism*, an anthology of his writings, Julius Nyerere wrote: "The existence of racialism, of tribalism, or of religious intolerance, means that a society is not socialist—regardless of whatever other attributes it may have."⁴²

Addressing employees of the national building corporation in March 1973, President Nyerere stressed that the building of a socialist society is the difficult, but noble, task facing TANU and the whole people of Tanzania.

The Federal Government of Nigeria has declared repeatedly that all the peoples should have equal rights and that no single ethnic group should dominate the others. It is stressed that the Government should provide equal opportunities for the economic, political and cultural development of all Nigerian citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

The principles underlying the national policy of the Nigerian Government have been most explicitly stated in

³⁹ J. Nyerere, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴⁰ J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism, Uhuru na Ujamaa*, Dar es-Salaam, Nairobi, London, New York, 1968, p. 4.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 32.

⁴² Ibid., p. 4.

the works of the head of state, Major-General Y. Gowon. He attaches great importance to ethnic problems. The collection of Gowon's speeches published to mark the tenth anniversary of independence is, significantly, entitled *Faith in Unity*.⁴³ The slogan "One Nigeria" remains the Government's guiding principle in dealing with the national question.

Gowon has repeatedly stated that the Ibo are full and equal citizens and that their return to the Federation is a welcome development. He has pointed to the need for consolidating national unity and pursuing policies that will draw the different peoples of the country closer together. Y. Gowon sees his main task to be that of taking into account the interests of the whole country and all its ethnic groups when he is tackling Nigeria's problems.

In a broadcast on November 30, 1966, Yakubu Gowon said: "We must also discourage any attempt to revive tribal consciousness and worsen regional animosities."⁴⁴

Setting forth the Government's programme for national reconciliation, Yakubu Gowon stated: "While recognising our ethnic differences in the country, the leaders and people of post-war Nigeria should concentrate on actions which will promote national consciousness and the evolution of Nigerian nationhood."⁴⁵

Such are the main principles of the programme documents of African countries that directly concern ethnic problems. As the above shows, these principles are basically the same in all the countries: the equality of all citizens is proclaimed, irrespective of race, tribe, etc., tribalism is condemned, manifestations of racism, regionalism and ethnic discrimination are punished by law, etc. Some policy documents also reflect extremely important policy principles concerning the selection of cadres, and emphasise the need for serious ideological work and raising the political consciousness of the masses. All the parties invariably demand the strengthening of national unity.

But it is one thing to enunciate principles; to put them

⁴³ Y. Gowon, *Faith in Unity*, Lagos, 1970.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 137.

into effect is quite a different matter. How are these propositions accomplished in practice?

FIRST STEPS AND DIFFICULTIES

The governments of African states are putting the basic propositions of the programme documents into practice. Serious attention is paid in particular to reducing the role of the ethnic factor in political life. Besides educational work, laws are issued to combat inter-tribal enmity and separatist ideology, programmes are devised to eliminate inequality in the development level of various regions, the tribal principle in the formation of an army is rejected, special attention is paid to training national cadres and to developing a national culture, etc.

The majority of parties refused to build party organs on an ethnic basis. As stated above, the Constitution of the Progressive Union of Senegal says that membership of it is incompatible with belonging to an ethnic or regional alliance of a political nature. At the end of April a decree was issued in Ghana⁴⁶ which had made it illegal, under threat of a heavy fine or imprisonment, to form parties on a tribal or religious basis or to give them names intended to arouse tribal or religious feelings.

In May 1967 the Government of Nigeria banned all parties and organisations (over 80) which had been built on tribal principles.

In a number of countries tribal discord is punished by law. Article 55 of the Mali criminal code says: "Any intention, any action of such a nature that might establish or raise racial or ethnic discrimination, any intention, any action that might provoke or assist regionalist propaganda, any propagation of news aiming at an undermining of the nation's unity or directed against the state, any manifestation directed against freedom of conscience and religious liberty that might set the citizens against each other, will be punished."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ "Political Parties Decree", *The Ghanaian Times*, 30.IV.1969; *ibid.*, 1.V.1969.

⁴⁷ République du Mali, *Ministère de la Justice, Code Pénal*, Loi No. 99 A.N.-R.M. du 3 août 1961, Koulouba, p. 29.

The criminal code of Guinea says: "Any action of racism or regionalism, as well as any propaganda of racial, tribal or subversive nature" will be punished by imprisonment from one to ten years.⁴⁸

Efforts to foment inter-tribal discord in the People's Republic of Congo and in some other countries are punished severely.

The policy of eliminating real inequality between different peoples that is pursued by the governments of some African states contributes a great deal to the solution of ethnic problems.

The Government of Algeria, for instance, has recently been making great efforts to develop the most backward regions of the country, especially the Great Kabilia. These measures are also of great importance to the plan for strengthening Algeria's national unity. Most of the country's population of thirteen million consists of Arabs, but there are about two million Berbers: Kabils, Shawia, Oasis Berbers and Tuaregs. Most Berbers have now, apparently, been Arabified, but some regions (Kabilia, Shawia, Mzab, Tonggourt, etc.) preserve compact Berber settlements where different dialects of the Berber language function as the main language. This fact is used by neo-colonialist circles in an attempt to stir up trouble between the Arabs and Kabils.

In the autumn of 1968 a resolution was passed, allocating 550 million dinars to a three-year plan for developing Kabilia to be used for improving industry and agriculture, and for developing craft skills, health services and education.

The Government of Algeria has also taken steps to develop such backward regions of the country as Saura, Oasis, Tittery, etc.

Thus, the policy of proportional development and the elimination of economic and social differences between various regions of the country, that has been announced by the Government of Algeria, is being put into effect.

The economic and social transformations being carried out in Algeria provide for the industrialisation of the coun-

⁴⁸ République de Guinée, *Lois. Code Pénal*, Conakry, 1966, pp. 39-40.

try, radical agrarian reforms and raising the development level of backward areas. They will speed up the collapse of archaic structures and encourage the development of new social relations. Special local development programmes will level out regional, social and economic differences, put an end to outdated institutions inherited from the tribal system which are hindering the country's progress, abolish social inequality and involve the Berber-speaking population in the task of national construction. All this will promote the solution of ethnic problems and the strengthening of ethno-political unity.

The policy of eliminating real inequality in the level of social, economic and cultural development attained by different ethnic groups is being followed in other countries too. Of late great attention is being paid in Senegal to Casamance, the southern part of the country. The new four-year development plan for Senegal (from July 1, 1969) envisages considerable capital investment in the economy of this region—for developing transport and telecommunications, and the output of vegetables and fruit will also be increased.⁴⁹

In Kenya a plan for developing the Northern province, most of whose inhabitants are Somali and Galla cattle-breeders, has been adopted and is now in operation. Guinea is concentrating on the so-called "forest regions", inhabited by Gerze, Toma and other peoples. A special ministry to deal with the nomadic population of the Sahara has been formed in the Republic of Niger.

The "policy of national reconciliation" announced by the Government began to be implemented in the Republic of Chad in January 1971. It aimed to resolve the deep crisis in the country's internal politics that had existed since 1965 and been caused by the actions of the Tedda and Mubi peoples.

Speaking on Republic Day (November 28, 1972), President F. Toubalbai urged the people to heighten their national consciousness, and again emphasised the need to strengthen national unity and weld all the peoples in the country together, in order to promote economic and social develop-

⁴⁹ *West Africa*, 22.III.1969, p. 322.

ment. He declared that these aims could only be attained by establishing mutual understanding and eradicating hatred and tribal dissension, as well as by carrying through a cultural revolution to change people's outlook and raise their national consciousness.

There are many difficulties in solving the ethnic problems of Kenya; the Government and President Jomo Kenyatta are devoting great attention to the fight against tribalist ideology. The Government sponsored a wide publicity campaign under the slogan: "There are no tribes—only Kenyans!", to show that in modern Kenya all the peoples participate in running the country as well as in the share-out of material wealth. The author had many talks on these problems with people from various ethnic groups and with different political convictions during her stay in Kenya in May 1969. As a rule, the ordinary people of different ethnic groups do not feel animosity towards each other. Baluhya, Gikuyu, Kamba, Luo and the representatives of other peoples work side by side in the same government offices. Not far from Nairobi, in the Thika region, where about 99 per cent of the population are Gikuyu, a Kamba woman worked as the social department officer, and in Nyeri, also in Gikuyu territory, the same job is performed by a Baluhya woman. As yet they both speak only Swahili but are making progress with the Gikuyu language. They say that the Government of Kenya deliberately sends Baluhya, Luo, etc., to work in Gikuyu, Kamha, etc., areas and vice versa. But some politicians use the ethnic element for inflaming tribalistic feelings. They try to turn the peoples against each other, e.g., the Luo against the Gikuyu (the two most numerous peoples in Kenya). This policy of rousing nationalist hysteria led to conflicts between the Luo and the Gikuyu in the Kisumu region in October 1969 and to a worsening of the situation in the country.

The peoples of Nigeria are going through a new, momentous stage in their development after the war against Biafra; it is a period of reconstruction and reconciliation, a time for eliminating the consequences of the Nigerian crisis.

The Nigerian Government considers it vital to normalise the situation in East-Central State, which was the nucleus of the former Biafra. To judge from Nigerian press reports,

some success has been achieved in rehabilitating the state's economy and its further development, and attention is now being given to such acute problems as the food supply, unemployment and the resettlement of refugees.

The state's administration, including the police force, is staffed by Ibo.

The rebuilding of old schools and the opening of new ones produced the result that by autumn 1970 school attendance had reached its 1965 level. According to information furnished by the Governor of East-Central State, U. Asika, the number of those attending school has risen by 100 per cent. Fees in state schools have been reduced by 50 per cent and can be paid in instalments. This feature will play a significant part in the progress of education.

The Nigerian Government created an Emergency Relief Volunteers Corps, part of whose job is to send to work and make full use of all specialists who wish to help abolish the consequences of the war.

A Ministry of Community Development and Rehabilitation has been established in the Mid-West State to help the refugees.

Members of staff from universities and other educational establishments in Nigeria took an active part in the reconstruction work. A conference of leading educational workers was held in Lagos to discuss the problem of education in the war-affected areas.

In the University of Ibadan a Committee for War Affected Areas was set up. In January 1970 members of this Committee were sent to Lagos in order to discuss practical measures with the officials there. The Committee appealed to the lecturers and research workers of the university, asking them to collect money, food and clothes.

A delegation from the University of Lagos was sent to the eastern areas to find out exactly what aid was required.

Inter-state assistance is being carried further. For example, the Government of Mid-Western State declared its readiness not only to place some of its civil servants at the disposal of the Government of Benue-Plate State, but also to pay their salaries.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ *West Africa*, 25.VI.1971, p. 738.

In December 1971 an agreement was concluded between Kano State and Mid-Western State on mutual help in training staff to run the economy.⁵¹

The author was able to talk to such outstanding political figures as O. Awolowo and A. Enahoro during her stay in Nigeria in January-February 1969. They agreed unanimously about the need to form a united Nigeria with a strong centralised government. The new administrative division of the country into 12 states, which to a certain extent takes the ethnic factor into account, will undoubtedly remove much of the bitterness from the nationalities question. O. Awolowo and supporters of a federal system think that "...in the peculiar circumstances of Nigeria, only a federal constitution can foster unity with concord among the diverse national groups in the country, as well as promote economy and efficiency in administration". And further: "Since Nigeria is a multi-lingual and multinational country par excellence, the only constitution that is suitable for its peculiar circumstances is a federal constitution."⁵² The principles of the state system of Nigeria were worked out in greater detail by O. Awolowo in his book *The People's Republic*.⁵³

In the near future a federation is probably the most likely form of state system to be adopted. The attempt to create a unitary state undertaken by Ironsi in 1966 ended in failure.

The extension of economic links between different areas of Nigeria, the development of the home market and the raising of the educational level of the population will inevitably lead to the collapse of pre-capitalist structures and the intensification of ethnic processes. The probable outcome will be a rapid rise in national consciousness and a furthering of integration processes in the sphere of ethnic development.

Tanzania, with a population of more than 12 million, is one of the few countries in Africa where the ethnic factor does not play an important part in the country's political

⁵¹ "Kano and Mid-Western State Governments Sign Pact", *Kano State of Nigeria Today*, No. 4, Vol. I, January 1972, pp. 3-5.

⁵² O. Awolowo, *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution*, p. 49.

⁵³ O. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, Ibadan, 1968.

life. Although Tanzania (i.e., the continental part of it—Tanganyika) comprises 120 peoples according to census returns, relations between them have never been hostile. Of course, there have been conflicts and still are—between, for instance, the Masai and neighbouring Bantu, caused by cattle-stealing episodes or personal quarrels, but they cannot be considered as manifestations of tribal enmity. Such cases may occur in relations between members of the same ethnic group.

There were no large states on the territory of Tanganyika in the past. Consequently, no single tribe ever ruled over another. The level of economic development of the overwhelming majority of peoples is approximately equal. The only exception is the Chagga, among whom capitalist relationships had developed even before independence.

The active trade links forged by Arab and Swahili merchants, including slave-traders, with the interior of the country, as well as the endless stream of the migrants looking for work in the mines and sisal plantations, were of considerable importance to the development of ethnic processes. Contact between different ethnic groups and the ever wider use of Swahili have furthered the integration processes.

The ethnic factor does not play an important role in politics, largely because Tanganyika has never had rival parties, each supported by a specific tribe. From its very beginning the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was a mass political organisation, uniting in its ranks members of the most varied of the country's ethnic groups. Since January 1963 all the citizens of the country, irrespective of race, have been able to join TANU. Highly important to the solution of ethnic problems are the programme of progressive social and economic transformations adopted by TANU and the principles for a national policy formulated by Julius Nyerere.

In his speeches and articles Nyerere constantly underlines the danger of tribalism and appeals for the consolidation of all the peoples in order to form a united family of peoples—the Tanzanian nation. The author's talks with state and public leaders in Tanzania have convinced her that the Government of the country, when elaborating concrete national policy measures or making appointments,

takes no account of the ethnic factor, but considers that there is a single people, having common aims and tasks.

There is no doubt that the language policy of the Government also helps to consolidate the peoples of Tanzania. Although the population of Tanzania consists of 120 peoples with their own languages, many of them mutually unintelligible, the Government declared the state language (alongside English) to be Swahili. It is to be specially noted that the introduction of Swahili as a common state language met with no opposition from the population and was carried through quite painlessly. This is apparently one of the results of TANU's standing policy of levelling out the ethnic factor and really uniting the country's citizens.

The establishing of equality between workers in state enterprises and the founding of new kinds of co-operatives—so-called *ujamama* villages—in Tanzania go straight to the heart of the matter and eliminate the possibility of the exploitation of man by man or of one ethnic group by another. Equal political rights and opportunities for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, i.e., the right to vote and participate in state administrative bodies, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, are all vitally important to the upbringing of the new man, who will consider the interests of the nation as a whole before any other.

Another country on the African continent where the ethnic factor is insignificant is Senegal.⁵⁴ The population of the country, numbering about four million, contains various ethnic groups—Wolof, Serer, Toucouleur, Fulbe, Malinke, Soninke and others. All these peoples speak different languages, belonging to different linguistic families. Nevertheless, both the published data and the author's personal observations in 1961 and 1969 indicate that Senegal does not suffer from the problem of tribalism. At any rate, it is not very strongly pronounced, and there are no cases of bitter inter-tribal enmity and tension. One of the

⁵⁴ See also: *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1966, p. 30.

most important reasons for this is the policy of the ruling party, the Progressive Union of Senegal (UPS), headed by President L. S. Senghor. It tolerates no tribalist ideology nor any organisation based on the tribal principle.

Academic, state and public leaders in Senegal emphasised in their talks with the author in February 1969 that the ethnic factor does not play a substantial part in determining appointments or evolving economic and social development policies. Thus, for instance, the Governor of an economically important area in St. Louis said that the economic development plan provided for advances in the area's agriculture and that it made absolutely no difference to him what ethnic groups lived there. Aims and tasks were common to all, the Governor said.

Every country has its particular features and its specific nationality problems; it would seem that attempts to solve them should take into consideration the historical past and the peculiarities of ethnic processes.

The governments of African states face great difficulties when they try to deal with ethnic problems. One example is the problem of language. Many aspects of national development depend on it, e.g., the elimination of existing inequality in the economic and cultural level of different peoples and the training of national cadres.

In 1959, one year before many African countries won their independence, at the Second Congress of African Writers and Poets in Rome, the following resolution was adopted: "The independent and federated Africa should adopt neither European nor any other foreign language for its national expression."⁵⁵

The following fourteen years showed the utter impossibility of implementing this resolution. The languages of the former metropolises have now become the official languages of most African states.

The supremacy of the European languages will probably remain intact in the near future. Moreover, investigations that have been carried out in a number of countries in recent

⁵⁵ "11-ème congrès des écrivains et artistes noirs", *Présence africaine*, Vol. I, Nos. 24-25, Paris, 1959, p. 397.

years, including research by specialists from the GDR, and which were described at the Second Congress of Africanists in Dakar, show that the European languages, especially French, are gaining ground. The policy of francophony is largely responsible. Thus, one of the main tasks of the Agency for co-operation between francophone countries in the fields of culture and technology, established in mid-March 1970 at the Niamey conference, is to do all in its power to spread the use of French.

The linguistic situation in African countries is exceedingly complicated. Besides such widespread languages as Arabic (spoken by more than 83 million), Swahili (according to some data 30 or 40 million), Hausa (probably about 20 million), Malinke (more than eight million), Ibo, Yoruba and Fulfulde (each of which is spoken by no less than 10 million), almost every state in Africa has languages spoken only by a few thousand people.

The problem of language gives rise to fierce argument among African scholars, politicians and statesmen. As a member of a UNESCO mission in 1964, the author had to make a special study of the problem of the development of African languages and the possibility of using them in teaching, adult education, broadcasting, etc., in a special way. As UNESCO consultants, the members of the mission took part in a discussion of these problems at the Educational Planning Conference and the Conference of the Ministers of Education of African States in Abidjan in March 1964. The answers to our questionnaire, as well as talks with heads of state, ministers of education, linguists and public and political figures, reveal vast differences of opinion. Some want the development of African languages, others categorically state that this is impossible and demand the use of only English or French as the state language and the language of the classroom. Still others defend African languages, but at the same time talk about the need to study the European languages as well.

However, the majority of the African leaders and the intelligentsia want to stimulate African languages. They consider that in future the local languages will supersede the European languages. President Sékou Touré of the Republic of Guinea considers it essential that the official

language should be an African tongue, rather than English or French.⁵⁶

Professor Ki-Zerbo is of the opinion that the death of the African languages would mean cultural suicide.⁵⁷ The Minister of Community Development and Culture in Uganda, Constantine Katiti, talked to the author in April 1969 in Kampala about the necessity for the development of African languages and their significance for cultural education. In his view, culture can be developed only in the mother tongue, and so it is necessary to preserve and develop the African languages.

But what African languages are to be developed? Every country has a plethora of different languages, to say nothing of dialects. Many of them have no written form. Is it necessary to develop all the languages existing in a country, or only the most important ones? Which languages may be considered the most important? What can serve as a criterion in choosing between languages? The point is that it is necessary not only to create written languages for the peoples who do not possess them, but also to publish educational material, books, newspapers and magazines. To do all this, vast sums of money and a lot of special staff are needed. In practice the idea is more or less a non-starter. One must also bear in mind that the resulting linguistic patchwork would hinder communication between people belonging to different ethnic groups, would further consolidate tribal division and might delay the process of national integration of the African peoples.

Some work in the field of developing the native languages is being carried out in many African states. In some states written languages are being created for the most important languages, unification of alphabets is being undertaken, a new spelling system is being worked out and scientific study of the African languages has begun. It is especially noteworthy that native African specialists are coming to play a greater role in tackling linguistic problems.

After the granting of independence to Ghana the Con-

⁵⁶ *West Africa*, 21.IV.1972, p. 500.

⁵⁷ Prof. Joseph Ki-Zerbo, "The Content of Education in Africa", Final Report, Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa, Addis Ababa, May 15-25, 1961, Annex IV, p. 57.

vention People's Party decided that one of its most important tasks lay in reorganising education, introducing African languages into the school system. The Bureau of Ghana Languages was established with departments of Twi, Fanti, Ewe, etc. It was to activate the preparation, publication and distribution of periodicals and literature in local African languages, including school textbooks.

Work was begun on creating a unified written language for peoples of the Akan and Dagbani groups.⁵⁸

The language problem was debated by the Ghanaian Parliament in May 1971. It was proposed that there should be a single official language for the whole country. Attention was drawn to the increasing use of Akan. However, opinions differed, some members suggesting that the introduction of a single national language might bring about a negative reaction.⁵⁹

Written forms for the most important local languages of Mali and Guinea were introduced in 1967, but it is still too early to assess the results.

As stated above, in the continental part of Tanzania the Government introduced Swahili as the official language. This interesting experiment deserves close study.

Swahili is beginning to play a greater role in Kenya. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) announced the beginning of a broad campaign to make Swahili the official language.

The Somali language was introduced in written form in Somalia in January 1973, and was declared to be the national language of the republic.

In Uganda the Conference of the Linguistic Society that took place in April 1970 urged the Government to make Swahili the official language. At the same time the Conference recommended the development of the Luganda and Lwo languages.

The Local Languages Society of Nigeria, under the auspices of the University of Ifadan, was established as long ago as 1958. This Society urged the development of the three main languages of Nigeria: Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ *Ghana. An Official Handbook*, Accra, 1962.

⁵⁹ *West Africa*, 11.VI.1971, p. 655.

⁶⁰ *The Case for Nigerian Languages*, No. 1, 1964, p. 8.

The idea of spreading the Hausa language over the next few years was suggested, and in 1964 a special committee was even formed to study the question. There was also a suggestion about using Hausa as an official language in other countries of West Africa.

The Wolof language is gaining more recognition in Senegal, where several ethnic groups exist. I remember the heated arguments that took place in the lobby of the Conference of the Ministers of Education in Abidjan in March 1964. Some insisted that language policy ought to favour French, others tried to prove the need to develop Wolof in order to make it the state language of the future. Some were opposed to this and pointed to the danger of "Wolofisation", which threatened to arouse tribal feelings. Eight years have passed since the author's first visit to Senegal in April 1961 and great changes have taken place: Wolof is gaining ground. In 1971 a decree was issued introducing the Wolof language in written form.

The Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa, that took place in May 1961 in Addis Ababa, made a detailed examination of the problem of national languages. "The plan for educational development in Africa", adopted by African states at the Addis Ababa Conference, requires the introduction of African languages into teaching.⁶¹

Conference members consider that the mother tongue should necessarily be used to combat illiteracy and in adult education.⁶²

The Conference on Educational Planning and the Conference of the Ministers of Education of African States, which took place in Abidjan in March 1964, supported the development of African languages and the need to use them in the drive against illiteracy among adults. In some countries the local languages are already used for this purpose; in Kenya Lwo, Kamba, Gikuyu, Luhya, Masai, Swahili, etc.,

⁶¹ "Conférence d'états africains sur le développement de l'éducation en Afrique", Addis Ababa, May 15-25, 1961; "Rapport final. Aperçu d'un plan de développement de l'éducation en Afrique", Addis Ababa, 1961, p. 51.

⁶² Ibid. pp. 57-58.

are used; and in Nigeria—Ibo, Yoruba, Hausa, Nupe, Tiv, Esik and other languages. Eight African languages are used in the fight against illiteracy in Guinea and nineteen in Uganda.

It is natural that every country will display its own peculiarities and its own specific features in laying down its language policy. Some countries may accept only one language as official, other countries, e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, Zaire, etc., may have two or three languages.

Only a policy of equality for all languages and peoples (irrespective of their economic and ethnic development level) will help to solve the language problem in states that are as ethnically heterogeneous and complex as most of the African countries are. Any departure from this principle is capable of aggravating relations between individual peoples, strengthening tribalist tendencies and impeding integration processes.

Language policy might play an important role in the consolidation of various African peoples, in the struggle against the ideology of tribal particularism and separatism. It would seem that in defining the language policy one must bear in mind the extreme complexity of the ethnic problems in most African states. One of the main features of the language policy must be the overcoming of tribal isolation and tribalistic sentiments and promotion of a common national self-awareness.

The problem of the self-determination of peoples and of the formation of their own states is very acute in some countries.

For many long years the rising bourgeoisie of the Ewe fought for the removal of the existing political frontiers and for reunion in one state. The aim of creating their own state was also announced by the ruling circles of the Bakongo, living in the Congo, Zaire, Gabon and Angola. Before the declaration of independence in Ghana the feudal chiefs of the Ashanti demanded the creation of an Ashanti state. From time to time the tribal leadership of the Tuaregs advanced plans for setting up an independent state for the Tuaregs, who live in a number of countries in West and North Africa. Plans for secession from Uganda have been long cherished by the feudals of Buganda. As stated

above, there was a movement in favour of autonomy or secession in the Southern Sudan, and mention has already been made of the events in Nigeria and the efforts to secede undertaken by its eastern part in 1967.

When studying the various movements in different African states aimed at secession and the creation of individual states, it seems necessary to take into consideration a complex of many factors. On the one hand, these movements are closely connected with ethnic processes and may testify to a rising national self-awareness when the frontiers drawn by colonisers and cutting across single ethnic organisms turned out to be obstacles on the path towards national consolidation (Ewe, Somalis).

On the other hand, a longing for separation and the creation of an independent state can be explained by political motives when the drive towards self-determination is impelled by a rising bourgeoisie (Biafra, Katanga) or feudal circles (Buganda).

Finally, the slogan of self-determination is being used more and more by neo-colonialists in order to strengthen their own position, as well as by nationalist leaders in inter-party struggles and especially during elections to legislative bodies.

It is necessary to emphasise that such movements are not merely local: they touch on a whole complex of internal and inter-state problems. The Ewe movement for reunification caused serious complications between Ghana and Togo, and the Somali problem and the plan for creating a "Great Somalia" affected the relations between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya.

Moreover, the striving of the peoples for self-determination has its effect on relations between various states outside Africa. Today such problems are becoming an international problem.

There is no doubt that the principle of self-determination has substantial importance for the solution of the nationalities question within the present national states. The right to self-determination and to an independent working out of its destiny belongs to every people irrespective of its size and level of ethnic, social and economic development. This Marxist-Leninist principle is familiar to everybody.

But the inalienable right of self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states, must not be confused with the practical and political expediency of secession or gaining autonomy in each concrete case. It is certainly not true that separation is always in the real interests of a people. The division of Africa into many small, economically weak states is already proving to be a serious obstacle to its social and economic development. The implementation of the self-determination principle on an ethnic basis in forms that would increase separatism would not only aggravate the difficulties of the present situation, but would lead to further fragmentation of the continent. The question of who will benefit from self-determination is by no means immaterial to the various peoples. In many cases, it may only be of use to neo-colonialist powers, who have an interest in the existence of small or economically and politically weak states.

Recognition of the political inadvisability of separation for various peoples is not the same as rejection of the self-determination principle, since self-determination may take different forms. The unitary state, confederation, federation or autonomy are all different forms of self-determination. Moreover, it does not imply *a priori* recognition of the legality of military suppression of a people longing for separation. Such actions may only make ethnic relations even more complex. In any case, they do not provide a stable and long-term solution of the question.

In resolving the problem of self-determination the tasks imposed by the common struggle for social emancipation are the main and decisive condition.

Every independent state in Africa has its specific character, which obviously makes its mark on various aspects of the nationalities question. In addition, we must take account of the extreme complexity and contradictory nature of ethnic processes in different countries: intertribalisation, rising national self-consciousness and the formation of great ethnic communities are accompanied by supertribalisation, the strengthening of ethnic self-awareness and nationalistic and separatistic tendencies.

Every country has its own priorities in the field of ethni-

cal development. In spite of the peculiarities of every state, the ethnic factor plays a certain role in the political life of these countries.

There can be no doubt about the importance of the principles for resolving ethnic problems, as declared in constitutions and party policy statements, as well as the policy of consolidating all the peoples in a country.

By calling the peoples in their states single nations, the constitutions and party policy statements emphasise national unity, the common element uniting people of different ethnic affiliations.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that within the state framework single nations, e.g., a Tanzanian or Guinean nation, may emerge in the future. At the moment, however, the process of national integration and consolidation still has a long way to run. Specific historical conditions in the individual countries produce different variants of ethnic development. In some countries they may lead to the emergence of a single ethnic community from the different ethnic constituents of the state; in others several communities, including nations, may form or are forming (e.g., Nigeria).

In such countries, naturally enough, government policy has to interlock with the processes of ethnic development. In other words, it has to facilitate the formation and, later, the harmonic development of several nations.

However, in a number of cases the identification of a nation and a state produces negative results. The declaration in the constitutions of some countries that all the peoples within the state political boundaries form a single nation, regardless of the ethnic processes that are operating, merely glosses over the ethnic problems. State political unity can only be attained through a correct national policy. Many African leaders start from the premise that a single nation exists and that the task is, therefore, to consolidate it. In our view, the task is to *create* this unity. Any exaggeration of the part played by the ethnic factor, just like attempts to ignore it, can only make the existing difficulties worse.

The complicated ethnic structure of many countries is an indisputable fact. But some African leaders deny the existence of diverse ethnic groups in their countries and

consider the ethnic names themselves to be something shameful. A long time will pass before the Masai stop feeling themselves to be Masai, or the Bakongo give up their ethnic self-awareness and call themselves Congolese, or the Ibo and Yoruba consider themselves to be only Nigerians. Ethnic consciousness is still strong, and this undoubtedly influences relations with other ethnic groups.

While ethnic communities exist, ethnic interests exist too. Ethnic nihilism and indifference to the needs of individual peoples when formulating and implementing a programme for economic and cultural construction, just like reactionary forms of nationalism and chauvinism, may not only do great damage to the improvement of inter-ethnic relations, but also hold back the drive towards national and social emancipation. As Lenin pointed out, "...only exclusive attention to the interests of various nations can remove grounds for conflicts, can remove mutual distrust..."⁶³

Democratic methods for resolving ethnic problems presuppose: the equality of all peoples, large or small; the eradication and prohibition of all discrimination or ethnically motivated privileges; a democratic state system that ensures the equal development of ethnic minorities; the absence of coercion when the language problem is being settled; respect for national culture, beliefs and traditions; help to backward peoples, in order to bridge the gap in economic and social development; etc. Most of these principles are proclaimed in the constitutions of the African states and other policy statements from African governments and ruling parties. The use of these democratic guidelines in dealing with ethnic problems will do much to relieve the ethnic contradictions in African states at their present level of social, economic and political development.

The formation of national unity which in this case is understood to mean not the formation of a single nation within the state frontiers but the nurturing of the feeling of belonging to one state and the identification of the individual with other peoples in the same state, all having a common aim, is a long process.

⁶³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 386.

In order to reduce this period, progressive forces in Africa are fighting resolutely against any displays of inter-tribal enmity, national narrow-mindedness and tribalist and chauvinistic tendencies. They want to educate members of different ethnic groups in the spirit of mutual respect and co-operation.

The experience of national construction in the independent states of Africa illustrates the need for extreme caution and great tact when dealing with ethnic problems.

P. I. Puchkov

ETHNIC PROCESSES IN OCEANIA

The ethnic situation in the countries of Oceania has considerable influence on the political, economic and cultural development of various other countries in the world. The long-term development of any country can not be planned without taking into account the ethnic trends emerging there. It is particularly important to consider the processes of ethnic development in young developing countries that have recently gained political independence, since it is in these countries that the ethnic situation changes most rapidly.

In Oceania four countries have recently attained independence. The question of granting independence to other countries is now on the agenda. For this reason the investigation of ethnic processes in Oceania has become one of the urgent tasks for that area.

The processes of ethnic development that are going on in the countries of Oceania have much in common with those taking place in other colonial or newly independent countries. In particular, there is the great intensity of these pro-

cesses, their accelerating pace, the predominance of the processes of consolidation over other ethnic processes, etc.

On the other hand, the special features of ethnic development in Oceania are quite apparent. They result mainly from the region's geographical peculiarities (especially its fragmentation into islands), the distinctive political situation and the specific ethnic structure.

It is rather difficult to summarise the ethnic trends observed in the whole of Oceania. The point is that, despite Oceania's comparatively small area and small population, it is a very diffuse region geographically, and so the processes of ethnic development vary perceptibly from place to place.

Ethnic processes can be divided according to type into two large groups: the processes of ethnic division and ethnic amalgamation. The former are typical of the epoch of the primitive communal system, the latter—the period of the decline of the primitive communal system and later historical periods.

The processes connected with ethnic amalgamation can in turn be divided into the processes of consolidation and the processes of assimilation. Ethnic processes of different types are at work in Oceania, but the processes of consolidation are the most pronounced.

The speed with which the consolidation process takes place depends on a number of factors. The most important are the level of social and economic development and the intensity of the economic links between different sections of the population; geographical features; the degree of complexity in the ethnic structure of the population; the linguistic, cultural, religious and racial closeness of the different groups in the population involved in this process; the existence or absence of a written language among the groups that are consolidating (and if it exists—the uniformity or diversity of the literary form of the language); the colonial status or political independence of the country (if a colony—the degree of the development of the national liberation movement), etc.

As a rule, the higher the level of social and economic development and the closer the economic links, the faster

the process of consolidation. In Oceania, the highest level of social and economic development has been achieved by Polynesia and Fiji, with New Caledonia and Micronesia slightly behind them, and most of Melanesia and especially Papua bringing up the rear.

The geographical conditions in which the population of a country lives can have a substantial effect on the processes of consolidation. A flat, open terrain usually facilitates ethnic contacts and so makes for the consolidation of the population living there. Very rugged terrain, high mountain ranges, mountainous barriers which are difficult to surmount, and impenetrable tropical jungles complicate the processes of consolidation. The most compact area among the regions of Oceania is, of course, Papua, but it is intersected by relatively high mountain ranges. The most diffuse is the territory of Polynesia and Micronesia, where tiny coral islands and others of volcanic origin predominate. What is the effect of such fragmentation on the course of ethnic processes? At first glance it might seem that the diffuseness of the territory of Oceania must, of necessity, have a slowing-down effect on consolidation processes. However, this is far from always being the case. After all, the geographical features, including compactness or diffuseness of territory, do not directly affect ethnic processes, but work through some intermediary, either promoting or hindering economic or cultural ties between the different parts of the country. Separation of the different parts of a territory by the sea does not always exert a negative influence on these ties and, through them, on ethnic processes. If the stretches of water are not too wide, then, assuming that the islanders have developed adequate seamanship, they serve to bring neighbours closer together, rather than divide them. In any case, a narrow strait is usually easier to cross than a high mountain range or tropical thickets. It is not pure chance that in many parts of Indonesia there is much closer contact between the coastal areas of neighbouring islands than between the littoral and hinterland of large islands. The Polynesians are excellent seafarers. The people of Micronesia also make fairly good sailors. Consequently, in both Polynesia and Micronesia, the narrow straits between the islands forming the

archipelago, let alone the stretches of water between the separate islets of an atoll, can not divide off neighbouring populations. Contacts within an archipelago are generally of a regular kind, and very often links also exist between the inhabitants of neighbouring archipelagos. Needless to say, if the water barrier is quite wide, contacts between the inhabitants of adjacent island groups are impeded and the links are only of a sporadic kind.

The ethnic structure of the population also has a very marked effect on the course of consolidation processes. Admittedly, though, this is a two-way connection, since the ethnic structure itself in fact largely depends on the level of ethnic development in the country. Assessed in terms of the complexity of the ethnic structure of their indigenous populations, the regions of Oceania fall into two groups: Polynesia, Fiji and, to a lesser extent, Micronesia have a relatively simple ethnic structure, while Melanesia, New Caledonia and Papuasia have a very complex ethnic composition. It is clear that the first group has more favourable conditions for consolidation. As to regions where the ethnic structure is complex, consolidation processes have more favourable conditions for development in districts whose populations are relatively close linguistically, culturally and anthropologically. In this respect too Melanesia (with New Caledonia) undoubtedly has a considerable advantage over Papuasia. In Melanesia, most of the population speaks cognate languages, while in Papuasia, there are several groups of languages, which are completely unrelated genetically.

The process of consolidation is speeded up considerably by the introduction of a written language, provided, of course, that a single language has been adopted as a literary form for the whole territory. As we see it, the consolidation of the people of Fiji, who speak a number of dialects, sometimes differing markedly from one another, was greatly accelerated by the creation of a single written language. If, on the other hand, a population that is trying to consolidate has several variants of the literary language, the process of consolidation is greatly complicated.

The political system in a given territory also exerts considerable influence on the consolidation process. Inde-

pendent statehood promotes unity in the population. Colonial status usually retards the process of consolidation, although a powerful national liberation movement may reduce this negative influence appreciably.

Let us now consider the development of consolidation processes in the countries of Oceania. The first point to be made is that these processes have developed in one form or another in practically all the countries of the region. Consolidation processes differ from place to place in the stage of development, structure and scale.

As far as the stage of development is concerned, we can see in Oceania, on the one hand, cases where ethnic consolidation is just about to begin, and, on the other, examples of the final stage of the process. In Papuasia consolidation is only at a very early stage; the trend towards drawing together is as yet so weak there that it is difficult to make any definite comment. The process is more manifest in Melanesia, although here too it is only at an early stage. The slow pace of consolidation processes in Papuasia and Melanesia is due to a number of causes, the most important of which are the low level of social and economic development in these areas (resulting in poor ethnic contacts) and the complex ethnic structure of the population. The geographical features do not favour consolidation either. In Papuasia, neighbouring ethnic communities are often separated by mountain ranges or tracts of almost impenetrable tropical forest, while Melanesia is split into separate, far-flung islands (which impedes contacts, considering that the Melanesians' level of seamanship is rather low). At the same time it must be said that in recent decades a number of factors promoting ethnic consolidation have come into play in Melanesia and, to a lesser extent, in Papuasia. In the first place, the penetration of capitalist relations is gradually strengthening economic links between neighbouring territories. Also of great importance is the development of a plantation economy in several areas of this part of Oceania. A considerable proportion of the male population of the islands has worked in these plantations at one time or another.¹ Joint work of members of different ethnic groups

¹ See: H. J. Hogbin, *Social Change*, London, 1958, p. 239.

in the plantations reduces their alienation and isolation and makes for a certain ethnic-cultural drawing together. The process has been substantially promoted by the national liberation movement that has swept the archipelagos of Melanesia. In the British Solomon Islands, the "Masinga Rule" Movement has gained momentum,² and in the New Hebrides—the John Frum Movement³ and the "naked cult".⁴ These national liberation movements have fostered among various ethnic groups in the colonies a feeling of militant solidarity with neighbouring groups in the struggle against the colonial regime, and a sense of belonging to a single whole has been engendered.

In South and Southeast Melanesia (New Caledonia, the Loyalty Islands and Fiji) the level of social and economic development is, as pointed out above, noticeably higher than in the main part of Melanesia. Their territory is also more compact. Fiji, moreover, is notable for the relatively simple ethnic structure of its indigenous population. All these factors have a favourable effect on the development of consolidation processes, which are in full swing here. In Fiji we are witnessing in fact the final stage of the process of consolidation: a single people has already been formed.

In Micronesia, ethnic consolidation has also reached a considerably higher stage of development than in the main part of Melanesia and Papua, thanks to the higher level of social and economic development, the greater linguistic and cultural affinity of the population and, finally, better communications between the different areas (this is largely due to the fairly good seafaring skills developed by the Micronesians).

The process of consolidation has gone even further in the archipelagos of Polynesia. The relatively high level of social and economic development, close contacts within the different archipelagos (as already stated, the Polynesians are fine seafarers) and ethnic and linguistic homogeneity

² See: C. S. Belshaw, *Changing Melanesia. Social Economics of Culture Contact*, Melbourne and Wellington, 1954, pp. 109, 413.

³ H. J. Hogbin, op. cit., p. 213.

⁴ J. G. Miller, "Naked Cult in Central West Santo", *The Journal of the Polynesian Society*, Vol. 57, No. 4, 1948.

inside each archipelago are all responsible for the fact that the consolidation processes are now very far advanced in most of Polynesia's archipelagos: here it is a question of achieving a closer unity between peoples that have already formed.

As for the internal structure of the processes of consolidation and the correlation of the different aspects of the process, there can be several different combinations. Thus, in some cases the establishment of the linguistic unity of the population comes to the forefront in the process, and this precedes all notions of ethnic affinity or rudiments of common ethnic self-consciousness. In other cases the reverse happens: long before the establishment of a single language, amalgamating groups come to feel their relatedness, i.e., definite rudiments of a common ethnic consciousness appear. In most of the developing countries with populations consisting of many different tribes as well as in countries that are still under colonial rule but which are fighting for national liberation, it is this second variant of the correlation of different aspects of ethnic consolidation that prevails. It is found in the western part of Oceania (in most of the archipelagos of Melanesia and Micronesia), which is noted for its complex ethnic structure.

Finally, a word about the scale of the consolidation processes and the extent to which they involve a population. As in other parts of the world, the consolidation processes in Oceania display marked differences in scale. On the one hand, processes into which a possession's whole indigenous population has been drawn can be observed here, while, on the other, there are processes that do not extend beyond just one island or an even more limited area. Quite often both kinds of process coexist, i.e., simultaneously with a process that is taking place within a whole possession, localised processes embracing different parts of the possession are going on. We once suggested calling these taxonomically different consolidation processes macro-consolidation and micro-consolidation respectively.⁵ Just such a combination of the processes of micro- and macro-consolidation

⁵ P. I. Puchkov, *The Shaping of Melanesia's Population*, Moscow, 1968, p. 25 (in Russian).

can be observed, for example, in the British Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and French Polynesia. Thus, in the British Solomon Islands one can, on the one hand, see consolidation processes at work on individual islands (Choiseul, New Georgia, Santa Isabel, etc.). In the course of these micro-processes the population of each of the islands mentioned is gradually going over to one language (respectively, Bamhatana, Roviana-Marovo, Bugotu, etc.) and is building up a certain measure of ethnic unity. On the other hand, in the territory as a whole the macro-consolidation of the entire Melanesian population is proceeding (the process is as yet only at an embryonic stage).

In the New Hebrides, alongside the drawing together of all the indigenous inhabitants of the condominium (macro-consolidation), we can also see the formation of ethno-territorial groups on some of the islands: Banks, Oha, Mae-wo, Ambrym, Efate, etc. (micro-consolidation).

In the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (usually referred to nowadays simply as Micronesia) the further cohesion of ethnic communities that have already formed (the Trukese, Ponapeans and the Marshallese, etc.) is going on, as well as the gradual drawing together of all the indigenous peoples of the country.

In French Polynesia the situation is identical. Here, on the one hand, the closing stage in the process of micro-consolidation is taking place (the final ethnic formation of small ethnic communities of Tahitians, Tubuaians, Tuamotuans, Mangarevans, Marquesans, etc.) and, on the other, one can see an early stage in the process of macro-consolidation (the drawing together of all the Polynesians in the colony). It is interesting to note that the ethnic drawing together of the indigenous peoples in French Polynesia is accompanied by the gradual spread of a single language, Tahitian, among them (only on the Marquesas Islands, among Marquesans, has the language failed to make much headway).

While on the subject of consolidation processes, mention must be made of a similar process among one of the non-indigenous groups in Oceania—the descendants of immigrants from India and Pakistan (more precisely, from former

British India). From 1879 onwards people from different regions of India were brought to the Fiji Islands to work in the sugar-cane plantations. Cut off from their homeland, they had to rely on one another for support, and this tended to shatter religious and caste barriers separating the various immigrant groups.⁶ Hindustani came to be the language in common use between the different Indian groups. The different groups of the Indian population have usually joined forces in the national liberation movement. All this points to the first signs of ethnic consolidation among the Indians of Fiji or, as they are usually called, the Fiji-Indians. Probably the most isolated of all the Indian groups are the Indian Moslems. With the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, some of the Moslems tended to identify themselves with the newly created Moslem state. A special term, "Pakistani", even came into use to describe them, despite the fact that the forefathers of most of the Moslems living on Fiji came from areas that now form part of the Republic of India.

The processes of ethnic assimilation are more typical of the countries with a high level of economic and social development. In underdeveloped countries these processes play a limited role. As for Oceania, assimilation processes are taking place mainly in those countries where industry or a plantation economy are developed and where, consequently, manpower is imported. The speed of assimilation depends on the particular combination of factors affecting the process: the size of the group being assimilated, its territorial distribution, the length of time it has spent in the assimilating environment, the type of employment of members of this group, their economic ties with the main population of the given territory, the social and legal status and the family position of the group being assimilated, the existence or absence of contact with their country of origin, the attitude of the ethnic environment towards them, the linguistic, cultural, religious and racial affinities of the assimilating group and the one being assimilated, the degree of difference in the cultural levels of the minority being assimilated.

⁶ *Fiji. Report for 1926*, London, 1927, p. 28; A. Burns, *Fiji*, London, 1963, p. 111.

ilated and the assimilating majority, and so on. Many of these factors are often so closely interwoven that it is sometimes impossible to isolate them.

Let us now examine the influence of these factors on the assimilation processes at work in different parts of Oceania.

The quantitative factor is very important in the process of assimilation: if the non-native group makes up only a small fraction of the population in the area, assimilation proceeds quickly, but if this group accounts for a fairly large proportion, assimilation is more difficult. Thus, the Chinese living in Samoa and Fiji (where their proportion is small) are more easily assimilated than the Chinese who have settled in Tahiti and Hawaii (where their percentage is considerable).

The territorial distribution of the foreign group has the following effect on the speed of its assimilation: a compact group is usually more resistant to ethnic assimilation than one that is dispersed. If we take Fiji as an example, we shall see that groups from other parts of Oceania (the descendants of immigrants from the Solomon Islands and New Caledonia, as well as immigrants from Rotuma, Samoa and Tonga), which are dispersed throughout the Fijian population, have already been partially assimilated by the people of Fiji.⁷ Micronesians from Ocean Island (Banabans), who have settled in a compact group on Rambi, one of the small islands in the Fiji Archipelago, are not as yet showing any signs of being assimilated.

The influence of the time factor on assimilation processes is so obvious that it requires no elucidation. It is perfectly clear that, all other factors being equal, a group that has lived in an alien ethnic environment for a long time is far more likely to be assimilated than one that has just arrived. In Fiji, the immigrants from other islands of Oceania (and their descendants) can be divided into two groups, which differ in the time of their arrival. The first group is made up of the descendants of islanders who were imported for work on the plantations in the 19th century. The second consists of people who arrived fairly recently in order to

⁷ See: A. Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

study or earn money.⁸ The first of these groups has already been partially assimilated; the second has not yet undergone this process.

The speed of the assimilation process depends to a certain extent on the type of work performed by members of the group being assimilated and their economic links with the basic population. If the two groups have similar occupations and are closely linked economically, the assimilation processes are usually accelerated. Thus, Oceanians who emigrate from their native islands more often than not end up on other archipelagos in Oceania in a familiar economic environment with which they merge quickly. This "economic assimilation" considerably facilitates ethnic assimilation.

The social and legal status of an immigrant population may also affect the course of the assimilation processes. Assimilation is undoubtedly impeded wherever the newcomers are not treated as full and equal citizens. A clear illustration of this is provided by the island of Nauru. Here only the indigenous population enjoys full civil rights. Although immigrants (Chinese, Gilbert and Ellice islanders) make up half the population, they are unable to merge with the local ethnic group, despite the fact that some of them (the Gilbert and Ellice islanders) are culturally very close to the people of Nauru.

All immigrants (at least the men, who form the bulk of immigrants) can be divided into three groups according to their family status: married men who have come without their families, married men who have come with their families, and bachelors. These three groups are subject to different types of assimilation. The bachelors are assimilated more quickly than the others, many of them contracting mixed marriages with local girls. In Fiji, for instance, marriages between Fijian girls and immigrants are very common.⁹ As for the group of people who move with their families, most of them also remain permanently in their new homes. Nevertheless, complete assimilation of this group is complicated by the fact that such family units

⁸ N. McArthur, "Fijians and Indians in Fiji", *Population Studies*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1959, pp. 202-03.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

preserve and even reproduce the old ethnic community. In this case, assimilation takes place only in the second or even third generation. "Family" immigration of this type to New Caledonia by residents of the Wallis and Futuna islands is probably one of the reasons why the newcomers are not being very quickly assimilated. Still more difficult is the assimilation of immigrants who have left their families at home. In most cases this group does not assimilate at all. Thinking all the time of returning to their native parts, immigrants of this type look upon the country they moved to as a temporary refuge, which they will leave sooner or later.

In general, any form of contact with the country of origin (letters, transfer of money, etc.) usually retards the process of assimilation.

The speed of assimilation also largely depends on the attitude towards the aliens by the surrounding ethnic environment. Friendliness or antipathy between the members of different ethnic communities inherited from the past have a pronounced effect on the development of ethnic contacts. For example, the traditionally good relations between the peoples of Fiji and Tonga are probably at least partly responsible for the comparatively rapid "dissolving" of Tongan groups living among Fijians.

Quite naturally, the closer the groups in contact are in language, culture, religion and race, the faster the process of assimilation. The different peoples of Polynesia have definite linguistic, cultural and racial affinities with one another. This explains the rapid assimilation of individual Polynesian groups which move into the area of another Polynesian people. Thus, quite a few residents of the various islands of Polynesia—Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, etc. emigrate to New Zealand in search of a living. The Maori people quickly assimilate all these groups, especially the Cook Islanders who are particularly close to them in language and culture. On the other hand, Polynesian groups which move to Melanesia, especially the central part (the Solomon Islands and New Hebrides), are far less likely to be assimilated. For example, immigrants from the Wallis Islands, who move to take up work in the New Hebrides are rarely assimilated by the local population.

There is also a definite connection between the process of assimilation and the cultural levels of the groups in contact. Assimilation takes place most quickly where the cultural levels are approximately the same. Assimilation proceeds quite rapidly too where the immigrant group has a somewhat lower (but not too low) level of culture than that of the ethnic environment. Finally, if there are sharp differences in the cultural levels and if the immigrants are culturally superior to the local population, the process of assimilation is made more difficult. We shall illustrate just two of all the possible variants. The native population of the Fiji Islands is manifestly superior in cultural development to indigenous population of the Solomon Islands. Whenever immigrants from the Solomon Islands come to Fiji and stay there for a long period, they are gradually assimilated by the Fijians; but if Fijians settle in the Solomon Islands, assimilation hardly ever takes place.

Having examined the most important factors behind assimilation and linked them with the concrete assimilation processes taking place in Oceania, let us now turn to another type of ethnic process that can also be observed on the islands of Oceania. This is the process which in the latest Soviet literature on ethnography has been referred to as ethnic integration. By this is meant the interaction of ethnic units within one country which gradually fuses them into a single people. The totality of the ethnic units among which this process has begun is suggested to be named a national-political or ethnic-political community (the second seems the happier of the two terms). As far as Oceania is concerned, it is only as yet possible to talk more or less definitely about the beginning of such a process with reference to the Hawaiian Islands. There we can see a definite drawing together and considerable mixing of the ethnic communities living on the archipelago: Hawaiians,¹⁰ Americans, Japanese, various Filipino groups, etc.

¹⁰ "Hawaiian" is now often used to designate the mixed Hawaiian-American and Hawaiian-Asiatic population. Very few pure Hawaiians are left—only a few thousand people. The sharp decrease in the numbers of indigenous Hawaiians is a result of American colonisation. The shattering of Hawaii's centuries-old social foundations and principles of everyday life, the spread of alcoholism, prostitution and

Nevertheless, this process is bound to spread much further in Oceania. One can foresee its development in French Oceania, New Caledonia and, in the more distant future, on the Fiji Islands.

To continue our forecasts, one must expect in the not too distant future an upsurge of the consolidation processes on most of the archipelagos in Oceania. In Polynesia (and Fiji) the final stage in the consolidation of the peoples that have already formed will come about. It is possible that in some regions of Polynesia (the Cook Islands and French Polynesia) new peoples will begin to form from more or less self-contained ethnic units. In Micronesia, the present Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (or on a large part of it), contours of a future united Micronesian people will appear. In the near future the Melanesian-New Caledonians will probably consolidate finally into a single people. As for the main part of Melanesia and Papua, ethnic development here will apparently take place on a number of levels. Firstly, the micro-processes going on in some regions and on some islands will accelerate and come to a conclusion. Secondly, consolidation (in the case of New Guinea—rather integration) of the population will begin within the bounds of separate political formations.

As for the major non-indigenous groups in Oceania (not including New Zealand), their future seems to be as follows. The Americans, Japanese and other non-natives living on Hawaii will become more and more closely integrated with the Hawaiians and will eventually form a single ethnic whole. In Fiji, the Indian population, whose nucleus will be the local Hindi- (more precisely, Hindustani-) language groups, will consolidate completely. We have already pointed to the possible integration, in the distant future, of the archipelago's entire population. In New Caledonia the process of ethnic separation of Franco-New Caledonians from metropolitan French, will intensify and will, in the long run, trigger off another process—the process of the ethnic integration of the country's entire population mentioned above.

imported American ailments, against which the local population did not become immediately immune, have led to the extinction of a large proportion of the indigenous population.

Thus, all the countries of Oceania will see a simplification of their ethnic structure and its gradual transition from heterogeneity to homogeneity. The population of Oceania will become more and more uniform. The national liberation struggle of the peoples of Oceania and their determination to rid themselves of colonial dependence will greatly promote this trend. The attainment of political independence by the countries of Oceania will be a powerful stimulus to all the groups in their populations, prompting them to unite.

At the same time, during certain periods and in some regions of Oceania, factors may come into play, which will channel developments in the opposite direction. Thus, in a number of places one may expect to see a temporary revival of separatism (in fact, signs of it have already come to light in Papua-New Guinea, Micronesia and several other regions). The temporary complication of ethnic structure as a result of the immigration of alien groups is another foreseeable possibility.

However, all these eventualities are unlikely to have any substantial influence on the main trend in the ethnic development of the countries of Oceania—the gradual drawing together of all groups in the population.

Against Racism

P. N. Fedoseyev

RACIALISM—AN IMPERIALIST IDEOLOGY

The unmasking of all forms of racialism, including their Zionist variety, and critical analysis of the anti-popular activity of modern racialists, who fight against social progress and international security, is one of the tasks of Marxist-Leninist science.

From the historical point of view, racialism resulted from the slave-owning system as the ideological justification for domination over conquered tribes and over "low castes" or classes. In more recent times racialism made rapid headway owing to colonial conquests and the introduction of slavery in the USA. The colonisers and slave-owners intensively propagated their malicious theory about the supremacy of their own race over the enslaved peoples. Preachers of the race theory—Chamberlain, Gobineau, and the like—attracted world support and loud publicity in bourgeois society.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels severely condemned the theory and practice of racialism, and raised the banner of struggle for the complete equality of all races and nations. More than once Marx expressed his indignation concerning the racialist fabrications of Gobineau. For example, in

his letter to Laura and Paul Lafargue on March 5, 1870, he wrote: "Some ten years ago a certain M. de Gobineau published a work in four volumes, *On the Inequality of Human Races*, written to prove in the first instance that members of 'the white race' are like gods among the other human races and, of course, the 'noble' families within the 'white race' are in turn the flower of this elite".¹

While the racialists were doing all they could to emphasise the differences in the cultural development of peoples, dividing the earth's population into "superior" and "inferior" categories and preaching the inferiority and natural mental deficiency of "coloured" races, Marxism proved scientifically that differences in the cultural levels of peoples do not depend on any racial or national peculiarities but on particular stages of historical development.

Rejecting racialist fabrications about the "superiority" or "inferiority" of one race or another, modern science fully supports the idea of the oneness of the human race and of the equality of the physical and mental capabilities of all men irrespective of the colour of their skin.

Racial oppression and the spread of racialist ideology became especially strong with the transition from premonopoly capitalism to the reactionary domination of imperialism. The racial theory was adopted by the most aggressive circles of the bourgeoisie and especially by the main instigators of the Second World War—the German fascists and Japanese militarists.

Although the collapse of fascism dealt racialist ideology a crushing blow, racialism was not totally eradicated from the social life of our planet. Although the main strongholds of racialism, Nazi Germany and militarist Japan, had been defeated, a number of hotbeds of racial oppression and racial discrimination have remained even up to the present day.

As before, racialist ideas have many followers in extremely influential circles in the greatest capitalist country of the modern world—the United States of America. National minorities of the USA, making up almost one-fifth of the country's population, are subject to the most shameless

racial oppression in this citadel of "Western democracy". Unmasking the racialism of the American bourgeoisie, Lenin wrote: "Having 'freed' the Negroes, it took good care, under 'free', republican-democratic capitalism, to restore everything possible, and do everything possible and impossible for the most shameless and despicable oppression of the Negroes."²

Using the United States of America as an example, Lenin exposed the close connection between the exploiting nature of capitalism and racial oppression. "...The position of the Negroes in America *in general*," he emphasised, "is one unworthy of a civilised country—capitalism *cannot* give either *complete* emancipation or even *complete* equality.... Shame on America for the plight of the Negroes!"³

The present crimes of racialists in the USA bring shame on American imperialism in the eyes of the whole world.

Any move made by the American Negroes, Indians and other peoples to defend their rights are ruthlessly suppressed. The whole world was aroused by the fate of the courageous American Negro public figure and Communist, Angela Davis, who was for many months under threat of conviction or execution.

In order to justify the lawless treatment of Negroes, the American ruling clique adopted the racialist conceptions of the Nazis. "Scientists" from the USA wrote a number of papers in a vain attempt to establish the racial inferiority of Negroes. Thus, A. Jebsen, Professor of Psychology at the University of California, published an article in one of the journals, where he did his best to prove that, owing to genetic peculiarities, Negroes were very backward in intellectual ability as compared with white men. This pseudo-scientific article was feverishly acclaimed by the American ruling elite. The complete text of the article was read by one of the American parliamentarians at a session of the US Congress.

There are other capitalist countries apart from the United States of America where harsh racialist regimes exist. First of all, there is the Republic of South Africa, where racial-

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 24-25.
³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 18, p. 544.

¹ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 32, S. 655.

ist ideology is enshrined in the country's constitution. This racialist country has a series of laws which officially proclaim racial inequality in all spheres of social, political, economic and cultural life and which are directed against the native inhabitants that make up the overwhelming majority of the country's population.

A racialist police regime has also been established in the former British colony of Southern Rhodesia. The British authorities are responsible for the existence of this shameful regime; first, they secretly supported the racialists of Southern Rhodesia and then, throwing out a challenge to democratic society the world over, they concluded an official alliance with the racialist government.

Racialism is the ideological basis of apartheid and genocide, one of the abominable methods used by imperialism to hold its positions in the face of irreversible changes for the sake of peace, progress and socialism.

Chauvinist, racialist ideology and racialist methods have been fully adopted by international Zionism and by its shock brigade—the Israeli extremists. The leaders of Zionism have carefully concealed from the world public the documents revealing their criminal collusion with the leaders of fascism during the Second World War.

For the Israeli ruling clique racialism and chauvinism are the weapon behind their expansionist policy, their plunder and oppression of the working people. The Arabs who have been living in Israel for many years and the Arabs of the areas occupied by Tel Aviv are victims of the abominable practice of national enslavement, mass terror and persecution. The Soviet Union, true to the principles of freedom and independence for all nations, has always been and continues to be on the side of the Arab countries in their struggle against imperialism and Zionism, for the speediest elimination of the results of Israeli aggression.

Zionism is the bitter enemy of friendship and peace among nations. The Zionist leaders call any condemnation of their policy "anti-Semitism". But the nations of the world have long recognised this cheap and old trick of the Israeli aggressors. Anti-Semitism is as alien to the Soviet system as any other manifestation of racialism. Any propaganda of racial or national exclusiveness, or national

hatred and scorn are punished in the Soviet Union by law. The slanderous anti-Soviet fabrications of the Israeli rulers will mislead nobody.

It is precisely in Israel that much talk is heard about purity of blood and the inadmissibility of mixed marriages. The division of the Jews themselves in this country into first-class and second-class citizens depending on country of birth and colour of skin is a shameful fact in a long string of chauvinistic and racialist actions on the part of international Zionism.

Racialism is apparent in other parts of the globe too. Genocide is taking place in South Vietnam, in the Portuguese colonies and in Australia. Nor has it disappeared in Western Europe. In particular, real persecution of the so-called "coloured" immigrants is carried on in Britain. One of the influential figures in the Conservative Party, E. Powell, introduced an outspokenly racialist programme with the purpose of preventing coloured people from entering Great Britain.

The racialists and their lackeys are making their presence felt in Japan; they are the same racialists who once created the "East Asia League" in order to establish the so-called "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" and who glorified the superiority of yellow skin, arousing militant chauvinism with the slogan "Asia for Asians". The world remembers what a storm was unleashed by an aggressive Japan that rushed to realise the projects of the racialists.

Attempts to use racial and national prejudices are characteristic of the great-power policy of the leaders of the People's Republic of China today.

Marxism-Leninism has always resolutely opposed chauvinism wherever it has been found. Karl Marx wrote: "...Chauvinism is... a means of hindering the international co-operation of the working class, the first condition of its emancipation."⁴ The ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the whole Soviet people is the ideology of internationalism. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an embodiment of equal rights, fraternal friendship and co-operation between many nations and

⁴ Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 17, S. 558.

peoples. And this is the source of the great power and strength of the multinational Soviet state.

The ideas of equality of rights, friendship and co-operation are basic for both the internal and foreign policy of the CPSU and of the Soviet state. "Our experience has left us with the firm conviction that only exclusive attention to the interests of various nations can remove the grounds for conflict, can remove mutual mistrust, can remove the fear of any intrigues and create that confidence, especially on the part of workers and peasants speaking different languages, without which there absolutely cannot be peaceful relations between peoples or anything like a successful development of everything that is of value in present-day civilisation".⁵

The Soviet Union has always been, and remains, true to the principles of internationalism, a faithful ally of the oppressed peoples. "Manifestations of racism and apartheid," says the Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU, "must be universally condemned and boycotted."⁶

The trends of world social and political development today limit the possibilities of propaganda of racialism in any sphere of modern public life more and more. The working men of our planet understand that only the unity and solidarity of the working people, irrespective of the colour of their skin, can be a guarantee of success in the struggle against lack of rights and exploitation.

The world communist and working-class movement provides powerful support in the struggle of the peoples against racialism.

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 appealed to all honest people of the world to unite their efforts in the fight against the misanthropic ideology and practice of racialism.⁷

The fight against racialism and its varieties cannot be limited only to general condemnation and censure; it is

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 386.

⁶ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 38.

⁷ See: *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, Prague, 1969, p. 35.

necessary to fight against specific mouthpieces of racialism and chauvinism, against their concrete manifestation, for only in this way is it possible to eradicate this evil. In theory as well as in political practice, this fight is connected with radical problems of world development today. The fight against racialism is not only a question of condemning it on principle but of actively struggling against its various concrete manifestations and of offering effective assistance to peoples fighting against oppression.

Criticising racialism with mere words cannot have any success or yield the desired results. Now that racialism has been condemned by the whole of progressive mankind, many racialists become turncoats, pretending to be anti-racialists. Condemning racialism in words, they often support racialism by their deeds and practise racial discrimination themselves. Thus, taking up positions of blatant racialism and aggression, international Zionism and its organisations, as well as its far-flung secret service, try to use carefully masked forms of influence on the social consciousness of peoples. The Zionists have no qualms about depicting themselves as "humanists who are independent of class" or about operating with falsified "national and historical" arguments, etc.

The cause of emancipating the working people from any kind of social and national oppression calls for a decisive struggle against efforts to introduce racialism in any veiled form into the liberation movement. The unfortunate historical experience of the Bund showed how damaging to the struggle any departure from the principles of internationalism can be. The Bund tried to base its activity on the Zionist idea of a special Jewish nation, a completely false and reactionary idea, as Lenin pointed out. All true internationalists rejected the idea of the Bund, for it played into the bands of the various enemies of the revolution who tried to present the socialist movement not as a class movement, but as a movement of particular nations and separate races.

Racialism is the antipode of science. The development of science in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provided many irrefutable facts confirming the oneness of mankind and rejecting the racialist notions. From the point of view

of natural history and sociology, it is possible to say that racialism essentially opposes the achievements of scientific thought and scientific research. Natural science has fully refuted racialist fabrications about the biological non-equivalence of the various races. Marxist teaching about the role of labour in the origins of man and of human society and about the role of production in social development rejects all racialist fabrications outright.

Marx, Engels, Lenin, their disciples and followers proved scientifically that the development of peoples takes place in accordance with universal social laws. The peoples have certain basic features in common at certain historical stages of their development, despite their national characteristics. Distortion of one feature or another in the historical and cultural development of peoples has always been motivated by reactionary class interests.

Progressive science has the task of further deepening the class analysis of racial doctrines, implanted by imperialist reaction under present-day conditions. Marxist social science has to develop the study of the successively more refined forms of racist obscurantism, propagated by the agents of imperialism in the working and national liberation movement. It is necessary to popularise and disseminate scientific knowledge about races and ethnic groups. It is the duty of our ethnographers, sociologists and the representatives of all the branches of historical study to extend the work of unmasking racism and its Zionist variety.

Racialism is the enemy of progress. No matter what form it takes, racism is, and has always been, a weapon of reaction and obscurantism. It is the ideology of the slave-owning system and colonialist robbery. Although the world colonial system has already collapsed, the poison of racism attacks people's minds and feelings even now. Modern racists and chauvinists use these misanthropic ideas to impede the progress of mankind.

Chauvinistic racist ideas hinder the liberation movement of peoples and hold back the development of their culture and education. It is not mere chance, that the most reactionary social forces of the twentieth century have used the banner of racism. It was especially apparent in fascism.

Racialism and its different varieties have always fought against everything that is advanced and progressive; it may be a socialist revolution or socialist construction, the liberation struggle of peoples or the defence of peace and international security. That is just why racialists and Zionists are outspokenly anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, and are the most ferocious antagonists of socialism and the socialist movement.

Racialism is the enemy of peace and friendship among peoples. It always serves militarism and aggressive policies.

The policy of genocide pursued by the American aggressors in South Vietnam has led to about six million peaceful inhabitants (i.e., more than one-third of the country's population) being killed, wounded or made homeless. As a result of persecution and the removal of the Arab population from their lands in Israeli-occupied Arabic territory, the number of Palestinian refugees has risen to almost 1,500 thousand.

Under the banner of racialism, imperialism fans the flames of war in various regions of the world. It is precisely racialism, chauvinism and Zionism that is the basis of the education of the aggressive armies that are thrown by imperialists against peaceable freedom-loving peoples. For the war-mongers chauvinism has always been a means of dulling the consciousness of the masses.

The struggle for peace and the struggle against any stirrings of aggression and the militarisation of life in capitalist countries cannot be separated from a relentless struggle against all types of racialist, chauvinistic ideology.

The attitude towards racialism is the most important criterion of humanism. Nobody can be considered a humanist who tolerates any manifestations of racialism. It is no humanism, if somebody chatters about humane ideals and at the same time tolerates a humiliating position, without any rights, for the Negroes, negotiates with racialist regimes and assists them, and sends troops to suppress national minorities who demand equal rights and a reasonable standard of living.

The attitude towards racialism is an important criterion of democracy. The most striking contradiction of the bourgeois

democracy is its tolerant attitude towards racialism, towards the unequal position of national minorities. A democracy where racial prejudices are cultivated and supported and which tolerates and defends those racialist reserves still remaining in the world is a complete and utter farce.

It is very important to use legislative means in the struggle against racialism, as specified in the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and according to which all member countries of UNO are obliged to take effective measures to ensure equal rights for all, irrespective of their race and nationality.

An example of the effective and real embodiment of equal rights for all citizens is given by the socialist countries, where this equality is based on social ownership of the means of production and on the elimination of exploitation of one man by another.

The task is put before the nations of the world to urge all governments to do their duty in the struggle against racialism before UNO and the whole of mankind and to overcome the sabotaging by the imperialist countries of the UNO resolutions on the fight against racialist regimes.

Racialism and chauvinism are the antipodes of internationalism. The task of all Communists is to fight resolutely against racialism and chauvinism, which hinder the struggle against imperialism—the principal antagonist of internationalism and of the liberation movement of the peoples.

Emphasising the importance of internationalism and international solidarity in the fight against imperialism, the Communist and Workers' Parties condemn everything that impedes the unity of the working people, the working class and all liberation forces. They condemn resolutely the efforts of the Maoists to use racialist and chauvinistic conceptions in order to advance their power-seeking designs to the detriment of the liberation movement.

A non-class approach to the line-up of world forces is simply a manifestation of reactionary ideology. What does the opposing of the East in general to the West in general mean without a class analysis of public and social phenomena? This is a peculiar geopolitical racialist conception, concealing dreams of hegemony; behind it lies the attempt

to use chauvinistic racial prejudices for the establishment of Great Han ideology and policy.

Anyone who undermines the international Communist movement and seeks to divide up the liberation forces of the world according to a geographical, geopolitical, racial or national principle cannot be an internationalist. Anyone who attacks the stronghold of international unity—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the socialist countries, the socialist community—cannot be an internationalist.

The staunchest fighters for peace, friendship and the freedom of peoples are the Marxist-Leninist parties. V. I. Lenin wrote: "We are opposed to national enmity and discord, to national exclusiveness. We are internationalists."⁸

Guided by Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the revolutionary vanguard of our epoch—the international Communist movement—stands firm against imperialism's efforts to impede the cause of the social progress by using misanthropic racialist doctrines.

⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 293.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Racial discrimination remains one of the most acute problems of mankind, as UN Secretary General U Thant pointed out in one of his last messages for the International Day of Struggle for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination which is observed every year. It was noted in the message that racialism continued to remain a daily reality in the regions where apartheid existed, in colonial territories and even in some independent states. Therefore it was the task of the United Nations to intensify the actions of all the nations against racialism.

The problem of racial relations in essence is undoubtedly of a class, political nature. Racialism and racial discrimination have always been an instrument of socio-economic and ideological oppression, have served as justification for the exploitation by the ruling class of one nation of the peoples of other nations. Ever since capitalism arose racialism has been utilised by the European bourgeoisie for justifying the colonial oppression of the African, Asian and Latin American peoples. Imperialism likewise utilises racialist theories which advocate the superiority of some races and peoples over others for fomenting chauvinism and misanthropy and for justifying colonialism and the

annihilation and enslavement of entire peoples and religious and ethnic groups. To this day the ideas of natural racial superiority serve the interests of the US imperialist bourgeoisie which lays claim to leading the world and of the ruling circles of imperialist states.

The record of world history strikingly demonstrates to what disastrous consequences the ideology and policy of racialism lead: graphic proof is offered by the monstrous atrocities of the Hitler clique which killed millions of people on the pretext of their "racial inferiority". The conscience and concept of justice of the peoples striving for peace, freedom, social and economic progress naturally cannot reconcile themselves to the ideas and policies of racialism which justifies the exploitation and oppression of people because of their colour, slant of eyes, ethnic group, and so on. That is why the establishment of the legal equality of all people, irrespective of race and nationality, has for a long time been the demand of all progressive movements and organisations: it is reflected in the numerous declarations, calls, appeals, and also in documents of legal significance. Struggle for the elimination of racial discrimination has political, moral, economic, and legal aspects. In the present article we shall examine some questions related to the legal aspect of the problem, to acts of international and national laws which regulate racial relations.

INTERNATIONAL LAW CONDEMS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Among the international legal acts which embody generally recognised rules and principles of international law, primary significance attaches to acts of the United Nations, the most representative and authoritative international organisation.

A considerable part of these acts deals, to one or another extent, with the struggle against racial discrimination and notes its essential significance for world peace, for the maintenance of normal relations between states, and for social progress. Thus, a number of UN acts elevates the principle of equality of people and nations, without distinction as

to race, to one of the cardinal principles of international law. This is above all the UN Charter. Paragraph 3 of Article 1 mentions among the purposes of the United Nations: "To achieve international cooperation ... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion...." A similar provision is contained in Para C, Article 55.¹

The principle of defending human rights which is formulated in the UN Charter and provides, as an inalienable part, for the ensuring of equal rights to all races and nationalities,² has been further developed in a number of subsequent major UN acts. Thus, for example, on December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which proclaims in Article 1: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Article 2 lays down that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status". Article 7 of the Declaration proclaims "equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination".³

On December 14, 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It is pointed out in the Preamble that the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and friendly relations is possible only on the basis of "respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion".⁴

¹ *Charter of the United Nations*, United Nations, New York, Chapter 1, Article 1, point 3.

² See: G. Tunkin, *Ideological Struggle and International Law*, Moscow, 1967, p. 107 (in Russian).

³ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, United Nations, December 1948.

⁴ *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, United Nations, General Assembly, 15th Session, New York, 1960-1961, Annexes, p. 8.

Thus, the principle of equality of people, irrespective of race and national origin, has been consistently recorded in UN acts over many years. It was further developed and concretised as applied to cardinal political, civil and socio-economic rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 16, 1966.⁵

The USSR played an important part in the recording and consolidation of the principle of equality of people in international law. It will be recalled that the preliminary proposals for the United Nations Charter, adopted in Dumbarton Oaks, did not contain the principle of abolishing discrimination on the ground of sex and language. It was the Soviet Union that submitted the proposal that international co-operation should be expressed in encouraging respect for human rights, and especially the right to work and the right to education, and also for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, language, religion or sex. Thanks to the stand of the Soviet Union the amendments of the four inviting powers envisaged that one of the purposes of the United Nations was to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, language, religion or sex. At the San Francisco conference these proposals were accepted and incorporated in the UN Charter.⁶ It was on the initiative of the USSR that important articles on the right to work, education and to participation in administering the state, irrespective of race, national origin, and so on, were included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Many UN acts specially take up questions of eliminating different forms of racial discrimination and protection of the racial equality of men and nations. Thus, exceptional importance attaches to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the UN

⁵ See: *The Soviet Union and the United Nations, 1961-1965*, Moscow, 1968, Appendix, pp. 611-20 (in Russian).

⁶ S. B. Krylov, *Materials for the History of the United Nations*, Moscow, 1949, pp. 90, 91, 270, 302 (in Russian).

General Assembly on November 20, 1963,⁷ and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was approved by the UN General Assembly on December 21, 1965⁸ and came into force on March 13, 1969.

The Declaration proclaims discrimination between human beings on the ground of race, colour or ethnic origin an offence to human dignity and condemns it as a denial of the principles of the United Nations Charter, as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 1). The Declaration condemns the policy of racial discrimination which may be pursued by states, institutions, individual groups or persons, and points to the need for exerting special efforts to combat racial discrimination in civil rights, the acquisition of citizenship, education, religion, employment and housing, and the prohibition of racial discrimination in places of public use. Under Article 4, all states must take effective measures to revise the policy of governments and other public authorities and to repeal laws and rules which lead to the creation and consolidation of racial discrimination wherever it is still applied. They must issue laws prohibiting such discrimination. Article 6 bans the employment of the race criterion in determining political rights and above all the suffrage. Of great importance is Article 9, according to which all states must take immediate and positive measures, including legislative and other steps, for legally persecuting and/or declaring as unlawful organisations which encourage racial discrimination or incite to it.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is important primarily because it gives the widest definition of racial discrimination of all incorporated in international law. This Convention qualifies racial discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an

equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life". According to Article 2 of the Convention, "States Parties ... undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms". In Article 3 "States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature". Article 4 specifically provides for the duty of states to declare dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, any incitement to racial discrimination as a crime punishable by law. The States Parties "declare illegal and prohibit organisations, and also organised and all other propaganda activities which promote and incite racial discrimination...".

The most abominable and criminal manifestation of racial discrimination is genocide, i.e., acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. That is why the adoption of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide⁹ by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948, was a great moral and political victory for the peoples. According to Article V of the Convention, the Contracting Parties undertake to enact the necessary legislation and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide.

The unlawfulness of racialism and racial discrimination in different forms was proclaimed in a number of other UN acts and also in acts of such international organisations as UNESCO, ILO and the Organisation of African Unity.

We specially examined in detail the content of these international legal acts to demonstrate the indisputable nature of the propositions that: 1) contemporary international law regards as unlawful racial discrimination in any forms; equality of people, without distinction as to race and nation, is a principle of international law; 2) struggle against racial discrimination and the protection of the rights of all, without distinction as to race or national origin,

⁷ *Contemporary International Law*, pp. 268-74 (in Russian).

⁸ *The Soviet Union and the United Nations, 1961-1965*, pp. 601-11 (in Russian).

⁹ *Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* United Nations Publications, New York, 1952, pp. 11-12.

is an international legal duty of states; 3) the international legal documents prohibiting racialism have elaborated and indicated the legal forms of struggle for the elimination of racial discrimination, the employment of which is also a duty of states, namely, repeal of racial legislation, prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race, colour of skin, nationality or language.

Hence it is of interest to examine the question of how these propositions are reflected in the national legislation of different states.

PROHIBITION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGISLATION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

The USSR and other socialist countries apply consistently and fully in their legislation the principle of equality of all citizens, irrespective of race or national origin. In one of its first laws—the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia—the first socialist state in the world proclaimed, on November 15, 1917, the equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia, their right to free self-determination up to secession and the formation of an independent state, the repeal of all and any national and national-religious privileges and restrictions and the free development of all national minorities and ethnographic groups.¹⁰

The idea of equality of peoples and nations was then developed in the Soviet Constitutions which legislatively recorded the equal rights of citizens, irrespective of race or national origin, and proclaimed as contrary to the fundamental laws of the Soviet republics, the introducing or allowing of any privileges or advantages on the ground of race or national origin, just as any oppression of national minorities or restriction of their equality (Article 2 of the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1918 and similar articles in other Soviet Constitutions in the first Soviet years).¹¹

Contemporary Soviet legislation furnishes an example of the incorporation in national law of the international

legal principle of the equality of races and peoples. Thus, article 123 of the Constitution of the USSR lays down: "Equality of rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, government, cultural, political and other social activity, is an indefeasible law.

"Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, the establishment of any direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, are punishable by law." Similar provisions are contained in the Constitutions of all the Union republics.

The constitutional principle of the equality of citizens, irrespective of their race or national origin, is developed and concretised in legislation which provides diverse legal forms for the complete exclusion of racial discrimination from all fields of public life.

Thus, the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the USSR and the Union republics establish that the "capacity of having civil rights and duties (civil legal capacity) shall belong equally to all citizens of the USSR.... No one may be restricted in legal ability or legal capacity, except in the cases and in the manner established by law" (Article 8). The Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union republics on marriage and the family stipulate in Article 4 that "all citizens, irrespective of their nationality, race and religion, shall enjoy equal rights in family relations.

"No direct or indirect restriction of rights, or establishment of direct or indirect advantages in contracting marriage and in family relations shall be allowed in respect to nationality, race or religion."

Justice in the USSR both in criminal and civil cases is administered "on the principles of equality before the law and the court of all citizens, irrespective of their social, property, official status, national and racial origin and religious beliefs. (Article 7 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure and Article 8 of the Fundamentals of Soviet Criminal Legislation.)

It should be emphasised that Soviet legislation not only proclaims national and racial equality but also declares

¹⁰ *Decrees of Soviet Power*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, p. 39 (in Russian).

¹¹ *Collection of Official Documents on Soviet State Law*, Moscow, 1964, p. 36 (in Russian).

its violation a crime punishable by law. "Propaganda or agitation for the purpose of inciting racial or national hostility or discord, just as direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or the establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens depending on their racial or national origin are punishable by deprivation of freedom for a term of from 6 months to 3 years or exile for a term from 2 to 5 years"— so reads Article 11 of the Law of the USSR on Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes, Article 74 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and the respective articles of the Criminal Codes of the Union Republics.

Thus, for the Soviet Union the equality of people and nations, irrespective of race and nationality, is one of the cardinal principles of legislation consistently implemented since the first days of the existence of the Soviet state. Consistently advocating the incorporation of this principle into United Nations instruments, the Soviet Union acts in the interests of all mankind and draws on the experience of its successful application in Soviet society.

Equality of citizens, irrespective of race or national origin, is proclaimed in the Constitutions of other socialist countries. Article 69 of the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic lays down that any establishment of direct or indirect privileges or restrictions of the rights of citizens on the ground of their racial or national origin, just as any advocacy of national or racial hatred or contempt and the humiliation of man for motives of national origin, are prohibited and punishable by law.¹² Under the Constitution of the Korean People's Democratic Republic (Article 11) all citizens "irrespective of sex, national origin, creed, vocation, property status or education, are equal in all spheres of state, political, economic, social and cultural life".¹³

According to Para 49 of the Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic, citizens "are equal before the law and enjoy equal rights.... Any restriction of the rights

¹² See: *Constitution and Basic Legislative Acts of the Polish People's Republic*, Moscow, 1954 (in Russian).

¹³ *Constitution and Basic Legislative Acts of the Korean People's Democratic Republic*, Moscow, 1952, pp. 57-58 (in Russian);

of citizens" on the grounds of sex, creed or national origin is punishable by law.¹⁴

Provisions for the equality of all citizens, irrespective of national origin or race, in all spheres of state, political, economic and cultural life are also contained in the Constitutions of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and other socialist countries. Just as in Soviet law these constitutional provisions on racial and national equality are developed in laws. For example, the Act on the General Principles of Civil Law of Poland records in Article 6 that "sex, race, nationality, creed and origin do not influence the legal capacity".¹⁵ Article 4 of the Law on the Judiciary of Bulgaria points out that the "courts apply the laws precisely and equally with regard to all citizens, irrespective of sex, nationality, race, creed, origin, citizenship, social and property status or education".¹⁶

In their vicious slanderous campaign against the socialist countries, the enemies of socialism have repeatedly resorted to the tale about the oppression of persons of some nationalities in these countries. But they have not cited, and cannot cite, a single example of a legislative or governmental act to prove these fabrications. This is only natural because socialist legislation prohibiting racial discrimination directly reflects the Leninist principle of the national policy of these states, the actual equality of nations and nationalities which is based on social ownership of the means of production and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man.

Thus, the legislation of socialist countries furnishes a model of the legal regulation of questions of combating racialism and racial discrimination. What is characteristic of these countries is that this legislation is actually being implemented. According to data of Soviet judicial

¹⁴ *Constitution and Basic Legislative Acts of the Hungarian People's Republic*, Moscow, 1954, p. 43 (in Russian).

¹⁵ *Constitution and Basic Legislative Acts of the Polish People's Republic*, Moscow, 1954 (in Russian).

¹⁶ *Laws on the Judiciary and the Procurator's Office and the Civil Procedural Code of the People's Republic of Bulgaria*, Moscow, 1958, p. 28 (in Russian).

statistics, judicial agencies of the USSR practically do not have to take up cases connected with the violation of these laws.

QUESTIONS OF STRUGGLE AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGISLATION OF CAPITALIST COUNTRIES AND NEWLY-FREE COUNTRIES

The idea of equality of all people, irrespective of race and national origin, expressed in the UN Charter and Declarations, had also been incorporated in Constitutions of some bourgeois states adopted after the Second World War. Thus, the 1958 Constitution of France proclaims in Article 2: France ensures "the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race, or religion".¹⁷ Article 3 of the Constitution of Italy sets forth that "all citizens have the same social dignity and are equal before the law without distinction as to race, sex, language, religion, political convictions or personal or social status".¹⁸ Article 14 of the 1947 Constitution of Japan declares: "All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin".¹⁹ Of Latin American states mention should be made of Panama, whose Constitution (Article 21) provides that all "Panamanians and foreigners are equal before the law. There shall be neither special rights nor personal privileges, nor distinctions because of race or origin or class nature, sex, creed or political convictions".²⁰

It should be borne in mind, however, that such provisions are not often found in the constitutions of bourgeois countries. The reverse is rather the case, they are an exception.

¹⁷ *Constitutions of Bourgeois Countries*, Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1968, p. 39 (in Russian).

¹⁸ *Constitutions of Bourgeois States of Europe*, Moscow, 1957, p. 539 (in Russian).

¹⁹ The Constitution of Japan, Nov. 3, 1946, in *Constitutions of Nations 1965*, Vol. II, p. 523.

²⁰ *Constitutions of States of the American Continent*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1959 (in Russian).

It should also be noted that these constitutional provisions are not spelled out in laws and therefore no legal mechanism exists for their enforcement.

Highly gratifying in this respect is the progressive nature of constitutional legislation in young Asian and African states, which have won their national independence in the post-war period. Adherence to the ideals and principles of the UN Charter, the Declaration and other UN Acts which prohibit racial discrimination is confirmed in the constitutions of a number of states. Thus, the Preamble to the Constitution of Dahomey states: "The people of Dahomey solemnly proclaim their adherence to the principles of Democracy and Human Rights, as defined by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and as guaranteed by the present Constitution." Similar references are contained in the preambles to the Constitutions of Mauritania, the Gabon Republic, the Malagasy Republic and some other states.²¹

Direct prohibition of racial discrimination and propaganda of racialism is characteristic of the constitutions of many Asian and African states. Thus, Article 6 of the Constitution of Upper Volta proclaims: "The Republic ensures all citizens equality before the law, irrespective of origin, race, sex or religion. It respects all religions. Any propaganda of particularism, which is of a racial, ethnic, or regionalist nature, any display of racial discrimination, are punishable by law." Similar provisions are incorporated in the constitutions of Dahomey (Article 6), Mauritania (Article 1), Niger (Article 6), Mali (Article 4), the Congo (Brazzaville) (Article 1). The Fundamental Law of Civil Freedoms of the Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) speaks in Article 1 of "ensuring respect for the human personality, irrespective of race, colour, sex, language or religion". The constitutions of Kenya, Sierra Leone, Uganda and other states have special articles against discrimination on racial, national or ethnic grounds.²²

²¹ See: *Constitutions of States of Africa*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1963; Vols. II and III, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

²² Op. cit., Vols. I-III.

The implementation of these constitutional provisions in African and Asian countries is proceeding with great difficulty, not always fully or consistently, because of political and economic difficulties and the complexity of racial, national and tribal relations. But it is a fact that the young national African and Asian states in their majority strive to apply the ideas of UN Declarations on the elimination of racial discrimination of every kind and to discharge their duties of UN members in this respect.

A different impression is created by the legislation of imperialist states. Without venturing to come out openly against the demands of the peoples of the world to take measures for the abolition of racial discrimination, the governments of the United States, Britain and other imperialist powers did everything possible to emasculate the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial content of UN Declarations and Conventions on struggle against racialism and deprive these documents of their imperative nature and purposefulness. Instead of concrete proposals on the prohibition of racialist activity and propaganda the delegations of the imperialist powers sought to limit these UN acts in their drafting stage to general statements about the unlawfulness of acts of violence in general, which would enable the racialists to escape responsibility. The Western delegations tried to create the impression that struggle against racialism and racial ideology ran counter to the freedom of speech, the right of association, and so on. Exposure in the United Nations of the political and legal insolvency of this line of reasoning was a big success for the delegations of the progressive states. Thanks to the persistence and energetic actions of socialist and young national states the Declaration and the Convention on the elimination of racial discrimination in all its forms were adopted in their present form. The United States, Britain and other imperialist powers had to vote for them in order not to remain in isolation.

Although they voted for the Declaration and the Convention and thereby assumed definite international legal commitments, the United States and Britain did not implement them fully; in particular they did not incorporate to a sufficient degree in their national legislation the pro-

visions of international law on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination.

Thus, the 15th Amendment to the US Constitution points out that "the right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged... on account of race, colour or previous condition of servitude".

Under pressure from the civil rights movement, Congress and the US Supreme Court passed between 1959 and 1968 a number of laws and judgements against racial discrimination in electoral rights and family relations and against segregation in educational establishments, public places and renting accommodation.

Analysis of these laws and judgements shows that (1) they have a very limited sphere of activity, and do not cover many aspects that are vital to Negroes and other persons facing discrimination (working conditions, local elections, outlawing organisations preaching racism, etc.); and (2) they contain many limitations and exemptions. For example, the main pronouncement, the Civil Rights Law of 1964, which outlaws discrimination in employment, exempts enterprises and institutions that employ fewer than 25 people, private schools and colleges, intra-state trade, etc.

Moreover, these federal laws have not been included in the legislation of the states. Worse still, laws which directly run counter to the above-mentioned federal laws continue to operate in many states and it is these laws that determine the activity of judges and officials. Only in half of the states are there laws prohibiting racial discrimination in one or another form. There is racial discrimination in the sphere of labour and wages in practically all states; in some states the law prohibits inter-race marriage.

Formally, Britain has no racialist laws. Nor was there any anti-racial legislation until recent years. Only in December 1965 was a law on racial relations adopted which prohibits discrimination in public places on racial grounds. In 1968, another law was passed. But neither law declared racial discrimination a criminal offence, as could have been expected inasmuch as this follows from the UN Declaration and Convention, nor did they stipulate any penalties. And, what is most important, the question is left open

of discrimination in the sphere of private ownership where the interests of persons of non-British origin residing in England are most of all affected. Yet, the British press and the local administration have repeatedly noted that discrimination is widespread on racial grounds, especially in employment and renting of houses.

INTERNATIONAL UNLAWFULNESS OF LEGISLATION OF
COUNTRIES WHICH ELEVATE RACIALISM INTO
A PRINCIPLE OF STATE POLICY

National legislation of states which elevate racial discrimination into a principle of state policy is a flagrant violation of international law and an open challenge to the concept of justice of the peoples.

It will be recalled what world-wide indignation was aroused at the time by the notorious Nuremberg racialist laws of Hitler Germany. The Law On the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of April 7, 1933, decreed the dismissal of all civil servants of "non-Aryan" origin. The laws on the admission to the bar of April 10, 1933, on the cluttering of German schools and universities with alien elements of April 26, 1933, and other such laws, prohibited persons of "non-Aryan" origin to practise medicine and law, to teach in schools or universities. The law of September 15, 1933, deprived Jews of German citizenship. In the same year thousands of opponents of racialism and Jews were sterilised under the Law on the Protection of the People from Hereditary Ailments for the Purpose of Improving the German Race. Marriages between Jews and persons of German blood were prohibited by the Law on the Protection of German Blood and German Honour of September 15, 1936; violation of this law was punishable by hard labour.²⁵

With the downfall of fascist Germany the Nuremberg

²⁵ For details see: M. N. Andryukhin, *Genocide, the Gravest Crime Against Humanity*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 59-61 (in Russian).

laws became null and void and their sponsors and executors were severely punished. But these laws and the misfortune and suffering they inflicted upon millions remain in the memory of the peoples. They identify these and similar laws with fascism and its misanthropic, maniacal racial theory.

Hence it is not surprising that the states which now, too, openly apply in their legislation the policy of racial discrimination arouse the particular wrath and indignation of the peoples who rightly associate the political regimes established in these countries with fascism and their legislation, with the Nuremberg laws of Hitler Germany.

The Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia are states which proclaimed apartheid (racial discrimination) their official state policy. A report in 1967, presented by the special Reporters of the UN Human Rights Commission, said that two measures formed the keystone of apartheid: classification of the population into races and the geographical division of these races. For example, representatives of these races live in different regions and ride in different buses and trains. They go to different schools, churches, restaurants, cinemas, beaches, clubs, and sport events. They enter through different doors, sit in parks on different benches and often use different telephone booths and taxi stands. They are treated in different hospitals and buried in different cemeteries. Even different hours are fixed for visits by non-whites to zoological gardens, picture galleries, museums and public parks.

The apartheid policy has been legislatively consolidated. Thus, many laws of an open racialist nature were passed by the parliament of the Republic of South Africa. Under the 1950 Group Areas Act, the population is registered for the purpose of establishing their racial origin; the country is divided into regions in which only persons of a definite race may reside and stay. Under the Industrial Conciliation Act, adopted in 1936, some jobs are declared the sole privilege of the white population. The local administration has the right to determine the number of non-white workers which have to be hired, the time and the place of their employment. The 1950 Act prohibits marriages between

Europeans and non-Europeans and declares sexual relations between persons of different races a crime. In all, about 1,200 laws, government acts and different regulations are now in force in the Republic of South Africa which discriminate against all non-Whites in the country on racial grounds.

Rhodesia where power, with the connivance of the British government, was seized by the white minority comprising about 10 per cent of the country's population, follows in the footsteps of the RSA. Here too racial discrimination is a principle of legislation. The racialist constitution of Rhodesia empowers the government to employ any repressive measures against the Africans. Only those persons who meet the high property and educational standards are given the right of vote at elections. This actually bars the African population from participating in the elections. A number of acts has been published legalising judicial arbitrary action with regard to Africans.²⁷

The question of racial discrimination had been repeatedly discussed in the United Nations, its committees and commissions. There are more than 40 resolutions condemning the racialist policy of the RSA government. A number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations and the Security Council denounced the actions of the racialist regime in Rhodesia. But the governments of the RSA and Rhodesia continue the policy of racial discrimination, specifically through legislation. Thereby the RSA and Rhodesia openly violate the generally recognised principles of international law and oppose the Declarations and Conventions recognised by all mankind. The ruling circles of the RSA and Rhodesia could commit such unlawful actions only because they are supported by the imperialists of the United States, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is the intrigues of the latter that explain why many UN resolutions condemning racial discrimination in the RSA and Rhodesia are not implemented, why up to now UNO has not decided on the adoption of a Convention banning and punishing genocide, the draft of which was sub-

mitted by the USSR and a number of African countries as far back as 1971.

The government of Israel, too, is following the path of racialism and racial discrimination. Encouraged by the selfsame imperialist circles of the United States, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Israeli authorities are also elevating racial discrimination against persons of the non-Jewish nationality into a principle of legislation. On March 10, 1970, the Israeli parliament passed a law under which Israeli citizenship will be given only to persons of Jewish origin who meet the requirements of the Judaic religion. One of the paragraphs of this law lays down that only a person born of a Jewish mother who professes the Judaic faith is considered a Jew. Thereby the freedom of religion and the natural right of parents of mixed origin to decide what nationality to choose for their children is denied. The adoption of this law, directed against the Arab population and Israeli Jews who are not distinguished by "racial purity", is a logical embodiment of the racialist theory of Zionism, of the racialist myth of the "chosen nation". Racial discrimination against the Arab population is actually practised in the country in question such as possession of property, employment and payment for work.

In conclusion let us point to the insolvency of attempts made by the defendants of the racialist regimes in the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia to justify the non-compliance with UN resolutions by the authorities of these countries on the grounds that the racial policy, expressed in national legislation, is supposedly an internal affair of a state. It clearly follows from the declarations and other UN acts that racialism even in one country is a crime against entire humanity. We have demonstrated that racialism and racial discrimination violate fundamental human rights recognised by all mankind and recorded in UN acts.

At the same time it is clear that a state which applies a policy of racial discrimination within a country is a source of tension in international relations. Cases of disputes between states on these grounds have already occurred. In 1946 the United Nations and its agencies had to take up the complaint of the government of India against

²⁷ G. F. Tairov, *Races and Politics*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 122-27 (in Russian).

the discriminatory policy of the government of the Union of South Africa with regard to persons of Indian origin. The African states have repeatedly raised in the United Nations the question of discrimination in the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia against persons of African origin. The UN General Assembly in its resolution On the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa of December 2, 1968 noted with concern that "these policies have led to a violent conflict, creating a situation in the whole of southern Africa which constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security". These facts conclusively prove the legitimate and just nature of the statement contained in the Preamble to the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: "All forms of racial discrimination and, still more so, governmental policies, based on the prejudice of racial superiority or on racial hatred, besides constituting a violation of fundamental human rights, tend to jeopardise friendly relations among peoples, co-operation between nations and international peace and security." Let us also recall that under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg crimes on racial grounds as crimes against humanity were declared subject to its jurisdiction "whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated" (Article 6).

Thus, UN documents concerning the prohibition of racial discrimination and the examination of questions dealing with the policy of racial discrimination pursued by the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia, UN resolutions on sanctions against these countries and other international legal acts, clearly show that racial discrimination in one or another country is a question not only of internal jurisdiction.²⁸

It is a question of international significance and, in accordance with the UN Charter, Declarations, Conventions and other acts of international law, the peoples of the world have a right to demand that the governments of these states annul the racialist laws where they still exist, prohibit

²⁸ See: D. Levin, *Responsibility of States in Contemporary International Law*, Moscow, 1966, pp. 100-03 (in Russian).

all and any forms of racialism and racial discrimination, declare their manifestations a criminal offence, and establish the real equality of citizens, irrespective of their race and national origin, in all fields of political, economic and cultural life.

from published research, consider the developing countries their main object of study. True, in the past too the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries were essentially the main study objects of Western ethnographic science, which was then regarded as a science of primitive societies.

However, if earlier the social life of those peoples was studied in a static state, now scholars focus attention on the social processes at work in the lives of those peoples. The concerted anti-imperialist struggle of the three great forces of the contemporary revolutionary movement—the world socialist system, the international working-class and the national liberation movement—threw the colonial system into a state of crisis and secured successes for the peoples struggling for their liberation from colonial oppression and neo-colonialism. A number of African and Asian countries have embarked on independent development. This has wrought considerable changes in the political structure of the world, and changed the balance of forces in favour of socialism. Profound social changes are taking place in the young independent states. They attract the attention both of the progressive public and the ideologists of imperialism. The young states are determining their social orientation, choosing the road of socio-economic development under conditions of the confrontation between the forces of progress and reaction. The imperialists use all and every means in their endeavour to split the anti-imperialist front formed by the peoples fighting for their national liberation; they attempt to mobilise the internal forces of reaction to suppress the patriotic and democratic movement of the masses in the young independent states.

The ideologists of neo-colonialism cannot but admit that the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the experience of socialist construction in the USSR and other socialist countries exert an enormous influence on the peoples of the Third World. They therefore strive to discredit the ideas of socialism in every way. However, seeing that upon anti-communism and anti-Sovietism fail to achieve their aim, they try to camouflage them with theories about "Asian", "African" and "national" socialism.

Western ethnological science, which until recently practically held a monopoly on the study of the social life

Our age is witnessing socialist and national liberation revolutions, the rout of imperialism and the elimination of the colonial system, the triumph of socialism and communism on a world scale and the intensification of the struggle between the two opposed social systems. Consequently, the social sciences are faced with the urgent and responsible task of undertaking a profound study of modern historical experience and the patterns of development operative in various countries and among different peoples. This attaches great importance to sociological and ethnographic research into the processes at work in the social, national and ethnic relations in the different social systems. In recent years there has been a certain, though not always clearly distinct, division of labour in the study of these questions between Western sociologists and anthropologists: the former study the complex of social problems predominantly in the industrially developed countries, the latter ("cultural" and "social" anthropologists), as can be seen

of peoples in the colonial world, plays a definite part in the ideological struggle for influence on the Third World peoples. Small wonder, therefore, that a number of Western anthropologists declare that they could make a major contribution to contemporary international relations by studying the "processes of change" in the Third World.

Speaking of the trends of such research by Western anthropologists, A. G. Frank, a radical Canadian scholar, notes that their work "serves the interests of imperialism rather than the interests of the colonialised peoples".¹ Consequently, it is not surprising that the Western scholar encounters seemingly unexpected obstacles to the study of the developing countries. Now that the peoples formerly oppressed by imperialism have awakened and embarked on the road of progress and independent national development, they indignantly repudiate the concept "primitive society", which was used to describe them in the past, and anthropology as a science of primitive societies. The negative reaction to these concepts can be clearly seen in an article by E. Dozier, a US anthropologist of Indian descent.² The anthropologists themselves, as also young intellectuals in the new nations, frequently characterise anthropology as a science linked with colonialism. The prominent British anthropologist Daryll Forde wrote about the links between the ethnographic research of British Africanists and the tasks of the colonial administration.³ Specific research by the Belgian Africanist Jacques Maquet and the US anthropologist Kathleen Gough reveal the historical links between ethnography and colonial interests.⁴ "For many of us who were anthropologists in tropical Africa, it required an effort to become aware of these disturbing correspondences between our discipline and the colonial regime," Jacques Maquet

¹ A. G. Frank, "Comment. Social Responsibilities Symposium", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1968, p. 413.

² Edward P. Dozier, "The Concept of 'Primitive' and 'Native' in Anthropology", *Yearbook of Anthropology*, New York, 1955.

³ See: D. Forde, "Applied Anthropology in Government. British Africa", *Anthropology Today*, Chicago, 1953, pp. 844-65.

⁴ See: Jacques J. Maquet, "Objectivity in Anthropology", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1964; K. Gough, "Anthropology, Child of Imperialism", *Monthly Review*, Vol. 19, No. 11, 1968.

writes.⁵ The prominent Canadian Africanist Peter Gutkind writes in a similar vein: "The literature in the field of 'practical' or 'applied' anthropology indicates how closely some social anthropologists have identified their discipline with... colonial policies.... To the colonial peoples, however, particularly the educated élite, the work of the anthropologists assisted the colonialists in the implementation of their policies."⁶ Of interest in this respect are also the views of Koentjaraningrat, the Indonesian scientist, who says that during the bigger part of its history, anthropology was a Euro-American science about non-European peoples and that therefore in most former colonial countries the view prevails that anthropology is the study of "primitive people" and is based on colonial interests.⁷ That is why these countries are making efforts to replace the Euro-American anthropologists with their own scholars as quickly as possible. Much has been said about the suspicious attitude to Western ethnographers in a number of Third World countries in the discussion on the pages of the *Current Anthropology* journal on Frances Henry's article "The Role of the Fieldworker in an Explosive Political Situation".⁸

Ethnographic research into the traditional customs and rites of the people is considered in those countries as an undesirable reminder of their colonial past. The content of that research is often sharply criticised by the educated people of those countries. In the above-mentioned article Peter Gutkind quotes a political leader in Malawi who speaks on the inadequacy of the field data and the conclusions drawn from them in the works of H. Shapiro and other British Africanists.⁹

Small wonder, therefore, that after the Second World War many Western scholars were barred from countries

⁵ Jacques J. Maquet, op. cit., p. 51.

⁶ See: Peter Gutkind, "Comments on the article by F. Henry, 'The Role of the Fieldworker in an Explosive Political Situation'", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 5, 1966, p. 555.

⁷ Koentjaraningrat, "Anthropology and Non-Euro-American Anthropologists: The Situation in Indonesia", *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology. Essays in Honour of G. P. Murdock*, New York, 1964, p. 295.

⁸ F. Henry, op. cit.

⁹ See: Peter Gutkind, op. cit., pp. 555-56.

which traditionally were studied by Western anthropologists. These countries willingly accept sociologists, economists, but not anthropologists.¹⁰

How do our Western colleagues approach the study of peoples developing in what they call an "explosive situation"? They are particularly concerned with the question of how a Western anthropologist should behave in a politically tense situation so as not to be regarded as an agent of imperialism. Much attention is given to questions of methods and methodology of the ethnographic research in the developing countries.¹¹ The former anti-historicism of anthropological "presentism" in the descriptions of society has, the scholars themselves admit, become useless in the present epoch of "traumatic cultural changes".

A new social approach was demanded of science not only in the research of cultural changes (studied as processes of acculturation, westernisation, modernisation, urbanisation), but also in explaining their causal relations and in forecasting their further development.

What theoretical postulates does Western anthropology use for the solution of these pressing problems? It became obvious that former theoretical nihilism and the concentration on empirical fact-finding, based on "cultural relativism", had become useless. Melville Herskovits, theoretician of cultural relativism, insisted that every culture should be treated as an individual and unrepeatable system, based on immutable and specific cultural traditions, expressed in a unique system of values.¹² The systems of values of different peoples, Herskovits maintained, are incomparable.

¹⁰ G. Jan Held, "Applied Anthropology in Government; The Netherlands", *Anthropology Today*, Chicago, 1953, pp. 876-77; J. R. Hooker, "The Anthropologists' Frontier: The Last Phase of African Exploitation", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, No. 1, 1963, pp. 455-59.

¹¹ See: R. E. Ward, F. Bonilla, J. Coleman, M. Weiner (Eds.), *Studying Politics Abroad: Field Research in Developing Countries*, Boston, 1964; S. Diamond, *Nigerian Discovery: The Politics of Field Work; Reflections on Community Studies*, Ed. by A. J. Vidich, J. Bensman and M. R. Stein, New York, 1964, pp. 119-54.

¹² Melville J. Herskovits, *Cultural Anthropology*, New York, 1955; "Some Further Comments on Cultural Relativism", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 60, No. 2, 1958.

that is why there are no general regularities in the history of human society. The "cultural" relativists justified their denial of the ideas of progress and ascending development in human history by saying that it was impossible to establish what should be considered progressive: everything is relative—what is progressive for some, may be regressive for others. The adherents of the relativist theory regarded history as a process of quantitative changes within the framework of a unique tradition characteristic of every people. They regarded human society as the sum of unique and incomparable cultures and civilisations. The reactionary essence of cultural relativism was displayed with particular clarity in the relativistic Statement on Human Rights submitted by a group of US anthropologists to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.¹³

The powerful upsurge of the national liberation movement after the Second World War, the striving for economic and social progress by the peoples who had won national sovereignty, convincingly demonstrated the baselessness of relativistic anti-historicism. A scientific criticism of it is given in many works of Soviet and foreign scholars.¹⁴

Beginning with the 1950s we observe a feverish search for a "theory of development", in fact, even an "anthropology of development" emerged. By the end of the 1950s this search took the form of a "renaissance of evolutionism", vividly expressed in connection with the centenary of the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, when,

¹³ Statement on Human Rights Submitted to the Commission on Human Rights, United Nations, by the Executive Board, American Anthropological Association, 1947, *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1947, pp. 539-43.

¹⁴ S. N. Artanovsky, "Problems of Relative Value of Cultures and the Theory of Cultural Relativism", *Sovetskaya etnografiya*, No. 3, 1958; "Cultural Relativism in American Ethnography", *Modern American Ethnography*, Moscow, 1963; "Philosophic Relativism and Neorican Ethnography", *Philosophic Sciences*, No. 6, 1963; Y. P. Averkiyeva, "Colonial Ideology", *Philosophic Sciences*, No. 6, 1963; Y. P. Averkiyeva, "Contemporary Trends in the Development of Ethnography in the USA", *Modern American Ethnography*, Moscow, 1963 (all in Russian); R. Redfield, *The Relativism in the Study of Man*, New York, 1961; R. Redfield, *Primitive World and Its Transformations*, New York, 1953, p. 148; Jacques J. Maquet, "Le relativisme culturel", *Présence africaine*, 1958-59, No. 22, pp. 65-73, No. 23, pp. 59-68.

as Julian Steward, the well-known US anthropologist, described it, there was a "universal proclamation" of evolutionism.¹⁵ It will be recalled that for almost fifty years Western anthropology had derided and rejected evolutionism in anthropology. Militant anti-evolutionism was spearheaded against ideas of development, against the recognition of general regularities in mankind's progressive social development.

Having discovered by their research that forms of social life are changing, these ideologists attempted to explain these changes without the idea of evolution. They criticised and "refuted" Marxism as "19th-century evolutionism". The word "evolution" was a dangerous one, and to call a person an evolutionist was practically tantamount to accusing him of Marxist "sedition".

By the 1960s it had become unfashionable to have the reputation of being an anti-evolutionist, and the former critics of evolutionism began to insist that they had always been evolutionists and had criticised only the empirically unbased dogmas of the unilinear evolutionism of the 19th century. Of interest in this connection were the debates in British anthropology on the question whether Bronislaw Malinowski, the founder of the functional school, was an evolutionist or not.¹⁶

However, the universal "proclamation" of evolutionism was fraught with a hidden danger for the Western scholars, it could turn out to be a "proclamation" also of Marxism. Indeed, this did happen in part. In connection with the rebirth of evolutionism many US anthropologists of the younger generation turned ever more frequently to Marxism, when resolving cardinal problems of social science.

Nevertheless most US scholars, to dissociate themselves from "19th-century evolutionism" and, hence, from Marxism, began to call themselves neo-evolutionists.

Neo-evolutionism is now in high fashion in theoretical anthropology of the bourgeois West.¹⁷ Its adherents

¹⁵ Julian H. Steward, "Evolutionary Principles and Social Types", *Evolution After Darwin*, 1960, Vol. 2, p. 184.

¹⁶ *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 5; Vol. 9, No. 1, 1968.

¹⁷ See: Y. P. Averkiyeva, "Neo-Evolutionism and Modern American Ethnography", *SE*, No. 6, 1959.

do to some extent reject the extreme anti-historism and theoretical nihilism of the anti-evolutionists. In the writings of many of them we observe a certain historical approach to the events being studied. Yet, there is no single definition of the essence of neo-evolutionism. Some began to call the concept "cultural change"—"evolution", using the term in the old metaphysical sense, i.e., regarding development as a sum of quantitative changes and saying that a continuity of such changes exists only in the social life of particular peoples. The adherents of that understanding of neo-evolutionism endeavour to conciliate their views with the views of relativist-positivists who deny progress (George P. Murdock).¹⁸ The neo-evolutionism of Julian Steward, a prominent theoretician of that trend, has found manifestation in the theory of multilinear evolution.¹⁹ Steward sees the history of mankind as a sum of multilinearly developing self-contained systems. He believes that neo-evolutionism differs from 19th-century evolutionism in that the former "does not look for universal parallels", for "universal laws" of social development, although it does recognise the existence of certain regularities in the development as an emergence of new traits, but does that relativistically, that is, only within the framework of the limited systems of particular development lines. According to Leslie White, Steward recognises evolution only "piecemeal".²⁰ Steward attempts to explain the multilinear development of human society as a consequence of man's adjustment to different ecological environments. This ecological determinism, he believes, is the main distinction of neo-evolutionism from "economic determinism", as he interprets Marxism.

According to the definition of Eric Wolf, a US anthropologist and sociologist, neo-evolutionism is an eclectic com-

¹⁸ G. P. Murdock, "Evolution in Social Organisation", *Evolution and Anthropology: A Centennial Appraisal*, Washington, 1959.

¹⁹ Julian H. Steward, *Theory of Culture Change; Methodology of Multilinear Evolution*, Urbana, 1955, p. 4; "Cultural Causality and Law. A Critical Formulation of the Development of Early Civilisations", *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1949, p. 3.

²⁰ Leslie White, Book Review, see *American Anthropologist*, Menasha, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1957, p. 540.

bination of 19th-century ideas of evolutionism, diffusionism, functionalism and ecological theory, which is being justified by the assertion that the limitations of one approach are compensated by the positive qualities of the other approaches.²¹ According to the views of a US anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt, comparative functionalism, together with the processes of ecological adaptation, form "the basis of a modern evolutionary approach to culturo history".²² All adherents of neo-evolutionism consider it a theoretical antithesis to Marxism. But some critics of neo-evolutionism attempt to identify it with Marxism.²³ These attempts are evidently based on the fact that the judgements of some Western scholars who campaign for a renascence of 19th-century evolutionism, but do not consider themselves neo-evolutionists, are really close to Marxism. The views of some neo-evolutionists on the role played in social development by social and property inequality, and the recognition by them of basic and superstructural phenomena in social life also bear a certain resemblance to the conceptions of Marxist sociology. However, it also happens that essentially anti-Marxian conceptions are clad in Marxist-like terminology. This should be regarded as indirect proof of the great popularity of Marxist ideas in the West.

Neo-evolutionism with its conception of ecological adaptation and its relativistic interpretation of development is the most widely accepted methodological basis of anthropological research in the West. True, we also encounter a critique of neo-evolutionism and attempts to develop it. For example, the American scholar M. Harris proposed in opposition to neo-evolutionism a supposedly new philosophical system to which he gave the name "cultural materialism". It claims to be some sort of "synthesis" of the ideas of neo-evolutionism and "improved" Marxism. From Marx Harris has borrowed only a few ideas on the relationship

²¹ See: Eric R. Wolf, "The Study of Evolution", *Horizons of Anthropology*, Chicago, 1964, p. 110.

²² Walter R. Goldschmidt, *Comparative Functionalism*, Berkeley, 1966, p. 124.

²³ Morris E. Opler, "Cultural Evolution. Southern Athapaskans and Chronology in Theory", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, Albuquerque, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1961, p. 18.

between base and superstructure, discarding the very essence of Marxism—dialectical materialism. Marx the revolutionary and the teaching he created about proletarian revolution Harris finds unacceptable.²⁴

As the anthropologists begin to concentrate attention on the study of class societies, they are turning more and more to the Marxist understanding of the essence of a class society at the same time as different anti-Marxist variants are affecting their views. A broadening of the theoretical interests of Western scholars has been noted by K. Little, an anthropologist himself, who said that to explain the social roots of contemporary revolutionary movements, anthropologists must now read with equal attention Durkheim, Marx, Merton, Pareto, as well as Firth, Linton, Lowie, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown.²⁵ Even the list of names, which mentions Marx next to such modern bourgeois sociologists as Merton and Pareto, testifies to the theoretical helplessness of Western anthropologists.

Most adherents of the theories fashionable in modern Western sociology do not go beyond the general ideas of neo-evolutionism, and have not only failed to outlive the postulates of cultural relativism, but apply them extensively in their practical and theoretical research.

Today cultural relativism has become particularly reactionary both in the theory and the practice of international relations.

The adherents of cultural relativism have repeatedly stated that they have counterposed a recognition of the value of all cultures and the uniqueness of every single one to racialism and the "Europe-centrism" of the 19th-century evolutionists, having done so because they were moved by deep respect for the cultures of peoples which differ from European civilisation. However, objective facts show that the emphasis by these scholars on the uniqueness of the traditional cultures of African and Asian peoples, and their accent only on the distinction of these cultures from the European, were used to justify the existence of

²⁴ M. Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*, New York, 1968.

²⁵ K. Little, "The Context of Social Change", *American Anthropological Association Memoir*, No. 194, 1963, p. 366.

a barrier between the colonialists and the local population. It suggested to the general reading public the view that the oppressed peoples in the colonies were people with a primitive pre-logical way of thinking, with exotic customs and habits, which were consequences of that way of reasoning. An ethnographic description of these peoples suggested the idea of their mental inferiority as compared with the researcher's own nation. The assertion by M. Herskovits and his followers that the uniqueness of each culture results from the fact that every people reasons in its own way and has its own idea of what is desirable, essentially laid the foundation for a new variant of racism—psychoracialism. No wonder, therefore, that at present, to quote C. Lévi-Strauss, the French scholar, "the doctrine of cultural relativism ... is deemed unacceptable by the very people on whose behalf it was upheld, while those ethnologists who favour unilinear evolutionism find unexpected support from peoples who desire nothing more than to share in the benefits of industrialisation, and who prefer to look at themselves as temporarily backward rather than permanently different."²⁶

Melville Herskovits called upon his colleagues and pupils to study the cultures of different peoples without expressing evaluations as to which cultures and cultural institutions should be regarded as better and higher and which as worse and lower, and thus preached a doctrine of ethical neutrality. He considered the impartiality of the researcher the supreme quality of "objective" science about the cultures of peoples.²⁷ R. Redfield, a prominent American anthropologist, wrote as early as 1953 that the doctrine of "ethical neutrality" and a "benevolent" attitude of scientists to all variants of "value" systems" cannot be accepted for it would mean an equally benevolent attitude to the

²⁶ C. Lévi-Strauss, "Anthropology: Its Achievements and Future", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 125. If the French scholar speaks of the popularity of scientists who favour unilinear evolutionism, which is generally identified with Marxism, the American Anne Parsons frankly admits that "so far, however, the books which have most influenced anti-colonial nationalism are not those of anthropology, but rather those of Marx and Lenin". (See: *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1966, p. 364.)

²⁷ M. Herskovits, *Cultural Anthropology*.

value systems of the colonial peoples and to the value system of the Nazis.²⁸

What does it mean to hold positions of cultural relativism in the modern USA? It means, as its adherents aver, to refrain from evaluations of political events and phenomena in the world today, it means to become allegedly a "value free" scientist, one "not culture bound". These conceptions have a breeding ground in the political indifference of the philistines in bourgeois society. Their reactionary essence was particularly vividly demonstrated by the attitude adopted by some US anthropologists with respect to the war in Vietnam. Appealing to the principles of relativistic "objectivism", these scientists condemned their colleagues who protested against the shameful intervention in Vietnam, who branded the actions of their government in that war as barbarian.²⁹ According to the cultural relativists the actions of such scientists are guided by "values" and allegedly contradict the "ethics of the scientist", undermine the "independence of the scholar". One of them has taken his relativism so far as to consider the atrocities perpetrated by the Americans in Vietnam as nothing but a historical form of cruelty and torture of war victims that is alleged to have existed in certain human societies for ages (the Papuans, Iroquois, Aztecs, etc.); they say that ethnographers should study them "objectively", "impartially", and should not apply ideology and moral evaluations to their research.³⁰ Attempts were made to justify the "impartiality" of the scholar by referring to a metaphysical split of his personality into two supposedly independent essences—the scholar and the citizen. One of the adherents of such deideologised anthropology as a science of man and society, for example, wrote: "As professional anthropologists, we study many forms of human cruelty—dispassion-

²⁸ R. Redfield, *The Primitive World and Its Transitions*, New York, 1953, pp. 145-46.

²⁹ See: *American Anthropologist*, Menasha, Vol. 69, No. 3-4, 1967, p. 383; "Social Responsibilities Symposium", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1968, Pt. 1; "Anthropology and World Affairs As Seen by USA Associates", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 5, No. 5, 1964.

³⁰ *Fellow Newsletter*, American Anthropological Association, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1967, Correspondence.

ately and objectively. As citizens, most of us want to do all we can to reduce human suffering. These two roles are separate and we do our profession a great injury when we confuse them."³¹

These relativistic appeals for the deideologisation of a science, which is considered the most human of all social sciences, evoked violent protest by many honest Western scholars, who in their writings³² convincingly prove by historical examples that there is no "science for the sake of science", that there are no and can be no scientists working in an "ivory tower". There is not and cannot be a scientist who is not personally responsible to society, and this is particularly true of representatives of such a science as anthropology. Let us but remember what C. Wright Mills, the famed US sociologist, said about the very silence of a scientist being a "blessing of the existing". The prominent US anthropologist John Gulic indicates that the appeals of US scientists to relativistic objectivism are untenable in practical respects. He noted that cultural relativism "grants to every culture the right to be accepted dispassionately as somebody's way of life rather than being dismissed in stereotypic terms". He said that the anthropologists themselves do not follow these postulates. Many American intellectuals, including anthropologists, he claimed, held the Arabs in contempt. "Many of the liberals who denounce the American dropping of napalm on Vietnamese villagers are not in the least concerned about its being dropped on Arab villagers by Israel."³³

The result of heated debates on the question about the attitude of ethnographers towards war was the publication of a collection of articles by scientists who opposed the war in Vietnam and exposed the scientific baselessness of all attempts to justify the inevitability of war because of some alleged inborn human aggressiveness.³⁴

³¹ *Fellow Newsletter*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Correspondence, p. 10.

³² J. Maquet, "Objectivity in Anthropology", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1964; "Social Responsibilities Symposium", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1968.

³³ John Gulic, "Comment. Social Responsibilities Symposium", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No. 5, 1968, p. 414.

³⁴ *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression*, New York, 1968.

Cultural relativism enhances the ideology of racialism which in our days is a strong ideological barrier to the class unity of the forces fighting imperialism.

True, today most Western ethnographers and anthropologists oppose racialism, especially after the victory over the Nazis. We know, for example, of the statement about the scientific groundlessness of racialism made by American scientists in the *Current Anthropology* journal.³⁵ At the same time, alongside general statements about the scientific groundlessness of racialism, the adherents of cultural relativism emphatically stress the specifics, the incomparability of the cultures of different peoples, which are supposed to evolve from the specific modes of reasoning, "views on what is desirable", all of which ultimately leads up to racialism donned in psychological clothing.

Some writings proclaiming the noble principles of racial equality, contain attempts to bind up anti-racialism with anti-communism.

The British anthropologist Michael Banton, in his book dedicated to race relations, strove to show that the race relations in the Republic of South Africa tend to prove the groundlessness of the Marxist understanding of racialism as one of the aspects of capitalist exploitation. At the same time, Banton, applying some principles of historical materialism to the analysis of various forms of race relations in the history of racialism, admits that some of them are so widely accepted in modern Western sociology, that it still remains to be ascertained to what extent these principles are an exclusively Marxist method of analysis.³⁶

All the works of that kind pursue a single aim—to show that theories being evolved by Western scientists are better and superior to the ideology of Marxism, that it is not the Marxists, not the Communists, but these scientists who are true defenders of the equality of the oppressed.

Cultural relativism with its emphasis on the specific nature of the culture of every people is used by reactionary ideologists as the ideological basis for chauvinism, for nation-

³⁵ See: *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1962, p. 445; Vol. 4, No. 3, 1963, p. 323; Vol. 5, No. 2, 1964, pp. 107-08.

³⁶ Michael Banton, *Race Relations*, New York, 1968, p. 169.

al enmity, for national-tribal intolerance. "One may say," J. Maquet says, for example, of the ethnographic writings of the relativists, "that the proud affirmation of fidelity to *négritude* and *africanité* was made possible by anthropological studies."³⁷ The neo-colonialists and their ideologists fan up this enmity in order to divert the peoples from concerted anti-colonial and anti-imperialist actions, to suggest to them the thought that they cannot get along without the colonialists. This idea was developed, for example, by the West German scientist A. Lommel at the Seventh International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnographic Sciences held in Moscow.³⁸

Cultural relativism is the ideological basis of all sorts of nationalistic and chauvinistic conceptions about national exclusiveness, the conceptions of the "pluralism" of Marxism, i.e., of "national Marxism" of national varieties of socialism, which are used in the interests of neo-colonialism, in the interests of its tactics based on the "divide and rule" principle. The ideologists of anti-communism extensively resort to relativistic dogmas in the struggle against the forces of peace and progress.

In present-day conditions of the peoples' struggle for social progress the exposure of the reactionary essence of the conceptions and theories founded on ideas of cultural relativism has become a prime task of progressive ethnological science.

³⁷ J. Maquet, "Objectivity in Anthropology", *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1964, p. 49.

³⁸ A. Lommel, "Progrès et adaptation", *Seventh International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnographic Sciences*, Moscow, 1967, Vol. 4.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE EXPLOSION MUST COME

Over the last two decades the political map of Africa has undergone enormous changes. Many peoples have thrown off the colonial yoke and won their political independence. Dozens of sovereign states have appeared on the map. Yet there still remains in the south of Africa an imperialist colonial complex that covers 4,500 thousand square kilometres and has a non-European population of some 32 million people. It is the largest colonial enclave in the world.

The Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies form this "devil's pact" or "unholy alliance", but the mainstay of the imperialist enclave is undoubtedly the Republic of South Africa. The Republic contains a mere six per cent of Africa's population and only four per cent of its area. But it produces about 25 per cent of Africa's gross output, 40 per cent of its industrial production, 75 per cent of its steel, more than 20 per cent of all types of power and 57 per cent of all electric power. More than a half of Africa's rail freightage and some 45 per cent of the continent's road vehicles are located in the Republic

of South Africa.¹ The country possesses a highly developed manufacturing industry, capable of producing the most varied commodities from agricultural machines to heavy armaments. Africa's largest White population lives here: 3,800 thousand people, 60 per cent of whom are Afrikaners.² These Whites enjoy complete political supremacy and have a powerful military machine at their disposal. Finally, South Africa is the country that receives the greatest backing from the major imperialist states. They are not in the least disconcerted by that special form of colonialism that has given rise to the regime of apartheid.

The special feature of South African colonialism lies in the "coexistence" within the same frontiers of "White" South Africa, a developed capitalist state that has now reached the imperialist stage, and "non-White" South Africa, a typical colony. In this sense apartheid can be said to possess the most despicable characteristics of both imperialism and colonialism.

When analysing the nature of South African imperialism, one must bear in mind that it is a variety of "local imperialism". This term was used by Lenin while he was describing British colonial settlements. He pointed out that local bourgeois groups were colonial exploiters twice over. They indulged in 1) "Great-Power imperialism (participation in the imperialism of Great Britain)". 2) "Local imperialism"—its "isolationism ... 'exclusiveness'".³ As though seeing far into the future, Lenin stressed that the principles underlying both tendencies were essentially the same.

The development of South African "local imperialism" and the emergence of its political superstructure in the form of the fascist apartheid regime cannot be divorced from the history of the National Party. The party grew out of Afrikaner nationalism, which has been carefully nurtured by the Afrikaner leadership. It has striven to provide the

¹ *Statistical Yearbook, 1968*, New York, 1969, pp. 349, 411-12, 585-86.

² The Afrikaners, or Boers, are the descendants of the first Dutch settlers. In their language (Afrikaans) the word *Afrikaner* simply means "African". The remaining 40 per cent are mainly of British origin. They are often referred to as "English-speaking" South Africans.

³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, p. 532.

Boer farming and industrial bourgeoisie with conditions favourable to rapid development. Playing on the chauvinistic feelings of the Afrikaners, who have not forgotten their defeat in the Anglo-Boer war, the nationalists have spared no effort to gain the support of large sections of the White community. They have always been pathologically obsessed with race. While it is true that all the other parties and groupings that have been in power at one time or another also adhered to racist principles, none of them devised such a comprehensive and sophisticated system of racial discrimination as the Nationalists began to introduce in the form of apartheid the moment they achieved undivided control of the country in 1948.

In 1947, a year before the parliamentary elections, the Nationalists published their election manifesto, entitled "Race Relations Policy of the National Party". The document was put together by a group of professors at the University of Stellenbosch, notorious as the "brains trust" of Afrikaner nationalism, under the aegis of the racist secret society the Broederbond.⁴ The manifesto voiced the following basic principles:

"In general terms our policy envisages segregating the most important ethnic groups and subgroups in their own areas where every group will be enabled to develop into a self-sufficient unit.

"We endorse the general principle of the territorial segregation of the Bantu and the Whites....

"The Bantu in the urban areas should be regarded as migratory citizens not entitled to political or social rights equal to those of the Whites. The process of detribalisation should be arrested.

"The interests and employment prospects of the White workers in White areas will be protected."

"The choice before us," the manifesto declared, "is one of two divergent courses: either that of integration, which

⁴ *Broederbond* is the Afrikaans for "Band of Brothers". Formed in 1918, this secret society has become the main proponent of Afrikaner nationalist ideas. The ruling National Party is really a tool of the Broederbond. Since 1948 the posts of president and prime minister, as well as key positions in the state machinery, have only been held by leading members of the Broederbond.

would in the long run amount to national suicide on the part of the Whites, or that of apartheid...."⁵

Although triumphant in the 1948 parliamentary elections, the Nationalist Party was not prepared to implement the principles that it itself had proclaimed. That is why during their first year and half of office the Nationalists' racial legislation did not depart either in type or quantity from the norms of South African life. "Apartheid" remained a cheap election gimmick that could be gradually forgotten, as is often the case with election slogans in bourgeois countries.

In 1950, however, the country saw the first pieces of legislation to show that the Nationalists seriously intended to impart a real, practical meaning to the vague ideas of apartheid.

All apartheid legislation can be subdivided into two large categories: the first covers the laws and edicts that limit the social and economic rights of non-Whites, i.e., the norms that directly govern their economic exploitation; and the second category under this classification takes in the norms that restrict political and civil rights. It includes the laws and edicts that deprive non-Whites of any opportunity of protesting or struggling against their economic exploitation, and provides a legal basis for the conversion of four-fifths of the country's inhabitants into a vast labour pool, making them outcasts stripped of elementary human rights. All that remained was to select criteria for placing the inhabitants of the Union of South Africa into the various racial groups. This function is now performed by the Population Registration Act. Before the bill was introduced in parliament, Dr. Malan, the Prime Minister of the first Nationalist government, was quoted in *Die Burger* on February 21, 1950, as saying that "a national register is the basis of the whole policy of apartheid".⁶

The Population Registration Act stipulated that the population was to be broken down into three groups: Whites, Natives and Coloureds. Subsequently a separate group was established for Asians. Article 7 of the Act defines these

⁵ W. H. Vatcher, *White Laager*, New York, 1965, p. 136.

⁶ G. M. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality*, London, 1958, p. 81.

discriminatory types in terms of an obviously casuistic formula. It emerges that a Coloured is any person who is neither White nor Native. A Native is anyone who belongs, or is acknowledged as belonging, to any African native race or tribe. A White person is one who is "obviously white in appearance" or who is accepted as a member of the White race; but exceptions to this rule are persons who, although clearly white in appearance, are generally considered to be Coloureds.⁷

This "scientific" hocus-pocus provided the basis for a universal identification of racial affinity. A favourite method of the officials undertaking this classification was to stick a pencil into the subject's hair and make him bend down: if the pencil stayed in place, the person was African, but if it fell out, he was Coloured (they have finer hair!). However, when these "methods" proved inadequate, the officials started inspecting documents. This had thousands shaking in their shoes. As the old South African saying puts it: "Never try to find out who your ancestors were: you might become a Hottentot!" Even if one digs into the ancestry of those descended from the first Boer settlers, in some time-yellowed register one may stumble upon the fatal phrase "mother unknown". In other words, some distant forebear who was African or mulatto was quietly excluded from the family circle. Even if the skeleton has lain in the cupboard for a century, the Act of 1950 declares today's light-skinned descendants of such a union to be "Coloureds". In *The Anatomy of Apartheid* E. S. Sachs writes: "The tragedy of those people who had always considered themselves 'white' suddenly finding themselves classified as coloured is indescribable. There were many suicides, and disruption of families. In the same family very often some members are in appearance 'whiter' than the others; this has often been the case even between husband and wife."⁸

The next important piece of apartheid legislation was the Group Areas Act. It provides for the establishment of racial ghettos in which only a single racial group has the

⁷ Ibid., p. 81.

⁸ E. S. Sachs *The Anatomy of Apartheid*, London, 1965, p. 287.

right to own land and settle. The Act developed and particularised the line initiated in 1913 by the Native Land Act, which ushered in the principle of territorial segregation and the division of land-ownership rights between Europeans and Africans. This racist carve-up has produced the result that only 13.7 per cent of the country has been placed at the disposal of the 45 million Africans. The remaining 86.3 per cent, the most fertile land and the areas with the greatest mineral wealth, has been legally declared to be the preserve of the Whites.

When submitting the Group Areas Bill to parliament, the Nationalist leader Dr. Malan called it "the nucleus of the apartheid policy". Supplemented later by the Pass Law, the Separate Representation of Voters Act, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, the Native Urban Areas Act as amended in 1956, the Bantu Law Act of 1964 and many others, this Act deprived Africans and, later, other non-Whites of all or nearly all political and civil rights in "White" areas. The authorities enforce the Act systematically to deport various racial groups from areas that have been allotted to another racial group (usually Whites). Over the last few years alone the Group Areas Act has been invoked to drive about a million people from "White" areas. About a further four million Africans are liable to be resettled in the so-called "homelands" or Bantustans in the near future.⁹

The Suppression of Communism Act was one of a "package" of acts dating from 1950 that were to lay the foundations of apartheid. Supplemented later by the State Emergency Act and the Subversive Activities Act (better known as the "Sabotage Act"), it paved the way for turning the country into a police state. Having banned the South African Communist Party, the racist clique in power then outlawed the African National Congress and the Indian Congress, i.e., all the organisations that refused to compromise with apartheid.

The fact that the denial of political and civil rights to non-Whites (primarily Africans) is not an end in itself, but simply a means of economic exploitation, is amply

illustrated by a series of prescriptive acts in the social and economic sphere. The apartheid legislation that exists on this level has no precedent in modern history.

The African's identity card, the so-called "reference book", alone is enough to arouse anger and indignation. It has special pages for observations made by employment exchanges, movement control and employers' signatures. The African is expected to have his identity card with him at all hours of the day and night. The slightest infringement of the Pass Law is punishable by a fine or arrest. Offenders are usually sent to work on farms. As a result, the tens of thousands of people who break the Pass Law have become a highly important source of cheap agricultural labour.

Noteworthy too is the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. When introducing it to parliament, the Nationalist Minister of Labour explained that it was a precautionary measure to protect the standard of living of South Africa's White workers: they were not to suffer as a result of proximity to another racial group which had a lower standard of living. The Native Labour Act of 1953 denied Africans the right to strike.

All non-Whites, and Africans in particular, are mercilessly exploited economically. The figures speak for themselves: the Whites, who make up less than 20 per cent of the population, receive 74 per cent of the national income. A White miner takes home an average 316 rand a month, but his African counterpart pockets only 18. In the gold mines the differential is even greater: 327 rand, as opposed to 16.¹⁰

The high level of exploitation is maintained in part by the system of migratory labour fostered by the restrictive laws of apartheid. Since the life of every African worker depends entirely on whether he will be allowed to live and work in some "White area", he has no say in choosing either the place or the type of work. The conditions are thus ripe for capitalist exploitation on a prodigious scale. Racists also think that these conditions delay the formation of a highly organised proletariat among African workers.

⁹ *Les Cahiers du Communisme*, Paris, March 1972, p. 64.

¹⁰ *Les Cahiers du Communisme*, Paris, March 1972.

The production relations that have been built up in the Republic are totally anomalous, and do not fit into the classical capitalist framework. The French journal *Les Cahiers du Communisme* points out that, as far as the African masses are concerned, there is no such thing as free labour, although this is normally a *sine qua non* for the development of capitalist production relations. This freedom is denied and at the same time many forms of forced labour have been preserved and are developing. The journal makes the point that, of course, free labour here means the purely legal right of the proletarian to sell his labour. After all, it is the possession of this right that distinguishes the proletarian from the slave, serf... or the migrating worker in the Republic of South Africa who are denied this right. In addition, the existence and development of capitalism require that labour, like any other commodity, should be bought according to its value (or almost according to its value).¹¹

Nothing like this can be observed in the Republic of South Africa. From this point of view, apartheid is a system for exploiting labour whose renewal is not assured. This is not even considered, since the homelands always contain a huge army of landless and unemployed manpower. Thus it came about that over a period of many years forced labour and the rabid exploitation of the labour force temporarily supplied the South African ruling class with a gigantic accumulation of capital.

But a form of capitalism as perverted as this has its limits: the gradual running down of necessary manpower reserves makes the use of capital more difficult; the smallness of the home market retards the expansion of production; and labour productivity remains very low.

The country had been short of White workers now for a long time. Official circles in Pretoria acknowledge that, even if the whole White population were engaged in production, the annual deficit in skilled manpower would still run to some 12,000-13,000 men. Since the end of the sixties many sociologists, industrialists and chambers of commerce executives have stated that the shortage of skilled

¹¹ *Les Cahiers du Communisme*, Paris, March 1972.

workers is assuming frightening proportions and may affect the competitiveness of South Africa's whole economic system.¹²

Equally serious is the abnormal narrowness of South Africa's home market, caused by the poverty and low purchasing power of the 15 million Africans. Needless to say, no one at the top is thinking seriously in terms of altering the plight of the African population, and it is imagined that all problems will be solved by an export drive and the conquest of new markets, mainly in the free states of Africa. This, incidentally, is one of the hidden reasons for the Vorster Government's much-vaunted "new course", intended to "build bridges" with the continent's free countries.

Pretoria's "new course" in foreign trade remains controversial. Not all African capitalists have an interest in foreign trade expansion. Those who supply the home market consider this flirting with "foreign" Africans as an unnecessary luxury and a bad example which could, as they put it, have a negative effect on race relations in the Republic.

All this is taking place against the background of the collapse of apartheid's main contention. Time and experience have shown the absurdity of trying to herd the Africans into so-called Bantustans, thus ridding the "White" areas of them. The economy of "White" South Africa simply cannot survive without the hands of millions of Africans. Moreover, the Bantustans are unable to accommodate even one-half of the country's African population. Despite the Government's efforts, Africans escape from the Bantustans, since there is no work to be found there. Even official statistics are forced to admit that White areas are becoming "Blacker". The Stellenbosch academics produce alarmist screeds on the danger of a demographic "explosion", since Whites now form a dwindling proportion of the whole community.

As is usually the case, the objective difficulties acted as catalysts which stirred up and deepened the conflicts between different sections in the ruling party. During the second half of the sixties the supporters of the "pragmatic"

¹² *The Financial Times*, March 3, 1969.

approach within the National Party came to be called the *verlichte* ("enlightened") and their opponents the *verkrampt* ("narrow-minded"). The latter adhere fanatically to the main dogmas of Afrikaner nationalism. In the autumn of 1969 the split that had long existed within the party culminated in the formation of a new party, the *Herstigte Nacionale Parti* (HNP), the "Regenerated" or "Reformed" Nationalist Party.¹³

Attempts are made in the West to depict Vorster and the whole ruling clique as being almost "liberal", comparing them with the extremists in the HNP. In fact, though, there has simply been a family quarrel in the racist camp. United in their wish to perpetuate the colonial oppression of non-Whites, different members of the Afrikaner elite disagree as to the ways and means of preserving *baasskap*, the rule of the White man. Incidentally, the opposition United Party has also spoken out in favour of *baasskap*. This party reflects the interests of the South African bourgeoisie mainly of British origin.

The internal contradictions of apartheid and strife among the Afrikaner elite are all factors that objectively assist the activities of the national liberation forces who are fighting the racist dictatorship. Nevertheless, the tasks confronting the South African patriots are hard enough. The Republic's ruling class is rich. It controls a powerful, well organised military and police force, and enjoys the support of both a sizeable section of the White population and the imperialist states of the West. There is one other feature which distinguishes the Republic of South Africa from the other countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, where the peoples struggled to drive out West European or North American colonialists. In those countries the liberation forces had to rid their territory of colonialists and their political administration, but did not have to crush an imperialist state machine as such. In South Africa the national liberation forces are obliged to destroy South African imperialism itself on its home ground.

The fight against the South African brand of fascism has welded together a united front of all progressive forces.

¹³ *The Cape Times*, October 27, 1969.

Communists have always been well to the fore. It was against them that the apartheid regime struck out first of all: the Suppression of Communism Act heads the list of restrictive and repressive legislation brought in by the Malan Government in 1950.

In June 1955 the National Congress met. It was the most representative gathering in South Africa's history. It was attended by the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress and the Congress of Democrats (the party of European opponents of apartheid). Three thousand delegates from the length and breadth of the country adopted the historic Freedom Charter, which has remained the programme of struggle for all democratic forces ever since. The Charter called for an end to apartheid and the establishment of a democratic state in South Africa in which power would belong to all who lived in it—both Black and White. While voicing the demand for the complete equality of the different national groups, the Charter also expressed general democratic objectives: the return of all national wealth to the people, the abolition of forced labour and the handing over of the land to those who work it. The Programme of the South African Communist Party, adopted in 1962, defines the principal aim of the national liberation revolution in South Africa to be "to establish an independent state of National Democracy in South Africa".¹⁴

Before the onset of the sixties progressive organisations in South Africa sought to repeal discriminatory laws and struggled to democratise the country's political life by entirely peaceful, non-violent methods. However, the bloody reprisals taken against Africans at Sharpeville and Lang, as well as numerous other crimes perpetrated by the apartheid regime, which unleashed a merciless wave of terror, convinced the patriots that guns speak louder than words against an enemy who knows only the language of force. Speaking at a meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, John Marks, the Chairman of the South African Communist Party, said: "When the people was deprived of all legal rights, when a campaign of terror broke out, when tons of

¹⁴ *African Communists Speak*, Moscow, 1971, p. 145 in Russian).

thousands of patriots were thrown into prison and reprisals became an everyday occurrence, the masses concluded that there was no other way to freedom except by armed revolutionary struggle."¹⁵

On the night of December 16, 1961, when the racist clique was celebrating its national holiday to commemorate the Afrikaners' victory over the Zulus in the battle of Blood River in 1838, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth were shaken by explosions. They heralded the birth of a new militant organisation, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation).¹⁶ A pamphlet distributed by the organisation stated that in the life of every nation there comes a moment when it has to choose between whether to submit or fight. The organisation was determined to fight, using all methods necessary to attain freedom and democracy. Thus the South African freedom-fighters openly declared that henceforth violence would be met with violence, force with force.

The full weight of the punitive apparatus descended on the underground fighters. The Subversive Activities Act (or Sahotago Act) was quickly passed. The penalties ranged from five years' imprisonment to death. The idea of "sabotage" is very broadly interpreted in South Africa: it covers "any unlawful act" committed for political ends, including writing slogans on walls and taking part in demonstrations and illegal strikes.

But in spite of cruel repression, power substations and transmission lines were blown up. A bomb exploded in one of the ministries in Pretoria, and in Durban the office of the local Nationalist paper *Die Nataller* was damaged.¹⁷ As in any struggle, success alternated with failure, but new fighters took the places of those arrested or killed.

In the summer of 1963 the police raided a farm in Rivonia, near Johannesburg, and seized Walter Sisulu, Nelson Mandela, Gowan Mbeki, Lionel Bernstein and other leaders of the national liberation movement. The authorities were jubilant. The press carried sensational announcements:

¹⁵ International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1969, p. 268 (in Russian).

¹⁶ *Sechaba*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1972.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Plot foiled! African National Congress, Communists and Umkhonto we Sizwe prepared armed rising! Plotters routed!

Nationalist newspapers demanded the death penalty for all those arrested. A clumsy indictment which contravened all basic legal norms was concocted in a tearing hurry. Biased as it was, even the court had to dismiss the case. The prosecution was given time to prepare a fresh indictment. In the end, the defendants at the "Rivonia trial" were given stiff sentences under the Suppression of Communism Act, even though most of them were not members of the Communist Party.

The accused were fortunate in having a good lawyer, Abraham Fisher. It was largely his skill that prevented the racists from sending their victims to the gallows. This man's amazing story is evidence that even the Afrikaner elite is not immune to the virus of revolution.

Abraham Fisher's ancestors came to South Africa more than 200 years ago. His grandfather was the President of the Orange Free State, and his father was its Chief Justice. Abraham was given a good education, and in the thirties he lectured in economics and law at Oxford. As befitting the scion of such distinguished Afrikaner stock, he made a "good match" and married the niece of "the" Field-Marshal Smuts, the old Boer commander and one of the founders of the Union, who had been the country's Prime Minister for many years. Fisher could easily have made his way to the upper reaches of the state hierarchy. Instead he preferred the hard road, fighting in the cause of communism.

While Umkhonto were persevering with their operations inside the country, giving the authorities much cause for concern, the organisation's high command was planning the second phase of the struggle. On the tenth anniversary of the founding of the African National Congress (ANC) the journal *Sechaba* reported that groups of Umkhonto fighters had made their way in secret to the friendly African countries, where they were now training for guerrilla warfare.¹⁸ In 1967 the ANC entered into an alliance with the Rhodesian patriots organisation, the Zimbabwe African People's Union

¹⁸ *Sechaba*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1972.

(ZAPU). Joint armed action by the partisans of South Africa and Rhodesia caused a real panic in racist headquarters in Pretoria and Salisbury.

South African Communists are playing their part in the military activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe. They have already proved their worth in battles with the forces of Vorster and Smith. Moreover, proceeding from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the South African Communist Party (SACP) speaks out against rash, adventurist campaigns. All mass action, and even more so military action, must be meticulously planned. South African Communists make this point clear. It must also be appropriate to the objective situation, and start at the right time and in the right place. Although they are in the front line, Communists do not support the adventurist view that the incursion of armed guerrilla groups into South African territory will automatically spark off an uprising. The SACP emphasises that the men in the field are really performing a political function. Their action should organise the masses and rouse them to put up a fight on practical issues and voice their demands. Having carefully considered the question, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the SACP which was held in 1970 made a number of recommendations. In particular, it was said that the main military effort should begin in rural areas and be based there. At the same time there was a need for armed operations in towns.

As the anti-apartheid movement within the country grew in strength and size, so the criminal racist dictatorship increased the scale of its repression and stepped up measures to perpetuate its notorious baasskap. John Balthazar Vorster displayed particular talents in turning South Africa into a police state. During the Second World War he collaborated with the intelligence service of the Third Reich in planning a pro-nazi putsch in South Africa. Along with many other conspirators, Vorster was then arrested and spent some months behind the barbed wire of the Koffifontein concentration camp.

Combining the posts of Minister of Justice and Minister of Police in the Verwoerd Government, Vorster developed and improved the machinery of oppression. At his insistence, the police force was increased to 50,000 men by 1965. This was

supplemented by reserves of 20,000, and special police women's detachments.

The South African courts worked at such a pace that soon there were not enough prisons, whereupon Vorster drafted a law providing for house arrest for up to five years. People confined to their own flats are not allowed to see friends and relatives. Houses have become prisons. But the courts were unable to cope with the patriots and the hundreds of thousands of Africans who broke the numerous restrictive laws of apartheid. Then a law was drafted to bring in preventive detention: people could be put behind bars for up to six months without being charged.

After the death of Verwoerd, Vorster became head of the Government and again set about reorganising the political criminal investigation system. A Government decree established a special security force, BOSS (Bureau of State Security). General van den Berg, an old friend of Vorster's from his pro-nazi subversion days during the war, was appointed to take charge of BOSS. The Nationalist majority in Parliament amended the legislation, and the security force was given unique privileges. The publication or transmission of any information which BOSS judged to relate to matters of security was forbidden. The divulging of any facts about van den Berg's detainees was a crime punishable by a long term of imprisonment. Even the judicial authorities may be refused access to relevant information if BOSS considers it a threat to its own interests. The exclusiveness of BOSS's position in the state apparatus is underlined by the fact that its head is answerable directly to the prime minister.

Ex-SS butchers who fled after the defeat of Nazi Germany found a use for their talents under van den Berg's wing. The names of the director of BOSS, the head of the police security service General Krüger, the Chief Commissioner of Police Jubert and the chief police investigator Swanepoel have a ring in South Africa today that is as ominous as the names of Himmler, Heydrich, Kaltenbrunner and other SS and Gestapo men once were in Europe.

The journal *Sechaba* publishes the accounts of people who have managed to escape from apartheid torture-chambers. Their words convey a frightening picture of the tortures

employed by the South African Gestapo. One of the escapees, named Mhele, said that another prisoner, Cushela, was tortured for days on end, so much so that he asked to be shot. Police Captain Baker, to whom Cushela eventually said that he could not stand any more torture and that his head was splitting with the pain, replied mockingly: "The cause of your headache is that you do not want to tell the truth." Shortly afterwards Cushela was tortured to death.¹⁹

According to eye-witness accounts, van den Berg's prisoners are beaten and tortured not only by warders, but also by police and security service chiefs. The chief police investigator Colonel Swanepoel has acquired particular notoriety for his refined techniques. A former prisoner named Zimhano told how, under Swanepoel's supervision, he was tortured with an electric current and a needle was jabbed into his private parts. For many months after this the unfortunate man was unable to return to normal: "I could not sleep.... Every few moments I involuntarily jumped ... I felt as if the machine was still being used."²⁰

At the end of 1971 the country was swept by a wave of raids and arrests. Police agents tore into the flats of university professors, priests and the families of prominent members of the national liberation movement who were serving sentences in prisons and concentration camps. One of those arrested was a schoolteacher called Ahmed Timol. Three days later the authorities announced that he had committed suicide by throwing himself through the window of an interview room on the 10th floor of the Johannesburg police headquarters.

Shortly after this "suicide" the British press published an interview with Donald Morton, a Methodist minister who had fled South Africa fearing arrest. He said that he had received reliable information to the effect that the doctor who had performed the post-mortem on Ahmed Timol observed that his fingernails had been torn out, that his right eye had been knocked out and that he had suffered many other mutilations.

At the beginning of June 1972 foreign news agency reports

¹⁹ *Sechaba*, Vol. 5, No. 11, 1971, p. 2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

from South Africa began to read like accounts from a theatre of military operations. Spine-chilling pictures supplemented the descriptions of bloody police reprisals against those taking part in anti-Government rallies and demonstrations. There was one substantially new feature in the events: for the first time in the Republic's history White citizens fell victim to the mass terror of the racist dictatorship.

As often happens, it all seemed to begin with particular events. At the beginning of May 1972 the students of the African University of Toerloop went on strike. They were protesting against the expulsion of the chairman of their students' council, A. Tiro, and against the whole unfair, discriminatory system of education for Africans. Non-Whites come in for rough treatment in South Africa. An order from Pretoria expelled all the 1,200 students, and the University of Toerloop was closed.²¹

The authorities considered that to be the end of the matter. But it turned out that the main events were yet to happen. The National Union of South African Students, which embraces the White English-language universities, responded to the call of the African students and decided to show their solidarity by mounting a protest campaign at the beginning of June. This resulted in bloody reprisals against the peaceful student demonstrators.

Uniformed police and plain-clothes men charged into the groups of students, hitting out recklessly with their truncheons and half-killing passers-by. The Nationalist Party maintains that its nationalism is of a Christian type. But the unrestrained guardians of the regime rushed into churches and cathedrals, where their victims were seeking refuge, and continued with their excesses. Many uniformed policemen took the precaution of removing their number badges, so as to avoid identification. In Capetown, for example, such an incident took place in St. George's Cathedral, not far from the Parliament building. The Johannesburg *Sunday Times* wrote that the action of the authorities differed little from the well-known events at Sharpeville, and that police conduct was comparable with the wild outbursts

²¹ *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, June 6, 1972.

of the storm-troopers and brown shirts in nazi Germany.

In reply to the explosion of indignation throughout the country, Prime Minister Vorster hastened to lay the blame at the door of mythical "foreign agitators". Meetings and demonstrations were banned, but the ban was ineffective. Moreover, the scope of the protest movement and its slogans widened considerably. Factory and office workers, not just students, now joined in anti-apartheid demonstrations. For example, more than 10,000 people assembled on June 11 in the main square of Johannesburg. They carried placards and banners with the slogans "Down with apartheid!" and "Free the workers!"

The upsurge of student protests put an end to many of the myths that the Nationalists had been spreading for years. They claimed to have brought peace and order, but the country was yet again in a state of crisis. The Nationalists said that apartheid was supported by the majority of White citizens; but it was the White students who initiated the massive protests of summer 1972, and they were later joined by White factory and office workers. The Nationalists persist in their claim to represent all Afrikaners, but a statement condemning police atrocities was signed by 1,000 students at the University of Stellenbosch, the intellectual centre and "brains trust" of Afrikaner nationalism.

The point is that an ever growing number of White South Africans are beginning to realise that apartheid acts against their interests too, and not just against those of the Africans and Coloureds. The scales are falling from the eyes of people from various social strata, and they can see that apartheid has no future and that it simply means a denial of elementary democratic rights, terror and repression against all who disagree with Government policy, irrespective of the colour of their skin.

The international community does not accept the inhuman, barbaric system of racial persecution practised in South Africa. The colonialism and racism that flourish in the land of apartheid are in flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter. The Charter proclaims the right of peoples to self-determination, and outlaws colonialism. These progressive statutes with their

democratic and anti-colonial content were buttressed by the Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted in 1960 by the UN General Assembly at the suggestion of the Soviet Union.²²

South African racism is a question that is always on the agenda of the General Assembly sessions, meetings of the Security Council and other UN bodies. *Action Against Apartheid*, published by UNO headquarters, gives a long list of UN resolutions on South Africa, starting with the first session of the General Assembly, when the question was included in the agenda at the suggestion of the delegation from India.²² At the end of 1972 the 26th session of the General Assembly again adopted a resolution stressing that the inhuman and aggressive policy of apartheid practised by the Government of the Republic of South Africa creates a dangerous and potentially explosive situation in South Africa. Particularly significant was the holding in 1972 of a session of the Security Council in the headquarters of the Organisation of African Unity in Addis Ababa. It bore witness to the concern felt by mankind over the situation that has developed in the Republic of South Africa and the whole of South Africa.

The adoption by the 28th session of the UN General Assembly of the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid has tremendous political significance. Drawn up at the instigation of the Soviet Union, the Convention defines apartheid as a crime against humanity, violating the principles of international law and posing a serious threat to international security and peace. The Convention lists the inhuman acts that result from the policy and practice of apartheid, and stipulates the criminal liability of persons, members of organisations, and state bodies and representatives committing these acts. The states that are signatories to the Convention are pledged to take legislative and other measures to combat the crime of apartheid and punish persons guilty of perpetrating it.

The same session of the UN General Assembly declared 1973-1983 to be the Decade for Action to Combat

²² *Action Against Apartheid*, United Nations, New York, OPI/364-08382, May 1969.

Racism and Racial Discrimination. In order to work out practical measures to implement the resolutions adopted, it was decided to call a World Conference on the struggle against racism and racial discrimination not later than 1978.

There is no doubt that one might today be talking about the apartheid system in the past tense, were it not for the broad help and support that the racists receive from the leading imperialist powers. Every year sees a growth in investment from Britain, the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan.... The invested capital yields colossal profits thanks to the merciless exploitation of the labour of millions of Africans. But it is not only economic benefit that impels the Western powers to look after South Africa and the other members of the "unholy alliance". From the international imperialist point of view, the White colonial bloc on the southern tip of Africa is an important strategic bridgehead and base from which to attack the free African states. That is why in the West there is so much zealous support for the idea of a "dialogue" between the Republic of South Africa and the free states of the continent. Through the agency of their South African "wards" the international imperialist forces would like to use neo-colonial methods to bring off a sort of political reconquest, a restoration "on the quiet" of pro-imperialist regimes in free Africa.

In the meantime Britain, the USA and other imperialist states continue to flout the resolutions of the various United Nations bodies concerning the elimination of apartheid: they deliver arms to the racists and sabotage the adoption of any really effective measures against the criminal racist regime.

And yet the days of the bloody dictatorship are numbered. The explosion that will destroy apartheid is inevitable. No one will help the ruling clique in Pretoria to perpetuate its monstrous system of national and social persecution. The peoples of South Africa will rid their country of the stigma of racism.

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